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THE  AMERICAN  ARMY 
IN  THE  EUROPEAN  CONFLICT 

TRANSLATED  FROM  THE  FRENCH 
BY  THE  AUTHORS 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NKW  YORK  •   BOSTON  •   CHICAGO  •   DALLAS 
ATLANTA  •   SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  •  BOMBAY  •  CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Lm 

TORONTO 


MARSHAL  PETAIN  GENERAL  PERSHING 

Commander   in   chief   of  the  Commander   in   chief   of   the 

Frpnrh  Armies  American    Expeditionary   Forces 


AT  CHAUMONT 


THE  AMERICAN  ARMY 

IN  THE 

EUROPEAN  CONFLICT 


BY 
COLONEL  DE  CHAMBRUN 

AND 

CAPTAIN  DE  MARENCHES 


WITH  MAPS 


o  „^  ;» 


iQeto  gotir 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1919 

AU  rights  reserved 


Copyright,  1919 

By  the  macmillan  company 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.    Published  November,  1919. 


d? 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 

PAGE 

The  Declaration  of  War  —  Universal  Miutary  Serv- 
ice     I 

CHAPTER  n 

Arrival  of  General  Pershing  in  France  —  First 
Plans  —  Formation  of  the  General  Staff  —  Or-  ,  • 

GANIZATION      OF      FiGHTING      UnITS SELECTION      OF 

Ordnance  Material  and  Other  Equipment  — 
Methods  of  Training — ^  Camps  —  Schools  —  Es- 
tablishment OF  General  Headquarters  at  Chau- 
MONT 33 

CHAPTER  HI 

Establishment  of  the  Lines  of  Communication  — 
Organization  of  the  Services  of  the  Rear     .     .     78 

CHAPTER  IV 

First  Appearance  of  American  Contingents  on  the 
French  Front  —  The  First,  Second,  Twenty- 
Sixth,  and  Forty-Second  Divisions 116 

CHAPTER  V 

Participation  of  American  Forces  in  the  Spring  De- 
fensive AND  IN  THE  SUMMER  CoUNTER-OfFENSIVE 
OF     1918 133 

CHAPTER  VI 

Organization  of  the  Main  Services  of  the  Expedi- 
tionary Forces  —  Chief  of  Artillery  —  Tank 
Corps  —  Chief   Engineer  —  Air   Service  —  Signal 


Contents 

PAGl 

Corps  —  Medical    Department  —  Quartermaster 

—  Ordnance  —  Chemical     Warfare  —  Inspector 
General  —  Judge-Advocate i86 

CHAPTER  VII 

Situation  of  the  Expeditionary  Forces  at  the  Begin- 
ning OF  September,  191 8 247 

CHAPTER  VIII 

The  American  Army  During  the  General  Offensive, 

September-November,  19 18  (Battle  of  St.  Mihiel)  piA 

—  Operations  Between  Meuse  and  Argonne     .  262   ^^^ 

<^ 

CHAPTER  IX 
The  March  to  the  Rhine 307 

CHAPTER  X 

Part  Taken  by  American  Units  in  the  Operations  on 
British  Front  —  And  in  Secondary  Theaters  of 
THE  War 320 

CHAPTER  XI 

Development  of  the  Lines  of  Communication  —  Or- 
ganization IN  America  —  Sea  Transportation  — 
Growth  of  the  Services  of  the  Rear  in  France  — 
Director  General  of  Transportation  —  Motor 
Transport  Service  —  Military  Board  of  Alued 
Supply 331 

CHAPTER  XII 

Great  Benevolent  Associations  Under  the  Mili- 
tary Authority  —  American  Red  Cross  —  Young 
Men's  Christian  Association  —  Knights  of  Co- 
lumbus —  Salvation  Army  —  American  Library 
Association  —  Jewish  Welfare  —  Young  Wom- 
en's Christian  Association,  etc.,  etc 361 


Contents 

CHAPTER  XIII  PAGE 

Franco-American  Cooperation  —  Conclusion   .     .     .  385 

Appendix  I  —  Order  of  Battle  of  the  American  Expe- 
ditionary Forces  at  the  Date  of  December  i,  19 18  391 

Appendix  II  —  Organizations  of  the  American  Ex- 
peditionary Forces  Cited  in  General  Orders  by 
THE  French  High  Command 410 

Index .     .     •     .     •     •     .     .  421 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 

Marshal  Petain  and  General  Pershing  at  Chaumont  .  Frontispiece 

Situation  of  American   Units   before  the  summer  counter- 
offensive      Facing  page  162 

Location  of  American  Divisions  on  the   ist  of   September, 

1918 248 

Plan  for  Attack  of  the  Saint-Mihiel  Salient 266 

Operations  between  Meuse  and  Argonne 288 

Organization  of  the  Services  of  the  War 340 


THE  AMERICAN  ARMY  IN  THE 
EUROPEAN  CONFLICT 

CHAPTER  I 

THE    DECLARATION    OF    WAR  —  UNIVERSAL    MILITARY 

SERVICE 

Although  the  American  people  have  ever  been 
patient  and  slow  to  anger  they  are  not  incapable  of  war- 
like resolution,  and  since  1776  have  more  than  once  given 
proof  of  their  fighting  spirit.  But  before  taking  up  arms 
the  nation  must  be  permeated  with  a  sense  of  the  re- 
sponsibilities involved,  and  possess  a  clear  notion  of  the 
inherent  justice  of  her  cause. 

Placed  by  nature  in  a  position  of  independence  and  po- 
litical isolation,  untroubled  by  international  disputes,  the 
United  States  has  watched  foreign  conflict  from  afar. 
War  has  seemed  an  eventuality  too  fearful  to  be  lightly 
invoked,  and  many  grave  persons  considered  that  nothing 
short  of  a  territorial  invasion  would  ever  arouse  the 
Great  Republic  to  an  ordeal  by  battle. 

Such  has  never  been  our  personal  opinion. 

If  the  country,  as  a  whole,  seems  peaceful  and  patient, 
the  citizen  is  often  a  militant  idealist,  prompt  to  redress 
a  wrong,  proud  of  his  independence,  and  ready  to  fight  at 
a  moment's  notice  on  a  question  of  personal  or  national 
honor. 


•  ***  I   V    X  i'  t  St' 

2        r/r^  American  Arniytri  the  European  Conflict 

The  difference  between  his  individual  characteristics 
and  those  of  the  mass  may  perhaps  be  explained  by  the 
country's  vast  dimensions  and  the  particularism  of  each 
state  or  city,  which  tends  to  concentrate  popular  atten- 
tion upon  affairs  of  local  importance  and  to  limit  the 
range  of  political  interest  and  activity  to  each  special  dis- 
trict or  community. 

It  is  thus  natural  that  the  first  appeal  to  a  broader  na- 
tional sentiment  should  penetrate  slowly  through  these 
vast  areas,  that  a  long  interval  must  follow  the  first  alarm 
and  precede  executive  decision. 

This  phenomenon  has  been  noticed  on  previous  occa- 
sions of  political  unrest.^  American  wars  have  been  re- 
markable for  breaking  out  with  sudden  violence  after  a 
protracted  period  of  hesitation,  contradiction,  party 
polemics,  and  sometimes  even  apparent  public  indiffer- 
ence. Thus  the  country  passed  through  many  gradations 
of  feeling  during  the  months  which  preceded  the  con- 
flict with  Spain;  long  also  were  the  years  of  tension  that 
preceded  the  Civil  War;  McKinley,  like  Lincoln,  was 
for  a  long  time  considered  as  a  "  temporizer."  ^ 

1  It  took  all  the  veneration  and  military  prestige  of  Washington  to 
enable  him  to  run  counter  to  the  strong  trend  of  public  opinion  which, 
in  America,  favored  the  great  French  Revolution;  when  the  violence  of 
the  American  sentiment  was  such  that  nothing  short  of  the  President's 
inflexible  character  and  the  immense  popularity  which  he  enjoyed  could 
have  availed  to  prevent  a  declaration  of  war  against  England.  (See 
Tocqueville  and  Marshall.) 

2  A  long  period  of  political  tension  and  press  provocation  preceded  the 
war  with  Spain.  President  McKinley,  a  warm  advocate  of  arbitration,, 
had  declared  that  he  would  never  allow  outside  pressure  to  force  him 
into  war,  but  the  sinking  of  an  American  battleship  in  Havana  Harbor; 
aroused  the  belligerent  spirit  to  such  an  extent  that  the  President  was 
compelled  to  follow  the  pronouncement  of  the  Investigating  Commission. 
The  specialist  verdict  that  the  Maine  had  been  blown  up  from  without' 
at  once  precipitated  the  country  into  war. 


Declaration  of  War  3 

Germany's  great  diplomatic  error  was  her  failure  to 
judge  the  country's  moral  evolution  during  the  period  of 
neutrality. 

The  Imperial  Government  was  incapable  of  under- 
standing that  a  people  which  had  not  sprung  to  arms  at 
the  first  provocation  might  yet  be  goaded  beyond  endur- 
ance by  the  second  or  third  repetition  of  a  grave  offense. 

It  was  only  when  the  nation  was  ablaze  with  anger 
that  the  military  psychologist  beyond  the  Rhine  realized 
that  the  fires  of  wrath  had  been  a  long  time  smoldering. 
And  yet  a  brief  survey  of  Foreign  Office  reports  concern- 
ing past  wars  clearly  indicates  that  this  is  not  the  first 
occasion  on  which  European  statesmen  and  diplomatists 
have  been  misled  into  thinking  that  American  patience 
was  national  apathy. 

Few  in  the  Old  World  foresaw  the  formidable  strug- 
gle between  South  and  North.  Contemporary  argument 
tended  to  show  that  neither  of  the  opposing  factions 
would  actually  come  to  a  trial  of  force,  that  President 
Lincoln,  with  his  peace-loving  nature,  his  horror  of  fra- 
tricidal strife,  with  what  was  then  supposed  to  be  his 
*'  hesitating  "  character,  could  never  give  the  signal  for 
battle. 

It  was  repeatedly  declared  that  a  commercial  and  agri- 
cultural people  would  not  and  could  not  make  the  sacri- 
fices which  such  a  war  must  entail.  That  logically  — 
then  as  now  —  war  could  not  he. 

Such  was  the  onlookers'  conclusion  in  1861  when  the 
first  gun  fired  upon  Fort  Sumter  was  echoed  by  Lincoln's 
thrilling  proclamation.  Such  was  the  conclusion  of  Ger- 
many in  19 1 6. 

A  country  which  had  submitted  to  a  violation  of  her 
inherent  rights  at  sea  was  one  which  would  never  fight. 


4        The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Germany  proclaimed  that  although  some  occasional 
American  Don  Quixote,  led  perhaps  as  much  by  a  taste 
for  adventure  as  by  chivalrous  impulse,  might  enlist  un- 
der the  British  flag  or  enroll  in  our  Foreign  Legion,  such 
isolated  cases  counted  for  nothing  in  the  mass  of  Ameri- 
can commercialism,  and  that  the  people,  as  a  whole,  were 
far  too  busied  in  the  pursuit  of  material  welfare  to  be 
aroused  in  a  cause  pertaining  merely  to  abstract  right  and 
wrong.  That,  in  short,  America  would  have  "  Peace  at 
any  Price." 

And  yet  America  had  endured  In  her  Civil  War  a  bit- 
ter four  years'  struggle  which  has  since  been  aptly  charac- 
terized as  "  right  fighting  with  right."  How  could  those 
who  witnessed  the  titanic  combat  of  brother  against 
brother  suppose  that  this  same  country  would  hesitate  in 
a  clearly  defined  cause  of  Right  and  Wrong?  of  Human- 
ity against  Barbarism?  How  could  the  Great  Republic, 
founded  on  the  doctrine  of  Thomas  Paine,  bred  in  the  cult 
of  liberty  and  social  justice,  stand  passively  aside  and 
watch  the  ideals  her  fathers  bled  for  trampled  beneath 
the  iron  heel? 

As  we  in  France  watched  from  the  trenches  at  Verdun 
the  flaming  of  the  war  beacon  in  the  western  sky,  as  we 
followed  the  impassioned  utterances  of  those  representa- 
tive statesmen  who  in  House,  Senate,  Press  and  on  the 
public  platform,  called  on  their  fellows  to  remember  the 
country's  honor  and  arise  in  the  cause  of  freedom  no 
doubt  ever  entered  our  minds  as  to  the  eventual  outcome 
of  America's  moral  crisis. 

We  knew  that  though  many  of  us  would  not  live  to  see 
the  triumph  of  her  ideals,  yet  her  Ideals  would  one  day 
triumph;  that  if  America  hesitated  longer  than  some 
who  loved  her  might  have  wished,  before  taking  the  final 


Declaration  of  War  5 

deciston,  it  was  rather  the  hesitation  of  one  who  asks  how 
and  when  and  not  whether  to  act. 

A  complete  study  of  the  causes  which  led  up  to  the 
eventual  rupture  between  the  United  States  and  Germany 
is  not  within  the  scope  of  this  work,  nor  could  French  sol- 
diers with  propriety  discuss  the  divergent  opinions  and 
different  political  tenets  of  American  public  men. 

Neither  can  we,  for  the  same  reasons,  examine  into  the 
far-reaching  influence  of  overt  and  concealed  German 
propaganda,  acting  as  an  effective  brake  on  the  native  im- 
pulse of  the  country  to  *'  take  sides  "  in  the  European  con- 
flict. 

The  stirring  events  which  preceded  America's  entry 
into  the  war  are  still  fresh  in  every  mind.  They  are, 
perhaps,  as  yet  too  near  for  any  author  to  view  them  with 
the  necessary  mental  perspective,  or  to  embody  their  his- 
tory in  permanent  literary  form. 

It  must  be  our  rule  —  except  in  describing  certain  ma- 
terial organizations  where  official  statistics  are  given  — 
to  speak  only  of  those  things  which  have  come  under  our 
personal  observation  and  which  occurred  upon  our  own 
theater  of  war. 

Those  who  desire  a  more  complete  picture  than  we  can 
give  of  certain  personalities  who  played  an  active  part  in 
the  drama  of  America's  development  as  a  world  power, 
and  who  wish  to  study  the  two  schools  of  thought  which 
struggled  with  equal  ardor  to  impose  their  respective  con- 
victions upon  the  mass  of  their  fellow-citizens,  will  find  a 
quantity  of  such  records  among  the  files  of  contemporary 
journalism  during  the  war,  among  American  state  papers 
and  official  publications. 

The  President's  published  addresses,  proclamations, 
and  epistles,  together  with  the  correspondence  between 


6        The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

the  Secretary  of  War  and  Colonel  Theodore  Roose- 
velt, will  give  the  searcher  for  historical  data  a  compre- 
hensive view  of  both  sides  of  the  question  of  military  pre- 
paredness. 

As  for  us  we  must  limit  ourselves  rigidly  to  a  brief  re- 
cital of  the  facts  —  for  in  these  pages  facts  alone  import. 

Their  dates  mark  the  steady  progress  of  the  moral 
preparation  of  the  citizen-soldier  whom  the  nation  was 
soon  to  send  into  battle  on  a  foreign  soil. 

Toward  the  end  of  April,  191 5,  certain  Americans  con- 
templating passage  on  the  British  liner  Lusitania  received 
warning  from  the  German  embassy  in  Washington  that 
they  would  do  better  to  abandon  their  project  of  sailing 
on  this  vessel,  it  being  the  intention  of  the  German  Ad- 
miralty to  sink  her  during  the  voyage. 

The  threat  was  generally  considered  absurd;  such  a 
crime  was  thought  to  be  too  flagrant  a  breach  of  neutral 
rights  for  Germany  to  attempt. 

Nevertheless  the  fact  that  foreign  officials  should  dare 
to  make  this  threat  and  had  even  utilized  the  American 
press  to  sound  the  warning,  ar-oused  great  wrath  among 
certain  Americans.  Quite  a  general  demand  was  made 
that  the  German  Ambassador  who  had  thus  overstepped 
diplomatic  prerogatives  should  at  once  be  given  his  pass- 
ports. 

On  the  seventh  of  May,  the  great  liner  was  attacked  by 
two  German  submarines  —  one  of  which  was  identified  as 
the  U21  —  and  sunk  without  warning  near  the  head  of 
Old  Kinsale  off  the  Irish  coast,  no  effort  being  made  to 
save  either  passengers  or  crew,  of  whom  upwards  of 
eleven  hundred,  including  more  than  a  hundred  Amer- 
icans, perished. 


Declaration  of  War  7 

From  this  moment  we  may  date  the  rise  and  growth  of 
an  active  belligerent  spirit  among  the  American  people. 

During  the  horrified  pause  which  followed  this  latest 
German  atrocity  a  declaration  was  made  and  sworn  to 
that  the  ship  carried  munitions  of  war  and  that  Germany^s 
action  was  justifiable  on  that  ground,  although  it  was 
subsequently  proved  and  confessed  that  the  witness  who 
alleged  having  seen  guns  on  the  Lusitania  was  paid  to  say 
so  by  funds  collected  for  that  purpose  by  the  German 
propaganda.  The  check  on  popular  indignation  which 
the  debates  on  this«question  involved  had  been  effective. 
When,  on  May  15th,  the  President  of  the  United  States 
sent  a  formal  warning  to  Germany  that  no  further  out- 
rage of  the  sort  would  be  tolerated  or  go  unpunished,  this 
threat  elicited  a  very  humble  response  from  the  Imperial 
Government,  offering  indemnities  for  loss  of  American 
life  and  expressing  sincere  regret  for  the  incident. 

The  occasion  to  declare  war  on  account  of  the  Lusi- 
tania had  by  this  time  passed.  Nevertheless  American 
opinion  had  been  much  incensed.  In  many  public  centers 
**  Remember  the  Lusitania ''  was  placarded.  Memorial 
meetings  were  called.  Money  for  the  allied  cause  and 
for  the  widows  and  orphans  of  the  war  as  well  as  for  the 
victims  of  the  submarines,  poured  Into  Europe  from  the 
United  States.  The  youth  of  America  began  to  group 
itself  together  and  form  societies  of  military  preparation.^ 
In  some  schools,  practical  efforts  were  made  toward  ob- 
taining a  certain  amount  of  soldierly  discipline. 

Nine  months  elapsed  without  any  definite  incident  tend- 
ing toward  a  rupture  of  friendly  relations,  for,  although 

3  General  Leonard  Wood's  untiring  crusade  on  platform  and  in  the 
press  for  military  preparedness  elicited  a  warm  response  from  the  mili- 
tary elements  of  the  country. 


8        The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

submarine  attacks  continued  against  vessels  carrying 
Americans  on  board  the  cases  generally  admitted  of  dis- 
cussion on  technical  grounds  and  terminated  either  with 
apologies  and  indemnities,  or  the  proof  that  the  aggres- 
sors, as  In  the  case  of  the  Ancona,  belonged  to  the  Aus- 
trian, and  not  the  German,  Navy. 

American  indignation,  however,  had  been  excited. 
The  exchange  of  diplomatic  notes  between  the  United 
States  and  Germany  became,  on  the  part  of  the 
former,  progressively  menacing  until  the  climax  was 
reached. 

On  August  19,  19 15,  the  English  steamer  Arabic  was 
sunk  off  the  Irish  coast.  Two  Americans  were  numbered 
among  the  forty-four  victims.  On  November  9th  the 
Italian  ship  Ancona  met  a  similar  fate  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean. On  January  2,  19 16,  the  Persia  also  was  sunk 
without  warning. 

Finally  on  March  24th  the  Channel  packet  Sussex,  car- 
rying American  passengers  and  mails,  was  sunk  in  the  nar- 
row seas  by  a  German  submarine. 

This  new  outrage  elicited  a  message  to  Germany  far 
more  aggressive  In  tone  than  the  former  notes  relating  to 
like  Incidents  and  terminated  with  a  clearly  defined  warn- 
ing that  should  such  another  crime  be  perpetrated,  the 
American  Government  would  feel  obliged  to  sever  on 
the  Instant,  all  diplomatic  relations  with  the  German  Em- 
pire. 

The  Imperial  Government  reflected  seriously  upon  this 
message  and  at  length  gave  solemn  assurances  to  the 
President  of  the  United  States  that  no  more  ships  would 
be  sunk  without  previous  warning  and  without  legitimate 
steps  being  taken  to  safeguard  the  lives  of  passengers. 
It  should,  however,  be  noted  that  Germany  did  not  hesi- 


Declaration  of  War  9 

tate  to  demand  America's  intervention  with  a  view  to  les- 
sening the  rigors  of  the  British  blockade. 

This  mild  answer  and  the  careful  observance  of  her 
word  during  the  rest  of  the  year  were  probably  induced 
by  a  very  serious  shortage  in  Germany's  sea  flotilla  which 
required  several  months  to  reconstitute.  Whatever  her 
motive,  the  result  was  satisfactory  to  America,  who  ap- 
peared to  have  obtained  a  great  moral  victory  in  forcing 
the  Imperial  Government  to  "  back  down,"  and  it  was 
generally  declared  that  by  his  vindication  of  neutral  rights 
and  humanitarian  principles,  President  Wilson's  diplo- 
macy had  triumphed. 

From  the  German  point  of  view,  also,  the  policy  was 
not  unsuccessful.  During  eight  months,  America,  reas- 
sured by  the  peaceful  and  friendly  declarations  of  Ger- 
many, took  no  step  in  military  preparation.  Much  of 
that  spiritual  *'  readiness  for  war  "  which  had  begun  to  be 
felt  in  the  country  at  large  had  even  been  checked  and 
more  or  less  undone  by  the  idea  that  Germany  was 
pledged  henceforward  and  forever  to  respect  AmeHcan 
rights  at  sea  and  definitely  abandon  her  terrorization  of 
all  neutral  nations  by  her  submarine  menace. 

In  reality  it  was  far  from  that  country's  intention  to  re- 
voke a  policy  so  essential  to  the  prestige  of  her  sea  com- 
mand. 

No  sooner  had  a  more  numerous  and  powerful  sub- 
marine fleet  been  constructed,  than  the  German  Ambas- 
sador in  Washington  handed  to  the  Secretary  of  State  a 
note  dated  January  31st,  19 17,  revoking  all  former  prom- 
ises. This  note  now  declared  it  to  be  the  inherent  right 
as  well  as  the  irrevocable  intention  of  the  Admiralty  to 
sink  without  warning,  any  vessel,  whether  neutral  or  bel- 
ligerent, in  a  zone  defined  by  her  as  forbidden. 


lo      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

The  indignation  in  America  was  now  at  fever  heat. 
The  national  press,  while  loudly  censuring  Germany's 
duplicity,  called  upon  the  President  of  the  United  States 
to  make  a  definite  and  hostile  declaration.  Mr.  Wilson's 
patience  was  indeed  at  an  end.  Although  on  February 
3d  he  once  more  expressed  incredulity  concerning  Ger- 
many's actual  intention  to  carry  out  her  monstrous  threat, 
he  nevertheless  felt  it  incumbent  upon  him  to  fulfill  his 
own  menace  to  that  power  by  taking  the  course  indicated 
by  him  in  the  previous  year  and  recalling  his  ambassador 
from  Berlin. 

The  presidential  message  concluded  with  the  following 
words : 

"...  We  shall  not  believe  they  are  hostile  to  us  until  we  are 
obliged  to  believe  it:  and  we  purpose  nothing  more  than  a  reason- 
able defense  of  the  undoubted  rights  of  our  people." 

The  world  was  not  long  to  remain  in  doubt  regarding 
the  definition  of  Germany's  hostile  attitude  by  an  overt 
act. 

Within  a  few  days  two  American  vessels  were  sunk  — 
the  Housatonic  and  the  Lyman  M.  Law  —  and,  on  Feb- 
ruary 26,  19 1 7,  the  President  appeared  before  Congress 
to  ask  a  special  grant  of  power  authorizing  him  to  arm 
American  ships  against  similar  aggressions.^  At  the 
same  time  he  confessed  himself 

"  For  a  time  unable  to  believe  that  such  things  would  be  done  by 
any  government  that  had  hitherto  subscribed  to  the  humane  prac- 
tices of  civilized  nations." 

*  The  Cunarder  Laconia  with  two  Americans  aboard  was  sunk  at  the 
same  time.  On  the  eighteenth  of  March  the  American  ships,  City  of 
Memphis,  Illinois,  and  Vigilancia,  met  the  same  fate.  On  March  21st  the 
Healdton,  crossing  from  Philadelphia  to  Rotterdam,  was  sunk  without 
warning  and  with  twenty-one  victims.  On  April  ist  the  Aztec  was  sent 
to  the  bottom. 


Declaration  of  War  ii 

The  die  had  now  been  cast  and  wave  upon  wave  of 
popular  enthusiasm  arose  as  one  epoch-making  event  suc- 
ceeded another. 

On  April  2,  the  President  branded: 

"  The  present  warfare  of  Germany  against  commerce  a  war- 
fare against  mankind." 

And  this  statement  was  followed  in  four  days  by  the 
solemn  declaration  of  a  state  of  war  between  the  United 
States  and  Germany.  Orders  were  also  given  for  the  re- 
moval of  alien  enemies  from  the  civil  territory  of  the 
Union  and  their  forcible  detention  in  concentration  camps. 

The  presidential  address  was. a  strong  denunciation  of 
the  actions  in  the  United  States  of  the  German  govern- 
mental agents  during  the  three  years  of  America's  neu- 
trality. 

"  It  has  filled  our  unsuspecting  communities  and  even  our  offices 
of  government  with  spies  and  set  criminal  intrigues  everywhere 
afoot  against  the  National  Unity  of  Council,  our  peace  within  and 
without,  our  industries  and  our  commerce.  Indeed  it  is  now  evi- 
dent that  its  spies  were  here  even  before  the  war  began  and  it  is  a 
matter  of  fact  that  the  intrigues  which  have  more  than  once  come 
perilously  near  to  disturbing  the  peace  and  dislocating  the  indus- 
tries of  the  country  have  been  carried  on  at  the  instigation,  with 
the  support  and  even  the  personal  direction,  of  official  agents  of 
the  Imperial  Government  accredited  to  the  United  States." 

After  a  further  arraignment  of  such  procedures,  the 
President  continued  with  a  very  noble  and  eloquent  state- 
ment of  American  aims,  now  that  her  final  participation  in 
the  European  struggle  was  definitely  decided. 

"  We  have  no  selfish  ends  to  serve,  we  desire  no  conquest,  no 
dominion ;  we  seek  no  indemnities  for  ourselves,  no  material  com- 
pensation for  the  sacrifice  we  shall  freely  make.  We  are  but  one 
of  the  champions  of  the  rights  of  mankind." 


12      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Although  the  public  mind  was  ripe,  the  country  was  ma- 
terially quite  unready  for  combat.  With  characteristic 
boldness  America  had  in  fact  declared  war  without  the 
slightest  military  preparation  at  a  moment  when  the  with- 
drawal of  Russia  from  our  alliance  had  placed  the  allied 
cause  in  a  precarious  situation. 

No  one  as  yet  knew  what  form  American  participation 
might  be  called  on  to  take.  Was  an  army  to  be  raised? 
Was  a  fleet  to  be  sent  abroad  or  to  guard  the  coast  at 
home  against  a  submarine  aggression  or  bombardment 
from  the  sea?  Was  a  rising  of  the  dissatisfied  pro- 
Germans  to  be  feared  from  within? 

In  order  to  discuss  some  of  those  questions  it  was  de- 
cided on  the  part  of  both  France  and  England  to  send 
missions  to  the  United  States. 

On  the  tenth  of  March  accordingly,  the  French  Prime 
Minister,  M.  RIbot,  organized  a  war  mission.^ 

No  one  better  than  Marshal  Joffre  could  have  been 
selected  for  such  an  embassage,  nor  could  a  more  powerful 
appeal  have  been  made  to  the  public  imagination. 

His  personality  was  already  familiar  In  the  United 
States,  where  his  simplicity,  strength,  and  practical  com- 
mon sense  would  lend  weight  to  any  proposition  he  might 
suggest. 

The  wave  of  enthusiasm  which  greeted  the  arrival  of 
the  French  war  mission  gave  new  energy  to  the  conscrip- 
tion movement. 

It  is  scarcely  too  much  to  say  that  the  eventual  triumph 
of  the  Allies  was  assured  on  the  day  when  House  and 

5  This  mission  was  headed  by  M.  Viviani,  Minister  of  Justice  and 
Vice-President  of  the  Cabinet  Council.  The  members  were:  Marshal 
Joffre,  Vice-Admiral  Chocheprat,  and  Marquis  de  Chambrun,  deputy,  who 
left  Paris  on  April  15,  19 17. 


Universal  Military  Service  13 

Senate  voted  the  measure  for  universal  and  compulsory 
military  service  in  the  United  States. 

When,  after  a  tour  of  the  great  cities  of  the  Union  and 
the  French-speaking  provinces  of  Canada,  the  French  and 
British  missions  joined  forces  in  New  York  and  marched 
through  the  city,  acclaimed  by  perhaps  the  largest  throng 
of  human  beings  ever  assembled  for  such  an  occasion,  it 
was  evident  to  all  that  the  tide  of  war  was  about  to  turn; 
that  America  was  entering  the  European  conflict  deter- 
mined to  achieve  success  and  ready  to  fight  for  it  as  of 
old  "  to  the  last  dollar  and  to  the  last  man.'*  On  that 
day  no  one  in  America  doubted  the  eventual  triumph  of 
the  allied  cause. 

Political  tension  was  at  an  end;  the  war  spirit  coursed 
through  every  vein  and  artery  of  the  vast  continent.  It 
only  remained  to  organize  this  great  moral  force,  to  give 
practical  instruction  to  the  youth  of  America  eager  to 
learn  how  best  to  develop  their  martial  spirit  into  mihtary 
efficiency. 

On  the  day  that  war  was  declared,  April  6,  19 17,  the 
permanent  army  of  the  United  States  counted  190,000 
men  distributed  in  small  detachments  —  regiments,  bat- 
talions, and  even  companies  —  over  the  immense  terri- 
tory of  the  Union  and  her  colonial  dependencies.  An  ex- 
peditionary corps  recently  equipped  for  service  in  Mexico 
had  just  been  disbanded  upon  the  completion  of  their 
mission. 

The  regular  army  had  recrossed  the  Rio  Grande,  leav- 
ing upon  the  border  a  large  force  of  cavalry  and  some 
elements  of  infantry,  which  latter  would  have  scarcely 
amounted  to  a  brigade.  The  National  Guard  units, 
which 'had  also  been  employed  upon  the  border,  had  been 


14      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

relieved  and  sent  to  their  respective  States,  only  a  small 
number  of  Pennsylvania  militia  still  lingered  near  the 
Mexican  frontier.  Thus  war  surprised  the  American 
army,  reestablished  upon  a  peace  footing  and  entirely 
unprepared  by  any  previous  attempt  at  mobilization,  for 
taking  part  in  a  foreign  war.® 

Although  the  country  had  been  recently  divided  into 
military  departments  this  reorganization  was  purely  ter- 
ritorial in  character,  corresponding  approximately  to 
the  regional  distribution  in  France  before  the  war  of 
1870. 

The  formation  of  divisions,  which  was  contemplated 
in  some  of  the  new  military  departments,  remained  only 
in  prospect,  and  it  may  be  stated  that  the  only  appreciable 
advantage  which  had  accrued  to  the  army  during  the 
period  of  political  tension  was  that  the  ranks  of  existing 
organizations  were  increased  by  numerous  voluntary 
enlistments/ 

This  army  before  November  i,  19 18,  was  to  swell  to 
the  formidable  array  of  181,095  officers  and  3,483,444 
men,  of  whom  more  than  two  millions  crossed  the 
Atlantic. 

To  carry  out  this  gigantic  mobilization,  to  secure  the 
number,  form  the  commanding  officers,  and  organize  the 
fighting  units,  an  immense  effort  was  necessary. 

«  It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  Colonel  Roosevelt,  since  two  years,  had 
never  ceased  to  advocate  military  preparedness.  Through  personal  pres- 
tige he  was  able  to  enroll  a  sufficient  number  of  volunteers  to  make  up 
a  division  which  was  complete  on  paper. 

7  The  enlistments  for  the  fiscal  year  1917  totalled  160,084.  It  must  be 
also  considered  that  the  Mexican  expedition  resulted  in  perfecting  the 
training  of  the  regular  troops  which  participated.  The  National  Guards 
who  remained  on  the  border  also  took  advantage  of  this  situation  to  im- 
prove their  military  training. 


Universal  Military  Service  15 

Under  the  modest  title,  "  An  act  authorizing  the  Presi- 
dent temporarily  to  increase  the  military  establishments 
of  the  United  States  "  was  voted.  This  epoch-making 
law,  on  May  i8th,  created  compulsory  military  service 
by  selection  ^  and  thus  secured  the  number  necessary  to 
create  an  army. 

8  In  1814,  in  spite  of  the  political  influence  of  President  Madison  and 
the  no  less  great  prestige  of  Secretary  of  War  Monroe,  a  bill  was  in- 
troduced with  a  view  of  obtaining  for  the  Executive  the  power  to  raise, 
by  means  of  draft,  a  national  array.  Opposition  developed  and  peace 
came  before  this  bill  was  enacted.  But  in  1863,  when  the  war  of  seces- 
sion was  at  its  height,  America  had  recourse  to  conscription.  From  the 
decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  upholding  the  draft  law  of  1917,  we  extract 
the  following  quotation  which  serves  to  show  that  the  Federal  Congress 
in  passing  the  act,  "  Authorizing  the  President  to  increase  temporarily 
the  military  establishment  of  the  United  States "  remained  completely 
within  the  constitutional  tradition: 

"  In  that  year,  when  the  mutterings  of  the  dread  conflict  which  was 
to  come  began  to  be  heard  and  the  proclamation  of  the  President  calling 
a  force  into  existence  was  issued,  it  was  addressed  to  the  body  organized 
out  of  the  militia  and  trained  by  the  States  in  accordance  with  previous 
acts  of  Congress.  (Proclamation  of  April  15,  1861.)  That  force  being 
inadequate  to  meet  the  situation,  an  act  was  passed  authorizing  the  accept- 
ance of  500,000  volunteers  by  the  President  to  be  by  him  organized  into 
a  national  army  (Act  of  July  22,  1861).  This  was  soon  followed  by  an- 
other act  increasing  the  force  of  the  militia  to  be  organized  by  the  States 
for  the  purpose  of  being  drawn  upon  when  trained  under  the  direction  of 
Congress  (Act  of  July  29,  i86i).  The  two  acts  when  considered  together 
present  in  the  clearest  possible  form  the  distinction  between  the  power  of 
Congress  to  raise  armies  and  its  authority  under  the  militia  clause.  But 
it  soon  became  manifest  that  more  men  were  required.  As  a  result,  the 
act  of  March  3,  1863,  was  adopted,  entitled,  *  An  act  for  enrolling  and 
calling  out  the  national  forces  and  for  other  purposes.'  By  that  act, 
which  was  clearly  intended  to  directly  exert  upon  all  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States  the  national  power  which  it  had  been  proposed  in  1814  on 
the  recommendation  of  the  then  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Monroe,  every 
male  citizen  of  the  United  States  between  the  ages  of  twenty  and  forty- 
five  was  made  subject  by  the  direct  action  of  Congress  to  be  called  by 
compulsory  draft  to  the  service  in  a  national  army  at  such  time  and  in 
such  numbers  as  the  President  in  his  discretion  might  find  necessary.  In 
that  act,  as  in  the  one  of  1814,  and  in  this  one,  the  means  by  which  the  act 
was  to  be  enforced  were  directly  Federal  and  the  force  to  be  raised  as  a 


1 6      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Never  before  had  so  great  a  country  and  in  so  brief  a 
time  realized  such  a  basic  transformation  of  its  funda- 
mental principles  and  most  inveterate  customs,  and  this 
with  the  unanimous  consent  and  enthusiastic  approval  of 
all  parties  concerned. 

The  drafting  of  this  measure  not  only  determined  the 
general  sources  from  which  the  new  contingents  were  to 
be  drawn,  but  also  arranged  the  principle  of  their  dis- 
tribution. The  simple  mechanism  of  this  law  gave,  when 
put  into  application,  an  even  greater  result  than  that 
which  had  been  foreseen.^ 

From  the  fifth  of  June,  19 17,  to  the  twenty-fourth  of 
August,  19 1 8,  10,481,000  citizens  between  twenty-one 
and  thirty  years  of  age  inscribed  themselves  at  the  regis- 
tration boards. 

This  age  limit  was  the  one  first  determined  upon;  but 
later  on,  with  a  view  to  avoid  weakening  any  one  category 
of  worker  and  thereby  defeating  the  economic  interests  of 
the  country  which  it  was  so  important  to  uphold,  the  age 
limit  was  extended  to  embrace  those  from  eighteen  to 
forty-five.  In  consequence  of  this  extension,  the  number 
of  inscriptions  rose  to  23,709,000.  It  thus  became 
evident   that   "  The   act   authorizing  the    President   to 

result  of  the  draft  was  therefore  typically  national,  as  distinct  from  the 
call  into  active  service  of  the  militia  as  such.  And  under  the  power  thus 
exerted,  four  separate  calls  for  draft  were  made  by  the  President  and  en- 
forced. That  of  July,  1863,  of  February  and  March,  1864,  of  July  and 
December,  1864,  producing  a  force  of  about  a  quarter  of  a  million  of 
men." 

9  "The  whole  nation,"  said  the  President  on  the  eighteenth  of  May, 
1917,  "  must  be  a  team  in  which  each  man  shall  play  the  part  for  which 
he  is  best  fitted.  To  this  end  Congress  has  provided  that  the  nation  shall 
be  organized  for  war  by  selection.  Each  man  shall  be  classified  for  serv- 
ice in  the  place  to  which  it  shall  best  serve  the  general  good  to  call  him. 
...  It  is  in  no  sense  a  conscription  of  the  unwilling,  it  is  rather  a  selec- 
tion from  a  nation  which  has  volunteered  in  mass." 


Universal  Military  Service  l^ 

temporarily  increase  the  military  establishment  of  the 
country  "  was  capable  of  furnishing  the  numbers  which 
would  swing  the  balance  of  power  to  the  Allies 
if  it  might  be  possible  to  organize,  equip,  and  transport 
to  Europe  such  large  masses  of  men.  Method  was  the 
first  thing  required  in  order  to  select  among  the  men  who 
had  registered  those  best  fitted  for  active  service. 

The  Federal  Government  and  Congress  had  em- 
phasized their  intention  to  apply  the  new  laws  in  a  demo- 
cratic spirit  of  equity.  It  was,  however,  essential  to 
avoid  mustering  those  individuals  indispensable  to  the 
support  of  their  families,  those  who  were  necessary  to 
the  material  prosperity  of  the  country,  such  as  miners, 
agricultural  and  industrial  workers,  those  employed  in  the 
great  public  services,  and  also  the  proselytes  of  certain 
religious  sects  which  forbid  their  adherents  to  carry  arms. 

On  the  twenty-second  of  May  the  services  were  or- 
ganized for  recruiting  operations  at  the  War  Department, 
and  General  Crowder,  late  Judge-Advocate,  was  placed 
at  the  head  of  the  new  services  with  the  title  of  Provost 
Marshal  General. 

Each  State  had  been  divided  into  districts  of  registra- 
tion comprising  about  30,000  inhabitants.  A  registra- 
tion board  consisting  of  three  members,  usually  a  local 
magistrate,  a  physician,  and  a  clerk  was  to  be  found  in 
each  district. 

It  was  accordingly  before  these  boards,  assembled  over 
the  entire  territory  of  the  United  States  and  on  a  date  set 
by  the  President,  that  the  men  belonging  to  the  categories 
which  came  under  the  new  law  were  to  present  themselves. 
In  less  than  sixteen  days  ^^  the  central  services  at  Wash- 
ington were  in  possession  of  all  the  results  of  the  first 

10  The  first  conscript  was  drafted  into  the  national  army  on  July  30th. 


l8      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

military  census  which  comprehended  almost  ten  million 
names.^^ 

The  average  registration  was  about  2,500  In  each  dis- 
trict. The  number  of  registrants,  recapitulated  In  each 
State,  permitted  the  Federal  authorities  to  determine  the 
proportion  which  was  to  be  furnished  by  each  one  when 
the  time  came  to  raise  the  effectives.  In  the  completion 
of  their  work,  which  they  handled  In  the  same  way  as  the 
voting  machinery,  these  registration  boards  were  suc- 
ceeded by  local  Incorporation  boards,^^  charged  with  the 
duty  of  examining  and  classifying  registrants  In  order  to 
select  among  the  names  Inscribed  the  men  who  were  to 
be  Incorporated.  These  formed  Class  I  and  were  first 
rendered  liable  for  military  service,  those  in  the  other 
classes  being  granted  temporary  exemptions.  Like  the 
registration  board,  these  local  boards  were  formed  of 
three  members  appointed  by  the  State  governor  and  ap- 
proved by  the  President.  They  ordinarily  comprised  a 
prominent  citizen  of  the  locality,  a  sworn-In  physician, 
and  a  clerk.^^  Practically  all  cases  of  exemption  were 
examined  by  these  boards,  except  those  reserved  for  the 
district  boards,  where  more  delicate  cases,  such  as  exemp- 
tions, asked  for  on  account  of  industrial  or  agricultural 
reasons  were  passed  upon.^^ 

In  what  order  might  the  citizens  who  had  registered 
expect  to  be  Inducted  into  service? 

It  was  decided  that  the  system  of  drawing  by  lot  should 

"The  disparity  between  this  figure  and  that  of  10,481,000  given  above 
is  explained  by  the  number  of  men  who  had  attained  military  age  be- 
tween the  first  census  operations  and  that  of  August  24,  1918. 

12  The  local  board  numbered  4,552;  the  district  boards  numbered  156. 

18  Under  certain  circumstances  the  registration  board  was  transformed 
into  a  local  board. 

1*  There  existed  one  or  more  district  boards  in  each  Federal  district. 


Universal  Military  Service  19 

be  applied  and  one  of  the  Senate  halls  was  set  apart  for 
this  procedure. 

Thanks  to  this  very  simple  method  recruiting  opera- 
tions were  decentralized  and  placed  in  the  hands  of  the 
regional  authorities  In  each  State,  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment only  Intervening  In  the  process  of  drawing  by  lot. 

Certain  modifications  were  made  In  the  detailed  appli- 
cation of  the  draft  law.  After  December  15,  19 17,  the 
administration  of  the  law  was  improved  by  the  system  of 
classification  that  was  employed  In  the  selection  of  men. 
The  economic  needs  of  the  nation  required  that  men 
whose  removal  would  interfere  with  Its  civic,  family,  in- 
dustrial, and  agricultural  life  should  be  taken  In  the  order 
in  which  they  could  best  be  spared.  On  December  15th 
all  exemptions  that  had  previously  been  granted  were 
annulled  and  all  registrants  were  required  to  file  ''  ques- 
tionnaires "  giving  detailed  information  in  regard  to  in- 
dustrial status.  On  May  16,  19 18,  according  to  a  joint 
resolution  of  Congress,  it  became  possible  to  frame  new 
regulations  whereby  the  quotas  to  be  furnished  by  the 
several  States  were  apportioned  according  to  the  number 
of  registrants  In  Class  I  instead  of  according  to  the 
population  as  was  required  by  the  original  act. 

Additional  types  of  local  boards  were  established 
later.  Medical  advisory  boards  were  appointed  at  a 
later  date  by  the  President  on  the  recommendation  of  the 
State  governors.  At  the  same  time  legal  advisory 
boards  were  also  established  to  assist  registrants  and 
draft  officials  In  the  Interpretation  of  the  Selective  Service 
law.  The  number  of  the  members  of  these  committees, 
particularly  the  medical  personnel,  was  augmented.  The 
Executive  defined  with  greater  exactitude  what  the  motive 
for  such  exemptions  were  to  be,  but  It  may  here  be  said  in 


20      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

a  general  way  that  no  fundamental  changes  were  made 
in  the  application  of  the  conscription  laws. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  many  members  of  Congress 
had,  during  the  discussion  of  this  mihtary  legislation, 
objected  that  it  would  be  difficult  if  not  impossible  to 
apply  the  measure  with  equity,  their  fears  were  not 
justified. 

The  Secretary  of  War,  to  whom  is  due  in  great  measure 
the  success  of  this  legislation,  attributes  the  merit  of  it  to 
the  zealous  manner  in  which  the  State  governors  per- 
formed their  task  and  especially  to  the  immense  popular 
enthusiasm,  which  carried  all  before  it. 

*'  If  the  army,"  said  he  in  November,  191 8,  "  had  been 
obliged  to  create  a  new  set  of  salaried  Federal  officials  to 
handle  the  draft,  we  would«not  have  a  force  of  over  two 
miUion  men  on  European  soil  to-day.  The  draft  secured 
a  large  army  in  record  time  without  unjust  discrimination 
or  destruction  of  industry;  and  it  gained  the  respect  and 
support  of  the  American  people." 

The  mechanism  of  the  recruiting  system  may  thus  be 
summed  up  in  a  few  words :  The  central  power  merely 
fixed  the  total  figure  to  be  obtained  and  decided  upon  the 
number  to  be  contributed  by  each  State.  The  governor 
of  each  State  was,  in  his  turn,  to  distribute  the  effectives 
which  had  been  called  for  among  the  different  local 
boards,  and  these  finally  were  to  designate  the  men  whom 
they  had  found  apt  for  service. 

As  we  have  said,  the  law  besides  laid  down  certain 
principles  of  general  organization. 

While  respecting  the  existing  text  of  the  National 
Defense  Act  promulgated  In  19 16  the  legislators  decided 
first  to  increase  the  Regular  Army  to  a  strength  of  18,033 
officers  and  470,185  men;  second,  to  increase  the  National 


Universal  Military  Service  2 1 

Guard  to  13,377  officers  and  456,800  men;  finally,  to 
create  a  new  army  called  ''  National  Army  "  to  be  entirely 
composed  of  men  supplied  by  conscription. 

The  military  forces  of  America  were  thus  to  include 
three  different  organizations:  the  Regular  Army,  the 
National  Guard,  and  the  National  Army.  The  first  com- 
posed of  professional  soldiers  to  whom  should  be  added 
voluntary  enlistments  and,  if  necessary,  men  supplied  by 
the  draft;  the  second,  comprehending  National  Guard 
volunteers  and  eventually  drafted  men;  the  third,  which 
was  an  entirely  new  organization,  was  to  be  formed  from 
the  contingents  supplied  by  the  compulsory  draft. 

But  as  time  went  on,  a  succession  of  measures  tended 
to  break  down  the  barriers  separating  these  three  armies 
from  one  another.  It  was  decided  that  in  the  Regular 
Army,  as  well  as  in  the  National  Guard,  voluntary  enlist- 
ments would  be  accepted  only  for  the  duration  of  the 
war.  The  age  limit  of  men  who  signed  these  enlistments 
was  unified  in  both  armies.  The  pay,  indemnities,  and 
promotions  were  made  practically  identical  for  the  entire 
forces  of  the  United  States.  Thus  the  law  had  created 
three  nuclei  or  centers  of  organizations  and  training 
rather  than  three  different  armies. 

The  volunteer,  whose  desire  was  to  fight  as  soon  as 
possible  —  and  there  were  many  such  in  America  at  this 
time  —  enlisted  in  one  army  rather  than  in  another  with 
but  one  object  in  view,  that  of  taking  the  shortest  way  to 
the  battle-fields  in  France. 

As  the  war  spirit  grew,  this  state  of  mind  became  pro- 
nounced in  all  classes;  among  regulars  and  volunteers  as 
well  as  army  conscripts. 

Although  at  the  beginning  the  War  Department  en- 
deavored to  maintain  in  the  National  Guard  and  in  the 


22      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

National  Army  the  links  which  are  generally  established 
between  men  coming  from  the  same  town  or  village,  and 
to  preserve  the  traditions  of  certain  military  organiza- 
tions it  was  to  be  foreseen  that  a  tendency  toward  amal- 
gamation and  the  formation  of  one  national  army  would 
become  more  and  more  evident  as  time  went  on. 

Moreover,  the  constantly  growing  necessity  to  call 
upon  the  resources  of  the  country  at  large  in  order  to 
keep  up,  at  full  strength,  the  organizations  fighting  at 
the  front  or  training  at  the  rear  tended  to  bring  about 
the  same  phenomenon  as  had  been  already  observed  in 
France:  a  growing  inclination  to  dissolve  all  differences 
existing  between  active  and  reserve  formations. 

From  the  month  of  August,  191 8,  the  existing  barriers 
between  the  American  units  were  abolished.  One  army 
only  remained :     The  Army  of  the  United  States. 

In  order  to  complete  the  Regular  Army  and  the 
National  Guard  —  to  the  extent  permitted  by  law,  and 
to  form  the  first  contingent  of  the  National  Army,^^ 
President  Wilson  called  upon  687,000  men  to  be  inducted 
from  the  first  conscription.  Later  on  the  total  of  in- 
ductions reached  2,800,000  men.^^ 

15  The  President  was  authorized  in  the  first  place  to  constitute  the 
National  Army  by  two  successive  calls  for  500,000  men.  The  first  con- 
tingent, however,  consisted  of  637,000,  in  order  that  the  regular  army 
might  be  brought  up  to  the  number  authorized  by  the  National  Defense 
Act  and  afterward  to  dispose  of  the  500,000  necessary  for  the  formation 
of  the  National  Army. 

i«  Slightly  over  2,800,000  of  the  registrants  were  inducted  into  military 
service,  2,541,000  through  calls  issued  to  local  boards  to  furnish  their 
allotted  quotas,  and  259,000  through  inductions  of  individuals.  Approx- 
imately 140,000  of  the  latter  were  inducted  in  October  and  during  the 
first  ten  days  in  November  for  the  Students'  Army  Training  Corps.  With 
the  exception  of  these  students  and  a  few  thousand  volunteers,  no  men  of 
the  last  registration  were  inducted  into  the  army. 

1,680  officers  were  commissioned  during  the  last  eleven  months  preced- 


Universal  Military  Service  23 

It  was  an  easier  task  to  raise  these  forces  than  to  officer 
them.  On  June  30th  there  were  in  all  the  Regular  Army 
but  6,159  officers,  and  among  these  only  4,500  had  seen 
more  than  one  year's  service. 

The  National  Defense  Act,  of  which  we  have  pre- 
viously spoken,  had  foreseen  the  formation  of  an  Officers 
Reserve  Corps,  but  on  the  declaration  of  war  this  law 
had  been  in  effect  for  somewhat  less  than  a  year  and  the 
7,957  citizens  who  were  inscribed  upon  the  registers  as 
reserve  officers  had  had  but  a  very  rudimentary  training 
and  incomplete  military  instruction. 

Three  years  previous  to  the  war,  under  the  forceful 
impulsion  of  General  Leonard  Wood,  quite  a  number  of 
citizens'  training  camps  had  been  organized  throughout 
the  country.  The  first  of  these  had  been  instituted  at 
Plattsburg,  New  York,  and  there  during  the  summer 
months  a  large  number  of  volunteers  authorized  by  the 
department  commander  went  in  for  military  training. 
The  period  of  instruction  lasted  thirty  days,  the  course 
consisting  of  intensive  elementary  training  for  infantry, 
cavalry,  field  artillery,  and  engineers.  Students  who  had 
attended  one  or  more  camps  were  used  as  non-commis- 
sioned officers  or  as  subalterns  and  were  given  more  ad- 
vanced instruction,  including  the  knowledge  required  by 
administrative  staff  officers.  The  plan  soon  proved  very 
successful  and  a  large  number  of  college  students  over 
eighteen  years  of  age  and  young  business  men  attended 
the  camps  for  periods  of  a  month  or  more.  The  War 
Department  decided,  very  soon  after  the  breach  with  Ger- 
many, as  a  first  step  toward  the  solution  of  obtaining 

ing  the  war;  747  came  directly  from  civil  life  and  933  from  V^est  Point, 
the  Regular  Army,  the  Philippine  Scouts,  and  the  National  Guard. 


24      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

officers  for  the  new  army  that  it  would  Institute  a  three 
months'  course  of  intensive  training  In  camps  modeled 
In  general  on  the  Plattsburg  Idea. 

Fifteen  training  camps  were  accordingly  established  for 
candidates  seeking  commissions.  The  first  series  of  in- 
struction began  on  May  15th.  The  camps  were  dis- 
tributed through  the  entire  country  In  order  not  to  oblige 
the  participants  to  undertake  too  long  a  journey.  Each 
camp  was  prepared  to  receive  2,500  candidates  either 
from  the  Officers  Reserve  Corps,  selected  enlisted  men 
of  the  National  Guard  and  the  Regular  Army,  or  civilians 
who  possessed  certain  educational  qualifications. 

The  officers  of  the  Reserve  Corps  accomplished  their 
time  of  service  In  camp  either  as  instructors  or  as  students 
according  to  the  extent  of  their  military  preparation,  and 
were  subject  to  regrading  or  to  discharge. 

Upon  completion  of  the  course  of  Instruction  both 
officers  already  holding  commissions  in  the  Reserve  Corps 
and  candidates  were  recommended  by  their  commanding 
officers  for  appointment  to  such  rank  as  their  services 
seemed  to  merit.  During  the  first  five  weeks,  training 
was  the  same  for  all  and  the  instructors  took  special  pains 
to  observe  the  aptitude  shown  by  each  individual.  After 
this  period,  there  was  a  redistribution  among  the  or- 
ganizations in  each  camp  with  a  view  to  special  training 
In  the  different  branches  of  the  service.  At  the  same 
time,  eight  of  the  camps  designated  a  number  of  candi- 
dates who  were  transferred  to  Fort  Monroe  and  Fort 
Winfield  Scott,  for  further  Instruction  In  coast  artillery. 

The  engineer  companies  were  likewise  concentrated  In 
three  camps  devoted  especially  to  the  training  of  candi- 
dates for  commissions  In  that  branch  of  the  service. 

Led  by  the  experience  of  the  foreign  armies  during  the 


Universal  Military  Service  25 

first  years  of  the  war,  the  instructing  officers  made  a 
special  point  of  teaching  their  pupils  to  be  successful  in- 
structors, administrators,  and  leaders  —  in  short,  to  be- 
come thorough-going  officers. 

The  schedules  of  instruction  for  all  camps  were  pre- 
pared in  the  War  Department  and  prescribed  a  minimum 
number  of  hours  per  week  for  each  specialty.  Latitude 
was  thus  given  to  camp  commanders  for  the  most  prac- 
tical adjustment  of  their  program.  The  schedule  was 
based  on  a  minimum  day  of  ten  hours  and  a  week  of  five 
days. 

The  first  series  of  such  periods  of  instruction  terminated 
on  August  15th,  when  27,341  candidates  received  com- 
missions, most  of  these  being  at  once  appointed  In  the 
infantry,  cavalry,  field  artillery,  coast  artillery,  or  en- 
gineers.^"^ 

In  order  to  provide  some  of  the  staff  departments  with 
officers  who  had  some  basic  military  training,  candidates 
possessing  business  experience,  or  such  as  would  qualify 
them  for  service  In  the  quartermaster  corps,  adjutant- 
general,  and  ordnance  departments  were  commissioned  In 
those  branches  of  the  service. 

Some  few  recently  promoted  officers  were  at  once  sent 
to  Europe  in  order  to  supplement  training  in  French  and 
British  schools,  then  to  return  and  serve  as  instructors  at 
home. 

The  Secretary  of  War  summed  up  as  follows  the  work 
accomplished  in  the  American  training  camps : 

"  A  more  salutary  result  would  be  impossible  to  imagine.  The 
trained  professional  soldiers  of  the  army  received  this  great  body 
of  youthful  capacity  with  hospitality  and  quickly  impressed  upon 

^■^  On  leaving  camp  the  officers  appointed  were  commissioned  as  pro- 
visional officers  in  the  regular  service;   2  colonels,   1    lieutenant-colonel, 


26      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

it  a  soldierly  character.  The  young  men  brought  to  their  training 
habits  which  they  had  formed  for  success  as  civilians,  but  which 
their  patriotic  enthusiasm  rendered  easily  available  in  new  lines 
of  endeavor  for  the  service  of  the  country.  They  brought,  too, 
another  element  of  great  value.  They  were  assembled  from  all 
parts  of  the  country.  They  were  accustomed  to  the  democracy  of 
the  college  and  high  school;  they  recognized  themselves  as  new 
and  temporary  adventurers  in  a  military  life;  and  they  therefore 
reflected  into  our  military  preparation  the  fresh  and  invigorating 
atmosphere  of  our  commercial  democracy.  This  has  undoubtedly 
contributed  to  the  establishment  of  a  happy  spirit  which  prevails 
throughout  the  army,  and  has  made  it  easy  for  the  young  men 
chosen  under  the  Selective  Service  Act  to  fall  in  with  the  training 
and  mode  of  life  which  the  military  training  camp  requires.  An 
effort  was  made  by  the  department  as  far  as  possible  to  assign 
these  young  officers  to  the  training  of  troops  assembled  from  their 
own  homes.  By  this  means  a  preexisting  sympathy  was  used 
and  admiration  and  respect  between  officer  and  man  was  transferred 
from  the  home  to  the  camp." 

The  excellent  results  obtained  from  these  periods  of 
instruction  led  the  government  to  institute  a  second  series 
beginning  August  27,  19 17,  in  anticipation  of  the  need 
for  officers  to  take  charge  of  subsequent  levies  of  troops. 
72,914  candidates  presented  themselves,  of  whom  21,000 
were  admitted;  17,237  finally  graduated  and  received 
commissions. 

In  January,  19 18,  a  third  course  of  training  was  begun; 
but  at  this  time  the  divisions  of  the  Regular  Army,  the 
National  Guard,  and  the  National  Army  were  organized 
and  had  been  in  training  for  several  months. 

It  became,  therefore,  possible  to  select  from  these  units 
certain  candidates  for  commission  among  the  troopers 
who  had  shown  natural  military  aptitude.     Ninety  per 

235  majors,  3,722  captains,  4,452  first  lieutenants,  18,929  second  lieuten- 
ants, making  a  total  of  27,341  officers. 


Universal  Military  Service  27 

cent,  of  the  candidates  were  chosen  among  the  enlisted 
men  of  the  army  and  the  other  ten  per  cent,  from  civihans 
of  draft  age  who  had  received  military  training  at  recog- 
nized educational  Institutions. 

The  course  was  prolonged  two  weeks  in  order  to  admit 
of  a  more  thorough  administrative  instruction,  and  the 
men  who  had  given  complete  satisfaction  during  the 
course  of  this  last  period  were  at  the  close  of  It  commis- 
sioned as  second  lieutenants. 

Thus  the  American  Army  had  procured  In  a  minimum 
time  57,307  officers. 

They  were  distributed  as  follows : 

Field    Coast 
Ar-       Ar-        En- 
Infantry  Cavalry  tillery  tillery  gineers  Divers  Total 


Colonels  ...          2 

.... 

.... 

.... 

.... 

.... 

2 

Lieutenant- 

Colonels   .           I 

.... 

.... 

...  * 

.... 

.... 

I 

Majors 185 

18 

37 

I 

50 

3 

294 

Captains  .  .  .   3,379 

251 

849 

329 

419 

202 

5,429 

Lieutenants..  7,665 

258 

2,128 

575 

747 

1,001 

12,374 

Second  Lieu- 

tenants   ..23,346 

1,371 

8,540 

1,118 

750 

4,042 

39,207 

Total    ..34,578     1,89811,554     2,0531,966     5,248     57,307 

A  fourth  course  was  begun  in  twenty-four  instruction 
camps  with  a  view  to  securing  13,1 14  more  candidates  for 
commission.  These  camps  were  opened  in  the  training 
areas  of  the  divisions  of  the  National  Guard  or  National 
Army  who  were  grouped  in  anticipation  of  receiving 
orders  for  embarkation. 

These  schools  formed  a  part  of  each  division,  which 
latter  furnished  the  pupils. 

Under  the  original  plan,  the  school  was  to  accompany 


2  8      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

the  division  when  it  moved  overseas;  but,  owing  to  the 
urgent  need  of  line  officers,  these  training  centers  were 
separated  from  their  divisions  and  five  schools  were  es- 
tablished at  permanent  replacement  camps  for  candidates 
of  such  divisions  as  were  scheduled  for  early  overseas 
service.  Three  of  these  central  training  schools  were  for 
candidates  for  commission  in  the  infantry,  one  for  those 
of  the  field  artillery,  and  one  for  those  of  the  machine- 
gun  units.  Two  more  centers  were  added  in  order  to 
take  in  candidates  for  infantry  commissions  and  another 
also  for  cavalry. 

Instead  of  one  class  graduating  every  three  and  a  half 
months,  arrangements  were  made  for  a  new  class  to  enter 
the  central  schools  every  two  weeks,  so  that  there  would 
be  practically  a  continuous  flow  of  line  officers  available 
for  replacements  or  for  assignments  to  new  units  as  they 
were  organized. 

On  November  i,  191 8,  there  were  approximately 
46,000  candidates  in  these  schools. 

A  center  of  instruction  for  colored  officers  was  or- 
ganized in  Fort  Des  Moines,  Iowa;  others  were  created 
at  Porto  Rico,  In  the  Philippines,  and  the  Hawaiian 
Islands. 

An  idea  of  the  American  effort  in  view  of  obtaining 
competent  officers  for  the  army  may  be  secured  by  group- 
ing the  information  contained  in  this  chapter  with  that 
concerning  the  measures  undertaken  in  France  by  General 
Pershing  to  continue  this  work. 

Each  of  these  separate  efforts  was  necessary  to  bring 
about  the  desired  end;  namely,  the  rapid  and  efficient 
training  of  a  hitherto  inexperienced  body  of  officers  who 
were  thus  enabled  to  conduct  a  new  warfare  upon  foreign 
soil. 


Universal  Military  Service  29 

It  now  remained  to  group  the  fighting  units. 

In  the  early  days  of  the  war  it  had  been  decided  that 
organization  work  in  America  would  be  limited  to  the  for- 
mation of  divisions.  Upon  his  arrival  in  France  General 
Pershing  was  to  give  his  government  the  benefit  of  advice 
concerning  the  organization  of  that  army  which  he  was 
called  upon  to  command. 

The  composition  of  the  division,  undertaken  in  the 
United  States,  was  to  be  uniform;  and  was  to  comprise 
two  brigades  of  infantry  of  two  regiments  each  and  a 
brigade  of  artillery  consisting  of  three  regiments. 

It  was  at  first  expected  to  organize  divisions  of  regular 
troops  numbered  from  i  to  25,  divisions  of  National 
Guard  numbered  from  26  to  75,  and  divisions  of  the 
National  Army  forming  a  series  from  77  to  91.^^ 

The  First  Division,  made  up  for  the  most  part  of  regu- 
lar troops,  was  grouped  together  on  the  wharves  previous 
to  departure,  having  never  up  to  that  time  been  entirely 
assembled.  The  Second  Division  also  was  made  up  of 
units  already  existing  in  peace  time  but,  like  the  first,  never 
occupied  a  divisional  camp  in  America,  being  grouped  to- 
gether only  on  French  soil.  It  included  a  brigade  of 
marines  and  a  brigade  of  regulars. 

In  order  to  form  the  other  divisions,  vast  camps  were 
established,  each  one  with  a  lodging  capacity  for  40,000 
men  or  more. 

Sixteen  of  these  military  cities  were  reserved  for  the 
troops  furnished  by  the  draft,  sixteen  others  for  the 
National  Guard  divisions,  the  latter  of  whom,  assembled 
at  first  in  their  own  States,  were  given  preliminary  train- 
ing in  local  camps  under  the  supervision  of  the  generals 

18  The  Ninety-second  and  Ninety-third  Divisions  which  came  to  Europe 
were  composed  of  colored  troops. 


30      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

commanding  the  different  departments.  In  the  month  of 
September,  19 17,  they  began  to  pour  In  great  numbers 
into  the  camps  prepared  for  their  reception  by  the  Federal 
authorities. 

In  the  same  month,  the  recruits  sent  directly  from  the 
local  Incorporation  boards,  began  also  to  reach  the  divi- 
sional training  camps. 

As  to  the  regular  divisions  —  not  to  speak  of  the  al- 
ready mentioned  First  dind  Second  —  they  were  sent  for 
training  into  those  camps  which  had  been  occupied  and 
left  vacant  by  the  units  of  the  National  Guard  and  the 
National  Army  which  had  been  the  first  to  embark  for 
France. 

Once  assembled  in  these  training  centers  a  long  wait, 
sometimes  of  many  months,  was  imposed  upon  most  of 
the  divisions  on  account  of  the  shortage  In  sea  transporta- 
tion facilities. 

This  time  was  not,  however,  lost,  but  on  the  contrary 
was  employed  in  valuable  Instruction  for  officers,  non- 
commissioned officers,  and  men.  Under  the  guidance  of 
their  own  chiefs  and  with  the  advice  of  prominent 
techniclsts  in  every  branch  of  the  service  furnished  by 
the  French  and  British  armies,  the  Americans  underwent 
strenuous  drilling  exercises  and  became  adept  in  the  use 
of  most  of  the  weapons  which  serve  in  modern  warfare. 

A  number  of  American  officers,  among  whom  were  in- 
cluded the  generals  commanding  the  divisions  which  were 
in  training,  came  over  at  this  time  for  a  short  period  of 
actual  experience  at  the  front. 

The  program  to  be  followed  was  drawn  up  for  the 
division  training  camps  by  the  training  section  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  In  Washington  which  remained  in  close  touch 
with  the  headquarters  of  the  Expeditionary  Forces.^^ 

1*  See  Chapter  II,  Methods  of  Instruction. 


Universal  Military  Service  ^t 

Unfortunately  there  was  a  serious  shortage  in  the 
equipment  necessary  for  the  conduct  of  modern  war. 
This  shortage  applied  to  practically  all  kinds  of  equip- 
ment, including  rifles,  machine  guns  and  trench  mortars. 
The  lack  was  most  felt,  however,  in  artillery,  aviation, 
and  tank  material. 

The  difficulties  in  regard  to  rifle  shortage  were  solved 
by  the  issue  to  National  Army  divisions  of  the  old  Krag- 
Jorgensen  rifle  of  which  there  were  several  hundred  thou- 
sand on  hand  until  the  model  19 17  rifle  which  had  been 
adopted  began  to  be  produced  in  sufficient  quantity, 
October  and  November,  191 7.  The  artillery  material 
with  which  the  American  Army  had  been  equipped  was 
allotted,  as  far  as  available  numbers  would  permit,  to  all 
artillery  organizations,  so  that  usually  each  regiment  had 
a  few  guns  with  which  to  begin  training.  Where  this 
was  not  practicable,  as  in  the  case  of  the  heavier  field 
types,  wooden  models  were  made  by  the  organizations  for 
training  purposes.  Similar  expedients  were  resorted  to 
in  the  case  of  trench  mortars,  both  light  and  heavy  types. 
The  problem  of  equipment  for  machine-gun  and  auto- 
matic-rifle training  was  solved  in  part  by  obtaining  a 
variety  of  these  weapons  in  addition  to  a  number  of 
Benet-Mercier,  Colt,  Maxim,  and  Catling  guns  already 
on  hand.  Those  so  obtained  included  Chauchat  rifles  and 
Hotchkiss  machine  guns  from  the  French,  and  Vickers 
guns  from  the  British. 

Prior  to  their  entrance  into  war,  the  United  States 
Army  comprised  only  nine  regiments  of  field  artillery. 
Under  the  provisions  of  the  National  Defense  Act,  this 
number  was  increased  on  May  15,  19 17,  to  twenty-one 
regiments.  The  National  Guard  was  likewise  lacking  in 
a  large  number  of  artillery  organizations.     In  order  to 


32      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

remedy  this,  cavalry  regiments  of  the  Regular  Army  and 
infantry  regiments  of  the  National  Guard  were  converted 
into  field  artillery  units.  Naturally,  the  great  shortage 
In  artillery  equipment  was  felt  particularly  In  these  or- 
ganizations the  personnel  of  which  had  had  no  experience 
in  this  branch  of  the  service. 

The  materials  —  cannons,  mortars,  airplanes  —  sent 
from  France  and  England  for  training  purposes  were 
not  always  as  numerous  as  desired  and  a  great  many 
were  of  antiquated  types. 

Other  schools  and  other  units  for  specialists  were 
created  as  occasion  arose,  and  formed  by  the  War  Depart- 
ment. 

We  have  thus  seen  in  a  general  way  how  the  mobiliza- 
tion and  constitution  of  divisions  was  carried  out  in 
America  and  how  the  instruction  of  these  Improvised 
forces  which  were  soon  to  play  so  Important  a  part  in 
the  European  battle-fields  was  undertaken. 

For  us  Frenchmen  the  term  mobilization  has  a  more 
extensive  meaning.  It  includes  not  only  all  the  above- 
mentioned  processes  necessary  for  the  constitution  of 
fighting  units,  but  also  the  preliminary  measures  essential 
for  the  furnishing  of  transportation,  equipment,  horses, 
and  all  the  supplies  requisite  to  make  a  military  force 
live,  move,  and  fight. 

An  account  of  this  series  of  operations  which,  in  order 
to  become  effective,  required  not  only  time  and  money, 
but  also  the  extensive  aid  of  the  Allies  who  were  already 
engaged  in  war,  will  find  its  natural  place  In  the  chapters 
devoted  to  the  services  of  the  rear  and  the  line  of  com- 
munications utilized  in  France  by  the  American  Expedi- 
tionary Forces. 


CHAPTER  II 

ARRIVAL    OF    GENERAL    PERSHING    IN    FRANCE  —  FIRST 

PLANS FORMATION    OF    THE    GENERAL    STAFF 

ORGANIZATION    OF     FIGHTING    UNITS SELECTION 

OF  ORDNANCE  MATERIAL  AND  OTHER  EQUIPMENT 

METHODS  OF  TRAINING CAMPS SCHOOLS ES- 
TABLISHMENT OF  GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS  AT 
CHAUMONT 

The  S.  S.  Baltic  which  left  New  York  on  the  twenty- 
eighth  of  May,  19 1 7,  had  on  board  General  John  J. 
Pershing  accompanied  by  his  hastily  improvised  staff. 

The  Allied  governments  had  been  informed  of  his  ap- 
pointment to  the  command  of  the  Expeditionary  Forces, 
but  aside  from  his  name  and  its  associations  with  recent 
American  operations  on  the  Mexican  border,  little  was 
known  in  Europe  of  the  man  who  was  called  upon  to 
assume  such  important  functions. 

In  America,  on  the  contrary.  General  Pershing  was 
known  to  all  and  enjoyed  a  high  and  well-earned  military 
reputation  in  the  United  States  Army. 

At  the  West  Point  Academy,  in  the  early  days  of  his 
training,  he  was  equally  esteemed  and  liked  by  both  in- 
structors and  comrades.  He  graduated  in  1886  well  at 
the  head  of  his  class,  of  which  he  was  chosen  president;  a 
good  indication  of  popularity  as  well  as  ability. 

He  had  selected  the  cavalry  as  his  particular  branch  of 
the  service,  and,  after  graduation,  he  made  a  reputation 

23 


34      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

as  an  active  campaigner  in  the  Indian  country  scouting 
over  the  plains  and  mountains  of  New  Mexico,  Arizona, 
and  Montana. 

He  was  particularly  successful  in  coping  with  the  fre- 
quent Apache  outbreaks  and  was  not  only  remarkable  for 
his  untiring  work  on  the  trail  but  also  gave  proof  of  great 
tact  and  diplomacy  in  dealing  with  that  warlike  tribe. 
His  excellent  services  soon  brought  him  under  the  favor- 
able notice  of  such  veteran  Indian  fighters  as  General 
Nelson  A.  Miles  and  associated  him  with  the  galaxy  of 
officers  who  surrounded  him  —  both  on  the  plains  and 
in  the  Spanish  War  —  Lawton,  Leonard  Wood,  Hugh  E. 
Scott,  and  many  others. 

In  1896  we  find  him  detached  from  his  command  as 
military  instructor  in  the  University  of  Nebraska,  and 
there  while  teaching  his  own  course,  he  became  at  the 
same  time  student  of  law  in  this  college  and  was  admitted 
to  the  State  bar.  In  consequence  of  his  successful  work 
he  was  designated  as  instructor  at  West  Point  in  the 
tactical  department,  remaining  until  the  outbreak  of  war 
with  Spain  at  which  time  he  asked  and  obtained  leave  to 
participate  in  action  with  the  Tenth  Cavalry  regiment. 
After  the  attack  on  San  Juan  Hill  he  was  cited  by  his 
colonel  as  the  officer  of  the  regiment  who  had  shown  the 
greatest  coolness  under  fire. 

At  the  termination  of  this  campaign,  he  was  entrusted 
with  the  organization  of  the  "  Bureau  of  Insular  Affairs  " 
under  the  direction  of  the  War  Department.  He  subse- 
quently applied  for  colonial  service  and  was  sent  to  the 
Philippines.  There  he  remained  at  the  conclusion  of 
his  period  of  service,  and  took  command  of  the  troops 
participating  in  the  campaign  against  the  Moros. 

Having  made  a  complete  success  of  this  enterprise 


General  Pershing^ s  Arrival  35 

which  brought  him  considerable  celebrity,  Captain  Persh- 
ing was  at  once  proposed  on  his  return  to  Washington 
for  the  rank  of  Brigadier-General;  the  proposition  was 
not  seconded,  but  his  talents  having  been  generally  re- 
marked there  was  no  hesitation  shown  In  confiding  to  the 
young  officer  the  post,  which  circumstances  rendered  ex- 
tremely important,  of  military  attache  In  Tokyo  whence, 
In  the  capacity  of  observer  he  was  able  to  follow  all  the 
operations  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War. 

In  1906  Captain  Pershing  obtained  his  stars. 

He  was  once  more  called  upon  to  return  to  the  Philip- 
pines, where  he  was  shortly  appointed  governor  of  the 
province  of  Mindanao,  with  very  extensive  powers; 
during  the  exercise  of  these  functions  he  showed  himself 
a  most  patient  and  able  administrator.  To  his  Initiative 
and  organizing  capacity  are  due  many  roads,  schools,  and 
hospitals  established  In  that  province. 

Then,  we  find  his  name  especially  connected  with  the 
Mexican  expedition.  Starting  at  the  head  of  an  Infantry 
brigade  reenforced  by  a  cavalry  regiment,  he  was  soon  to 
take  over  entire  direction  of  the  punitive  operations  which 
had  been  decided  upon  by  the  American  Government. 

The  rapidity  of  his  movements  was  a  revelation  to 
those  who  were  aware  of 'all  the  difficulties  of  execution 
entailed  by  such  maneuvers.  In  twenty-four  days  he 
had  traversed  the  State  of  Chihuahua  and  had  attained 
the  lines  of  Durango,  a  distance  of  five  hundred  miles 
through  a  country  where  the  hardships  incident  to  lack 
of  supplies  were  Immense.  Heading  a  detachment  of 
cavalry  and  mounted  artillery  he  made  a  raid  of  one 
hundred  and  twenty  miles  In  forty-two  hours. 

On  returning  from  Mexico  he  obtained  command  of  the 
Southern  Division  taking  In  most  of  the  territory  compre- 


36      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

hended  in  the  old  Confederation  and  also  the  southern 
border  States. 

The  officers  who  accompanied  General  Pershing  on  the 
Baltic  were  his  aides-de-camp,  his  chief  of  staff,  and  the 
future  heads  of  the  most  important  among  the  army 
services.  In  London,  where  they  remained  but  a  few 
days,  General  Pershing  had  interviews  with  the  King  and 
members  of  the  government,  who  had  special  connection 
with  the  military  operations  then  in  progress,  while  his 
companions,  visiting  the  War  Office,  profited  by  their 
short  sojourn  to  put  themselves  in  touch  with  the  English 
services  which  corresponded  to  the  several  branches  of 
which  each  was  about  to  assume  the  direction. 

On  June  13th,  at  about  five  in  the  afternoon.  General 
Pershing  arrived  in  Paris,  where  he  was  met  by  a  popular 
manifestation  as  remarkable  for  the  warmth  of  its  en- 
thusiasm as  by  its  spontaneity,  for  the  first  news  of  his 
arrival  was  only  made  known  through  the  evening  papers 
of  the  same  day. 

On  leaving  the  Gare  du  Nord  accompanied  by  M. 
Painleve,  Minister  of  War,  and  Marshal  Joffre,  he  was 
the  object  of  a  magnificent  ovation,  which  continued  all 
along  the  route  up  to  the  Place  de  la  Concorde  where  he 
was  to  take  up  his  residence.  He  was  acclaimed  by  the 
Parisians  with  an  emotion  as  intense  as  it  was  sincere. 

The  offices  of  the  American  headquarters  had  been 
instalbd  on  the  Rue  de  Constantine  near  the  Invalides, 
and  there,  on  the  morning  following  his  arrival,  General 
Pershing  went  to  work  upon  the  plans  which  were  to 
govern  the  organization  of  his  army.  As  to  instructions 
he  had  few  or  none.     His  actual  duty  consisted  in  taking 


First  Plans  37 

command  of  the  American  forces  from  the  moment  of 
their  debarkation,  to  organize  them  progressively  in  such 
a  manner  that  the  Allied  victory  might  be  rapidly  ob- 
tained. Thus  the  plan  was  apparently  simple;  its  ex- 
ecution, as  will  be  seen,  was  long,  complicated,  and  dif- 
ficult. 

Two  dominant  ideas,  from  the  very  beginning,  inspired 
all  subsequent  determinations  which  the  general  was 
called  upon  to  take;  and  It  may  be  justly  said  that  General 
Pershing  followed  out  the  realization  of  his  ideal  with  a 
constancy  of  purpose  which  alone  ought  to  earn  him  the 
particular  gratitude  and  appreciation  of  his  own  country 
and  those  of  his  Allies. 

The  commander  of  the  Expeditionary  Forces  was  de- 
termined to  organize  them  in  such  a  manner  as  to  keep 
for  the  army  of  the  United  States  its  national  autonomy; 
he  was  also  determined  to  instill  into  this  army  the  offen- 
sive spirit  in  its  most  ardent  form. 

He  was  well  acquainted  with  the  martial  qualities  and 
military  defects  of  his  compatriots,  and  he  knew  that  the 
American  citizen,  once  entered  into  the  career  of  arms 
was  capable  of  making  an  excellent  soldier  provided  he 
was  directed  by  methods  consistent  with  the  development 
of  his  warlike  virtues.     For,  as  has  been  excellently  said : 

'*  There  exists  between  the  military  habit  and  democratic 
customs  a  secret  link  which  only  war  can  make  apparent.  The 
men  who  dwell  in  a  democracy  have  a  natural  desire  to  acquire 
rapidly  the  material  benefits  for  which  they  strive,  and  when 
acquired,  it  is  natural  for  these  men  to  enjoy  their  easily. 
Audacious,  they  love  to  risk,  but  most  of  them  fear  death  less  than 
penury  and  suffering.  In  this  spirit  which  directs  their  industry 
and  commerce  and  which  they  carry  with  them  on  the  battle- 
field, they  are  moved  readily  to  expose  their  lives,  to  assure  by 
doing  so  the  fruits  of  victory.     There  is  no  success  which  is  so 


38      2  he  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

striking  to  the  imagination  of  a  democratic  people  as  military  suc- 
cess, for  it  is  achieved  rapidly  with  brief  and  concentrated  effort 
and  with  no  risk  but  of  life. 

"  Thus  while  their  ordinary  tastes  and  customs  incline  the  citi- 
zens of  a  republic  to  avoid  the  military  career,  their  manner  of 
thought  prepares  them  to  wage  war  well.  And  once  uprooted 
from  their  business  habits  and  their  comfortable  ways  they  readily 
make  excellent  fighters.  Peace  is  particularly  harmful  to  the 
army  of  a  democracy ;  war,  on  the  contrary,  assures  to  such  a  force 
advantages  unknown  to  other  armies." 

It  may  be  supposed  that  General  Pershing  understood 
his  countrymen  quite  as  well  as  Tocqueville  eighty  years 
before  him,  and  that  he  was  aware  that  the  American 
farmer,  of  simple  life,  laborious  habits,  and  often  subject 
to  severe  privations,  would  necessarily  make  an  energetic 
and  uncomplaining  soldier.  As  to  the  commercial  and  In- 
dustrial elements  furnished  by  the  business  centers,  they 
also  Inspired  his  full  confidence;  while  perhaps  more  diffi- 
cult to  handle  than  the  contingents  from  rural  districts 
they  shared  In  the  same  spirit  of  ambitious  Independence 
and  moral  energy.  The  most  Important  thing  was  to 
develop  these  qualities  along  military  lines  and  the  most 
indispensable  element  to  this  development  was  that  the 
new  formations  should  be  officered  under  a  competent 
command. 

The  general-In-chlef  had  decided  to  profit  by  the  ex- 
perience of  the  Allies  and  to  take  their  council,  If  need 
were,  but  he  was  quite  determined,  also,  to  reserve  the 
right  to  judge  In  what  manner  he  would  adapt,  for  the 
profit  of  his  army,  the  conclusions  suggested  to  him  by  the 
veterans  of  the  war. 

A  close  study  of  the  reports  which  had  come  under  his 
attention,  and  a  rapid  Inspection  of  the  French  ports,  com- 


First  Plans  39 

bined  to  make  the  general  at  once  adopt  all  the  conclu- 
sions that  had  been  reached  by  the  American  military 
commission  which  had  preceded  him  in  this  journey. 
Consequently,  St.  Nazaire  first  and  Bordeaux  second, 
were  chosen  as  the  harbors  which  were  to  be  used  for  the 
debarkation  of  the  American  troops.  He  also  approved 
the  choice  of  railroads  which  were  to  supply  the  armies, 
but  this  latter  with  one  reserve,  that  the  lines  chosen 
would  be  those  best  fitted  to  reach  that  part  of  the  front 
ultimately  entrusted  to  the  American  troops  when  they 
should  come  into  action;  for  at  this  date  the  destination 
of  the  American  forces  was  not  definitely  settled. 

The  general  was  therefore  naturally  impatient  to  de- 
cide with  the  commander  of  the  French  forces  upon  the 
scene  of  operation  where  his  armies  would  be  called  upon 
to  act. 

While  his  staff  and  services  were  getting  in  touch  with 
their  corresponding  bureaux  in  Paris  —  where  the 
Ministry  of  War,  according  to  the  instructions  of  M. 
Painleve  had  opened  wide  its  doors  to  receive  them  — 
General  Pershing  was  frequently  on  the  road  to  Com- 
piegne  in  order  to  consult  with  General  Petain  over  the 
plans  and  projects  governing  the  organization  and  ulti- 
mate engagement  of  his  armies. 

Let  us  attempt  to  set  before  the  reader  one  of  these 
first  interviews.  The  circumstances  are  yet  sufficiently 
fresh  in  the  minds  of  every  one  to  make  it  unnecessary  to 
dwell  upon  the  emotional  gravity  of  this  encounter. 

The  French  commander  found  himself  in  a  position 
which  his  knowledge  of  the  actual  situation  made  it 
impossible  for  him  to  embellish  by  any  spirit  of  optimism. 

Even  had  he  wished  to  remain  under  any  illusion  as  to 


40      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

the  possibilities  which  were  confronting  him,  the  great 
map  which  hung  before  his  eyes  behind  his  office  table 
would  have  reminded  him  at  every  instant  of  the  im- 
mensity of  the  task  before  him  and  the  dwindling  re- 
sources at  his  command. 

From  Belfort  to  the  Oise,  the  enemy's  trenches  were 
still  plentifully  manned,  and  it  was  evident  that,  if  Russia 
retired  from  the  combat,  the  German  troops,  released 
from  their  positions  in  the  East,  would  swell  the  ranks  of 
defenders  already  in  line. 

This  living  wall,  which  the  map  displayed  to  our  gen- 
eral, had  already  once  been  broken  by  him,  and  by  him 
only  at  the  head  of  his  thirty-third  corps  at  Carency  on 
the  ninth  of  May,  19 15,  but  might  it  not  now  and  almost 
any  day  move  forward  to  the  capital,  and  how  could  the 
present  menace,  increasing  daily  with  the  growing 
strength  of  the  adversary,  be  effectively  met  and 
countered? 

The  offensive  ardor  which  was  a  natural  instinct  as 
well  as  a  military  precept  with  our  chief  was  completed  by 
his  clear  and  logical  reason,  and  he  could  not  disguise 
from  himself  that  the  situation  of  the  effectives  under  his 
command  —  known  better  to  him  than  to  another  —  was 
grave  indeed.  His  thoughts  were  thus  constantly 
brought  back  from  the  domain  of  speculation  and  desire 
to  grim  realities. 

The  victory  which  he  was  bound  to  attain  could  be  won 
only  when  he  had  fashioned  the  instrument.  How  could 
he  foresee  the  day  of  Its  completion,  now  that  he  possessed 
neither  the  adequate  number  of  infantry  nor  yet  an 
artillery  which  by  Its  massed  fire  was  capable  of  protecting 
the  approach  and  seconding  the  attack  of  the  foot  soldier? 
This  theory  of  powerful  concentration  of  fire  he  had  him- 


First  Plans  41 

self  demonstrated  at  the  War  School  with  as  much  ability 
as  conviction. 

While  the  forces  under  his  command  were  gradually 
preparing  for  an  offensive,  following  their  instruction 
in  training  camps,  in  the  trenches,  and  even  on  the  bat- 
tle-fields, but  with  limited  objectives,  while  waiting  the 
time  when  the  arms  and  munitions  supplied  by  the  in- 
terior should  arrive  in  sufficient  numbers,  their  chief  was 
seeking  to  fix  the  propitious  hour,  the  advantageous 
ground  for  a  decisive  assault. 

It  was  on  one  of  these  days  of  anxious  waiting  and  of 
unremitting  labor  that  General  Pershing  appeared  at 
Compiegne,  and  with  him  the  French  commander  saw  ar- 
riving at  the  same  instant  the  possibility  of  attack. 
Memorable  indeed  was  the  day  on  which  these  two  men 
met.  The  American  gifted  with  the  best  qualities  of  his 
young  and  freedom-loving  race,  with  vigorous  and  prac- 
tical sense,  explained  his  conception  of  that  organization 
which  he  was  determined  to  create.  The  Frenchman, 
with  the  penetrating  mind  of  the  precisian,  the  acumen 
of  the  expert  tactician,  and  the  flexible  logic  of  the  man 
of  learning,  bent  his  wisdom  and  his  experience  to  measure 
this  new  and  unknown  force  which  came  armed  to  him 
from  the  New  World. 

He  saw  this  force  now  incarnate  before  him  in  the  per- 
son whom  he  addressed.  Clean-cut  and  expressive  of 
feature,  tall  and  broad-shouldered,  with  the  curt,  incisive 
gesture  common  to  the  man  of  action,  impatient  with  the 
effort  of  expression  in  a  foreign  tongue,  and  of  transform- 
ing his  thought  into  activity.  General  Pershing's  energetic 
profile  recalled  the  line  of  that  bronzed  and  warlike  figure 
of  the  Venetian  Colleone  with  clenched  fist;  typical,  also, 
of  those  stalwart  American  men  of  his,  whose  sinewy 


42      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

hands  would  soon  be  closing  upon  their  fixed  bayonets. 

In  spite  of  all  barriers  made  by  disparity  of  language, 
of  habits  and  method,  these  men  were  predestined  to  com- 
prehend one  another  and  had  many  points  of  mutual  con- 
tact. Both  shared  the  same  clear-headed  prudence  and 
powerful  mind,  both  were  dowered  with  resolute  per- 
severance and  indomitable  will,  both  had  the  inherent  love 
and  practice  of  hard  and  constant  work,  the  same  dis- 
regard for  undeserved  criticism,  the  same  horror  of 
popular  outcry  and  party  intrigue. 

The  friendly  collaboration  of  such  a  pair  was  therefore 
certain  to  be  close  and  its  results  epoch-making. 

The  decisions  taken  during  those  first  Interviews  were 
far-reaching  and  solved  many  difficult  questions,  even 
those  of  the  still  distant  future.  Later  on  events  fully 
justified  all  these  Initial  determinations.  Events  also 
justified  the  truth  and  appositeness  of  the  formula  which 
terminated  one  of  their  conversations,  the  application  of 
which  brought  about  victory:  "A  defensive  strategy 
until  the  Americans  are  ready  to  come  Into  line.'* 

After  General  Pershing  had  developed  his  conception 
of  a  great  American  army,  described  the  means  which 
the  United  States  were  to  furnish,  and  formulated  the 
hopes  which  he  founded  upon  the  dates  of  the  debarka- 
tions, came  the  time  when  It  was  necessary  to  study  the 
map,  in  order  to  determine  upon  the  future  zone  where 
our  new  associates  were  to  operate,  and  here  the  choice 
was  necessarily  made  by  the  process  of  elimination. 

It  would  have  been  impossible  to  change  the  sector 
which  the  British  held  from  the  Channel  up  to  the  Olse 
where  for  three  years  they  had  worked  on  constructions  of 
all  sorts;  this  region  was  also  In  line  with  their  supply  base. 


First  Plans  43 

From  the  Olse  to  Verdun  there  were  various  sectors, 
but  this  ground  might  at  any  moment  become  an  immense 
battle-field,  and  it  was  impossible  to  count  at  that  part  of 
the  front  upon  the  fixity  of  the  lines. ^  It  was,  of  course, 
essential  that  the  first  American  experiments  in  arms 
should  be  begun  in  a  relatively  quiet  trench  sector  which 
could  guarantee  the  stability  of  its  defense. 

On  the  other  hand  it  was  quite  indispensable  to  keep 
the  territory  about  Paris  free  and  the  railroad  lines  un- 
congested,  in  order  to  permit  maneuvering  in  case  the 
enemy  should  succeed  in  breaking  through,  and  in  threat- 
ening the  capital. 

The  mountainous  region  of  the  Vosges  presented  the 
drawback  of  forcing  the  new  soldiers  to  practice  a  warfare 
of  a  very  special  nature  which  was  calculated  to  unfit  them 
for  those  battles  which  later  would  probably  take  them 
in  to  open  ground. 

There  remained  the  Lorraine  front,  which  seemed  to 
be  more  favorable  to  the  needs  of  the  American  army. 
This  region  possessed  large  plains  of  sufficient  extent  to 
permit  of  preparatory  infantry  maneuvers  and  sufficient 
high  ground  to  allow  the  artillery  to  make  use  of  ob- 
servatories. 

Saint-Mihiel  presented  a  tempting  salient  for  decisive 
attacks  at  the  moment  when  the  American  forces  might 
be  expected  to  arrive  in  great  strength. ^ 

General  Pershing  was  inclined  to  favor  the  choice  of 
this  sector  after  a  careful  consideration  of  the  results 
of  his  study  of  the  line  of  communication.     As  we  have 

^The  French  armies  had  already  taken  the  offensive  several  times  on 
certain  portions  of  this  front. 

2  The  operations  for  the  taking  of  St.  Mihiel  were  discussed  during  one 
of  the  very  first  interviews  between  General  Pershing  and  General 
Petain. 


44      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

seen,  It  was  essential  to  seek  a  point  for  the  eventual 
abutting  of  the  American  effort  in  a  region  directly  in  line 
with  the  American  railroads  and  maritime  bases. 

It  was  also  decided  that  the  French  command  in  the 
front  zone,  and  our  war  ministry  in  the  rear  should  place 
at  the  disposal  of  the  American  armies  a  number  of  camps 
in  proximity  with  the  lines  of  communication,  which  would 
make  it  possible  to  complete  the  instruction  of  the  divi- 
sions arriving  from  the  United  States  before  coming  into 
line. 

The  village  of  Gondrecourt  with  its  outlying  districts 
was  chosen  for  the  infantry  of  the  first  division.  In  the 
meantime  the  artillery  of  this  same  division  was  to  pro- 
ceed to  Valdahon  (near  Besanqon)  for  firing  practice. 
This  training  ground  was  a  little  far  from  the  American 
railway  lines,  but  possessed  the  advantage  of  having 
barracks  and  other  installations  which  could  at  once  be 
utilized. 

The  two  commanders-in-chief  frequently  met  to  ex- 
change their  views  upon  the  methods  of  instruction  which 
were  to  be  enforced.  And  while  waiting  the  time  when 
General  Pershing  could  dispose  of  a  sufficient  number  of 
well-drilled  officers  indispensable  for  the  training  of  his 
troops,  the  French  command  arranged  to  detach  from 
their  ranks  an  entire  division  which  might  serve  as  guide 
and  model  to  the  first  American  unit  which  had  disem- 
barked. They  also  agreed  upon  the  eventual  manner  of 
placing  the  American  troops  in  line  when  their  instruction 
should  be  complete. 

No  time  was  lost  in  following  up  all  the  decisions  upon 
which  General  Petain  and  General  Pershing  had  reached 
an  agreement  in  order  to  set  the  American  contingents 
to  work  from  the  very  moment  of  their  landing.     One  of 


Formation  of  General  Staff  45 

the  most  pressing  questions  was  the  constitution  of  a 
General  Staff. 

Up  to  this  time  the  American  army  regulations  had 
not  foreseen  more  than  three  sections  among  which 
the  entire  constructive  labor  of  the  field  armies  was 
divided.  The  first  was  the  Bureau  of  Operations,  the 
second  that  of  Information,  the  third  directed  the 
general  Administration  of  the  army.  Such  a  division 
of  work  had  now  become  inadequate  for  a  General 
Staff  of  such  importance  as  that  of  the  Expeditionary 
Forces. 

After  thoroughly  studying  the  working  of  the  French 
"  Grand  Quartier  "  and  the  British  general  headquarters 
and  weighing  the  particular  conditions  in  which  the  Ameri- 
can army  would  be  placed,  General  Pershing  decided  to 
form  his  staff  along  the  following  lines  : 

At  the  head  was  placed  a  chief  of  staff  ^  holding  the 
rank  of  major-general,  assisted  by  a  deputy  chief  of  staff  * 
when  active  operations  were  in  progress.  Five  sections 
were  to  be  created,  each  one  having  at  its  head  a  brigadier- 
general.  These  sections  were  charged  with  the  arrange- 
ment and  organization  as  follows : 

First  (known  as  G-i)  :  Organization  and  equipment 
of  troops,  effectives,  replacements  and  remounts,  questions 
regarding  tonnage  and  priority  in  ocean  transportation, 
and  military  benevolent  associations.^ 

Second  (known  as  G-2)  :     Intelligence  service,  censor- 

*The  first  chief  of  staff  of  the  American  Army  was  General  James 
G.  Harbord.  He  was  succeeded  on  the  fifth  of  May,  1918,  by  General 
James  W.  McAndrew. 

*  General  LeRoy  Eltinge  was  appointed  deputy  chief  of  staflF  on  May  i, 
1918. 

°  Colonel  James  A.  Logan  was  first  chief  cf  this  section.  He  was 
succeeded  by  General  Alvery  D.  Andrews  on  August  21,  1918. 


46      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

ship,  secret-service,  counter-espionage,  circulation,  and 
map  section.^ 

Third  (known  as  G-3)  :  Military  operations,  strate- 
gical study,  plans,  orders,  reconnaissances,  location  of 
troops,  concentrations  and  liaison  with  the  armies  in  ac- 
tive operation  and  the  allied  armiesJ 

Fourth  (known  as  G-4)  :  Supplies,  transportation, 
labor,  statistics,  hospitalization  and  evacuation,  distribu- 
tion of  the  units  arriving  in  France  and  employment  of 
operatives.^ 

Fifth  (known  as  G-5)  :  Principles  and  methods  of 
instruction,  training  centers,  schools,  manuals,  and  regula- 
tions.^ 

This  last-named  section,  which  does  not  exist  in  our 
French  staff  or  rather  which  is  subsidiary  to  the  operation 
section,  was  destined  to  be  extremely  important  to  the 
American  Army. 

General  Pershing  did  everything  to  extend  the  activities 
of  this  section  whose  role  was  not  only  to  supervise  the 
general  instruction  of  the  troops  actually  in  France,  but 
also  to  advise  and  determine  the  courses  followed  in  the 
United  States. 

There  exists  in  the  American  staff  bureau  an  instru- 
ment which  our  French  service  lacks.  This  is  the  func- 
tion of  the  adjutant-general.^^ 

6  This  section  remained  during  the  whole  war  under  the  direction  of 
General  Dennis  E.  Nolan. 

"^The  first  chief  of  this  section  was  Colonel  John  McA.  Palmer.  He 
was  succeeded  in  the  early  days  by  General  Fox-Connor. 

8  This  section  was  at  first  headed  by  Colonel  W.  D.  Connor,  who  was 
in  turn  succeeded  in  May,  1918,  by  General  George  Van  H.  Moseley. 

9  This  section  was  commanded  by  Colonel  Paul  B.  Malone,  who  in 
February,  1918,  was  succeeded  by  Harold  B.  Fiske. 

10  The  first  adjutant-general  was  General  Benjamin  Alvord.  He  was 
succeeded,  when  he  left  France  for  America,  by  General  Robert  C.  Davis. 


Organization  of  Fighting  Units  47 

The  commander-in-chief  of  the  American  forces  gave 
to  this  function  a  very  important  role. 

The  adjutant-general  is  entrusted  with  the  current 
work,  the  keeping  of  archives  and  books,  the  registration 
and  formulation  of  administrative  orders,  the  settlement 
of  the  questions  of  personnel,  the  examination  and  estab- 
lishment of  promotion,  individual  notes,  printing  service, 
identification  cards,  prisoners,  and  recruiting.  The 
adjutant-general  keeps  in  constant  touch  with  the  com- 
mander-in-chief and  the  chief  of  staff  with  whom  he  re- 
mains in  intimate  relation.  He  participates  in  their  mess, 
prepares  and  registers  a  large  part  of  their  correspond- 
ence, and'attends  to  the  important  service  of  the  cipher 
with  Washington.  In  short  his  role  is  that  of  a  co- 
ordinating link  between  all  the  staff  services.  The 
adjutant-general  in  Chaumont  employed  some  58  officers 
and  700  men. 

Naturally  the  great  importance  of  the  department  was 
largely  due  to  the  fact  that  the  American  Army  was 
operating  far  from  home.  It  was  therefore  necessary  for 
General  Pershing  to  assure  through  his  staff  a  number 
of  those  services  which  in  the  French  Army  are  under- 
taken by  our  Ministry  of  War. 

The  constitution  of  fighting  units  was  now  the  principal 
preoccupation  of  the  American  high  command  during  the 
days  of  preparation. 

Herein  General  Pershing  gave  his  preference  to  a  sys- 
tem which,  while  perhaps  less  elastic  than  our  own,  was 
more  prudent  and  practical  considering  the  great  distance 
which  was  to  separate  the  future  combatants  from  their 
original  base.  He  intended  to  place  in  the  front  line 
units  sufficiently  strong  both  in  troops  and  material  to  be 


48      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

able  to  maintain  themselves  for  a  considerable  time  with- 
out constantly  calling  for  fresh  supplies  and  reenforce- 
ments.  In  comparison  with  French  units,  depleted  by  four 
years  of  warfare,  we  may  compute  that  the  formations  of 
our  new  ally  were  about  double  the  strength  of  our  own. 

The  army  corps  was  formed  with  six  divisions.  Four 
of  these  were  to  be  employed  in  active  service,  one  was  for 
replacement,  one  for  depot.  The  army  corps  also  in- 
cluded some  non-divisional  units,  practically  forming  a 
total  of  6,050  officers  and  170,000  men. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  this  formation  of  the  army 
corps  was  absolutely  rigid  and  immutable,  and  one  in 
which  General  Pershing  admitted  of  no  modification;  on 
the  contrary,  the  constitution  of  the  army  corps  which 
we  have  described  had  as  a  principal  object  to  supply  a 
permanent  base  of  computation  for  the  calculations  neces- 
sitated by  the  priority  schedules.  In  this  manner  the 
proper  number  of  troops  with  their  auxiliaries  could  be 
reckoned  upon  by  the  transportation  experts. 

The  commander-in-chief  had,  as  we  have  said,  closely 
observed  the  methods  employed  by  the  French  and  British 
for  the  handling  of  their  fighting  units,  especially  those 
which  were  engaged  in  active  operations,  and  he  was 
fully  persuaded  of  the  desirability  of  forming  an  organism 
which  would  not  be  too  rigid  nor  too  unwieldy  for  the 
exigencies  of  modern  warfare. 

Later  on  the  divisions  which  had  at  first  been  denomi- 
nated "  replacement  divisions  ''  were  used  like  the  others 
as  fighting  units,  and  the  army  corps,  as  in  France,  was 
transformed  into  a  merely  tactical  organ.  As  for  the 
depot  divisions,  they  became  a  sort  of  a  reservoir  fur- 
nishing the  fighting  units  with  men  and  officers  to  replace 


Organization  of  Fighting  Units  49 

those  whom  illness  or  the  enemy's  fire  had  forced  to  leave 
the  first  lines. 

The  non-divisional  elements  of  the  army  corps  included 
about  500  officers  and  16,000  enlisted  men  organized  as 
follows : 

One  brigade  of  corps  artillery  (usually  that  of  the 
depot  division),  consisting  of  one  regiment  of  155  heavy 
guns  and  one  of  4.7  inch  guns,  of  American  manufacture 
or  else  two  regiments  of  155. 

One  battalion  of  trench  artillery  consisting  of  four 
batteries  of  240  mm. 

One  battalion  of  four  batteries  of  auto-cannon  for  anti- 
aircraft defense. 

One  machine  gun  battalion  for  the  same  purpose. 

Two  cavalry  regiments. 

One  regiment  of  infantry  pioneers. 

One  engineer  regiment. 

One  field  signal  battalion. 

One  telegraph  battalion. 

One  detachment  of  pontoniers;  besides  trains  (am- 
munition, quartermaster,  etc.)  and  aviation  units  of 
which  the  number  varied  according  to  need. 

The  American  division  consisted  of  979  officers  and 
27,080  men;  it  included: 

Two  infantry  brigades. 

One  brigade  of  field  artillery. 

One  battery  of  trench  mortars. 

One  engineer  regiment  of  two  battalions. 

One  field  signal  battalion. 

One  motorized  machine-gun  battalion  of  two  companies 
and  a  certain  number  of  trains  and  services. 

Thus  constituted  the  division  seemed  well  fitted  for 


50     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

action.  Nevertheless  this  unit,  to  be  well  employed,  had 
to  be  engaged  under  certain  conditions.  Its  artillery  was 
not  sufficiently  powerful  to  cover  a  wide  front;  but  on  a 
narrow  one  —  two  miles  for  instance  —  the  infantry  was 
numerous  enough  to  be  echeloned  in  depth  and  thus  allow 
a  vigorous  attack  or  permit  a  long  resistance. 

The  infantry  brigade  was  composed  of  246  officers  and 
8,169  men.  It  included  a  staff  of  4  officers  and  20  men, 
a  machine-gun  battalion  of  four  companies,  and  two  in- 
fantry regiments. 

The  infantry  regiment  was  formed  of  three  battalions, 
a  machine-gun  company,^^  one  headquarters  company,^^ 
and  a  supply  company.  It  numbered  112  officers  and 
3,720  men. 

The  infantry  battalion  had  26  officers  and  1,000  men 
and  contained  four  companies. 

The  infantry  company  comprised  6  officers  and  250 
men;  it  was  composed  of  a  small  headquarters  detachment 
of  18  men  and  four  platoons  of  58  men  each. 

The  divisional  artillery  was  formed  by  one  brigade  of 
three  regiments  of  two  or  three  battalions  each. 

Two  regiments  manned  each  twenty-four  cannons  of 
75  mm.  and  possessed  two  battalions  of  three  batteries. 

One  regiment  manned  twenty- four  cannons  of  155  mm. 
howitzers  and  possessed  three  battalions  of  two  batteries. 

Thus   formed,   the  brigade   effectives   comprised   208 

11  The  American  machine-gun  company  includes  6  officers  and  172  men. 
It  is  composed  of  three  platoons  of  four  machine  guns  and  disposes  of 
four  spare  guns. 

12  The  headquarters  company  includes  8  officers  and  336  men  distributed 
among  five  platoons,  i.e.:  one  regimental  and  battalion  headquarters 
platoon  including  the  band,  one  platoon  of  telephonists  and  signalers,  one 
platoon  of  sappers  —  bombardiers,  one  platoon  of  pioneers,  one  platoon 
of  three  37  mm.  guns. 


Organization  of  Fighting  Units  51 

officers  and  4,769  men.     The  brigade  disposed  also  of 
3,883  horses. 

The  trench-mortar  battery  of  the  division  numbered  5 
officers  and  163  men. 

Command  of  tactical  units  was  organized  along  the 
following  lines : 

The  regiment  was  commanded  by  a  colonel  assisted  by 
a  lieutenant-colonel. 

The  infantry  or  artillery  brigade  was  placed  under 
orders  of  a  brigadier-general,  whose  staff  consisted,  if 
infantry,  of  5  officers  and  20  men;  if  artillery,  of  9  officers 
and  54  men. 

The  division  was  commanded  by  a  major-general, 
whose  staff  consisted  of  40  officers  and  200  men. 

The  staff  comprised: 

A  chief  of  staff  of  the  rank  of  colonel. 

Three  field  officers,  chiefs  of  supply,  information,  and 
operation. 

Three  aerial  observers. 

One  inspector  general  of  the  rank  of  colonel  charged 
by  the  division  commander  with  inspection,  investigations 
of  all  kinds  concerning  the  instruction  of  troops,  mainte- 
nance of  equipment,  and  administrative  accounts. 

One  adjutant-general,  a  field  officer  whose  duty  was  to 
assure  the  distribution  of  orders,  to  keep  the  archives, 
and  furnish  stationery  and  other  accessories  of  the  office 
work  under  his  supervision. 

One  judge-advocate  charged  with  the  duties  appertain- 
ing to  the  department  of  military  justice  besides  those 
concerning  all  questions  of  claims  and  indemnities  in  which 
matters  he  acts  toward  the  general  in  command  of  the 
division  as  legal  adviser. 


52      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

One  gas  officer. 

One  officer  of  the  signal  corps. 

One  machine-gun  officer. 

One  division  chief  of  engineers  who  is  the  colonel  in 
command  of  the  regiment  of  engineers  belonging  to  the 
division. 

The  army  corps  was  under  the  command  of  a  major- 
general  disposing  of  a  staff  of  54  officers  and  415  men. 

This  staff  comprised  one  chief  of  staff  of  the  rank  of 
brigadier-general  and  all  the  same  chiefs  of  sections  and 
of  services  as  in  the  staff  of  a  division,  with  the  exception 
of  the  machine-gun  officer. 

In  less  than  a  month  after  arriving  in  France  General 
Pershing  was  ready  to  submit  his  organization  plan  to  the 
Department  in  Washington.  It  was  put  into  practical 
effect  with  very  slight  modifications. 

His  projects  included  the  ultimate  formation  of  a  field 
army,  on  the  organization  of  which  he  reserved  his  deci- 
sion. But  in  order  to  have  the  necessary  elements  at 
hand  when  the  time  came,  he  requested  that  space  might 
be  reserved  in  the  priority  schedules  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  the  army  services. 

Certain  derogations  made  later  in  the  original  plans  of 
the  American  headquarters  caused  the  delay  in  the  arrival 
of  the  field  army  services.  But  we  may  already  give  a 
general  idea  of  their  prospective  organization. 

Their  staff  was  to  comprehend  a  number  of  sections 
corresponding  to  those  of  general  headquarters.  The 
army  corps  and  other  component  parts  of  an  army  such 
as  aviation,  engineer,  and  artillery  units  were  to  vary  in 
number.  Each  field  army  was  to  contain  powerful  artil- 
lery formations  including  several  brigades  of  155  mm. 


Selection  of  Equipment  53 

(6  Inch)  guns,  and  several  brigades  of  8  and  9.2  inch 
howitzers,  motorized  regiments  of  French  75  mm.,  and 
brigades  of  railway  artillery  or  of  guns  mounted  on  heavy 
tractors;  for  the  engineers  a  regiment  of  miners,  a  regi- 
ment of  water  supply  service,  a  regiment  of  construction, 
a  regiment  of  electricians,  and  a  regiment  of  park 
material  operators  consisting  of  six  companies. 

The  signal  corps  was  to  furnish  a  field  battalion  with 
two  telegraph  battalions  to  each  army. 

A  more  complete  enumeration  of  the  detachments 
which  each  special  service  was  to  assign  to  the  field  army 
will  be  found  in  Chapter  VI. 

The  selection  of  arms  and  ordnance  material  ^^  was 
inspired  by  a  close  study  of  the  French  and  British  ex- 
perience since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  when  the  choice 
was  not  imposed  by  the  conditions  of  manufacture.  For 
often  it  became  necessary  to  adopt  certain  models  already 
at  hand,  whether  in  the  case  of  rifle,  machine  gun,  or 
cannon  while  awaiting  the  manufacturing  of  more  per- 
fected weapons. 

The  American  Infantryman  was  equipped  with  the 
model  19 17  rifle  whose  weight  was  practically  the  same 
as  the  French  one.  Somewhat  shorter  than  the  latter  It 
was  terminated  by  a  knife  bayonet  also  considerably 
shorter  than  ours. 

The  automatic  rifle  which  the  American  army  utilized 
at  first  was  the  French  Chauchat.  Later,  the  units  arriv- 
ing from  America  were  supplied  with  their  own  automatic 

13  The  clothing  and  equipment  of  the  American  Army  were  not  modified 
to  any  appreciable  extent  during  the  war.  The  British  helmet  and  over- 
seas cap  made  of  olive  drab  were  substituted  for  the  felt  hat  and  the 
garrison  cap.     Each  man  received  a  gas  mask. 


54      ^he  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Browning,  firing  a  cartridge  turned  out  in  the  United 
States.  This  weapon  is  lighter  than  the  French  auto- 
matic rifle,  15  lbs.  instead  of  21  lbs.  Its  filler  holds  20 
cartridges.  It  can  fire  either  one  shot  at  a  time  or  else 
automatically. 

The  American  divisions  used  two  sorts  of  machine  gun, 
the  Vickers  and  the  Hotchkiss  models,  which  gave  place 
before  the  war  ended  to  the  Browning  water-cooled 
machine  gun,  and  lighter  by  a  third  than  the  French  mi- 
trailleuse (36.8  lbs.  as  against  52^4  lbs.). 

Both  these  Browning  weapons,  the  machine  gun  as  well 
as  the  automatic  rifle,  were  manufactured  in  large  quanti- 
ties and  calculated  to  replace  progressively  the  other 
weapons  which  had  been  distributed  in  the  opening  days 
of  hostilities.  Thus  the  question  of  supplying  ammuni- 
tion to  the  American  units  was  greatly  simplified  since, 
toward  the  end,  there  was  only  one  kind  of  cartridge  in 
use  among  the  American  infantry. 

As  to  the  artillery  material  of  all  kinds,  almost  every- 
thing was  supplied  by  the  French  ordnance  department 
up  to  the  time  when  the  United  States  should  be  ready  to 
modify  their  machinery  for  the  manufacture  of  the  can- 
nons adopted  by  the  army. 

It  had  been  decided  to  supply  the  light  divisional  bat- 
teries with  our  French  75  model,  which  was  able  to  fire  a 
projectile  weighing  13  lbs.,  .7  a  distance  of  ^y&  miles  and 
a  quarter  and  of  which  the  excellent  practical  working 
was  well  known.  The  heavy  batteries  received  the  155 
mm.  howitzer,  system  Schneider,  firing  a  shell  weighing 
117  lbs.  to  a  distance  of  seven  miles. 

Although  it  had  been  foreseen  that  these  heavy  divi- 
sional batteries  might  be  motorized  they  nevertheless  re- 
mained dependent  on  their  horses  as  formerly. 


Methods  of  Training  55 

The  artillery  of  the  army  corps  was  supplied  with  a  4.7 
inch  gun  (American)  which  carried  about  six  miles,  and 
whose  shell  weighed  109  lbs.  and  also  with  our  155  long, 
known  as  the  great  power  155  system  Filloux,  firing  a 
1 10  lb.  shell  to  a  distance  of  ten  miles. 

As  to  the  artillery  of  the  field  army,  it  had  been  ar- 
ranged that  it  should  use  the  155  long  (great  power)  and 
also  American  cannons  of  5  and  6  inch  firing,  at  a  maxi- 
mum distance  of  about  nine  and  eleven  miles,  shells  of 
46 >^  lbs.  and  95  lbs.  respectively,  also  English  8  inch 
mortars  ^^  and  American  mortars  of  9.2  inch  firing  at 
short  distance,  about  five  miles  and  three-quarters  shells 
of  222  lbs.  and  319  lbs. 

The  divisional  batteries  of  trench  artillery  used  the 
French  58  mortar  No.  2,  later  replaced  by  the  English 
Newton  mortar  of  6  inches.^^ 

The  trench  batteries  of  the  field  army  were  to  be  fur- 
nished with  the  French  240  while  awaiting  the  manufac- 
ture of  a  similar  American  weapon. 

All  the  material  used  for  anti-aircraft  defense,  the  75 
cannon  as  well  as  the  4.7  inch  shortened  and  with  weight 
reduced,  were  to  be  furnished  by  America. 

The  principles  governing  the  instruction  of  the  Ameri- 
can units  were  formulated  by  the  fifth  section  of  the  staff 
a  short  while  after  the  arrival  in  France  of  the  first 
American  contingents  and  were  immediately  approved. 

The  doctrine  thus  enunciated  during  the  formation  of 
the  army  was  practically  not  modified  during  the  whole 
period  of  hostilities.     The  value  of  the  theories  which 

^*  America    was    supposed    to    manufacture    this   gun    during   the    first 
months  of  the  war. 

15  Which  was  distributed  to  the  infantry. 


56      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

had  been  thus  put  into  force  were  absolutely  upheld  by 
the  military  events. 

The  first  instruction  program  delivered  by  the  Ameri- 
can headquarters  to  the  troops  who  were  disembarking 
read  in  part  as  follows : 

"  The  general  principles  governing  the  training  of  the  American 
Expeditionary  Forces  will  be  announced  from  these  headquarters. 
Strict  compliance  with  these  principles  will  be  exacted  and  nothing 
contrary  thereto  will  be  taught.  All  instruction  must  contem- 
plate the  assumption  of  a  vigorous  offensive.  This  purpose  will 
be  emphasized  in  every  phase  of  training  until  it  becomes  a  settled 
habit  of  thought. 

"  The  general  principles  governing  combat  remain  unchanged  in 
their  essence.  This  war  has  developed  special  features  which 
involve  special  phases  of  training,  but  the  fundamental  ideas 
enunciated  in  our  drill  regulations,  small  arms  firing  manual,  field 
service  regulations,  and  other  service  manuals  remain  a  guide  for 
both  officers  and  soldiers  and  constitute  the  standard  by  which 
their  efficiency  is  to  be  measured,  except  as  modified  in  detail  by 
instructions  from  these  headquarters. 

"  The  rifle  and  bayonet  are  the  principal  weapons  of  the  infantry 
soldier.  He  will  be  trained  to  a  high  degree  of  skill  as  a  marks- 
man both  on  target  range  and  in  field  firing.  An  aggressive  spirit 
must  be  developed  until  the  soldier  feels  himself,  as  a  bayonet 
fighter,  invincible  in  battle. 

*'  All  officers  and  soldiers  should  realize  that  at  no  time  in  our 
history  has  discipline  been  so  important;  therefore  discipline  of  the 
highest  order  must  be  exacted  at  all  times. 

"  Training  will  be  based  on  developing  sound  leadership  in  suc- 
cession in  the  squad  or  group,  the  platoon,  the  company,  and  finally 
the  higher  units." 

In  the  program  of  training  promulgated  by  the  fifth 
section  of  the  American  staff  special  provisions  were  made 
for  the  drilling  of  all  units  in  view  of  open  warfare,  rather 
than  elaborating  the  study  of  trench  combat.  This  was 
quite  according  to  the  personal  idea  of  General  Pershing, 


Methods  of   Training  57 

and  was  impressed  upon  all  divisional  commanders,  in- 
cluding those  who  were  to  return  to  the  United  States 
after  completing  their  tour  of  observation  in  France,  in 
order  to  proceed  with  the  training  of  their  divisions  in 
America  previous  to  transportation.  A  memorandum  to 
this  effect,  given  to  the  officers  before  their  return  to  the 
United  States,  is  quoted  here : 

"  The  disposition  to  regard  the  introduction  of  a  variety  of  new 
weapons  to  meet  the  special  conditions  of  trench  warfare  as  evident 
of  a  complete  departure  from  all  our  former  principles  of  combat 
should  be  constantly  opposed  and  the  attention  of  all  officers  should 
be  fixed  upon  the  ultimate  object  of  all  trench  operations;  namely, 
warfare  in  the  open  conducted  in  all  essential  elements  according 
to  the  principles  found  in  our  standard  manuals.  The  doctrine 
taught  by  the  General  Staff  of  all  the  great  armies  in  this  war 
confirms  this  opinion  which  was  naturally  considered  by  the  com- 
mander-in-chief before  its  promulgation  and  will  be  adhered  to 
by  him  in  directing  the  training  of  troops  in  France." 

General  Pershing  arranged  with  the  Secretary  of  War 
that  an  absolute  uniformity  of  training  should  be  prac- 
ticed on  both  continents,  and  a  series  of  cablegrams  be- 
tween Chaumont  and  Washington  were  to  make  known  in 
America  the  dominant  ideas  in  vogue  as  well  as  any  new 
technical  procedures  to  be  employed  in  France. 

In  one  of  these  cables  the  necessity  of  large  spaces  for 
the  exercise  of  troops  in  the  open  was  dwelt  upon. 

Thus  as  may  be  seen  General  Pershing  brought  to  all 
the  questions  of  military  instruction  an  attentive  study  and 
gave  a  vigorous  impulsion  to  his  training  policies.  Cer- 
tainly his  educative  influence  was  profoundly  felt  on  both 
sides  of  the  ocean. 

Nothing  is  more  difficult  than  to  lay  down  hide-bound 
rules  governing  the  exact  schedule  of  study  to  be  followed 


58      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

in  a  specified  time,  or  to  set  precise  dates  for  the  instruc- 
tion of  divisions  not  yet  landed.  Moreover  some  of  these 
divisions  came  to  France  with  their  instruction  well  under 
way,  others  with  the  merest  smattering  obtained  after 
a  very  short  stay  in  the  first  training  camps.  It  was,  how- 
ever, decided  that  each  division  should  complete  its  train- 
ing in  our  country  during  three  months  and  a  half,  which 
period  was  extended  later.  These  training  periods  were 
roughly  divided  in  three  phases. 

During  the  first  phase  the  training  was  followed  in 
camps,  artillery  and  infantry  separate.  During  the 
second  phase,  instruction  was  carried  on  in  the  front-line 
trenches  of  a  quiet  sector,  the  infantry  being  seconded, 
when  circumstances  permitted,  by  its  own  guns.  The 
last  phase  saw  the  infantry  and  artillery  once  more 
grouped  in  camp  practicing  concerted  maneuvers  with  ar- 
tillery and  infantry  linked. 

The  exact  duration  of  each  of  these  phases  was  de- 
termined according  to  the  degree  of  preparation  already 
reached  by  the  division  under  observation  before  quitting 
America.  Before  its  arrival,  each  division  was  preceded 
by  the  oflicer  to  whom  its  instructions  had  been  specifically 
entrusted.  This  officer  was  to  at  once  place  himself  in 
touch  with  the  Fifth  section  of  the  General  Headquarters, 
where  the  completion  of  instruction  was  studied  and  pre- 
pared. 

In  order  to  perfect  the  training  of  those  American 
units  arriving  in  France  General  Pershing  had  recourse  to 
the  French  and  British  armies  with  a  view  of  obtaining 
instructors. 

To  comply  with  these  needs,  General  Petain  detached 
to  the  service  of  the  Expeditionary  Forces  not  only  offi- 
cers, non-commissioned  officers  acting  as  instructors  and 


Camps  59 

liaison  agents,  but  also  three  complete  divisions;  the 
Forty-seventh,  Eighteenth,  and  Sixty-ninth,  which  were  to 
be  placed  in  turn  beside  the  American  units  and  serve  as 
model. 

Thus  the  general  ideas  having  been  agreed  upon,  a  doc- 
trine formulated,  and  certain  measures  dc'finitely  ad- 
mitted, it  was  necessary  to  open  more  camps  and  establish 
centers  of  instruction  in  view  of  perfecting  the  training  of 
the  divisions  as  fast  as  they  arrived  in  France,  as  well  as 
to  develop  the  technical  training  of  the  prospective  in- 
structors who  were  to  officer  the  American  units. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  General  Pershing  and  Gen- 
eral Petain,  as  soon  as  they 'had  arrived  at  an  understand- 
ing as  to  the  future  zone  of  action  to  be  occupied  by  the 
Expeditionary  Forces,  decided  upon  the  camp  at  Gondre- 
court  for  the  training  of  the  first  division. 

It  was  accordingly  in  this  village  and  in  its  outlying 
districts  that  the  American  infantryman  established  him- 
self after  the  French  manner;  that  is  to  say,  using  as  shel- 
ter the  houses  and  farms  of  the  rural  inhabitants  instead 
of  the  barracks  and  tents  to  which  he  was  accustomed  at 
home. 

Other  camps  were  prepared  for  the  troops  who  were 
expected  to  arrive  in  France  in  the  near  future.  These 
were  organized  around  Neufchateau  not  far  from  Gon- 
drecourt,  but  in  this  region  the  lodging  possibilities  were 
not  sufficient  to  house  all  of  these  troops  and  recourse  was 
had  to  French  and  American  labor  for  the  construction 
of  large  barracks.  Similar  camps  capable  each  of  lodg- 
ing an  entire  division,  with  training  ground  sufficiently 
spacious  for  all  maneuvers,  were  soon  to  spread  over  a 
region  comprised  between  Dijon,  Toul,  St.  Dizier,  and 


6o      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Jolgny  so  that  many  called  this  section  of  country  the 
"  American  Zone."  There,  at  the  close  of  hostilities, 
twenty-one  divisional  camps  could  be  counted. 

The  commander-in-chief  decided  also  upon  the  creation 
of  two  other  categories  of  training  areas,  to  be  located 
one  near  the  base  ports,  for  the  reception  of  the  depot  di- 
visions; another  along  the  communication  lines  and  In 
close  proximity  to  them  for  the  replacement  divisions 
which  It  was  unnecessary  to  establish  in  close  proximity 
to  the  front. 

In  all  these  centers  the  infantry  was  prepared  for  com- 
bat according  to  the  plans  laid  down  and  programs  elab- 
orated by  the  American  general  headquarters.  Trenches 
were  dug,  wire  entanglements  set  up,  firing  ranges  in- 
stalled, and  everywhere  an  intensive  preparation  was  in 
progress. 

If  it  seemed  relatively  easy  to  provide  adequate  means 
of  training  for  the  infantry  troops  It  was  correspondingly 
difficult  to  secure  proper  facilities  for  the  artillery,  which 
service  requires  immense  spaces  for  its  firing  practice. 

From  the  moment  that  the  American  participation  had 
been  decided  upon,  the  French  command  had  made  ready 
and  placed  at  the  disposition  of  the  American  artillery 
the  large  camp  of  Valdahon,  which  was  put  In  order  to 
receive  and  instruct  the  artillery  of  the  First  Division 
from  the  time  of  its  debarkation.  Stables  were  pre- 
pared and  the  polygon  arranged  to  suit  the  exigencies  of 
modern  ordnance.  During  this  preparation  General 
Pershing's  officers  were  being  brought  in  contact  with  ours. 

Various  decisions  were  undertaken  and  precise  rules 
laid  down  in  order  to  assure  the  training  of  the  Amer- 
ican artillery  troops  without  loss  of  time. 


Camps  6 1 

As  was  stated  in  a  memorandum  published  July  25, 
1917: 

"  The  technical  training  of  the  first  artillery  brigade  which  is  to 
furnish  the  future  instructors  to  the  American  troops  is  to  be  pur- 
sued according  to  the  French  system.  When  the  period  is  ter- 
minated, another  will  be  accomplished  at  the  front.  Then  the 
brigade  will  be  returned  to  its  division  in  order  to  proceed  with  its 
unit  to  the  practice  of  concerted  maneuvers. 

"  The  general  commanding  the  first  brigade  of  artillery  will 
assure  himself  of  the  attention  given  to  the  above  prescriptions  and, 
after  studying  the  results,  will  make  what  proposals  he  deems  op- 
portune." 

Persuaded  that  the  transportation  facilities  would  be 
rapidly  ameliorated,  and  that  the  arrival  of  the  artillery 
brigades  would  be  effected  sooner  than  had  been  fore- 
seen In  the  Initial  calculations,  General  Pershing  decided 
to  organize  other  camps  and  firing  ranges  at  Coetquldan 
and  Meucon  In  Brittany,  and  at  Souge  near  Bordeaux. 

A  stay  of  about  two  months  was  decided  upon  as  the 
normal  time  which  each  brigade  would  pass  In  camp. 
The  brigades  were  expected  to  arrive  in  France  at  the  rate 
of  three  or  four  a  month.^^ 

The  installation  of  these  camps  was  undertaken  with 

^^  The  American  artillery  brigades  arrived  in  Europe  at  the  following 

rate: 

1917  August    I  1918  June     8 

September    o  July   9 

October i  August    6  (a) 

1918  January    i  (a)  September    5  (a) 

February    o  October  3  (a) 

March i  November 2 

April  o  December    o 

May    2 

That  is  to  say  thirty-three  divisional  brigades  and  six  army  corps 
brigades. 

(a)  Included  the  brigades  which  had  been  transformed  into  corps 
artillery. 


62      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

as  much  rapidity  as  the  civilian  and  military  labor,  to- 
gether with  that  furnished  by  the  prisoners  of  war,  per- 
mitted.    These  camps  were  able  to  receive  respectively: 

Coetquidan. —  A  first  brigade  in  October,  19 17,  and  a 
second  in  November  of  the  same  year. 

Souge. —  Two  brigades  in  March,  19 18,  and  a  third  in 
May. 

Meucon. —  One  brigade  in  March,  1918,  and  a  second 
in  April. 

For  some  time,  when  the  American  artillery  was  arriv- 
ing en  masse,  it  was  found  necessary  to  utilize  La  Cour- 
tine  and  also  the  zones  of  Ornans,  Redon,  Bordeaux, 
Rennes,  and  Poitiers  in  order  to  begin  the  instruction  of 
the  new  arrivals  while  waiting  for  a  place  to  be  vacated  in 
the  above-mentioned  camps. 

Some  time  later,  in  July,  191 8,  it  was  decided  to  utilize 
the  camp  of  Courneau,  evacuated  by  the  Russian  troops, 
and  the  chief  of  the  American  artillery  raised  the  number 
of  brigades  to  be  simultaneously  instructed  at  Souge  up 
to  three. 

These  dispositions  made  it  possible  to  form  all  the  brig- 
ades without  loss  of  time. 

After  the  month  of  October,  19 17,  when  the  first 
brigade,  whose  instructions  had  been  directed  by  French 
officers,  was  ready  to  quit  camp,  it  was  already  possible 
to  select  twelve  American  officers  capable,  in  their  turn, 
of  teaching  the  new  arrivals  of  the  second  brigade.  To- 
gether with  a  few  French  instructors  a  new  training  nu- 
cleus was  thus  formed. 

This  method  was  continued  with  each  divisional  artil- 
lery and  gave  excellent  results. 

It  was  also  necessary  to  inaugurate  training  centers  for 
the  heavy  artillery  on  tractors  (army  and  army-corps  ar- 


Schools  63 

tlllery) .  These  centers  were  established  at  LIbourne, 
Limoges,  Clermont,  and  Angers  or  in  the  immediate  vi- 
cinity of  these  towns,  where  from  three  to  four  regiments 
of  heavy  artillery  were  placed  in  cantonments.  Schools 
for  the  training  of  drivers  were  instituted  with  all  the  ac- 
cessories necessary  for  the  pursuit  of  rapid  training. 

Thanks  to  this  system  of  taking  a  certain  number  of 
instructors  out  of  the  units  whose  training  had  just  been 
completed  it  became  possible  for  the  Americans  them- 
selves to  aid  in  the  military  preparation  of  the  units 
which  were  being  constantly  disembarked.  But  it  was 
easy  to  foresee  that,  as  time  went  on,  these  instructors 
would  not  be  sufficient  to  handle  the  training  of  all  the 
American  units.  It  could  also  be  presumed  that  all  the 
instructors  would  not  be  thoroughly  inoculated  with  the 
principles  which  the  Chaumont  headquarters  was  de- 
termined to  instill  into  the  troops  and  their  chiefs.  Nor 
could  the  application  of  this  system  provide  for  the  neces- 
sary number  of  staff  officers  which  would  be  required  at 
the  time  of  the  formation  of  the  big  units. 

Taking  also  into  consideration  the  lack  of  specialist 
training  In  every  branch,  it  became  clear  that  the  best  way 
to  meet  the  difficulties  of  the  situation  was  the  creation 
of  a  large  number  of  schools,  where,  to  quote  the  terms 
of  the  report  made  by  the  training  section  at  American 
headquarters.  It  would  be  possible  to  form  ''  a  staff  of- 
ficer and  a  cook  as  well  as  a  blacksmith.^' 

The  plan  for  the  organization  of  military  schools  in 
France  had  been  submitted  to  General  Pershing  on  Aug- 
ust 27,  19 1 7,  and  was  approved;  It  was  only  possible, 
however,  to  realize  the  project  by  degrees  according  to 
the  arrival  of  instructors,  material  and  students. 


64      The  AmeriuM  Army  in  the  European  Convict 

The  general  plan  may  be  thus  summed  up : 

In  emch  division  training  went  on  under  the  personal 
supervision  of  the  general  in  command  who  exercised  con- 
trol OTer  the  schools,  and  training  centers  established  in 
his  unit. 

In  each  army  corps  an  instruction  center  to  be  organ- 
ized for  the  purpose  of  training  replacements  of  all 
grades  and  conmianders  of  all  units.  Each  group  of 
corps  schools  to  instruct  commanders  of  proper  grades 
for  four  combat  divisions. 

For  the  entire  army  in  France  a  center  of  instruction 
known  as  "  the  army  school "  to  be  organized.  This 
group  was  to  indude  a  general  staff  college  as  well  as 
other  centers  for  the  preparation  of  instructors  who 
were  to  perform  their  duty  in  the  army  corps. 

These  army  schools  were  placed  under  the  direct  juris- 
diction of  the  general  headquarters  in  order  that  the  doc- 
trine which  would  govern  the  instruction  methods  and 
combat  tactics  might  be  transmitted  from  the  General 
Staff  throu^  these  schools  to  aU  units  of  the  army. 

For  the  base  diz^sions  centers  were  to  be  organized  for 
the  training  of  replacements  and  classes  organized  for 
^>ecialist  training. 

The  army  schools  were  to  be  established  at  Langres; 
those  of  the  first  corps  at  Gondrecourt;  those  of  the  sec- 
ond corps  at  Chatillon-sur-Seine,  and  those  of  the  third 
corps  at  Qamecy. 

General  Petain  and  Marshal  Sir  Douglas  Haig 
placed  a  certain  number  of  officers  and  men  at  the  disposi- 
tion of  the  American  staff  to  aid  in  the  formation  of  in- 
structing bodies  of  these  schools.  The  German  attack 
during  the  spring  of  191 8  made  it  necessary  slightly  to 
modify  the  instruction  plan.     Since  the  army  corps  were 


Schools  65 

called  upon  to  operate  at  the  front  and  their  commanders, 
in  consequence,  were  unable  to  maintain  a  personal  super- 
vision over  the  training  centers,  which  had  been  confided 
to  their  particular  charge,  it  was  decided  that  the  Chau- 
mont  headquarters  should  extend  its  zone  of  activity  in 
order  to  include  the  direction  of  the  army  corps  schook. 

Aside  from  this  slight  modification,  the  system  of 
schooling,  such  as  had  been  instituted  when  the  American 
disposed  only  of  40,000  men  on  our  soil,  underwent  abso- 
lutely no  change  up  to  the  signing  of  the  armisdce,  at 
which  time  our  American  allies  had  more  than  two  mil- 
lion men  in  France  and  everything  concerning  the  running 
of  these  schoob  was  highly  satisfactory. 

We  shall  first  examine  the  list  of  army  schools,  then 
the  corps  schools,  and  subsequently  the  schook  for  the 
instruction  of  specialists. 

The  army  schook  were  listed  as  follows : 

Army  general  staf  college:  established  at  Langrcs^^ 
opened  its  doors  on  November  28th.  It  was  destined  to 
prepare  student  officers  for  the  function  of  staff  officers 
for  corps  and  divisions.  The  course  was  of  three 
months'  duration.  Each  class  comprised  two  hundred 
students  from  the  rank  of  captain  to  that  of  coloneL  It 
was  found  possible  to  graduate  four  entire  classes  from 
this  school.  A  total  of  777  officers  were  enrolled  during 
the  four  courses  and  554  of  these  were  reconunended  for 
staff  duty  of  various  kinds. 

The  college  of  Langres  was  under  the  supervision  of 
General  James  W.  McAndrew,  who  was  later  to  become 
chief  of  staff  of  the  American  £iq>editionary  Forces. 

^  An  die  adioob  heroB  — cnliuncd  were  iinliliiWd  at  Ln^gics  unless 


66      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

General  McAndrew  was  a  specialist  in  all  questions  of 
military  instruction;  he  succeeded  in  making  the  army 
college  a  model  of  its  kind.  He  was  careful  to  surround 
himself  with  the  best  instructors  that  the  American, 
French,  and  British  armies  could  supply.  It  may  be  said 
that  this  institution  has  had  an  indelible  influence  upon 
the  fighting  methods  of  the  American  army. 

Army  school  of  the  line:  For  the  instruction  of  cap- 
tains and  field  officers  in  infantry  tactics.  The  course 
lasted  three  months.  Four  classes  were  graduated,  mak- 
ing a  total  of  497  oflicers.  The  first  course  opened  Feb- 
ruary 4,  191 8. 

Army  infantry  specialists*  school:  With  the  capacity 
of  1,200  students.  In  this  establishment  company  offi- 
cers and  non-commissioned  officers  were  trained  in  the  use 
of  infantry  weapons.  Seven  separate  courses  were  con- 
ducted at  the  same  time.  They  consisted  in  musketry 
and  bayonet;  automatic  weapons;  light  trench  mortars; 
37  mm.  gun;  observation  and  sniping;  grenades;  minor 
tactics.  The  first  term  began  December  17,  19 17,  the 
length  of  the  course  varying  from  two  to  four  weeks. 
3,018  officers  and  2,364  non-commissioned  officers  re- 
ceived instruction  at  this  school  during  its  existence. 

Army  machine-gun  school:  Opened  December  17, 
19 1 7,  for  the  training  of  officers  and  non-commissioned 
officers  in  the  use  of  machine  guns.  The  course  lasted 
four  weeks.  Fifteen  classes  were  graduated  up  to  Octo- 
ber 26,  19 1 8,  making  a  total  of  539  officers  and  465  non- 
commissioned officers. 

Army  engineer  school:  Where  300  officers  and  non- 
commissioned officers  could  be  trained  at  the  same  time 
in  the  duties  of  the  engineer  troops.  This  school  In- 
structed : 


Schools  67 

4,500  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  in  the  bridge 
section. 

3,000  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  in  the  camou- 
flage section. 

3,100  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  in  the  mining 
section. 

2,800  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  in  the  pioneer 
section. 

There  was  originally  in  this  school  a  topographic  sec- 
tion, which  was  later  transferred  to  the  army  intelligence 
school,  and  a  searchlight  section,  which  was  turned  over 
to  the  army  anti-aircraft  school. 

Jrmy  signal  school:  Had  a  capacity  of  400  students. 
179  officers  graduated  from  the  section  for  personnel  of 
mobile  units  and  149  from  the  section  of  radio  operators. 

Army  sanitary  school:  Established  with  a  view  of 
training  officers  of  the  medical  department  in  the  duties 
of  their  specialties  in  the  field.  The  course  for  dentist 
covered  two  weeks  and  for  medical  officers  five  weeks. 

516  student  officers  received  instruction  during  the  ex- 
istence of  this  school. 

Army  gas  school:  A  number  of  courses  were  here 
conducted  varying  from  a  two-hour  course  to  a  two-weeks* 
course  for  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  who  were 
to  be  used  as  instructors  in  the  divisions. 

The  number  to  pass  through  various  courses  was  as 
follows : 

Officers  Men 

Two-hour  course i>247  30j9i8 

One-day  course 1,682  1^837 

Two-day  course 516  8,657 

Six-day  course 473  4^577 

Two-week  course 43  8 


68      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Center  of  information  for  general  officers:  Was  only 
open  at  certain  periods  when  the  military  situation  made 
it  possible  to  group  the  generals  and  senior  colonels  in 
order  to  have  them  assist  at  lectures  and  courses  on  the 
recent  war  operations.  Two  courses  only  were  com- 
pleted.    Thirty-two  officers  were  present. 

Center  of  artillery  studies:  The  object  of  this  course 
was  to  develop  before  the  artillery  and  infantry  brigade 
and  regimental  commanders  the  results  and  lessons  con- 
tained in  the  recent  operations.  The  length  of  the  course 
when  the  military  situation  permitted  them  to  take  place, 
was  three  weeks.  Nineteen  students  only  were  able  to 
follow  them. 

Army  candidate  school:  With  a  capacity  of  8,000 
students.  The  course  lasted  three  months,  and  was  di- 
vided into  three  separate  sections : 

Candidates  for  commission  in  the  infantry  and  cavalry. 

Candidates  for  commission  in  the  engineers. 

Candidates  for  commission  In  the  signal  corps. 

It  was  originally  planned  to  train  candidates  for  com- 
missions in  all  branches  here,  but  the  increase  in  the  num- 
ber of  officers  necessary  called  for  the  establishment  of  a 
separate  school  for  artillery  officers  at  Saumur  and  finally 
a  separate  school  for  infantry  candidates  at  Valbonne. 
A  total  of  1 1,952  entered  the  Langres  school.  3,242  (in- 
cluding 65  marines)  were  commissioned  for  infantry; 
404  in  engineers  and  222  in  signal  corps,  2,354  (includ- 
ing 22  marines)  infantry  candidates,  823  engineer  can- 
didates, and  143  signal  candidates  who  completed  courses 
successfully  after  cessation  of  hostilities  were  commis- 
sioned In  the  officers'  reserve  corps  on  the  active  list. 

Infantry  candidates  school  (La  Valbonne) :  Could  ac- 
commodate 21,000  students.     The  length  of  the  course 


Schools  69 

was  to  be  three  months  and  the  object  to  instruct  selected 
soldiers  for  commissions  In  infantry.  The  school  was 
planned  to  have  classes  of  about  5,000  soldiers  enter  each 
month.  5,500  men  entered  with  the  first  class  on  Octo- 
ber 18,  19 1 8,  but  with  the  cessation  of  hostilities  on  No- 
vember nth  no  more  classes  were  started.  1,370  sol- 
rliers  of  this  first  class  were  graduated  and  given  commis- 
sions in  the  officers  reserve  corps  on  the  inactive  list. 

Army  field  officers^  course  of  two  weeks  was  created  to 
train  junior  field  officers  in  tactics  and  Infantry  weapons. 
Six  classes  amounting  to  a  total  of  476  officers  took  this 
course. 

Army  anti-aircraft  school:  With  varying  capacity  and 
course  of  from  four  to  eight  weeks.  This  was  a  com- 
bination school  and  training  center  of  anti-aircraft  per- 
sonnel in  gun  and  machine  guns  and  searchlights.  The 
artillery  section  handled  classes  of  forty  officers  and  four 
batteries  at  a  time. 

Army  intelligence  school:  Instructed  138  officers  in 
examining  prisoners  of  war  and  captured  documents,  also 
ninety  soldiers  in  restoration  of  photographs  taken  from 
aircraft. 

Heavy  artillery  school:  At  first  installed  at  Haussi- 
mont  near  Mailly,  was  soon  transferred  to  Angers,  where 
It  was  in  closer  touch  with  the  artillery  school  at  Saumur 
and  where  buildings  already  existing  and  vacated  by  the 
French  were  suitable  for  an  important  center  of  instruc- 
tion. Five  hundred  young  officers  of  the  heavy  artillery 
were  trained  and  taught  the  principles  then  governing 
their  branches  of  the  service.  Those  who  were  to  join 
the  railroad  artillery  perfected  their  training  at  the 
Mailly  school  while  the  others  detailed  to  the  motorized 
artillery  were   sent  to   Glen   to   complete   their  studies. 


70      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

This  school  also  formed  a  certain  number  of  specialists; 
orienters,  telephone  officers,  radio  officers,  who  followed 
a  three  weeks'  course.  A  special  tactical  course  was  also 
conducted  for  field  officers. 

Saumur  artillery  school:  Was  open  up  to  the  end  of 
March,  191 8,  for  reserve  officers,  second  lieutenants,  lieu- 
tenants, and  captains  who  arrived  from  the  United  States. 
These  officers  graduated  at  the  rate  of  one  hundred  and 
fifty  a  month  and  were  sent  to  join  the  artillery  brigades 
while  these  were  pursuing  instruction  in  camps. 

In  March,  19 18,  it  was  decided  to  make  use  of  the 
Saumur  school  for  the  formation  of  artillery  officers 
raised  from  the  ranks  of  non-commissioned  officers  and 
privates.  These  students  came  in  part  from  the  fighting 
forces  and  part  from  the  United  States.  The  average 
matriculation  reached  eight  hundred  a  month.  The  stu- 
dents thus  graduated  joined  (and  these  were  the  greater 
number)  some  formation  of  field  artillery,  the  others 
heavy  artillery  regiments. 

From  September,  19 17,  to  October,  19 18,  Saumur  in- 
structed about  4,000  officers. 

Tractor  artillery  school:  Allowed  800  officers  to  per- 
fect themselves  in  the  driving  of  heavy  tractors. 

Tank  school:  Which  constituted  essentially  a  train- 
ing center  for  the  personnel  of  both  officers  and  men  of 
tank  units.  It  began  operations  on  January  8,  19 18. 
The  first  tanks  were  received  from  the  French  Govern- 
ment on  March  23d  of  the  same  year.  755  officers  and 
9,275  men  were  trained  in  the  various  duties  of  the  per- 
sonnel of  the  tanks  units. 

The  capacity  of  the  three  corps  schools  was  2,500  offi- 
cers and  non-commissioned  officers  each. 


Schools  71 

A  corps  school  comprised  a  group  of  schools,  the  func- 
tions of  which  were : 

(a)  Instruction  and  training  of  platoon  and  company 
leaders. 

(b)  Development  of  instructors  in  the  use  and  tactical 
employment  of  infantry  weapons. 

(c)  Instruction  of  officers  and  non-commissioned  offi- 
cers of  the  special  services  and  of  various  specialists. 

The  course  of  instruction  at  the  corps  school  at  first 
lasted  five  weeks,  later  being  reduced  to  four  weeks,  and 
was  applied  in  schools  whose  curriculum  is  indicated  by 
their  names. 

(a)  Infantry  practical  school. 

(b)  Infantry  weapons  school. 

1.  Automatic  Rifle  Section. 

2.  Grenade  Section. 

3.  Musketry  and  Bayonet  Section. 

4.  Sniping,  Observation,  and  Intelligence. 

5.  Battalion  Scout  Officers  Section. 

6.  Stokes  Mortar  Section. 

7.  37  Mm.  Section. 

(c)  Machine-gun  School. 

(d)  Engineer  School. 

(e)  Gas  School. 
(/)    Signal  School. 

Aeronautical  School  (second  corps  only). 

In  addition  to  the  foregoing,  sanitary  schools  were  con- 
ducted for  a  while  in  the  first  and  second  corps.  An 
aeronautical  school  was  also  conducted  In  connection  with 
first  corps  schools,   but  was  subsequently  discontinued. 


72      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

The  first  corps  schools  began  work  on  October  15,  19 17, 
and  conducted  eleven  complete  courses  before  being  dis- 
continued on  December  21st,  1918.  12,535  students 
(officers  and  non-commissioned  officers)  graduated  from 
the  various  courses.  The  second  corps  school  were  estab- 
lished in  the  latter  part  of  January,  19 18,  and  the  third 
corps  school  began  September  2,  19 18.  Both  the  second 
and  third  corps  schools  were  still  in  operation  at  the  time 
of  the  armistice. 

In  addition  to  the  foregoing,  the  following  school  or 
training  centers  were  established  where  officers  and  sol- 
diers were  given  courses  of  instruction  in  special  branches. 

FOR  AVIATION 
American  Balloon  School  at  Meucon. 

Course  of  three  weeks  for  observers  (officers) . 

Course  of  ten  days  to  two  weeks  for  enlisted  special- 
ists (radio,  telephone,  chart  room,  winch,  ma- 
chine gunners) . 

American  Elementary  and  Observation  School  at  Tours, 

(Second  Aviation  Instruction  Center.) 

Two  months'  course  for  aerial  observation  (pilots). 

Three  weeks'  course  for  observers. 

Third  Aviation  Instruction  Center  at  Issoudun, 

Courses  for  pursuit  and  observation  pilots. 
A  three  weeks'  advance  training;  a  five  weeks'  pur- 
suit training. 

Fourth  Aviation  Instruction  Center  at  Avord. 

Instruction  given  by  "  Ecole  d' Aviation  Frangaise." 
Course  three  weeks. 


Schools  73 

Seventh  Aviation  Instruction   Center  at  Clermont-FeV' 
rand. 

Training  of  day  bombardment,  pilots  and  bombers. 
Length  of  course,  one  month. 

Eighth  Aviation  Instruction  Center  at  Foggia,  Italy, 

Training  pilots  in  day  and  night  bombing.     Length 
of  course,  six  weeks. 

French  and  American  Aerial  Gunnery  School  at  Cazaux. 
(Gironde,) 

Use  of  machine  gun.     Courses  for  pilots  and  ob- 
servers practically  same.     Three  weeks. 

First  Artillery  Aerial  Observation  School  at  Coetquidan. 
For  training  of  observers.     Course,  two  or  three 
weeks. 

Second  Artillery  Aerial  Observation  School  at  Souge, 
For  training  observers.     Course,  two  weeks. 

Fourth  Artillery  Aerial  Observation  School  at  Meucon. 
For  training  observers.     Course,  two  weeks. 

Fifth  Artillery  Aerial  Observation  School  at  Le  Valda- 
hon. 

For  training  observers.     Course,  two  weeks. 
(All  of  the  artillery  aerial  observation  schools  were 
used  to  train  artillery  personnel  in  the  work  of 
aerial  observation.) 

American  Advance  Artillery  Observation  School  at  Cha- 
tillon-sur-Seine, 

Conducted  in  connection  with  second  corps  aeronau- 
tical school.  Advance  artillery  and  infantry  liai- 
son.    Course,  two  weeks. 


74      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

American  Observation  School  for  Artillery   Officers  at 
Saumur. 

Conducted  in  connection  with  artillery  school. 
Length  of  course,  three  weeks. 

French    Elementary    Flying    School    at    Chateauroux. 
(Indre.) 

Ninety  students  were  instructed  here  in  preliminary 
training  by  French  instructors.  Length  of 
course,  two  months. 

Aerial  Gunnery  School  at  St,  Jean  des  Monts. 

Combination  French  and  American  school.  Pur- 
pose, use  and  application  of  machine  gun  in  the 
air.     Length  of  course,  about  ten  days. 

FOR   ORDNANCE 

Ordnance  School  of  Instruction  at  Is'Sur-Tille. 

Courses : 

{a)   Artillery  material.     Three  weeks. 

{h)   Small  arms  and  machine  guns.    Three  weeks. 

{c)    Ordnance  stores.     Two  weeks. 

Ordnance  Ammunition  School  at  Jonchery. 

Course :  Composition,  storage,  and  handling  of  ar- 
tillery, trench  mortar,  and  small  arms  ammuni- 
tion.    Length  of  course,  eighteen  days. 

Ordnance  Ammunition  School  at  Foecy. 

Purpose  and  course  same  as  at  Jonchery. 

Ordnance  School  at  St,  Jean  des  Monts, 

Purpose :  Training  in  use  and  maintenance  of  au- 
tomatic arms  in  connection  with  aerial  armament 


Schools  75 

work.     Course  varied  from  four  to  eight  weeks, 
according  to  preliminary  training  of  students. 

Ordnance  Experimental  School  at  Langres. 
Miscellaneous  school. 

FOR   CHEMICAL   WARFARE 
Gas  Defense  School  at  Chaumont. 

Course  in  gas  defense.  Length,  six  days.  Capac- 
ity, 200  students.     Usually  for  officers  only. 

FOR   POLICE   DUTIES 
Military  Police  Corps  Training  Detachment  at  Autun, 

Training  personnel  for  military  police  units.  Ca- 
pacity, i,ooo.  Length  of  course,  two  to  three 
weeks. 

FOR   TRAINING   TRUCK   DRIVERS 
Motor  Transport  School,  Decize, 

To  train  officers  and  soldiers  in  the  operation  and 
repair  of  motor  vehicles.  Capacity,  1,500. 
Five  separate  courses,  varying  in  length  from  two 
weeks  for  drivers  to  six  weeks  for  mechanics  and 
officers. 

FOR  INSTRUCTION  IN  CARE  AND  USE  OF  PIGEONS 

Pigeon  School,  at  Saizerais,  length  of  course,  one  week. 

FOR   INSTRUCTION   IN   MILITARY   MUSIC 

Bandmaster  and  Musicians^  School  at  Chaumont,  length 
of  course,  eight  to  twelve  weeks. 


76      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

FOR  INSTRUCTION  OF  OFFICERS  AND  SOLDIERS  IN  FRENCH 
SYSTEM  OF  HANDLING  RAILROADS 

Railway    Transportation  School  at  Angers    (length   of 
course,  2  weeks). 

FOR  INSTRUCTION  OF  CHAPLAINS  REGARDING  THEIR 
DUTY   WITH   TROOPS 

Chaplains*  School  at  he  Mans, 

A  considerable  time  was  necessary  for  the  installation 
of  all  these  schools  on  a  running  basis.  While  awaiting 
the  opening  of  the  above  training  centers,  the  Americans 
made  a  liberal  use  of  our  organizations,  especially  of  our 
army  schools,  aviation,  field  artillery,  heavy  artillery,  and 
railway  artillery  training  centers. 

We  may  add  that  the  American  army  was  also  repre- 
sented In  the  following  inter-allied  schools: 

At  Rosoy-en-Brie,  where  the  practice  of  circulation  or 
road  traffic  was  taught. 

At  Fontainebleau,  where  training  was  given  in  tank 
maneuvers. 

At  St.  Dizier,  where  regulating  officers  were  Instructed. 

This  enumeration  contains  only  the  schools  whose  char- 
acter was  permanent  and  can  give  but  an  inadequate  idea 
of  the  immensity  of  the  task  undertaken  by  the  American 
command  with  a  view  to  the  necessary  instruction  of  their 
rapidly  Increasing  forces. 

When  General  Pershing  had  elaborated  his  plans, 
chosen  the  personnel  who  were  to  carry  them  out,  and 
those  whom  he  placed  at  the  head  of  the  most  important 
services,  when  he  had  selected  the  zones  of  both  front 


Headquarters  at  Chaumont  77 

and  rear  of  his  great  army  and  decided  upon  the  future 
theater  of  operations,  he  became  impatient  to  group  his 
staff  In  some  locality  nearer  the  battle-field  where  the 
chiefs  of  sections  and  the  chiefs  of  divers  active  services 
might  work  in  closer  touch  with  one  another. 

He  fixed  his  choice  upon  the  town  of  Chaumont,  situ- 
ated not  far  from  the  end  of  his  communication  lines, 
in  the  very  center  of  the  various  training  camps  and  in 
close  proximity  to  that  portion  of  the  front  where  his 
divisions  were  to  take  up  certain  trenches  and  where,  ac- 
cording to  all  probability,  the  American  troops  under  his 
command  would  strike  their  first  blow. 

The  American  headquarters  were  established  at  Chau- 
mont during  the  first  days  of  September,  19 17.  Offices 
were  installed  in  the  barracks  of  the  109th  French  Infan- 
try regiment ;  the  officers  were  billeted  in  the  dwellings  of 
the  citizens  of  this  town. 


CHAPTER  III     , 

ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE   LINES   OF    COMMUNICATION 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  SERVICES  OF  THE  REAR 

When,  on  the  first  of  February,  19 17,  the  directors  of 
the  German  policy  declared  a  merciless  and  unrestricted 
submarine  warfare,  they  were  confident  that  American 
intervention  would  be  practically  Ineffective,  and  it  must 
be  confessed  that,  for  a  time,  appearances  were  such  as 
to  give  color  to  this  theory. 

The  vast  operations  necessitated  by  the  transportation 
to  Europe  of  an  American  army  —  men,  horses,  muni- 
tions, and  supplies  —  seemed,  if  Germany  succeeded  In 
barricading  the  European  Atlantic  ports  with  fleets  of 
submarines,  a  perilous  and  almost  impossible  undertaking. 

Moreover,  although  the  immense  stretch  of  American 
territory  was  rich  in  resources  of  all  kinds,  possessing  rail- 
roads capable  of  tremendous  activity,  these  resources  and 
this  activity  had  never  been  arranged  with  a  view  to  mili- 
tary exploitation.  The  needs  of  a  vast  army  in  the  field 
had  never  been  foreseen. 

No  system  corresponding  to  the  various  organizations 
created  in  France  during  peace  time  governing  supply, 
requisition,  and  military  purchase  had  been  even  thought 
of.  The  output  of  the  arsenals  was  extremely  limited, 
that  of  the  factories  turning  out  war  material  had  not 
been  centralized  and  was  already,  to  a  large  extent,  ab- 
sorbed by  the  Allies. 

78 


Lines  of  Communication  79 

From  the  first  day  of  mobilization,  the  railroads  were 
seriously  handicapped  by  the  enlistment  and  embarkation 
to  France  of  an  important  number  of  their  personnel,  and 
this  was  all  the  more  serious  when  we  consider  that  the 
great  centers  of  production  of  the  Middle  West  are  linked 
to  the  ports  on  the  Eastern  coast  by  some  twelve  hundred 
miles  of  rail. 

The  crossing  of  the  Atlantic  —  three  thousand  nautical 
miles  —  appeared  extremely  difficult  to  the  naval  experts 
and,  at  this  time,  the  shortage  in  tonnage  was  acutely  felt. 
During  April  the  German  submarines  had  beaten  all  pre- 
vious records,  having  sent  to  the  bottom  872,800  tons  of 
allied  and  neutral  shipping. 

The  French  ports,  many  of  which  were  already  con- 
gested by  the  traffic  of  the  British  services,  could  not  offer 
rapid  debarkation  facilities  to  numerous  troops  and  im- 
mense quantities  of  supplies. 

Although  the  French  railroads  were  provided  with 
trackage  capable  of  supporting  a  greatly  increased  traffic, 
the  rolling  stock  had  greatly  deteriorated,  and  the  per- 
sonnel was  so  depleted  after  thirty-two  months  of  war 
that  it  would  have  been  impracticable  to  subject  these  re- 
sources to  a  heavier  strain  than  they  were  already 
enduring. 

It  was  much  the  same  in  France  for  the  resources  of 
every  kind  which  had  been  already  so  largely  drained  by 
the  allied  troops.  What  might  happen  if  still  another 
army  were  to  add  Its  demands  to  those  of  our  own  sol- 
diers? Such  were  the  anxieties,  such  the  questions  which 
had  to  be  met  and  faced  In  order  to  establish  the  lines 
of  communication,  and  organize  the  new  services  of  the 
rear  necessary  to  prepare  for  the  entrance  of  the  Amer- 
ican forces  on  the  scene.     These  brief  remarks  can  give 


8o      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

but  an  inadequate  idea  of  the  gigantic  task  involved,  the 
immense  difficulties  that  had  to  be  conquered. 

All  the  construction  work,  all  the  activities  necessitated 
by  America's  entry  into  the  war  were  to  be  developed  in 
three  entirely  distinct  sections. 

The  first  of  these,  some  twelve  hundred  miles  in  length, 
covered  the  distance  between  the  principal  centers  of  pro- 
duction and  the  American  seaports. 

The  second,  three  thousand  nautical  miles  in  length, 
and  including  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  was  the  scene  of  action 
of  German  submarine  activities  and  was  linked  at  either 
extremity  by  the  American  ports  and  those  of  the  Allies. 

The  third,  some  five  hundred  miles  in  length,  separated 
the  French  ports  from  the  battle  front  in  Lorraine. 

Each  of  these  sections  must  be  separately  dealt  with, 
and  as  we  desire  more  especially  to  dwell  upon  what  we 
have  ourselves  observed,  we  shall  give  here  but  a  sum- 
mary of  the  work  accomplished  in  America  and  on  the 
ocean,  in  order  to  more  fully  describe  the  immense  or- 
ganizations realized  upon  the  soil  of  France. 

In  peace  time,  the  American  army  was  administered 
by  five  distinct  services. 

The  Quartermaster  Corps  supplied  pay,  food,  forage, 
clothing,  equipment,  fuel,  lodging,  bedding,  construction, 
and  transportation. 

The  service  of  Ordnance  supplied  armament  and  mu- 
nitions. 

The  Signal  Corps  manufactured  or  purchased  aviation 
material,  and  all  the  apparatus  for  telegraph,  telephone, 
and  optical  signalling. 

The  Engineer  Corps  and  the  Medical  Corps  furnished 
their  own  material. 


Activities  in  America  8i 

Between  the  sixth  of  April,  19 17,  and  the  eleventh  of 
November,  19 18,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  absolutely  no 
plan  of  mobilization  had  ever  been  matured  in  peace  time 
the  total  strength  of  the  army  was  to  pass  from  190,000 
men  to  3,665,000. 

These  figures  give  a  better  idea  than  any  description 
could  do  of  the  immense  task  entailed  upon  the  separate 
services  which  were  to  deal  with  such  large  masses  of  ma- 
terial and  men.  Each  service  had  to  immediately  reform 
and  practically  transform  itself,  increase  effectives  in  an 
enormous  proportion,  enlarge  their  organization,  and  has- 
tily improvise  the  training  of  a  specialized  personnel. 

Thus  the  quartermaster  corps  developed  between 
March,  19 17,  and  November,  19 18,  to  the  extent  of  220,- 
000  men:  i.e.,  from  8,000  to  228,000. 

As  to  the  methods  employed  by  this  service  in  dealing 
with  a  small  army  spread  over  an  immense  territory 
in  comparatively  petty  detachments  in  peace  time,  they 
were  unhesitatingly  abandoned  in  the  face  of  the  new 
problems  which  had  to  be  solved.  The  corps  was  com- 
pletely reorganized  into  seven  different  divisions: 

Clothing  and  equipage. 
Forage  and  fuel. 
Hardware  and  metals. 
Remount. 
Subsistence. 
Vehicles  and  harness. 
Motors. 

In  order  to  obtain  a  methodical  exploitation  of  the 
country's  sectional  resources  and  to  economize  railway 
transportation,  the  whole  territory  was  divided  into  zones 


82      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

generally  marked  so  that  each  one  should  be  able  to  sup- 
ply the  troops  which  were  to  be  stationed  in  its  territory. 

Each  zone  was  also  to  furnish  its  portion  of  suppHes 
accumulated  in  the  Atlantic  seaports  for  shipment  over- 
seas. 

Some  idea  may  be  formed  of  the  size  of  these  stores 
when  It  IS  considered  that  a  permanent  reserve  of  three 
months'  supplies  was  to  be  constituted  in  France  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  Expeditionary  Forces. 

At  the  same  time,  the  quartermaster  corps  undertook 
the  erection  of  large  buildings  destined  to  receive  both 
troops  and  material  of  all  kinds.  The  first  project  in- 
cluded the  establishment  of  sixteen  groups  of  barracks 
capable  of  containing  40,000  men  each. 

The  difficulties  encountered  by  the  ordnance  fully 
equaled  those  which  were  met  and  solved  by  the  quarter- 
master corps. 

The  declaration  of  war  found  the  American  army  with 
a  system  of  manufactures  which  was  scarcely  adapted 
even  to  the  needs  of  peace  time. 

Six  hundred  thousand  Springfield  rifles  of  the  1903 
model  were  on  hand  and  the  daily  output  of  this  arsenal, 
joined  to  that  of  the  establishment  at  Rock  Island,  did 
not  exceed  seven  hundred  pieces.  The  army  had  only  a 
few  hundred  machine  guns  of  various  models  (Benet- 
Mercier,  Colt,  Maxim,  and  Catling),  as  none  of  these 
had  been  definitely  adopted  as  a  permanent  standard  for 
the  American  army. 

The  number  of  field  guns  did  not  exceed  780  pieces  of 
small  and  1 14  of  middle  caliber.  There  existed  no  heavy 
field  guns. 

Neither  the  government  arsenals  nor  the  private  manu- 


Activities  in  America  83 

facturers  were  equipped  so  as  to  be  able  to  produce  the 
requisite  number  of  guns  of  American  pattern.  As  to 
the  manufacture  of  shells,  the  factories  capable  of  turning 
out  any  considerable  amount  were  taken  up  with  filfing 
the  orders  of  the  Allied  governments.  However,  fortu- 
nately and  mainly  on  account  of  these  orders,  the  United 
States  was  prepared  for  an  appreciable  development  in 
the  output  of  gunpowder  and  explosives,  and  strides  had 
been  made  in  the  production  of  nitric  acid  by  fixation  of 
atmospheric  nitrogen. 

Thus,  as  we  have  seen,  except  for  explosives  the  situa- 
tion of  the  ordnance  service  had  to  be  completely  revolu- 
tionized. Radical  measures  were  necessary  and  were  im- 
mediately taken  by  the  heads  of  this  department. 

In  order  to  utilize  those  factories  which  had  been 
producing  the  Enfield  rifle,  adopted  by  the  British  army, 
a  type  of  weapon,  called  model  19 17,  was  developed 
resembling  the  English  model  but  whose  bore  was 
modified  in  order  to  use  the  Springfield  cartridge, 
which  latter  America  was  able  to  turn  out  in  vast 
quantities. 

Important  orders  were  also  given  in  France  for  Hotch- 
kiss  machine  guns  and  Chauchat  automatic  rifles,  at  the 
same  time  experiments  were  made  with  the  Browning  light 
and  heavy  machine  guns. 

In  June,  19 17,  it  was  decided  to  adopt  French  material 
for  the  American  field  artillery. 

This  decision  greatly  simplified  matters,  since  it  gave 
American  factories  time  to  transform  and  adapt  their 
equipment,  while  the  French  industry,  utilizing  raw  ma- 
terials imported  from  the  United  States,  should  manufac- 
ture the  first  thousands  of  guns  required  by  the  American 
Expeditionary  Forces. 


84      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Some  idea  may  be  given  of  the  development  of  the 
ordnance  by  the  mere  mention  of  the  relative  statistics  of 
its  operations  for  one  year. 

In  June,  19 17,  this  department  transported  500  tons 
of  manufactured  goods  and  raw  material.  In  June, 
19 1 8,  this  total  was  increased  to  100,000  tons. 

When  war  was  declared,  American  aviation  was  prac- 
tically non-existent.  The  total  strength  of  the  service, 
including  officers  and  men,  did  not  exceed  1,185.  ^^^ 
number  of  machines  was  altogether  insignificant.  Ex- 
perience gained  on  the  Mexican  border  had  proved  that 
the  types  used  were  in  no  way  adapted  to  the  exigencies 
of  modern  warfare. 

The  aviation  section  of  the  signal  corps  had  therefore 
to  make  a  choice  among  the  various  existing  models,  if 
necessary  to  create  new  ones,  and  organize  its  manufac- 
turing program  from  beginning  to  end. 

In  May,  19 17,  the  "  Council  of  National  Defense  "  cre- 
ated the  "  Aircraft  Production  Board,"  and  a  commis- 
sion was  sent  to  Europe  in  order  to  study  the  best  types  of 
war  planes. 

Experiments  were  undertaken  with  a  view  to  creating  a 
powerful  engine  which  might  be  turned  out  in  large  num- 
bers, according  to  the  industrial  methods  of  intensive 
production  employed  in  America. 

The  Liberty  engine  was  finally  adopted;  but,  while 
waiting  the  first  output  of  these  machines  in  the  United 
States,  orders  were  given  for  great  numbers  of  training 
planes  of  old  pattern,  the  first  of  which  were  delivered 
in  June. 

In  February,  19 18,  the  first  American  made  war  plane 
with  a  Liberty  engine  arrived  in  France. 


Activities  in  America  85 

The  question  of  raw  material  presented  immense  diffi- 
culties. 

Europe  had  largely  depended  upon  America  to  furnish 
fir  wood  and  spruce.  Battalions  of  woodcutters  were  or- 
ganized and  set  to  work  In  the  forests  of  the  Pacific 
coast  in  which  large  quantities  of  those  kinds  of  wood 
exist. 

Shortage  of  flax  made  it  necessary  to  find  some  substi- 
tute possessing  the  qualities  required  for  a  fabric  used 
for  covering  airplane-wings.  A  manner  of  weaving  cot- 
ton tissue  was  speedily  found  which  proved  entirely  sat- 
isfactory. 

Thanks  to  studies  undertaken  In  the  United  States,  a 
substitute  was  also  found  for  castor  oil  as  a  high-grade 
lubricant,  a  mineral  oil  replacing  the  former  was  found 
equally  satisfactory  except  for  rotary  engines. 

The  rest  of  the  work  of  the  signal  corps,  the  construc- 
tion and  operation  of  telephone  and  telegraph  systems, 
will  be  examined  later,  as  will  that  of  the  engineer  corps, ^ 
in  connection  with  the  organization  of  the  lines  of  com- 
munication on  French  territory. 

But  we  must  not  leave  the  subject  of  the  first  measures 
of  organization  initiated  in  the  United  States  without  a 
short  mention  of  the  activities  of  the  medical  corps. 

Figures  must  again  speak  for  us  rather  than  a  lengthy 
description.  From  the  beginning  of  the  war  to  the  armis- 
tice the  medical  corps  in  America  established  hospitals 
with  a  capacity  for  120,000  men  and  had  under  treatment 
1,400,000  patients,  from  August  30,  19 17,  to  August  30, 
1918. 

^In  the  course  of  the  war,  the  effectives  of  the  engineer  corps  passed 
from  2,000  to  300,000  officers  and  men. 


86      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

The  sick  death  rate  among  the  troops  stationed  in 
America  was  only  0.64  per  cent.,  a  remarkably  low  per- 
centage, considering  that  the  army  was  composed  of 
young  recruits  suddenly  taken  away  from  their  homes  and 
assembled  in  great  numbers  in  hastily  constructed  camps 
and  barracks. 

The  gas  mask  designed  by  this  service  was  so  efficient 
that  no  case  is  known  of  a  soldier  using  it  that  died  from 
gas  poisoning. 

In  the  space  of  seventeen  months  from  June,  19 17  to 
November,  19 18,  the  American  army  transported  from 
one  continent  to  the  other  2,080,000  men  and  5,160,000 
tons  of  material. 

Four-fifths  of  the  men  and  half  the  material  were 
shipped  from  New  York,  and  a  quarter  of  the  material 
from  Newport  News,  Virginia ;  the  remainder  almost  en- 
tirely left  from  Baltimore  or  Philadelphia. 

The  quartermaster  corps  and,  after  August  4th,  the  em- 
barkation section  of  the  General  Staff,  shared  in  the  honor 
of  having  organized  the  system  of  sea  transportation. 

The  first  thing  to  be  found  was  an  adequate  system  of 
embarkation  facilities.  The  docks  of  the  Hamburg 
American  line  and  the  North  German  Lloyd  at  Ho- 
boken,  seized  at  the  beginning  of  hostilities,  were  imme- 
diately utilized.  But  as  time  went  on,  they  were  found 
inadequate,  and  other  docks,  including  those  of  the  Lam- 
port Holt  Company,  were  added  to  the  existing  facilities. 

Two  camps  were  established  in  the  immediate  vicinity 
of  New  York,  Camp  Merritt  and  Camp  Mills,  each  cap- 
able of  containing  40,000  men.  An  enormous  general 
storage  depot  was  constructed  at  Port  Newark,  another 
for  engineer  material  at  Port  Harrison,  New  Jersey. 


Sea  Transportation  87 

The  large  installations  at  Newport  News  were  placed, 
like  those  of  New  York,  under  the  command  of  a  general. 
They  included  an  organization  camp  for  labor  units  and 
an  embarkation  center  for  animals. 

Thanks  to  the  highly  developed  railroad  system  of 
America  and  to  the  excellent  equipment  of  the  ports,  huge 
masses  of  men  and  material  could  be  transported  without 
too  much  difficulty  to  the  navigation  companies'  piers. 

There  remained  the  most  difficult  problem  of  all,  on 
which  we  may  say  that  the  issue  of  the  war  in  great  part 
depended.  Where  could  the  ships  be  found  that  were  to 
carry  these  men  and  this  material? 

According  to  what  schedule  and  in  what  order  of  pri- 
ority were  the  shipments  to  be  carried  out? 

The  German  navigation  companies  who  had  supplied 
the  piers  might  also  be  expected  to  supply  the  first  neces- 
sary ships,  and  the  government  immediately  laid  hands  on 
interned  enemy  shipping  to  the  extent  of  460,000  tons 
deadweight,  chiefly  consisting  of  passenger  ships.  But  in 
consequence  of  willful  destruction  of  the  machines  by 
their  German  crews  and  in  some  cases  owing  merely  to 
a  long  stabilization  in  port  most  of  these  ships  needed 
repair  and  could  not  be  counted  upon  as  serviceable  before 
autumn. 

It  is  also  to  be  noted  that  even  this  large  amount  of 
tonnage  represented  little  more  than  half  of  the  allied 
and  neutral  shipping  that  had  been  sunk  by  enemy  subma- 
rines during  the  month  of  April  alone.  Other  measures 
of  a  drastic  character  had  to  be  taken. 

The  entire  output  of  the  American  shipping  yards  was 
requisitioned,  orders  were  largely  given  by  the  govern- 
ment to  private  firms.  All  this  entailed  considerable  de- 
lay.    In  order  to  meet   immediate   needs   all  available 


88      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

American  merchant  shipping  was  chartered;  by  the.  end  of 
June  the  American  army  disposed  in  all  of  seven  trans- 
ports and  six  cargo  boats,  totalling  94,000  tons;  at  the 
date  of  the  armistice  that  figure  had  grown  to  3,800,000 
tons. 

We  shall  examine  elsewhere  the  methods  employed 
during  seventeen  months  to  bring  American  tonnage  up  to 
the  last-named  figure.  During  the  early  period  which  at 
present  occupies  us,  i.  e.,  19 17,  the  increase  was  rather 
slow,  and  in  the  course  of  the  summer  was  almost  en- 
tirely due  to  the  chartering  of  American  shipping. 

After  the  month  of  September,  the  greater  number  of 
interned  German  ships  became  available.  The  following 
monthly  table  gives  the  increasing  total  of  cargo  tonnage 
assigned  to  the  service  of  the  American  Expeditionary 
Forces  in  France. 

June 48,000     September    223,000 

July    84,000     October    291,000 

August   125,000     November    460,000 

December 525,000 

The  army  which  left  American  shores  was  to  be  organ- 
ized in  France  upon  the  arrival  of  its  different  elements. 

Consequently  one  and  the  same  section  of  the  General 
Staff  was  at  first  entrusted  with  the  plans  governing  or- 
ganization and  sea  transportation. 

The  following  self-evident  considerations  were  now  to 
govern  the  priority  of  shipments. 

The  exclusive  transportation  of  combat  troops  would 
mean  that  the  French  services  of  the  rear,  already  badly 
congested  by  the  needs  of  the  French  army,  would  be  still 
more  strained  by  those  of  the  American  Expeditionary 
Forces. 


Sea   Transportation  89 

To  ship  troops  unaccompanied  by  adequate  supplies 
would  mean  that  they  would  have  to  subsist  on  the  re- 
sources of  the  country  of  their  destination. 

Three  years  of  war  had  cut  down  the  food  supply  of 
France  to  a  degree  that  was  on  the  verge  of  being  peri- 
lous. The  American  command,  well  aware  of  the  short- 
age existing  in  the  month  of  April,  19 17,  was  extremely 
anxious  to  supply  the  American  troops  by  means  of 
American  resources  in  order  to  leave  France  in  complete 
possession  of  her  own  and  also  with  a  view  to  minimizing 
as  far  as  possible  the  unavoidable  rise  in  prices  consequent 
on  the  supplying  of  still  another  army.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  shortage  in  tonnage  made  it  absolutely  impera- 
tive for  the  American  command  to  find  in  Europe  the 
greatest  possible  amount  of  supplies  of  all  sorts.  The 
importance  of  this  may  be  fully  realized  when  one  knows 
that  the  transportation  of  one  horse  from  America  to 
France  requires  ten  tons  of  shipping.  It  is  easy  to  see 
therefore  the  immense  economy  of  tonnage  entailed  if 
the  A.  E,  F.  could  find  in  France  or  England  or  Spain 
a  few  thousand  animals. 

A  close  study  of  these  difficulties  led  the  high  command 
to  decide  upon  certain  principles  which,  except  in  some 
unforeseen  cases  later  mentioned,  governed  the  execution 
of  transport  to  Europe. 

The  Expeditionary  Forces  were  to  be  embarked  in  suc- 
cessive phases  or  series,  each  series  consisting  of  an  army 
of  some  three  hundred  thousand  men,  equipped  with  all 
necessary  auxiliaries.^ 

-  The  following  table  gives  in  a  condensed  form  the  composition  of  the 
six  first  phases.  Divisions,  the  number  of  -which  is  followed  by  an  R,  are 
replacement  divisions.  Numbers  followed  by  a  D  are  those  of  depot 
divisions. 


90      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

In  each  phase  the  auxiliaries  and  services  were  to  be 
transported  ahead  of  the  combat  troops. 

First  Phase 

Service  of  the  Rear 83,482 

Army  Troops  R  D 7,200 

First  Corps    (Divs.   1-2-26-32-41-42 i74>ii8 

Army  Troops  10,400 

Total    First   Phase 275,200 

Second  Phase 

Service  of  the  Rear  R  R 73, "4 

Second  Corps   (Divs.  28-30-77-78-80-82) 178,114 

Army  Troops  16,262 

Total  Second  Phase 267,490 

Total  to  date 542,690 

Third  Phase 

Service  of  the  Rear  R  R 52,124 

Third  Corps   (Divs.  3-4"5-6-33-35) 177,070 

Army  Troops   17,054 

Total   Third   Phase 246,248 

Total  to  date 788,938 

Fourth  Phase 

Service  of  the  Rear 40,951 

Fourth  Corps   177,070 

Army  Troops  13,722 

Total  Fourth  Phase 231,743 

Total    to   date 1,020,681 

Fifth  Phase 

Service  of  the  Rear 27,174 

Fifth  Corps  177,070 

Army  Troops 5,856 

Total  Fifth  Phase 210,100 

Total  to  date 1,230,781 

Sixth  Phase 

Service  of  the  Rear 16,618 

Grand    Total    (excluding   Aviation    and    re- 
placements)       i>2'49t399 


Sea  Transportation  91 

One  month  of  supplies  was  to  be  sent  with  each  con- 
voy. A  reserve  of  three  months'  supplies  was  to  be  per- 
manently maintained  in  France  for  the  total  effectives 
landed;  forty-five  days'  rations  were  to  be  kept  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  ports,  thirty  days  in  the  interior  of  the 
country,  fifteen  days  at  the  front. 

Thus,  the  shipment  of  supplies  would  proceed  auto- 
matically, and  without  any  special  application  being  made 
to  Washington. 

On  these  principles,  General  Pershing's  staff  established 
a  document  of  paramount  importance,  the  "  Priority 
Schedule,"  which  was  sent  to  the  War  Department  and 
determined  the  order  in  which  different  organizations, 
personal  and  material,  were  to  be  sent  to  Europe. 

Military  events  naturally  greatly  modified  this  scheme. 
And  the  early  sending  of  a  division  of  infantry  decided 
on  moral  grounds,  was  the  first  of  a  series  of  modifications 
that  had  to  be  made  to  the  original  priority  schedule. 

This  division  of  the  regular  army  left  America  in  sev- 
eral detachments.  A  convoy  including  fifteen  ships  and 
carrying  15,000  men  and  16,000  tons  of  material  and 
supplies  set  sail  between  June  12th  and  17th  for  St.  Na- 
zalre,  arriving  on  the  morning  of  June  26th.  The  voy- 
age, thanks  to  the  extreme  vigilance  of  the  United  States 
Navy,  took  place  without  loss. 

Admiral  Sims  had  come  to  London  during  the  early 
days  of  April  in  order  to  organize  the  protection  of 
American  ships  In  European  waters.  It  was  decided, 
after  a  very  careful  study  had  been  made  of  the  matter, 
that  each  convoy  when  six  hundred  miles  from  our  coasts 
should  be  taken  In  charge  and  escorted  by  a  flotilla  of 
destroyers. 

In  order,  also,  to  evade  an  attack  which  might  take 


92      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

place  in  mid-ocean  if  a  fast  German  cruiser  succeeded  in 
running  the  coast  blockade,  each  convoy  was  accompanied 
from  America  by  an  armored-cruiser.  The  Seattle  was 
the  first  of  these  to  arrive  with  a  convoy  in  European 
waters. 

The  American  navy  accomplished  during  the  period  of 
hostilities  a  task  of  which  we  can  here  but  mention  the 
result. 

Out  of  more  than  ^vt  million  tons  of  material  sent 
from  America  to  France  only  79,000  tons  were  lost  at  sea. 
The  total  amount  of  American  shipping  sunk  was  200,000 
tons,  142,000  of  which  was  due  to  submarine  attacks. 

We  have  thus  rapidly  sketched  some  of  the  measures 
taken  in  view  of  assembling  in  America  and  transport- 
ing across  the  ocean  the  vast  masses  of  men  and  material 
of  the  Expeditionary  Forces.  We  shall  now  in  turn  ex- 
amine the  gigantic  organization  undertaken  on  French 
soil,  which  permitted  their  reception  on  arrival  and  al- 
lowed of  their  rapid  forwarding  at  an  ever  increasing 
speed,  to  the  battle-fields  where  the  fate  of  the  great  war 
was  being  decided. 

The  organization  of  the  lines  of  communication  and 
of  the  services  of  the  rear  of  the  American  army  was  car- 
ried out  in  France,  as  had  been  the  case  in  America  and 
on  the  Atlantic,  by  a  body  of  practical  men,  anxious  to 
make  the  best  of  existing  circumstances  at  the  time  of 
their  arrival,  to  do  things  on  a  large  scale,  and  to  do  them 
quickly. 

When  news  of  the  declaration  of  war  reached  Paris, 
Major  Logan,  head  of  the  American  military  mission  in 
France,  and  Captain  Boyd,  the  United  States  military  at- 


Lines  of  Communication  in  France  93 

tache,  at  once  made  every  effort  to  gather  all  information 
which  might  make  it  possible  for  the  government  at 
Washington  in  the  first  place,  and  for  the  commander 
of  the  Expeditionary  Forces  in  the  second,  to  arrange, 
with  full  knowledge  of  prevailing  conditions,  the  bases  of 
their  future  organization. 

At  this  moment,  both  officers  were  entirely  uninformed 
as  to  what  character  American  intervention  would  take. 
And,  in  regard  to  the  future  activities  of  the  great  repub- 
lic, the  most  varied  and  contradictory  rumors  were  cir- 
culated. 

Would  America  merely  content  herself  with  supplying 
the  Allies  with  war  material  of  various  kinds?  Would 
she  send  over  detachments  of  volunteers  or  aviation 
troops?  Would  great  armies  be  enrolled  for  combat  on 
European  soil?  To  none  of  these  questions  were  the 
American  military  representatives  in  Paris  furnished  with 
an  answer.  The  government  of  the  United  States  had 
not  made  known  any  decision  in  these  matters;  possibly 
they  were  waiting,  on  their  side,  for  the  result  of  the  in- 
quiries which  the  American  military  mission  was  to  make 
in  France. 

If  in  modern  warfare  the  services  of  the  rear  are  neces- 
sarily obliged  to  adapt  their  mobile  organizations  to  stra- 
tegical exigencies,  strategy,  on  the  other  hand,  must  also 
take  into  consideration  certain  prevailing  conditions. 
Most  particularly,  it  was  advisable  that  the  American 
army  should  profit,  in  so  far  as  possible,  by  certain  per- 
manent facilities  and  organizations  existing  on  French 
territory  at  the  time  of  its  arrival. 

We  have  already  observed  to  what  great  extent  such 
material  considerations  shared  in  the  decisions  of  the 
French  and  American  supreme  command  when  they  de- 


94      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

cided  as  to  the  future  zone  of  action  of  the  Expeditionary 
Forces. 

The  military  mission  had  the  task  in  hand  of  determin- 
ing upon  the  selection  of  the  most  favorable  ports  for  the 
debarkation  of  vast  numbers  of  troops;  they  had  also  to 
decide  how  to  supply  these  troops  and  where  to  assemble 
them  upon  arrival. 

During  April  and  May,  the  American  mission  verified 
on  the  spot  the  information  received  from  the  French 
General  Staff  in  regard  to  these  questions  and,  accompan- 
ied by  several  French  officers,  among  whom  one  of  the 
writers,  made  an  extensive  tour  of  ports,  railroad  yards, 
hospitals,  and  storage  depots  of  all  kinds.  Major  Lo- 
gan and  his  associates  thus  got  precise  details  on  the  re- 
sources at  our  command  and  the  part  which  they  might 
claim  in  their  use.  Often  the  field  of  study  and  selec- 
tion was  extremely  limited;  this  was  especially  the  case  in 
regard  to  our  seaports. 

Those  giving  upon  the  Channel,  as  far  as  Cherbourg, 
inclusive,  were  being  utilized  up  to  their  full  capacity  by 
the  services  of  the  British  army  and  those  of  the  French. 
Brest,  which  had  never  been  utilized  except  as  a  naval 
base,  had  never  been  equipped  with  the  facilities  for  han- 
dling a  heavy  traffic.  Neither  did  this  port  possess  any 
basins  provided  with  locks,  so  that  the  debarkation  of 
men  and  freight  could  only  be  carried  out  by  lightering. 

At  St.  Nazaire  the  conditions  appeared  more  favor- 
able. The  port  was  accessible  at  all  times  to  ships  draw- 
ing twenty-eight  feet ;  it  was  supplied  with  two  large  bas- 
ins and,  providing  that  certain  measures  were  taken,  was 
capable  of  a  daily  output  of  several  thousand  tons. 

At  the  time  of  the  first  German  advance  toward  Paris 
in  19 14  the  town  had  served  as  a  base  for  the  British 


Lines  of  Communication  in  France  95 

armies  and  25,000  men  had  simultaneously  been  quar- 
tered In  the  extensive  camps  situated  upon  the  neighbor- 
ing heights. 

Furthermore,  there  existed  at  St.  Nazaire  a  remount 
depot  which  was  very  well  organized  and  could  contain 
3,000  animals. 

Unfortunately  this  port  had  several  serious  draw- 
backs. The  piers  were  narrow,  the  warehouses  few  and 
far  from  capacious.  The  vicinity  of  habitations  made  It 
Impossible  to  build  new  ones.  The  railroad  lines  on  the 
piers  were  in  poor  condition,  drinking  water  was  scanty, 
and  the  port  Itself  was  very  much  congested. 

Nevertheless  It  was  hoped  that  by  developing  the  wa- 
ter-works undertaken  by  the  British  In  19 14  It  would  be 
possible  to  furnish  the  camps  with  water  In  sufficient 
quantity,  and  at  the  extremity  of  the  Penhoet  docks,  close 
to  Montoir,  there  existed  extensive  stretches  of  flat 
ground  which  would  be  excellently  adapted  to  storage 
purposes.  The  French  had  already  begun  at  this  point 
the  construction  of  a  few  warehouses.  With  adequate 
labor  and  rolling  stock  It  seemed  possible  to  repair  the 
tracks  on  the  piers  and  relieve  the  congestion  of  the 
port. 

We  should  also  note  that  Nantes,  situated  at  some 
forty  miles  from  St.  Nazaire,  could  dispose  of  three  or 
four  berths  with  twenty-five  feet  of  water  and  correspond- 
ing warehouses. 

In  the  harbor  of  La  Pallce,  the  Americans  could  at 
once  utilize  two  berths  and  a  forty-ton  crane. 

In  the  Gironde  region,  Paulllac  possessed  a  long  and 
narrow  wooden  pier  only  linked  with  the  main  railroad 
system  by  a  single-track  line. 

In  order  to  utilize  this,  it  was  necessary  to  cross  the 


g6      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Gironde  on  the  only  railroad  bridge  which  exists  at  Bor- 
deaux and  consequently  add  to  the  congestion  already 
considerable  at  this  point. 

The  port  of  Bordeaux  itself,  situated  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Gironde,  a  fact  which,  from  the  railroad  point  of 
view,  presented  the  drawback  mentioned  for  Pauillac,  was 
already  working  at  its  maximum  capacity. 

On  the  other  hand,  at  Bassens  on  the  right  side  of  the 
river  and  five  miles  downstream  from  Bordeaux,  the 
French  had  begun,  in  19 15,  the  construction  of  piers  for 
the  traffic  of  the  important  powder  factory  situated  at 
this  point.  In  April,  19 17,  the  third  berth  was  nearing 
completion  and  the  possibilities  of  extension  were,  so  to 
speak,  unlimited. 

Furthermore,  between  Bassens  and  St.  Suplice,  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  main  line  to  Paris,  stretched  vast  ground 
favorable  for  the  establishment  of  extensive  camps  and 
storage.  It  was  evident  that  if  the  Americans  were  to 
have  a  base  in  the  Gironde,  Bassens  was  specially  indi- 
cated as  its  center.  Such  was,  generally  speaking,  the 
situation  of  the  Atlantic  ports. 

As  to  the  Mediterranean  ports  they  were  not  then  to 
be  thought  of.  The  advisability  to  avoid  an  increase  in 
the  duration  of  the  round  trips,  the  intensity  of  subma- 
rine warfare,  the  necessity  of  not  dispersing  the  ships 
then  available  for  escort  duty,  all  pointed  to  the  advisa- 
bility of  concentrating  efforts  on  the  Atlantic  bases. 

Accordingly,  it  became  evident  that  if  America  were 
ever  to  send  a  large  army  to  fight  in  France  the  first  base 
would  be  upon  the  Loire  estuary,  with  St.  Nazaire  as  main 
port,  the  second  on  the  Gironde  with  its  main  port  at 
Bassens. 

Thus  the  starting  point  of  the  lines  of  communication 


Lines  of  Communication  in  France  97 

upon  French  territory  were  practically  imposed  by  cir- 
cumstances and,  their  point  of  arrival  having  been  decided 
upon  by  General  Pershing  as  necessarily  in  the  region  of 
Lorraine,  it  only  remained  to  select  railway  lines  which 
were  to  link  the  American  base  ports  with  the  combat 
zone  and  also  to  decide  upon  the  location  of  the  facilities 
which  were  to  be  established  along  those  railway  lines  or 
in  their  immediate  vicinity. 

The  structure  of  the  French  railroad  system  was  well 
fitted  to  the  establishment  of  such  a  line  of  communication 
running  from  the  southwest  to  the  northeast,  traversing 
the  whole  breadth  of  the  country  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Loire  and  the  GIronde  to  the  upper  valleys  of  the  Marne, 
the  Meuse,  and  the  Moselle. 

The  main  line,  running  through  Nantes,  Tours, 
Bourges  Nevers,  Chagny,  Dijon,  and  Is  sur  Tille  (446 
miles)  was  at  too  great  a  distance  from  the  front  to  serve 
for  the  transversal  movements  of  the  French  troops  and 
was  comparatively  uncongested. 

The  stream  of  traffic  coming  from  Bordeaux  could  be 
branched  on  to  this  main  artery  either  at  Tours  via 
Poitiers  or  at  VIerzon  or  Bourges  via  Limoges- 
Chateauroux. 

A  number  of  more  or  less  large  towns  situated  on 
these  main  railway  lines  offered  Important  facilities  al- 
ready existing,  as  well  as  buildings  that  might  receive  new 
organizations,  the  whole  or  part  of  which  could  be  turned 
over  to  the  American  services  of  the  rear. 

In  those  cases  where  it  was  necessary  to  erect  new  con- 
structions at  different  points  of  the  road,  considerable 
acreage  of  flat  ground  existed  in  close  proximity  to  the 
line. 

Such  In  a  general  way  was  the  sort  of  practical  Informa- 


98      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

tion  collected  for  General  Pershing,  and  which  was  laid  at 
once  before  him  upon  his  arrival  in  Europe. 

As  he  reported  himself  to  the  Secretary  of  War: 

"...  All  these  considerations  led  to  the  inevitable  conclusion 
that  if  we  were  to  handle  and  supply  the  great  forces  deemed  essen- 
tial to  win  the  war,  we  must  utilize  the  southern  ports  of  France 
—  Bordeaux,  La  Palice,  St.  Nazaire,  and  Brest  —  and  the  compar- 
atively unused  railway  systems  leading  therefrom  to  the  northeast. 
Generally  speaking  then,  this  would  contemplate  the  use  of  our 
forces  against  the  enemy  somewhere  in  that  direction,  but  the  great 
depots  of  supply  must  be  centrally  located,  preferably  in  the  area 
included  by  Tours,  Bourges,  and  Chateauroux,  so  that  our  armies 
could  be  supplied  with  equal  facility  wherever  they  might  be  serv- 
ing on  the  western  front." 

Thus  as  we  have  seen  the  general  organization  of  the 
rear  of  the  American  armies  was  rather  a  question  of 
circumstance  than  of  planning  and  the  conclusions  arrived 
at,  as  General  Pershing  aptly  expressed  it,  were  inevitable 
in  the  spring  of  19 17. 

In  order  to  realize  these  projects  the  Americans 
were  called  upon  for  the  greatest  exposition  of  energy, 
acumen,  and  perseverance  in  their  decisions,  when  once 
adopted. 

They  went  to  work  with  a  view  of  perfecting  what 
already  existed  rather  than  to  create  entirely  new  facili- 
ties. Thus,  upon  the  signing  of  the  armistice,  the  num- 
ber of  berths  utilized  by  the  American  shipping  in  French 
ports,  amounted  to  98;  85  were  of  French  construction 
and  12  only  had  been  built  entirely  by  the  Americans. 

Although  the  output  of  our  ports  was  small  in  19 17, 
they  nevertheless  did  exist  with  their  piers,  their  docks, 
and  their  locks  usually  in  good  condition.  It  was  suffi- 
cient to  prevent  congestion  —  herein  the  American  effort 


Services  of  the  Rear  99 

was  particularly  efficacious  —  to  equip  them  after  more 
modern  methods  and  to  provide  them  with  facilities  for 
unloading  and  storage,  with  labor  and  rolling  stock. 

One  of  the  first  duties  of  the  commission  of  specialists 
sent  to  France  in  the  month  of  June  (among  whom  was 
Major  Wilgus,  ex-vice-president  of  the  New  York  Cen- 
tral), was  to  improve  conditions  of  the  port  of  St. 
Nazaire. 

The  United  States  Government  was  requested  to  send 
over  a  quantity  of  labor  units  and  a  large  number  of  hoist- 
ing machines  from  seven  to  twelve  tons.  It  was  also  de- 
cided, in  order  to  meet  the  then  very  great  difficulties  in 
transportation  facilities,  to  create  a  large  storage  depot  in 
the  vicinity  of  Montoir  some  four  miles  northeast  of  St. 
Nazaire,  which  was  destined  to  receive  the  supplies  until 
it  was  possible  to  transport  them  nearer  to  the  front.^ 
The  plan  included  a  large  number  of  warehouses  provided 
with  a  system  of  receiving,  classification,  and  departure 
yards  branched  at  one  end  on  the  tracks  of  the  port  of  St. 
Nazaire,  on  the  other  end  on  the  main  line:  St.  Nazaire 
—  Nantes. 

The  entire  length  of  railway  lines  to  be  constructed  was 
250  miles;  the  total  capacity  of  the  warehouses  was  to  be 
over  14,000,000  cubic  feet. 

In  case  the  port  of  St.  Nazaire  should  be  found  Inade- 
quate, a  plan  of  docks  was  designed  to  be  constructed  on 
the  Loire  near  Montoir.  This  was  to  include  eight 
berths  with  a  constant  draught  of  thirty  feet. 

The  shipbuilding  yards  at  Penhouet,  with  their  cranes 
of  one  hundred  and  fifty  and  one  hundred  and  eighty  tons, 
were  admirably  fitted  for  the  debarkation  of  heavy  loads, 

3  Montoir  was  also  to  serve  as  a  permanent  general  storage  depot  for 
Base  Section  No.  i. 


100     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

and  several  workshops  for  mounting  locomotives  and  rail- 
road artillery  were  established  there. ^ 

The  19th  American  regiment  of  engineers,  consisting 
exclusively  of  skilled  personnel,  was  to  be  utilized  not  only 
for  the  erection  of  the  locomotives  sent  from  the  United 
States  but  also  was  expected  to  repair  the  French  and  Bel- 
gian locomotives. 

At  St.  Nazaire  there  was  also  established  a  shop  where 
the  automobile  vehicles  which  had  been  sent  in  parts  to 
economize  tonnage  were  assembled. 

Nine  camps  with  a  total  capacity  of  40,000  men  were 
established  for  the  reception  of  passing  troops  as  well  as 
for  those  permanently  assigned  to  the  base. 

A  filtering  plant  with  apparatus  for  a  daily  flow  of 
7,500,000  gallons  was  speedily  established. 

At  Savenay,  also,  large  watertanks  were  constructed, 
with  a  capacity  of  100,000,000  gallons  in  order  to  supply 
two  hospitals  each  of  2,500  beds.  This  water  was  ob- 
tained from  a  small  river  at  a  certain  distance  from  the 
town. 

Finally  at  Nantes  the  depots  of  St.  Luce  were  con- 
structed and  it  was  decided  to  double  the  Orleans  rail- 
way line  along  the  portion  of  the  road  where  It  was  sin- 
gle-tracked ;  that  is  to  say,  from  the  Pont  de  la  Rontonde 
to  the  Bourse. 

Thus  equipped,  the  lower  Loire  became  the  American 
Base  No.  i. 

From  the  month  of  August,  work  was  In  progress  on 
American  Base  No.  2,  which  was  being  prepared  at  Bas- 
sens. 

There,  as  we  have  seen,  the  French  service  of  public 
roads  and  bridges  had  been  constructing  docks  on  the 

*The  boiler  of  an  American  locomotive  weighs  twenty-three  tons. 


Lines  of  Communication  in  France  loi 

right  bank  of  the  Gironde;  their  plan  included  ten  berths, 
and  in  May  the  third  of  these  was  approaching  comple- 
tion. 

The  French  services  agreed  to  turn  over  these  docks 
to  the  Americans  during  the  lapse  of  time  necessary  for 
the  latter  to  construct  new  ones.  On  the  other  hand  the 
Americans  offered  to  share  in  the  work  which  we  had 
undertaken  and  agreed  to  construct  ten  new  berths  down- 
stream from  the  powder  mill. 

The  installation  of  the  port  of  Bassens  was  thus  to  in- 
clude two  quite  distinct  series  of  docks,  each  of  which 
could  handle  ten  ships : 

The  French  port  of  old  Bassens  partly  of  French, 
partly  of  American  construction. 

The  American  port  of  New  Bassens  exclusively  of 
American  construction. 

The  plans  designed  by  Major  Wllgus  for  the  railroad 
system  of  the  American  Bassens  was  a  model  of  perfec- 
tion and  simplicity. 

The  tracks  formed  a  loop  where  circulation  was  always 
in  the  same  direction.  The  cars  arriving  by  the  main 
line,  Paris-Bordeaux,  were  at  first  sent  to  the  receiving 
yards,  whence,  according  to  requirements,  they  were  sent 
to  the  tracks  established  on  the  piers  and  alongside  the 
warehouses,  where  they  were  loaded.  Finally  they  con- 
tinued to  the  classification  and  departure  yards  and  from 
there,  toward  St.  Sulplce  or  more  remote  destinations. 

The  facilities  at  Bassens  were  also  to  Include  a  refrig- 
erating plant.  The  frozen  meat  being  unloaded  from 
the  holds  of  the  ships  was  to  be  subject  to  a  second  refrig- 
eration, which  would  be  sufficient  to  allow  it  to  be  for- 
warded to  Gievres  in  ordinary  box-cars.  It  was  thus 
possible  to  do  without  refrigerator  cars. 


I02     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Just  as  the  Montoir  general  storage  had  been  estab- 
lished in  order  to  absorb  the  overflow  from  the  port  of  St. 
Nazaire,  it  was  decided  to  construct  at  St.  Sulpice  on 
the  Paris  line  an  immense  depot  for  the  reception  and 
storage  of  supplies  which  were  unloaded  at  Bassens. 
Port  and  storage  were  to  be  linked  by  an  independent  rail- 
way established  alongside  the  main  line. 

Besides  Bassens  the  other  facilities  contiguous  to 
the  Bordeaux  base  were  to  include  camps  for  troops, 
a  hospital  center  at  Beau  Desert  containing  25,000  beds, 
depots  for  ordnance  and  quartermaster  material  respec- 
tively at  St.  Loubes,  La  Bastide,  and  Lormont,  remount 
depots  at  Lormont  and  Merignac. 

On  the  whole  it  may  be  said  that  the  two  American 
bases  in  France  were  established  on  the  same  principles. 

In  each  were  to  be  found,  jirst  a  port  of  debarkation 
equipped  along  modern  lines;  second  and  next  to  the  port 
to  which  was  linked  by  an  independent  railroad  line  a 
general  storage  depot;  Montoir  for  St.  Nazaire,  St.  Sul- 
pice for  Bassens. 

The  depot  has  a  double  role ;  it  should  not  only  absorb 
the  output  of  the  port  no  matter  what  its  volume  might 
be,  in  order  to  avoid  congestion,  but  also  it  should  con- 
stitute for  the  intermediate  zone  a  reserve  from  which 
supplies  might  be  drawn  according  to  requirements. 

Various  organizations  necessarily  grouped  themselves 
about  this  nucleus:  camps,  hospitals,  bakeries,  remount 
stations,  workshops,  assemblage  and  repair  plants. 

It  may  be  interesting  to  note  here  that  the  two  great 
bases  —  St.  Nazaire-Nantes  and  Bordeaux-Bassens  —  in 
the  course  of  the  war  unloaded  almost  two-thirds  of  all 
the  freight  imported  for  the  use  of  the  American  Expedi* 
tionary  Forces,  to  be  exact,  62.03  P^^  cent. 


Lines  of  Communication  in  France  103 

These  installations  which  were  established  in  the  other 
French  ports,  such  as  La  Pallce,  Brest,  Le  Havre,  Roche- 
fort,  and  Marseilles,  were  not  nearly  so  important  and 
will  be  spoken  of  later. 

The  transport  difficulties  were  not  by  any  means  over 
when  the  personnel,  animals,  supplies,  and  material  were 
landed  and  grouped  in  the  various  camps,  remount  sta- 
tions, and  depots  in  the  vicinity  of  the  base  ports  —  in 
fact  they  were  only  begun.  Other  problems  remained; 
that  of  forwarding  these  masses  of  men  and  material  to 
the  front,  and  that  of  providing  for  their  maintenance 
and  adding  to  their  numbers  by  drawing  upon  the  local 
resources  of  the  country.  The  following  figures  will 
indicate  that  such  resources  were  by  no  means  negligible. 

Out  of  the  243,560  animals  of  which  the  Expeditionary 
Forces  disposed  during  the  war,  67,725  only,  were  im- 
ported from  America.  And  here,  at  the  risk  of  antici- 
pating events.  It  seems  Indispensable  for  us  to  sketch  some 
of  the  general  prescriptions  addressed  to  the  services  of 
the  rear  In  view  of  their  individual  organization  and  In 
order  to  assure  the  coordination  of  their  activities.  In 
General  Order  No.  8  (dated  July  5,  1917)  the  com- 
mander-in-chief already  determined  the  precise  duties  of 
the  organization  which,  seventeen  months  later,  was  to 
handle  millions  of  men  and  distribute  millions  of  tons  of 
supplies  and  material. 

By  the  terms  of  this  document,  the  chief  of  the  line  of 
communications  was  entrusted  with  the  territorial  com- 
mand In  the  whole  zone  of  communications  with  the  sup- 
ply, sanitary,  telegraph,  and  telephone  service  and  all  con- 
struction work. 

On  August  13th  General  Order  No.  20  created  prac- 
tically all  services  of  the  rear  In  France.     The  geograph- 


I04     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

ical  limits  of  the  line  of  communication  extended  from 
the  seaports  to  the  railheads  which  served  as  base  of 
supplies  for  the  field  transportation  of  the  combat 
troops. 

It  included  three  separate  zones  which  were  denomi- 
nated as  follows : 

The  Base  Sections:  The  three  first  were  created 
at  St.  Nazaire,  Bordeaux,  Le  Havre  (this  latter  base  sec- 
tion being  the  agency  for  receiving  and  dispatching  troops 
and  supplies  arriving  in  France  at  Channel  ports  via 
Great  Britain). 

The  Intermediate  Section:  Whose  limits  were  com- 
prised between  those  of  the  advance  section  and  those  of 
the  "  base  sections.'* 

The  Advance  Section:  Formed  by  the  French  zone 
of  the  armies. 

The  line  of  communication  was  charged  with  the  service 
of  military  railways  including  operation,  maintenance,  and 
construction. 

To  begin  with,  the  following  lines  of  railroad  were  to 
be  considered  as  military  railways  belonging  to  the  line 
of  communications,  for  the  purpose  of  railway  movements 
of  troops  and  material  and  the  use  of  existing  facilities 
under  French  control. 

Saint  Nazaire-Tours-Bourges-Dijon-Is-sur-Tille  and 
points  to  the  front. 

Bordeaux-Limoges-Bourges. 

Regulating  station:     Is-sur-Tille. 

The  postal  service  and  military  police  were  also  to  form 
part  of  the  line  of  communication.  Brigadier-General 
R.  M.  Blatchford  was  appointed  commanding  general, 
line  of  communication. 

And  here  we  must  mention  two  other  orders  (j)f  the 


Lines  of  Communication  in  France  105 

commander-in-chief  on  account  of  the  great  Importance 
of  the  new  services  which  they  organized:  General  Or- 
der No.  23  of  August  20th  established  in  Paris  a  general 
purchasing  board  with  a  general  purchasing  agent  at  Its 
head.  The  general  purchasing  agent  was  to  be  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  commander-in-chief  with  the  various  al- 
lied purchasing  agencies;  his  duties  were  to  coordinate 
and  supervise  all  purchasing  agents  of  the  American  Ex- 
peditionary Forces. 

General  Order  No.  37  of  September  14th,  established 
at  headquarters  a  transportation  department  in  charge 
of  the  operation,  maintenance,  and  construction  of  all  rail- 
roads and  canals  under  American  control,  together  with 
all  constructive  work  to  be  undertaken  on  wharves,  shops, 
and  other  buildings  for  railroad  purposes. 

The  chief  of  the  transportation  department  was  the 
director-general  of  transportation  and  was  assisted  by 
the  following  staff : 

{a)  Deputy  director,  {h)  engineer  of  construction, 
(c)  manager  of  light  railways,  {d)  manager  of  roads, 
{e)  business  manager,  (/)  general  manager,  (^)  deputy 
director  with  each  army  commander. 

General  Atterbury,  ex-vice-president  of  the  Pennsyl- 
vania Railroad,  was  appointed  D.  G.  T. 

Colonel  Wllgus  was  appointed  deputy  director. 

Thus  during  the  summer  of  19 17,  under  vigorous  im- 
pulsion of  American  Headquarters,  the  general  organiza- 
tion of  the  services  of  the  rear  was  making  speedy  prog- 
ress. The  organization  was,  however,  still  far  from 
having  the  character  of  unity  and  centralization  which  It 
acquired  later  on. 

At  the  end  of  19 17  the  supply  of  American  troops  in 
France  was  divided  Into  three  phases: 


lo6     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

The  procurement  of  supplies,  their  care  and  storage, 
their  transportation. 

Responsibility  for  the  first,  lay  with  the  chiefs  of  vari- 
ous supply  departments  (quartermaster,  engineer,  ord- 
nance, etc).  It  was  accomplished  by  purchase  or  requi- 
sition in  the  United  States  or  in  Europe. 

The  second  was  placed  under  the  control  of  the  general 
commanding  the  lines  of  communications,  who  was  re- 
sponsible for  the  care  and  storage  of  supplies,  material, 
and  equipment,  and  for  the  construction,  maintenance,  and 
repair  of  all  agencies  necessary  to  accomplish  this  pur- 
pose. 

The  third  fell  to  the  director-general  of  transporta- 
tion, who  had  charge  of  the  unloading  of  freight  and 
troops  from  ships  at  the  points  of  debarkation,  of  the 
transportation  of  all  troops  and  supplies  by  rail,  and  was 
responsible  for  the  construction,  maintenance,  and  opera- 
tion of  such  railroad  lines  and  rolling  stock  as  came  within 
American  control. 

And  now,  following  the  American  line  of  communica- 
tion in  France  we  will  leave  the  zones  of  the  bases  in 
order  to  penetrate  with  our  reader  into  the  intermediate 
section  before  reaching  that  of  the  advance. 

This  intermediate  section  would  have  had  no  reason 
to  exist  if  the  front  of  1917  was  to  be  stabilized  or  if, 
between  this  front  and  the  base  ports,  it  had  been  pos- 
sible to  count  upon  an  absolutely  regular  working  of  the 
railways.  In  that  case,  nothing  would  have  prevented 
the  storage  of  supplies  either  in  the  zone  of  the  advance 
or  In  the  vicinity  of  the  base  ports. 

In  practice  It  was  quite  otherwise. 

On  the  one  hand,  to  accumulate  vast  stores  in  the  army 


Lines  of  Communication  in  France  107 

zone  would  have  been  (without  mentioning  the  constantly 
increasing  dangers  of  aerial  bombardment)  running  the 
risk  of  seeing  these  supplies  fall  into  the  enemy's  hands  in 
case  of  an  even  slight  advance  on  his  part,  as  occurred  at 
the  end  of  November  after  the  battle  of  Caporetto,  when 
the  Italians  lost  vast  quantities  of  supplies  stored  in  close 
proximity  to  the  front. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  these  stores  were  left  in  the  im- 
mediate vicinity  of  the  ports,  and  were  only  drawn  from 
according  to  need,  it  would  have  meant  the  necessary  risks 
and  delays  involved  in  war  time  in  a  continuous  railroad 
transportation  on  a  distance  of  five  hundred  miles. 

Consequently  General  Pershing  decided,  between  the 
zone  of  the  bases  and  that  of  the  advance,  to  create  a 
third  one  —  the  intermediate  section,  intended  to  play 
the  role  of  a  regulator  for  the  shipments  from  the  first 
and  the  requests  made  by  the  second. 

Moreover  this  intermediate  section,  covering^  as  it  did 
a  stretch  of  the  country  where  the  armies  had  not  been 
quartered,  made  it  possible  for  the  American  services  sta- 
tioned on  its  territory  to  procure  by  calling  upon  local 
resources  certain  supplies  which  it  would  have  been  im- 
possible to  obtain  nearer  the  front. 

It  was  evident  that  the  diiTerent  services  of  the  rear 
should  have  their  large  installations  in  the  vicinitv  of 
the  main  embarkation  lines  which,  starting  from  Bor- 
deaux and  from  St.  Nazaire,  utilized  the  same  tracks 
from  Bourges  to  Is-sur-Tille. 

The  quartermaster  corps  decided  to  establish  remount 
depots  at  Selles-sur-Cher,  Gievres,  and  Sougy;  automobile 
acceptance  and  repair  parks  at  Tour,  Chateauroux,  and 
Nevers;  refrigerating  and  cold-storage  plants  at  Tours, 
Gievres,  Blois  and  Orleans,  bakeries  at  Dijon  and  Gie- 


io8      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

vres.  At  Tours  there  was  organized  a  plant  for  the  re- 
pair and  salvage  of  clothes  and  equipment  of  all  sorts, 
making  possible  immense  economies  of  both  money  and 
tonnage.  Motor  service  and  overhaul  parks  were  estab- 
lished at  Paris,  Tours,  Romorantin,  and  Nevers. 

The  principal  depots  and  repair  shops  of  the  ordnance 
were  installed  at  Mehun,  Foecy,  Gievres,  Romorantin. 

The  medical  corps  established  hospitals  in  all  the  above 
localities  and,  besides,  created  important  hospital  centers 
in  the  region  of  the  thermal  stations  of  Auvergne  (Le 
Mont  Dore,  La  Bourboule,  Roy  at,  and  Chatel-Guyon). 

As  to  the  engineers  corps,  charged  with  the  construc- 
tion work  (railroads,  camps,  barracks,  hospitals,  depots 
of  all  sorts)  its  activities  extended  over  all  the  region 
where  American  soldiers  were  stationed.  Its  main  de- 
pots were  located  at  Chateauroux  and  Gievres. 

The  signal  corps  began  the  construction  of  independent 
telephone  and  telegraph  lines  destined  to  connect  the 
headquarters  at  Chaumont  with  Paris,  Brest,  St.  Nazaire, 
and  Bordeaux. 

The  aviation  section  established  a  plan  for  a  large  pro- 
duction center  at  Romorantin. 

Of  all  these  installations  in  the  intermediate  section,  of 
all  those  that  have  been  established  by  any  army  at  any 
time  and  at  any  place  in  the  course  of  the  war,  the  most 
important  from  every  point  of  view  was  the  general  in- 
termediate storage  depot  at  Gievres.  Constructed  upon 
flat  ground,  adjacent  to  the  railway  line,  Tours-Bourges, 
and  fifty  miles  distant  from  Tours,  it  was  destined  to  be 
the  general  storage  depot  of  the  intermediate  section  for 
engineers,  medical,  quartermaster,  ordnance,  and  gas  sup- 
plies. 

The  depot  itself,  not  counting  the  barracks  and  hos- 


Lines  of  Communication  in  France  109 

pitals  annexed,  consisted  of  a  large  number  of  warehouses, 
vast  surfaces  of  open  storage,  a  refrigerating  plant,  and 
the  corresponding  railroad  yards.  The  definitive  project 
included  243  miles  of  rail,  of  which  155  miles  were  stand- 
ard gauge  road,  4,492,000  square  feet  of  storage  space; 
as  for  the  refrigerating  plant,  it  had  a  capacity  of  5,200 
tons. 

Gievres,  on  account  of  its  importance  and  geographical 
situation,  naturally  became  the  main  storage  depot  which, 
according  to  the  words  in  General  Pershing's  report  to  the 
Secretary  of  War,  permitted  the  American  armies  to  be 
supplied  with  equal  facility  wherever  they  might  be  serv- 
ing on  the  western  front. 

During  the  early  days  of  the  organization  of  the  serv- 
ices of  the  rear,  the  line  of  demarcation  between  the  Inter- 
mediate section  and  that  of  the  advance  was  less  definite 
than  In  the  French  system. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  authority  of  the  general  com- 
manding the  line  of  communications  extended  from  the 
ocean  ports  to  the  points  where  supplies  were  delivered 
to  the  field  transportation  of  the  combatant  field  forces. 

The  general  commanding  the  advance  section,  of  which 
Neufchateau  was  the  headquarters,  found  himself 
charged  with  the  establishment,  construction,  and  opera- 
tion of  all  the  camps,  hospitals,  remount  depots,  storages 
of  all  kinds  situated  in  the  French  "  Zone  of  the  Armies  " 
and  placed  under  American  control.  He  procured  the 
necessary  supplies  either  by  means  of  local  purchases  or 
by  requisitions  on  the  rear  and  was  in  charge  of  their  stor- 
age In  the  advance  depots. 

According  to  the  terms  of  the  general  order  of  August 
13th,  he  was  supposed,  with  a  view  to  comply  with  the  re- 


no     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

quests  of  the  fighting  troops,  to  draw  from  the  advanced 
depots  the  necessary  amount  of  supplies,  and  forward 
them  to  the  railheads;  i.  e.,  to  the  filllng-up  points  of  the 
"  field  transportation  of  the  combat  field  forces." 

This  simple  system  had  the  advantage  of  centralizing 
the  responsibility  to  the  utmost,  and  it  sufficed  for  a  long 
period  during  which  the  American  troops  were  occupying 
the  same  billets  and  the  same  quiet  sectors  upon  the  Lor- 
raine front,  but  it  was  no  longer  sufficient  for  their  needs 
when  the  large  units  were  definitely  formed  and  engaged 
in  active  operations.  This  sort  of  operation  necessarily 
entails  a  very  heavy  transportation  of  men  and  material, 
a  traffic  of  reenforcements,  evacuations,  and  supplies  in 
the  course  of  which  any  undue  delay  may  spell  disaster. 

It  is  therefore  essential  that  the  army  whose  interests 
are  involved  should  be  able  to  present  its  demands,  with- 
out intermediary,  to  an  authority  who  has  full  powers  and 
means  to  meet  them. 

In  the  French  organization  this  role  Is  filled  by  the  reg- 
ulating station  to  which  the  armies  in  the  field  ask  directly 
for  the  transport  of  all. kinds  which  they  may  require. 

After  close  study  of  the  question  General  Pershing  de- 
cided to  adopt  an  analogous  system  for  his  armies. 

On  December  12th,  a  general  order  prescribed  that  the 
troops  in  the  zone  of  the  armies  should  be  supplied  from 
the  storage  depots  by  means  of  regulating  stations.  The 
regulating  officer  —  i.  e.,  the  officer  in  charge  of  fhe  reg- 
ulating station  —  was  no  longer  under  the  orders  of  the 
general  commanding  the  lines  of  communication,  but  was 
a  member  of  the  coordination  section  of  the  General  Staflf 
of  the  army  or  group  of  armies,  supplied  through  his  reg- 
ulating station. 

He  drew  the  supplies  from  the  depots  of  the  lines  of 


Lines  of  Communication  in  France  iii 

communication,  forwarded  them  to  the  refilling  points 
(railheads),  where  they  were  turned  over  to  the  field 
transportation  of  the  troops.  Usually  a  separate  train 
was  provided  for  each  division. 

The  details  of  the  formation,  forwarding,  and  running 
of  trains  were  arranged  under  his  supervision  and,  accord- 
ing to  his  instructions,  by  a  representative  of  the  transpor- 
tation department;  in  short  the  Americans  practically  re- 
produced the  French  system  and,  as  in  our  case,  arranged 
that  the  military  authority  should  work  side  by  side  with 
the  seasoned  railroad  man. 

Moreover,  the  position  of  the  American  army,  which  at 
the  beginning  was  called  upon  to  act  in  close  contact  with 
the  French  armies,  made  it  desirable,  In  so  far  as  possible, 
to  adopt  a  similar  organization. 

The  first  American  regulating  station  was  established 
at  Is-sur-Tille,  far  enough  from  the  front  to  make  it  pos- 
sible to  add  to  the  station  an  important  advance  general 
storage  depot,  including  a  bakery  with  a  daily  output  of 
300  tons  of  bread. 

The  construction  work  carried  out  at  Is-sur-Tille,  which 
was  entirely  completed  at  the  time  of  the  armistice,  is  one 
of  the  most  Important  undertaken  in  France  by  the  Amer- 
ican engineers:  The  total  length  of  tracks  In  the  yards 
amounted  to  ninety-six  miles  (normal  gauge). 

At  almost  the  same  moment,  the  American  services  de- 
cided to  build  a  second  regulating  station  at  Lifiol-le- 
Grand  near  Neufchateau,  located  nearer  the  front  and 
destined  to  ultimately  replace  Is-sur-Tille  which  would, 
by  that  time,  have  become  the  general  storage  depots  of 
the  advance  section,  as  Glevres  was  that  of  the  Intermedi- 
ate section. 

The  construction  of  LIflfol  had  been  decided  with  the 


112     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

French  general  headquarters,  in  the  course  of  numerous 
conferences  between  Colonel  Payot,  director  of  the 
French  service  of  the  rear,  and  Colonel  W.  D.  Connor, 
chief  of  the  coordination  section  at  American  headquar- 
ters. 

It  was  understood  that  all  the  large  Installations  of 
the  zone  of  the  armies  were  to  be  interchangeable  and 
might  be  used  by  any  of  the  Allied  armies,  according  to 
the  turn  which  events  might  take. 

Thus  each,  while  working  ostensibly  for  his  own  army, 
was  in  reality  working  for  every  one. 

Naturally,  the  first  installations  of  the  advance  section 
were  established  along  the  lines  leading  to  the  Lorraine 
front:  general  storage  depots  at  Chaumont,  Vittel,  Ba- 
zoilles,  LIffol;  motor  transport  parks  at  Vesoul,  Epinal, 
Neufchateau,  Gondrecourt,  Toul;  ordnance  depot  at  Vil- 
lers-le-sec;  bakeries  at  Chaumont,  RImaucourt,  Neufcha- 
teau, Vittel;  refrigerating  plants  at  Is-sur-TIlle,  Chatillon, 
Epinal;  remount  depots  at  La  Neuville,  Bourbonne, 
Montiers-sur-Saulx,  Nancy;  forestry  centers  at  Epinal, 
La  Marche,  Domgermain;  hospitals  at  Chaumont,  Neuf- 
chateau, Contrexeville,  Vittel,  and  Toul. 

From  the  first  days  of  the  war,  the  American  Govern- 
ment fully  realized  the  Immense  Importance  which  a  good 
organization  of  railroad  transportation  would  have  for 
the  Expeditionary  Forces ;  consequently  It  had  at  once  sent 
to  France  a  commission  of  experts  constituted  by  some 
of  America's  most  competent  railroad  men. 

The  principal  members  were  Mr.  V^illlam  Barclay 
Parsons,  who  had  built  the  first  New  York  subway;  Mr. 
W.  F.  Wllgus,  ex-vlce-presldent  of  the  New  York  Central, 
and  Mr.  W.  A.  Garrett. 


Lines  of  Communication  in  France  113 

This  commission  found  the  railroad  system  of  France 
in  surprisingly  good  condition,  but  suffering  from  a  short- 
age of  rolling  stock  and  labor  that  enormously  reduced 
its  transportation  capacity;  its  first  care  was  therefore 
to  appeal  to  the  resources  of  the  United  States. 

General  Pershing,  informed  of  the  situation,  at  once 
requested  Washington  to  send  over  to  France  a  man  per- 
fectly qualified  by  his  experience  to  assume  the  general 
direction  of  railroad  transportation,  and  in  August,  Mr. 
W.  Atterbury,  vice-president  and  general  manager  of  the 
Pennsylvania  Railroad,  arrived  in  Paris  and  at  once  set 
to  work  with  Major  Wilgus. 

Their  general  plan  was  to  organize  the  transportation 
of  the  American  Army  in  France  along  the  same  lines  as  a 
great  railroad  company  and  including  all  its  usual 
branches;  the  only  difference  was  that  no  anxiety  existed 
as  to  the  financial  returns  of  the  operation  of  the  system. 

Let  it  be  mentioned  incidentally  that,  contrary  to  the 
legend  which  was  currently  circulated  by  the  public  and 
even  in  the  newspapers,  the  Americans  did  not  have  to 
construct  in  France  any  important  railroad  line  whatever. 
Practically  only  terminal  and  storage  tracks  were  built 
by  them.  The  only  double  main  line  constructed  was 
five  miles  in  length.  It  was  established  as  a  cut-off  con- 
necting the  main  line  of  the  P.  L.  M.  Railroad  south  of 
Nevers,  branching  off  near  Challuy,  crossing  the  Loire 
River,  and  rejoining  the  main  line  near  St.  Eloi. 

Other  important  projects  included  the  addition  of  a 
third  track  on  the  Bassens-St.  Suplice  line,  connecting  the 
lines  of  the  Orleans  and  state  railroads  at  Nantes,  and 
the  laying  of  two  additional  tracks  between  Bourges  and 
Pont  Vert. 

In  order  to  face  the  shortage  of  rolling  stock,  two 


114     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

solutions  presented  themselves  to  General  Atterbury:  the 
first  was  Importation  from  America,  the  other  consisted 
In  repairing,  by  means  of  American  labor,  the  thousands 
of  damaged  French  and  Belgian  locomotives  and  cars 
which  were  lying  Idle  as  a  consequence  of  the  lack  of 
skilled  workmen. 

In  December,  19 17,  both  solutions  were  simultaneously 
taken  up. 

The  main  repair  shops  were  established  at  Nevers, 
Cercy-la-Tour,  and  Saumur. 

Regiments  of  American  engineers  were  placed  at  the 
disposition  of  the  transportation  department.  These 
were  of  three  categories  : 

1st.   Construction  Regiments. 

2d.  Operation  Regiments. 

3d.  Shop  Regiments. 

They  were  made  up  strictly  of  specialists  In  the  differ- 
ent branches,  officered  by  men  who  were,  for  the  most 
part,  civil  engineers  of  great  experience.  Thus  the  class 
of  work  might  be  expected  to  be  very  high. 

We  shall  see  later  the  process  of  transformation  which 
was  effected  In  this  organization  of  which  the  bases  were 
laid  as  early  as  the  summer  of  1917;  but  before  leaving 
the  subject  of  transportation,  we  must  say  a  few  words  on 
that  of  the  motor  transport  service  which,  during  the 
war,  was  to  bring  such  effective  and  ever-Increasing  aid 
to  the  overstrained  railroads  and  attain  greater  and 
greater  Importance.  The  motor  transport  service  was 
organized  In  each  of  the  three  sections  of  the  line  of 
communications  by  a  general  order  dated  December  8th. 

It  Included  In  the  advance  zone  one  park  per  army,  in 
the  intermediate  section  an  Intermediate  group  consisting 


Lines  of  Communication  in  France  115 

of  several  organizations,  among  which  was  found  a  cen- 
tral depot  comprising  the  following  sections:  Supply, 
spare  parts,  main  shops,  salvage,  main  reserve  park,  and 
finally  in  the  base  zone  a  park  established  in  the  vicinity 
of  each  port  of  debarkation.  This  park  was  to  receive 
all  incoming  motor  transport  vehicles  and  personnel,  to 
organize  the  units,  and  afterward  forward  them  to  the 
organizations  of  the  intermediate  section,  or,  in  case  of 
emergency,  directly  to  those  of  the  advance  section. 

Thus  the  reader  who  has  patiently  followed  these  long 
explanations  may  be  able  to  form  some  idea  of  the 
American  services  of  the  rear  as  they  were  established  in 
France  at  the  end  of  19 17. 


CHAPTER  IV 

FIRST  APPEARANCE  OF  AMERICAN  CONTINGENTS  ON  THE 
FRENCH  FRONT THE  FIRST,  SECOND,  TWENTY- 
SIXTH,  AND  FORTY-SECOND  DIVISIONS 

During  the  conversations  which  took  place  between 
Marshal  Joffre,  the  American  Secretary  of  War,  and  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  touching  the  forthcoming 
intervention  of  America  in  the  European  conflict,  the 
marshal  had  dwelt  upon  the  necessity  of  forming  a  large 
number  of  strong  war  units  and  also  upon  the  urgency  of 
the  appearance  of  a  first  American  contingent  on  French 
soil.  It  was  considered  that  the  early  arrival  of  Ameri- 
can soldiers  among  our  troops  at  the  front  would  produce 
an  extremely  salutary  moral  effect.  His  suggestions 
were  favorably  received. 

Great  diligence  was  displayed  in  the  different  offices  of 
the  War  Department,  and  various  units  were  rapidly 
grouped  together  to  form  one  division.  The  i6th,  i8th, 
26th,  and  28th  regiments  of  the  regular  army,  which 
were  then  for  the  most  part  engaged  upon  the  Mexican 
border,  were  incorporated  into  the  First  Division. 

This  division,  which  was  the  first  to  respond  to  the  call 
of  the  victor  of  the  Marne,  and  to  display  the  Stars  and 
Stripes  beside  the  tricolor,  arrived  in  France  on  the 
twenty-sixth  of  June  and  disembarked  under  the  eyes  of 
General  Pershing. 

The  soldiers  who  composed  it,  volunteers  as  well  as 

116 


First  Division  117 

regulars,  produced  an  excellent  impression;  we  quote  the 
remarks  of  a  French  spectator : 

"  Orders  are  promptly  executed,  maneuvers  are  effected  with 
skill,  every  one  knows  his  place  and  his  business.  The  operations 
of  disembarking,  gathering  the  small  units,  and  marching  to  the 
barracks  are  carried  out  with  discipline  and  order.  The  men  are 
v/ell  set  up,  and  seem  perfectly  at  ease  upon  French  soil ;  with  their 
khaki  uniforms  closer  cut  than  those  of  the  English,  with  their 
picturesque  sombreros,  and  their  eminently  practical  equipment 
they  give  the  impression  of  cohesion.  The  soldiers  appear  to  be 
strong,  athletic,  and  healthy,  and  one  has  the  feeling  that  the 
nerves  of  such  a  troop  will  act  with  force  and  precision  at  the  hour 
of  combat." 

General  Sibert,  an  officer  of  engineers,  who  had  been 
one  of  the  most  efficient  among  those  who  constructed  the 
Panama  Canal,  was  in  command  of  the  First  Division. 
The  two  brigades  were  respectively  under  the  orders  of 
Generals  Bundy  and  Bullard. 

Upon  arriving,  the  troops  at  once  took  possession  of  a 
camp  situated  in  close  proximity  to  the  port  of  St. 
Nazaire,  and  which  had  been  prepared  to  receive  them 
while  awaiting  the  time  when  their  cantonments  would  be 
moved  nearer  the  front. 

Their  sojourn,  in  fact,  was  not  a  lengthy  one;  on  the 
fifteenth  of  July  the  division  was  entrained  for  the 
Gondrecourt  area  before  going  into  the  trenches  for  the 
first  time. 

Meanwhile  the  Fourth  of  July,  one  battalion  belonging 
to  the  Sixteenth  Infantry  carrying  the  flag  of  the  regi- 
ment arrived  in  Paris,  marched  in  defile  before  the 
President  of  the  Republic,  and  received  in  the  Court  of 
Honor  at  the  Invalides,  the  standards  offered  by  the 
French  Sons  of  the  Cincinnati.     Thence,  traversing  the 


ii8      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

capital,  amidst  the  acclamations  of  the  Parisians,  the  first 
American  soldiers  who  were  to  take  up  arms  for  their 
"  second  country  "  escorted  the  American  Ambassador 
and  General  Pershing  to  the  tomb  of  the  friend  of  Wash- 
ington and  gave  utterance  to  the  now  historic,  "  Lafay- 
ette, nous  voila." 

When  the  Sibert  division  took  possession  of  their  in- 
struction camp  they  occupied  a  line  of  villages  stretching 
along  the  Saulx  from  Gondrecourt  to  Ligny-en-Barrois. 

Here,  for  the  first  time  and  contrary  to  custom,  the 
American  soldier  did  not  pitch  a  tent,  but  was  lodged 
after  the  French  manner;  that  is  to  say,  in  the  villages 
and  adjacent  farmhouses.  He  soon  made  himself  quite 
at  home  in  the  barns  of  our  peasantry. 

Each  battalion  disposed  of  its  own  drill  ground,  rifle 
range,  trench  system,  and  wire  entanglements.  Divers 
centers  for  the  handling  of  grenades  and  other  weapons 
were  established  at  Mauvages  while  awaiting  the  installa- 
tion of  army  corps  schools.  Officers  and  men  were  to 
pass  fifteen  days  at  these  training  centers  and,  on  return- 
ing to  camp,  were  to  act  as  instructors. 

The  French  Forty-seventh  Division  of  ''  Chasseurs  a 
pieds  "  was  now  placed  beside  General  Sibert's  division 
to  serve  as  a  sort  of  guide  in  these  maneuvers.  Every 
day  lines  of  French  and  Americans  were  to  be  seen  dig- 
ging trenches,  practicing  with  trench  weapons,  handling 
rifles,  or  maneuvering  in  open  ground. 

The  First  Division  was  without  cannon,  the  artillery 
had  gone  to  Valdahon  to  the  firing  school;  but  our 
"  Chasseurs  "  had  their  own  guns  and  were  able  to  add 
some  artillery  instruction  to  the  various  lessons  which 
their  new  comrades  were  eager  to  take  advantage  of. 

General  Pershing  was  often  present  at  these  maneu- 


Firs t  Division  119 

vers.  He  always  took  occasion  to  express  his  opinion  on 
the  most  practical  methods  of  carrying  on  the  fight. 
How  often  have  we  not  heard  him  say:  "  Do  not  attach 
too  much  importance  to  trench  warfare,  mind  your  aim, 
have  confidence  in  your  rifle,  and  get  expert  with  the 
bayonet." 

The  aggressive  conceptions  of  the  commander-in-chief 
suited  the  caliber  of  his  men,  hardy  and  keen  for  action. 

For  some  weeks  the  Sibert  division  continued  to  profit 
by  the  experience  of  the  French  troops  under  a  direct 
American  command.  This  unit  was  reviewed  on  the 
eighth  of  September  by  President  Poincare  and  M.  Pain- 
leve,  Minister  of  War,  and  as  the  departure  for  the  front 
became  more  and  more  imminent,  Marshal  Joffre  ap- 
peared at  Gondrecourt  to  visit,  before  their  entrance  in 
the  trenches,  the  first  contingents  which  had  answered  his 
call. 

The  spectacle  was  impressive  and  moving.  After  the 
defile  he  said  a  few  words  of  welcome  and  Godspeed 
which  were  translated  into  English  and  met  by  the  accla- 
mation of  the  American  ofl[icers  gathered  around  the 
French  chief. 

A  few  days  later,  the  division  was  moved  to  the  sector 
of  Sommervillers,  east  of  Nancy.  Successively  the 
battalions  went  into  line  intercalated  with  the  French 
units  and  backed  up  by  their  own  artillery  which  had 
arrived  from  Valdahon. 

During  the  first  days,  the  American  batteries  contented 
themselves  with  remaining  in  close  touch  with  the  French 
batteries  which  had  been  maintained  in  line.  The  French 
were  entrusted  with  the  direct  covering  of  the  infantry, 
but  in  case  of  attack,  the  Americans  were  to  superpose 
their  fire  on  that  of  the  French,  thus  increasing  the  power 


I20     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

of  our  guns  without  as  yet  assuming  the  difficult  and 
delicate  task  of  maintaining  a  constant  liaison  with  the 
infantry  troops. 

Later  on,  as  they  became  more  expert  In  the  field,  the 
American  batteries  replaced  the  French  and  assumed  the 
direct  responsibility  of  liaison  with  their  own  infantry. 

General  Sibert's  division  was  distributed  as  follows: 
The  1 8th  Infantry  Regiment,  flanked  by  the  canal  Marne- 
Rhine  and  fronting  toward  Parroy,  held  the  right  end 
of  the  sector.  Proceeding  from  south  to  north  the  i6th, 
26th,  and  28th  regiments  filled  up  the  position,  the  left 
of  the  latter  extending  to  the  village  of  Arracourt. 

It  was  at  this  point  that  the  Americans  fired  their  first 
shells  into  the  German  lines  and  captured,  in  the  vicinity 
of  Bures,  their  first  prisoner.  This  honor  fell  to  the 
1 8th  Infantry  Regiment.  Here  also  they  met  with  their 
first  losses;  during  a  German  raid  against  that  portion 
of  the  front  held  by  the  i6th  Regiment.^  After  a  violent 
bombardment  the  enemy  succeeded  in  reaching  the  first- 
line  trenches  where  a  desperate  struggle  ensued.  During 
this  hand-to-hand  fight  the  Germans  succeeded  in  captur- 
ing a  few  prisoners. 

Soldiers  and  officers  were  eager  to  avenge  this  assault 
by  one  of  equal  vigor.  Plans  had  been  made,  the  men 
had  prepared  their  attack  which  was  about  to  be  executed, 
when  the  division  received  orders  to  leave  the  sector. 
Nevertheless,  the  American  soldier  had  already  been  able, 
in  the  course  of  numerous  reconnoissances  and  scouting 

1  The  tomb  of  the  first  American  killed  in  action  was  erected  by  sub- 
scription from  the  communes  and  the  department  of  Meurthe  et  Moselle. 
The  prefect  of  this  department  placed  a  Lorraine  cross  near  the  village 
of  Bathelemont  upon  which  is  the  following  inscription :  "  Here  rest  the 
first  soldiers  of  the  United  States  to  fall  on  the  soil  of  France  in  the 
cause  of  Justice  and  Liberty." 


First  Division  12 1 

parties,  to  demonstrate  his  superiority  over  his  enemy 
when  they  came  to  blows. 

The  last  elements  of  the  Sibert  division  were  relieved 
on  the  twenty-first  of  November,  and  the  whole  unit  was 
once  more  assembled  at  Gondrecourt  to  resume  training. 
This  time  the  instruction  was  of  a  different  order,  being 
limited  almost  entirely  to  concerted  maneuvers  in  the 
open,  and,  when  this  second  period  was  completed,  the 
Americans  were  judged  capable  of  holding  alone  a  divi- 
sional sector. 

The  First  Division,  of  which  General  Bullard  now  took 
command,  was  accordingly  established  with  its  head- 
quarters at  Menil-la-Tour,  north  of  Toul,  where  the  First 
Brigade,  commanded  by  General  Duncan,  and  reenforced 
by  a  large  portion  of  artillery,  relieved  the  French 
Moroccan  division.  The  front  thus  occupied  bordered 
the  southern  Woevre  and  stretched  from  the  "  Bois 
Carre,"  east  of  Seicheprey,  to  a  pond  in  the  vicinity  of 
Bouconville  village. 

Here,  framed  in  with  the  Thirty-second  French  Army 
Corps,  the  First  Division  soon  made  the  enemy  feel  its 
presence.  The  artillery  was  extremely  active,  daring 
patrols  operated  nightly,  as  much  with  a  view  to  "  getting 
their  hand  in  "  as  with  the  intention  of  taking  prisoners. 

The  first  of  March,  a  German  storming  party  consist- 
ing of  240  picked  men  from  the  "  shock  troops  "  and  with 
all  the  material  necessary  to  successfully  carry  out  this 
kind  of  operation,  attacked  the  "  Bois  Carre  "  which  was 
held  by  a  company  of  the  i8th  Regiment.  The  Ameri- 
cans, who  had  foreseen  the  attack,  had  taken  the  neces- 
sary precautions,  so  that  the  enterprise  completely  failed 
and  the  enemy  left  in  our  lines  seventeen  dead,  several 
prisoners,  a  machine  gun,  and  a  flame  thrower. 


122     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

The  First  Division  had  thus  already  acquired  the 
reputation  of  being  a  troop  whose  fighting  value  could 
be  relied  upon,  and  was  soon  to  give  even  more  positive 
evidence  of  the  stuff  its  men  were  made  of. 

Some  days  later,  when  the  Germans  were  carrying  out 
tlieir  attack  on  the  British  right  and  were  progressing 
toward  Amiens,  the  division  was  withdrawn  from  the 
Woevre  sector  and  transported  by  rail  to  the  zone  of 
active  operations. 

The  Second  Division,  commanded  by  General  Bundy, 
was  the  second  to  perfect  its  military  training  upon  our 
front.  Formed  like  the  First  of  regiments  belonging  to 
the  Regular  Army  but  to  which  a  large  number  of  recruits 
had  been  added,^  this  division  had  received  its  training 
on  French  soil.  Having  scarcely  landed,  it  was  immedi- 
ately directed  to  the  Bourmont  zone  and  there,  under  the 
same  conditions  which  we  have  described  for  the  sister 
division,  it  prepared  itself  for  active  warfare.  It  was 
pronounced  ready  for  combat  about  the  middle  of 
January,  191 8,  and  directed  to  the  portion  of  the  front 
comprised  between  the  Spada  Gap  and  les  Eparges. 

General  Bundy's  post  of  command  was  established  at 
Sommedleue,  near  that  of  the  chief  of  the  Tenth  French 
xA.rmy  Corps,  which  was  to  frame  in  the  American  con- 
tingents. 

From  the  moment  of  entering  the  line  the  men  of  the 
Second  Division  gave  proof  of  courage  and  tenacity.     On 

2  Including  a  brigade  of  marines  composed  of  two  regiments  which  had 
arrived  in  France  with  the  First  Division,  one  of  these  had  been  training 
with  General  Bullard's  troops,  while  the  other  was  engaged  in  work  on 
the  line  of  communication  where  there  had  been  a  shortage  in  labor. 
The  Second  Brigade  of  the  Second  Division  was  made  up  with  two 
regiments  of  regulars. 


Second  Division  123 

several  occasions  the  French  command  was  obHged  to 
moderate  the  ardor  of  these  fresh  troops.  It  was  notice- 
able that  every  time  an  American  division  appeared  in 
the  front  line  to  gain  experience  in  what  had  been  con- 
sidered a  "  quiet  zone  "  the  calmness  sought  for  was  im- 
mediately broken  up  and  the  sector  at  once  became 
animated;  the  foe  was  kept  constantly  on  his  mettle. 
Reconnoissances  were  multiplied,  patrols  were  sent  out 
in  force  every  night,  and  on  both  sides  raids  were 
organized. 

Two  companies  of  the  9th  Regiment  had  been  attacked 
near  Mezey  by  a  German  battalion.  This  position  held 
by  the  Americans  presented  many  difficulties;  moreover, 
when  the  French  held  the  same  ground  in  January,  19 18, 
there  had  been  serious  question  of  abandoning  it  as  too 
precarious. 

The  bombardment  which  preceded  the  German  attack 
was  particularly  violent.  A  rolling  barrage  of  great  In- 
tensity accompanied  the  first  assaulting  waves  which,  on 
April  15th,  at  half  after  midnight  succeeded  in  reaching 
the  advanced  outworks.  The  enemy's  fire  had  scarcely 
ceased  when  the  Americans  emerged  from  their  shelters 
with  remarkable  daring,  and  engaged  in  a  desperate 
struggle  calculated  to  give  a  splendid  idea  of  their  fighting 
qualities  to  their  more  experienced  adversaries.  In  the 
blackest  darkness  all  the  ground  for  a  moment  occupied 
by  the  foe  was  reconquered.  Seventy-two  Germans  dead 
were  counted  and  on  the  American  side  there  were  but 
seven  killed  and  nineteen  wounded.  When  the  roll  was 
called  ten  men  and  a  corporal  were  Indeed  missing,  but  not 
for  long.  Carried  off  as  prisoners,  at  a  given  signal  the 
little  band,  before  reaching  the  German  lines,  turned  upon 
their  captors,  seized  their  rifles,  and  made  such  good  use 


124     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

of  them  that  they  had  little  difficulty  in  regaining  their 
own  lines  safe  and  sound. 

The  division  whose  turn  now  came  to  appear  at  the 
front  was  the  Twenty-sixth,  composed  of  National  Guards 
recruited  among  the  New  England  States.  The  chief  of 
this  division,  General  Clarence  Edwards,  his  staff,  and  a 
small  number  of  officers  alone  belonged  to  the  Regular 
Army. 

They  had  arrived  in  France  at  the  end  of  October, 
19 1 7,  and  had  been  sent  to  Neufchateau,  where,  in  con- 
junction with  the  French  Sixty-ninth,  they  completed  their 
training  after  the  same  methods  as  their  predecessors. 
We  should,  however,  remark  that  at  that  period  the 
American  general  headquarters  of  Chaumont  was  able  to 
give  particular  and  close  attention  to  the  progress  of  in- 
struction of  the  troops,  to  correct  the  points  of  training 
which  had  been  defective,  and  that  the  last  comers  were 
able  to  profit  by  the  experience  of  the  first  divisions  which 
had  gone  before. 

When  infantry  and  artillery  were  pronounced  ready 
for  trench  work  —  that  Is  to  say,  on  the  ninth  of  February 
—  the  Twenty-sixth  Division  passed  Into  the  organization 
of  the  French  Eleventh  Army  Corps  which,  at  this  date, 
occupied  a  large  sector  north  of  the  Aisne  bordering  the 
Chemin  des  Dames. 

This  portion  of  the  front,  the  **  Couvrel  "  sector,  had 
remained  relatively  calm  since  the  attacks  of  October, 
1917.  The  entry  Into  line  of  the  American  troops  en- 
livened things  considerably. 

The  French  units  were  no  sooner  replaced  than  Gen- 
eral Edwards'  troops  were  subjected  to  a  fierce  localized 
attack  which  they  succeeded  In  repulsing,  showing  them- 


Twenty-Sixth  Division  125 

selves  on  this  occasion  particularly  tenacious;  in  resisting 
a  bombardment  of  thirty  hours,  during  which  the  German 
batteries  rained  thousands  of  toxic  shells  on  the  ground 
defended  by  the  I02d  Infantry  Regiment. 

Numerous  detachments  from  the  Twenty-sixth  Division 
were  called  upon  to  illustrate  their  offensive  quality  by 
frequent  raids  into  enemy  territory.  One  of  these  opera- 
tions, executed  by  Franco-American  troops,  was  so  well 
conducted  that  twenty-two  men  and  two  German  officers 
were  brought  back  without  the  Americans  having  lost  a 
man. 

General  Pershing  had  been  following  with  closest  atten- 
tion each  new  occasion  upon  which  contact  was  established 
between  American  troops  and  the  enemy.  For,  although 
he  attached  but  a  reasonable  importance  to  the  loss  or 
gain  of  a  small  trench  element,  each  new  enterprise  of 
the  sort  served  to  test  more  vital  things,  whether  he  had 
been  right  in  his  previsions  and  justified  in  his  decisions 
concerning  the  proper  training  for  his  soldiers.  These 
events  demonstrated  that  his  estimation  as  to  the  daring 
and  value  of  the  American  soldier  in  action  had  been  per- 
fectly correct. 

During  this  period  he  was  constantly  at  the  front,  visit- 
ing the  trenches  in  order  to  form  a  personal  impression  of 
the  morale  of  the  troops,  and  from  each  new  expedition 
he  returned  with  a  favorable  one. 

The  faults  which  might  be  noted  were  those  of  men 
who  were  as  yet  somewhat  green,  and  who  showed  excite- 
ment, agitation,  sometimes  an  excess  of  zeal,  but  who 
were  self-confident  and  strong  in  their  conviction  of  being 
able  to  down  their  opponents. 

The  onlooker  visiting  the  American  advance  posts  was 
struck  by  the  care  and  attention  of  the  men  on  watch; 


126      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

their  gaze  remained  constantly  fixed  upon  the  enemy's 
line.  As  to  the  trenches,  they  were  well  kept  up,  the 
shelters  clean  and  comfortable.  At  this  period  the 
American  detachments,  with  their  effectives  still  com- 
plete, were  always  able  to  dispose  of  a  large  number  of 
workers,  whereas  the  French  were,  after  four  years' 
heavy  losses  in  the  war,  sadly  lacking  in  workers. 

In  the  beginning  the  American  soldier  was  tempted  to 
consume  his  cold  provisions  without  waiting  to  have  them 
cooked,  but  placed  in  contact  with  our  troops  he  speedily 
acquired  our  habits  in  this  regard  and  brought  forward 
his  field  kitchens  after  the  French  fashion  as  close  as 
possible  to  the  firing  line. 

When  the  commander-in-chief  or  his  chief  of  staff  made 
a  surprise  visit  to  the  sector  they  passed  by  the  different 
parts  of  command  established  along  the  roads  which  lead 
to  the  trenches.  It  was  rare,  during  these  visits,  for  them 
to  encounter  any  commander  in  one  of  these  posts,  for  the 
officer  in  charge  was  usually  himself  inspecting  the  front 
in  closer  proximity  to  the  foe.  These  rear  posts  were 
generally  occupied  merely  by  an  officer  on  day  duty.  This 
was  quite  as  it  should  be.  General  Pershing  and  General 
Harbord  were  glad  to  note  the  full  consciousness  of  re- 
sponsibility shown  by  their  subordinates,  whom  they  were 
sure  to  find  at  an  early  hour  in  the  most  advanced  lines 
or  near  the  batteries.  It  was  noteworthy  that  the  Ameri- 
can officer  not  only  fully  realized  his  duty  as  commander, 
but  understood  that  his  role  consisted  also  in  the  no  less 
important  one  of  instructor^  especially  among  a  large 
number  of  inexperienced  troops. 

During  the  whole  period  of  training  within  view  of  the 
enemy  the  general  headquarters  at  Chaumont  remained 
in  constant   touch   with   the   divisions   thus   engaged   in 


Twenty-Sixth  Division  127 

sector;  an  officer  of  the  operation  section  of  the  general 
headquarters  detached  with  each  unit  remained  in  tele- 
phonic communication  with  the  chief  of  staff. 

Nor  were  General  Pershing  and  his  divisional  com- 
manders content  merely  with  a  close  surveillance  of  their 
own  troops.  They  were  eager  also  to  study  and  take 
advantage  of  French  experience.  Each  time  an  impor- 
tant operation  was  projected  on  our  side,  General 
Pershing,  at  once  informed,  hastened  to  the  scene  of 
action.  Those  generals,  also,  whose  troops  were  still 
in  America,  each  put  in  three  or  four  weeks  in  visiting 
our  front  to  personally  get  in  touch  with  the  most  modern 
warfare. 

On  the  twenty-first  of  August,  General  Pershing,  placed 
in  an  advanced  observation  post,  followed  the  entire 
operations  on  both  sides  of  the  Meuse. 

He  found  himself  beside  General  Corvlsart,  whom  he 
had  known  long  before  in  Manchuria,  and  who  was  now 
commanding  the  Sixteenth  Corps. 

It  was  under  their  eyes  that  our  troops  carried  the 
woods  of  Avocourt,  the  Mort-Homme-Hill,  the  Cor- 
beaux,  and  Cumieres  woods,  seized  the  villages  of  Champ 
and  Neuville,  taking  4,000  prisoners  and  inflicting  heavy 
losses  on  the  troops  of  General  von  Etzel,  who,  by  one 
of  the  curious  coincidences  of  war,  had  also  known  Gen- 
eral Pershing  during  his  stay  in  Kuroki's  army. 

On  the  twenty-third  of  October  General  Pershing 
again  watched  our  soldiers  during  a  desperate  assault 
against  the  powerful  positions  of  Allemant  and  La  Mal- 
maison  and  that  same  day,  accompanied  by  General 
Franchet  d'Esperey,  he  traversed  the  battle-field,  hardly 
as  yet  entirely  conquered,  in  order  to  study  the  immediate 
effects  of  our  artillery  fire,  which,  on  that  occasion,  had 


128     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

been  the  most  precise,  heavy,  and  efficacious  of  the  entire 
war. 

A  few  days  only  had  passed  since  the  entry  into  line  of 
the  Twenty-sixth  Division  when  the  Forty-second  also 
was  pronounced  sufficiently  prepared  to  take  contact  with 
the  enemy.  Consequently,  General  Menoher,  who  was  in 
command,  was  placed  with  our  Seventh  Corps  and  it  was 
in  the  ranks  of  this  French  force,  whose  front  extended 
from  Baccarat  in  the  Vosges  to  the  forest  of  Parroy,  east 
of  Luneville,  that  the  Forty-second  in  turn  received  its 
baptism  of  fire. 

The  Americans  distributed  their  regiments  and  dis- 
posed them  in  depth  formation,  back  by  their  own  ar- 
tillery, among  the  brigades  of  the  Seventh  Corps. 

General  Menoher's  headquarters  were  established  at 
Luneville. 

The  elements  of  this  division  had  been  recruited  among 
the  National  Guard  belonging  to  twenty-six  different 
States  of  the  Union.  They  had  already  been  obliged  to 
interrupt  their  instruction  several  times  since  arriving  in 
France. 

In  order  to  decongest  the  rear  of  the  Lorraine  front 
where  a  heavy  enemy  offensive  was  expected,  the  Forty- 
second  Division  had  been  transported  from  the  region  of 
Vaucouleurs  to  that  of  St.  Blin  near  Neufchateau,  and 
later  to  that  of  Rolanpont  not  far  from  Langres.  Never- 
theless, in  spite  of  these  interruptions  in  training,  General 
Menoher's  division  proved  to  be  nowise  inferior  to  those 
which  had  preceded  it. 

The  trenches  in  the  portion  of  the  front  where  they 
were  now  engaged  were  sufficiently  distant  from  those  of 


Forty-Second  Division  129 

the  enemy  to  permit  patrolling  parties  and  scouting 
squads  to  circulate  between  the  lines. 

Our  allies  profited  by  numerous  occasions  of  this  sort 
to  carry  out  successful  operations,  and  they  were  ex- 
tremely anxious  to  make  some  raids  in  force  which  were 
stopped  by  lack  of  munitions. 

When  compelled  to  renounce  an  independent  action  of 
this  sort  they  would  endeavor  to  participate  in  French 
raids,  and  we  have  seen  American  officers  up  to  the  rank 
of  colonel  accompany  our  troops,  penetrate  into  the  enemy 
trenches  among  our  own  soldiers,  and  even  bring  back 
prisoners. 

In  its  turn  the  Forty-second  Division  was  fiercely  at- 
tacked. On  the  night  of  March  4-5th  a  company  of  the 
1 68th  Regiment  posted  near  Badonvillers  was  assailed  by 
an  enemy  greatly  superior  in  force  and  advancing  in  four 
storming  parties.  The  preparatory  bombardment  had 
been  particularly  violent  and  had  allowed  the  enemy  to 
penetrate  into  the  American  lines.  After  a  fierce  hand- 
to-hand  struggle  where  rifle,  automatic  pistol,  bayonet, 
and  even  knife  played  a  part,  the  enemy  was  forced  to 
retire  without  having  made  a  single  prisoner.  The 
American  casualties  were  thirty-two  of  whom  twelve  were 
killed  including  the  company  commander. 

Some  days  later,  when  the  i68th  Regiment  penetrated 
into  the  enemy  lines,  they  found  a  paper  upon  one  of  the 
German  dead  acknowledging  the  failure  of  the  raid  of 
March  4-5 th  and  containing  the  statement  that  the  en- 
counter of  that  day  had  cost  the  Germans  fifty  men. 

General  Pershing  was  visiting  this  portion  of  the  front 
when  the  defenders  of  Badonvillers  were  leaving  their 
trenches  in  the  first  line  for  a  rest  position.     Men  and 


130     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

officers,  although  covered  with  mud  from  top  to  toe,  thin, 
weary  from  loss  of  sleep  during  many  nights,  marched 
past  their  commander-in-chief  with  such  a  fine  carriage 
and  appearance  that  nothing  could  have  given  a  better 
promise  of  what  might  still  be  expected  from  soldiers  of 
this  mettle. 

Mr.  Baker,  Secretary  of  War,  with  a  laudable  zeal  and 
a  complete  indifference  to  danger  which  would  have  done 
credit  to  a  seasoned  trooper,  also  visited  the  trenches 
where  the  American  divisions  under  heavy  bombardment, 
were  becoming  expert  in  the  use  of  arms.  On  the  nine- 
teenth of  March  he  inspected  both  the  Forty-second  and 
the  First  Divisions.  His  great  desire  was  to  be  in  close 
touch  with  the  new  life  of  the  American  soldier,  and  to 
make  him  feel  that,  after  all,  home  was  not  so  far  away, 
to  learn  from  his  own  mouth  his  present  needs  and  his 
present  desires. 

*'  Tell  me  what  you  want  and  I  will  see,  when  I  go 
back  to  Washington,  that  you  get  it.  Criticize  what  is 
faulty  in  organization  or  victualing,  I  am  here  to  see 
that  it  may  be  improved,"  said  he  to  the  private  soldier 
in  the  trench  as  well  as  to  the  battalions  assembled  at 
the  rear. 

He  neglected  no  opportunity  of  seeing  all  that  was 
possible,  when  presenting  himself  to  the  French  command 
in  the  various  regions  visited.  He  heard  everywhere  the 
same  story:  unanimous  praise  for  the  courage  and  vigor 
of  the  American  troops. 

On  March  20th  he  inspected  the  Second  Division  near 
Dieue,  and  would  have  continued  further  had  he  not  been 
obliged  to  leave  the  front  on  account  of  important  busi- 
ness which  made  his  presence  in  London  necessary.  He 
was  on  his  way  to  England  and  was  consulting  with  Gen- 


Twenty-Sixth  Division  13 1 

eral  Petain  at  Compiegne,  when,  on  the  morning  of  the 
twenty-first  the  Germans  launched  their  formidable  attack 
against  the  British  armies. 

Thus  on  the  day  of  this  offensive,  the  Americans  had 
four  divisions  at  their  disposal;  that  is  to  say,  about 
100,000  men  already  in  the  trenches  who  had  seen  active 
warfare  and  were  in  contact  with  the  enemy.  But  as  we 
shall  see  in  the  next  chapter,  the  actual  aid  rendered  by 
America  during  the  German  onslaught  was  not  to  remain 
limited  to  this  number. 

Before  entering  upon  a  description  of  the  fighting  dur- 
ing the  spring  and  summer  of  19 18,  we  must  not  fail  to 
mention  here  the  repulse  of  a  considerable  German  force 
in  the  southern  Woevre  front  which  could  scarcely  be  nar- 
rated elsewhere.  Though  it  occurred  somewhat  later 
than  the  events  above  described,  it  could  hardly  be  classed 
among  operations  of  such  magnitude  as  those  recounted 
in  the  following  chapters. 

The  Twenty-sixth  Division  which  had  been  withdrawn 
from  the  Chemin  des  Dames  on  the  eighteenth  of  March, 
was  ordered  to  replace  the  First  Division,  when  this 
latter,  leaving  the  sector  of  Menil-la-Tour,  north  of 
Tours,  was  rushed  to  the  defense  of  our  lines  then  closely 
^menaced  by  the  great  German  attack. 

This  relay  was  effectuated  on  the  night  of  the  second  — 
third  of  April. 

The  Twenty-sixth  found  itself  stretched  out  as  far  as 
the  Ailly  Wood  in  the  defensive  position  left  by  the 
Bullard  division.  On  the  twentieth  of  April,  after  an 
intense  bombardment  with  shells  of  all  caliber,  which  cut 
communication  between  front  and  rear,  the  259th  Ger- 
man regiment  in  full  force,  backed  by  two  or  three  com- 


132     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

panics  of  the  258th  Reserves,  and  troops  selected  from 
the  best  shock  battalions,  violently  assailed  the  Americans 
in  the  vicinity  of  Seicheprey. 

Fighting  lasted  all  day  and  even  into  the  twenty-first. 
After  a  fierce  struggle,  during  which  the  I02d  Regiment, 
the  same  which  had  endured  the  gas  attack  on  the  Chemin 
des  Dames,  bravely  sustained  the  shock,  the  part  of  the 
village  of  Seicheprey  that  the  Germans  had  captured  was 
rapidly  reconquered  and  the  entire  first  line  was  reoccu- 
pied. 

The  losses  were:  Killed,  2  officers  56  men;  wounded, 
5  officers  140  men;  missing,  5  officers  221  men. 

An  immediate  inspection  of  the  ground  gave  a  clear 
Idea  of  the  violence  of  the  struggle.  Forty-one  German 
corpses  together  with  a  great  quantity  of  equipment  of  all 
sorts  encumbered  the  ground.  Grenades,  mortars,  hel- 
mets hastily  abandoned  bore  witness  to  the  disorder  of 
the  retreat  of  the  attacking  forces,  under  the  strong 
pressure  of  the  counter-stroke  so  unexpectedly  dealt  by 
these  new  and  comparatively  inexperienced  American 
troops. 


CHAPTER  V 

PARTICIPATION  OF  AMERICAN  FORCES  IN  THE  SPRING 
DEFENSIVE  AND  IN  THE  SUMMER  COUNTER-OFFEN- 
SIVE OF  I918 

Toward  the  end  of  March,  when  the  rapid  German 
advance  on  Amiens  and  Montdldler  assumed  a  menacing 
character,  the  Allies  at  length  agreed  to  entrust  the  future 
conduct  of  war  operations  to  a  single  head. 

An  attempt  had  already  been  made  In  this  direction, 
but  the  scheme  was  discussed  only  to  be  abandoned  after 
the  Franco-British  offensive  of  April,  19 17,  when  General 
NIvelle,  for  a  certain  period,  commanded  the  large  com- 
bined forces  engaged  In  this  operation.  And  subse- 
quently, every  time  a  similar  project  for  the  unification 
of  command  was  suggested,  the  Idea  met  with  disfavor  on 
the  part  of  the  British,  and  found  few  partisans  In  Italy. 

Among  the  Americans,  on  the  contrary,  the  plan  met 
with  unqualified  approval,  and  they  lost  no  opportunity 
to  aid  In  putting  It  Into  effect. 

From  the  time  of  his  arrival  in  France  General  Persh- 
ing had  been  a  warm  advocate  of  a  unified  high  command 
among  the  Allies,  and  Colonel  House,  during  one  of  his 
brief  visits  to  the  Continent,  discreetly  seconded  the 
measure,  and  many  officers  who  arrived  with  the  Expedi- 
tionary Forces  expressed  surprise  that  the  plan  had  not 
already  been  realized. 

Whole-hearted  participation  in  the  War  Council  at 
Versailles  was  indeed  undertaken,  but  chiefly  with  the 

133 


134     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

hope  that  the  sincere  effort  of  the  American  delegates 
would  eventually  bring  about  the  desired  end,  without 
which  these  practical  soldiers  could  see  but  a  faint  chance 
of  victory.^ 

Great,  then,  was  the  joy  expressed  at  Chaumont  and 
In  Washington  when  news  was  received  on  March  27th 
that  the  choice  of  a  generalissimo  had  at  last  been  made 
and  that  General  Foch  had  been  raised  to  the  supreme 
command  of  the  Allied  forces  on  the  Western  front.^ 

The  news  was  hardly  official  when  General  Pershing 
hastened  from  his  headquarters  to  those  of  General  Foch 
at  Clermont-sur-Oise,  where  a  short  but  memorable  meet- 
ing took  place  on  the  twenty-eighth  of  March.  General 
Pershing,  with  a  magnanimous  self-effacement  which  must 
ever  redound  to  his  honor,  placed  the  American  forces 
under  his  command  at  the  unqualified  disposal  of  the  new 
commander-in-chief  of  the  Allied  armies. 

Illustrating,  as  it  did,  the  complete  concurrence  of  our 
most  recent  associate  in  the  plan  for  the  general  welfare 
of  the  coalition.  General  Pershing's  action  met  with  uni- 
versal approbation. 

This  rapid  and  far-reaching  decision  was  all  the  more 
to  the  American  general's  credit  in  that  it  was  so  com- 
pletely opposed  to  any  selfish  or  ambitious  interest. 

Up  to  this  time  the  commander-in-chief  had  carefully 
safeguarded  the  autonomy  of  the  Expeditionary  Forces. 
His  policy  had  been  to  develop  an  American  army  whose 

^  America  was  represented  in  the  Supreme  War  Council  by  General 
Tasker  H.  Bliss,  former  chief  of  staff  of  the  American  Army. 

2  When  President  Wilson  learned  of  the  unification  of  the  Allied  com- 
mand, he  expressed  his  satisfaction  in  the  following  words: 

To  General  Foch:  May  I  not  convey  to  you  my  sincere  congratulations 
on  your  new  authority?  Such  unity  of  command  is  a  most  hopeful  augury 
of  ultimate  success.  We  are  following  with  profound  interest  the  bold 
and  brilliant  action  of  your  forces.  Woodrow  Wilson. 


spring  Defensive  135 

unity  should  tend  to  bring  out  the  qualities  of  the  Ameri- 
can race  to  the  best  advantage,  and,  while  desiring  to  see 
his  own  men  profit  by  the  hardly  gained  experience  of 
the  Allies  to  which  end  he  studied  eagerly  the  best 
strategical  and  tactical  methods  in  use  on  the  French  and 
British  fronts  —  he  had  jealously  maintained  the  absolute 
integrity  of  the  American  Army. 

In  view,  however,  of  the  exceptional  gravity  of  the 
situation,  so  suddenly  developed.  General  Pershing  did 
not  hesitate  to  interrupt  the  accomplishment  of  the  task 
he  had  assigned  himself  nor  to  turn  over  to  the  supreme 
allied  command  all  the  forces  then  at  his  disposal. 

With  that  foresight  which  comes  from  a  thorough 
psychological  knowledge  of  his  men,  he  recommended  to 
General  Foch  the  advisability  of  employing  the  American 
troops,  as  far  as  possible,  in  large  units  and  of  avoiding 
their  distribution  in  small  fractions. 

For  although  the  method  of  a  so-called  amalgam  be- 
tween French  and  American  troops  had  been  freely  sug- 
gested as  the  best  manner  of  conducting  future  operations, 
General  Pershing  wisely  considered  it  as  prejudicial  to 
the  best  service  of  American  troops  in  action.  He  there- 
fore suggested  that  no  detachment.  Inferior  in  number  to 
the  regiment  or  brigade,  should  be  incorporated  In  a 
French  organization.  It  was  also  his  wish  that  no  step 
should  be  taken  which  might  complicate  the  task  of  re- 
grouping his  scattered  contingents  Into  an  American  Army 
at  the  earliest  moment  compatible  with  the  exigencies  of 
the  situation. 

In  compliance  with  General  Pershing's  desires  thus 
frankly  expressed.  It  was  decided  to  group  the  American 
forces  after  the  following  system : 

Those  divisions  which  already  possessed  their  quota  of 


\ 


13.6     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

artillery  and  their  own  services  were  to  go  into  action  as 
a  whole. 

Those  which  lacked  some  proportion  of  material,  but 
which  had  benefited  by  a  fair  amount  of  training  and 
seemed  physically  fit,  were  to  be  utilized  by  regiment  or 
by  brigade  framed  in  with  a  French  division. 

Those  whose  training  was  still  inadequate  were  ordered 
to  speed  up  preparation  and  carry  on  their  instruction  in 
a  quiet  sector  of  the  front,  thereby  making  large  numbers 
of  trained  French  troops,  occupying  such  sectors,  avail- 
able for  action. 

To  Generals  Petain  ^  and  Pershing,  acting  in  closest 
unison,  was  confided  the  difficult  task  of  arranging  the 
details  of  this  complicated  organization  and,  in  con- 
formity with  their  first  step  in  Its  execution  —  the  First 
Division,  which  had  been  holding  a  quiet  sector  in  the 
region  of  Toul,  was  relieved  on  April  2,  191 8,  by  the 
Twenty-sixth  and  shortly  after  was  ordered  to  entrain  for 
the  scene  of  active  combat. 

Since  March  21st  German  activity  had  been  very 
marked  on  the  section  of  the  front  toward  which  the  First 
Division  was  directed,  and  events  of  exceptional  gravity 
had  occurred. 

Indeed,  by  March  26th,  the  enemy  had  crossed  the 
Somme  south  of  Peronne,  and  at  the  end  of  the  month 
their  line  more  than  took  in  Noyon,  Lassigny,  Mont- 
didier,  Bray-sur-Somme,  and  Bapaume.  From  this  im- 
portant sector  the  Fifth  British  Army  had  been  hurled 
back  by  the  enemy's  lightning  advance  and  practically 
annihilated.     The    situation    appeared    critical.     How- 

*  Although  General  Foch  was  in  command  of  the  Allied  forces,  ma- 
teriel dealings  were  directly  carried  on  between  General  Petain,  com- 
mander in  chief  of  the  French  army,  and  General  Pershing,  commander 
in  chief  of  the  American  expeditionary  forces. 


spring  Defensive  137 

ever,  from  the  twenty-third  of  March  on,  French  units 
had  been  able  to  intervene  and  prevent  further  progress 
on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  The  transportation  of  troops 
had  been  speeded  up  by  every  possible  means,  and  it  was 
hoped  that  a  crisis  had  thereby  been  avoided. 

Our  troops  took  over  the  defense  of  the  sector  up  to 
the  line  of  the  Somme,  leaving  both  banks  of  the  river  to 
the  guard  of  the  British  armies  which  still  remained  intact. 

By  the  time  the  First  American  Division  had  detrained 
\  in  the  vicinity  of  Meru-Pontoise,  the  situation  of  the 
n3  Allies  was  already  looking  more  hopeful.  General 
Fayolle,  at  the  head  of  the  group  known  as  the  "  reserve 
group  of  armies,"  held  the  enemy  in  check,  with  the  First 
French  Army  under  General  Debeney  facing  east  on  the 
line  from  Villers-Bretonneux  to  Montdidier,  while  the 
Third  Army  (General  Humbert)  was  fronting  north  be- 
tween Montdidier  and  Noyon. 

Back  of  this  group,  General  Micheler's  Fifth  Army 
was  placed  in  reserve  in  the  zone  between  Beauvais,  Meru, 
and  Pontoise,  barring  the  road  to  Paris. 

This  army  of  General  Micheler's  was  to  serve  as  a 
reservoir  from  which  General  Fayolle  might  draw  fresh 
relays  of  troops;  it  also  served  as  a  sort  of  training  school 
for  the  new  units  assigned  to  it  and  was  called  upon,  in 
this  capacity,  to  prepare  the  First  American  Division  for 
the  new  system  of  semi-open  warfare  which  was  being 
inaugurated  at  the  front.^ 

To  this  Fifth  French  Army  the  American  division  was 
accordingly  confided  immediately  after  having  been  de- 
trained.    Mention    has    already    been    made    of    this 

3  The  Fifth  Army  was  at  the  disposition  of  General  Petain. 


138     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

splendid  unit,  the  first  of  the  kind  which  America  had  pre- 
pared for  action.* 

We  have  described  its  training  at  Gondrecourt  and  also 
its  first  contact  with  the  enemy  while  operating  In  the 
Lunevllle  sector.  We  have  observed  Its  stay  in  the 
southern  Woevre,  between  the  Bois  d'AIlly  and  the  Bois 
Mortmare  at  the  time  when  it  held  this  sector  of  our  line 
unassisted. 

Both  physically  and  morally,  the  First  Division  now 
appeared  in  perfect  fighting  trim;  at  its  head  was  General 
Bullard,  a  future  army  commander.  Most  of  the  majors 
and  captains  who  surrounded  him  were,  before  the  end 
of  the  war,  to  be  regimental  commanders  or  hold  im- 
portant positions  in  the  General  Staff.  Most  colonels 
in  command  of  regiments  at  this  time  were  future  divi- 
sion commanders;  the  chief  of  artillery  was  to  be  at  the 
head  of  an  army  corps  before  the  lapse  of  many  months. 

Presenting  as  it  does  so  fine  an  example  of  perfect 
unity,  splendid  fighting  spirit,  and  high  morale,  this  unit, 
which  produced  such  a  number  of  high  ranking  officers, 
may  be  profitably  studied. 

*  Order  of  Battle  of  the  First  Division  at  the  date  of  May  i,  1918. 

Major-General  Robert  L.  Bullard,  Division  Commander 

First   Infantry   Brigade  Second  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Geo.  B.  Duncan  Brigadier-General  B.  B,  Buck 

l6th   Infantry  Regiment  26th   Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  John  L.  Hines  Colonel   Hamilton   Smith 

l8th  Infantry  Regiment  28th   Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  Frank  Parker  Colonel  Hanson  E.  Ely 

First  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  C.  P.  Summerall 

.5th  Artillery  Regiment 

Colonel  Dwight  E.  Aultman 

6th  Artillery  Regiment 

Colonel  Cortland  Parker 

';th  Artillery  Regiment 

Colonel  L.  R.  Holbrook 


spring  Defensive  139 

The  rumor  no  sooner  became  current  that  a  few  days 
only  remained  for  training  and  preparation  than  every 
one  redoubled  their  efforts.  The  whole  division  worked 
feverishly,  great  activity  was  shown  in  picking  up  the 
latest  "tips"  which,  at  such  a  moment,  always  filter 
through  the  front  lines.  One  and  all  were  keen  after 
the  latest  bits  of  information,  centralized  and  spread  by 
the  staff  of  General  Micheler's  army,  and  no  sooner  did 
a  French  liaison  officer  appear  on  the  horizon  than  he  was 
beset  for  an  account  of  the  new  warfare  without  trenches 
which  had  now  begun. 

Fields,  roads,  and  farmyards  are  now  the  scene  of 
more  or  less  important  maneuvers,  during  which  special 
care  is  always  given  to  the  testing  and  study  of  every 
method  of  signalling. 

The  division  realized  at  once  the  paramount  importance 
of  adequate  linking  between  artillery  and  infantry  units 
by  means  of  telephone,  visual  signalling,  panels,  rockets, 
flashlights,  all  of  which  were  practiced.  General  Sum- 
merall,  commanding  the  divisional  artillery,  personally 
supervised  these  exercises,  constantly  visiting  the  smaller 
infantry  units  in  order  to  assure  himself  that  nothing  was 
left  undone  which  might  keep  the  infantryman  thoroughly 
informed  of  the  methods  which  the  artillery  would  be 
called  upon  to  use  in  battle  to  maintain  communication 
between  the  two  branches  of  the  service. 

According  to  his  ideas,  every  commander  of  a  more  or 
less  important  artillery  unit,  whose  mission  was  to  sustain 
or  protect  the  advance  or  retreat  of  the  infantry,  had  to 
keep  in  constant  touch  with  the  officer  commanding  the 
infantry  unit  involved,  through  a  series  of  relaying  posts 
organized  according  to  the  lay  of  the  land,  but  generally 
stationed  some  six  hundred  yards  apart. 


140     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

These  posts  consisted  of  one  officer  or  non-commis- 
sioned officer;  several  telephone  operators,  signallers, 
skilled  repairers,  runners,  and  even  sometimes  cyclists. 
Each  post  was  provided  with  all  the  equipment  necessary 
for  the  speedy  transmission  of  messages.  Thanks  to  this 
system  of  relays  —  a  veritable  human  chain  —  the  ar- 
tillery and  infantry  were  effectively  linked  during  action. 
As  the  first  division  possessed  a  large  number  of  non- 
commissioned officers  and  men,  both  in  artillery  and  in- 
fantry formations,  it  was  easy  to  establish  a  very  strong 
liaison  organization,  and  to  it  both  General  Bullard  and 
General  Summerall  attribute  in  no  small  measure  the  suc- 
cess of  the  First  Division. 

One  difficulty  remained,  however,  by  no  means  easy  to 
overcome  and  which  study  could  not  remedy.  This  was 
the  scarcity  of  horses. 

All  the  batteries  were  short  of  animals  and  many  of 
those  on  hand  were  in  poor  condition.  This  situation 
caused  grave  anxiety  to  the  artillery  commander  and  the 
officers  of  his  staff.  Fodder  was  scanty  and  arrived  at 
irregular  intervals;  an  epidemic  of  mange,  frequent  under 
such  circumstances,  made  serious  inroads,  and  it  was  im- 
possible to  invent  any  means  of  bettering  the  situation, 
of  which  the  American  high  command  was,  of  course,  fully 
aware. 

It  must  suffice  to  remark  here,  that  the  same  sense  of 
patriotic  duty  which  made  it  necessary  and  right  to  keep 
the  American  headquarters  thoroughly  informed  as  to  the 
unsatisfactory  state  of  the  artillery  horses,  made  it  equally 
natural  and  laudable  to  conceal  it  from  the  French  com- 
mand. The  Americans  did  not  wish  to  give  General 
Micheler  any  reason  for  declaring  the  division  unready 


spring  Defensive  141 

for  action  and  postponing  an  entry  into  the  fight  for  which 
every  one  was  eager. 

At  last,  after  a  combined  maneuver,  at  which  General 
Pershing  and  the  commander  of  the  Fifth  Army  were 
both  present,  the  First  American  Division  was  declared 
"  ready  and  fit  for  action."  Marching  orders  were 
issued  on  April  i6th,  and  the  following  day,  after  having 
been  thrilled  by  a  stirring  address  from  the  commander- 
in-chief  the  division  set  forth  upon  the  road  to  join  the 
Sixth  French  Corps.^ 

In  the  meanwhile,  and  somewhat  to  the  disappoint- 
ment of  the  eager  American  troops,  the  news  from  the 
front  was  steadily  becoming  more  and  more  reassuring. 
The  enemy's  line  now  seemed  almost  stabilized,  with  the 
exception  of  the  front  toward  Hangard-en-Santerre  and 
Villers-Bretonneux  where  these  villages  were  still  chang- 
ing hands,  but  the  intensity  of  the  fighting  was  decreasing 
as  it  approached  Montdldier. 

It  seems  due  to  his  American  comrades  that  one  of  the 
writers  of  these  pages  should  here  recount  some  of  the 
negotiations  with  which  he  was,  at  this  time,  entrusted. 

As  the  American  troops  were  nearing  the  sector  of 
Mesnil-St.  Firmin  they  became  aware  that  they  were  be- 
ing sent  to  a  comparatively  quiet  portion  of  the  front  held 
by  the  First  Army.  At  once  several  American  officers 
came  to  beg  their  French  comrade  to  use  all  his  influence 
with  the  French  military  authorities,  in  order  to  obtain  a 
change  of  orders  which  would  direct  the  division  into  the 
vicinity  of  Hangard-en-Santerre  which  was  still  the  scene 
of  desperate  fighting. 

5  The  Sixth  Array  Corps  was  relieved  a  few  days  later  by  the  Tenth. 
Thus  General  Vandenberg  had  control  of  the  operations  in  this  sector 
during  the  American  operations  which  are  here  examined. 


142     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

The  sector  which  General  Debeney  had  assigned  to 
the  American  troops  (Villers  Tournelle-Mesnll  St. 
George  near  Montdldier)  was,  on  the  contrary,  if  not 
altogether  quiet,  at  least  apparently  stabilized,  and  the 
front  confided  to  the  division  did  not  exceed  three  miles 
in  length. 

The  enemy  had  ceased  his  infantry  attacks,  but  con- 
tinued to  use  his  powerful  artillery  in  a  prolonged,  harass- 
ing fire  or  in  violent  concentrations  upon  certain  points. 
He  seemed  determined,  while  resigned  to  making  no 
further  advance,  to  hold  every  inch  of  ground  in  his  pos- 
session, especially  the  heights  of  Cantigny,  dominating  the 
valley  of  the  Avre  which  he  had  crossed.  From  those 
heights  he  enjoyed  a  commanding  position,  and  one  which 
gave  him  every  advantage  for  concealing  the  movements 
of  his  troops. 

The  mission  entrusted  to  the  First  Division  was  not, 
however,  a  strictly  passive  one.  General  Bullard's  men, 
while  organizing  the  sector  for  a  strong  defense,  had 
orders  to  assume  a  semi-aggressive  attitude  which  might 
make  their  presence  felt  and  to  prepare  for  an  offensive 
action  should  orders  for  attack  be  issued.  We  are  fully 
justified  in  declaring  here  that  the  First  Division  acquitted 
itself  admirably  of  this  dual  role. 

Hardly  had  the  troops  deployed  on  the  ground  allotted 
to  them  than  the  men  began  vigorously  to  "  dig  them- 
selves in."  One  brigade  occupied  the  first  positions,  the 
other  was  held  in  reserve.  Three  lines  of  trenches  with 
communications  were  at  once  established,  battery  em- 
placements were  prepared,  others  perfected,  advantage 
being  taken  of  every  hollow  of  the  ground. 

The  artillery  lost  no  time  in  assuming  an  aggressive 
attitude.     General  Summerall's  brigade,  reenforced  by  a 


spring  Defensive  143 

regiment  of  French  75's,  fired  not  only  all  the  shells 
allotted  to  it  by  the  American  command,  but  also  all  the 
ammunition  which  they  could  obtain,  "  due  to  exceptional 
circumstances,"  from  the  French  authorities. 

The  opposing  batteries  immediately  came  to  grips. 
Concentrative  and  destructive  fire  thundered  with  equal 
violence  from  both  sides.  But  gas  shells  were  employed 
with  a  frequency  which  we  unfortunately  were  unable  to 
rival,  as  the  Germans,  at  that  time,  disposed  of  ample 
supplies  of  yperite. 

Toward  May  15th,  the  American  gunners  began  to 
secure  a  distinct  advantage,  and  the  hour  when  the  in- 
fantry was  to  have  its  turn  was  not  now  far  distant. 

General  Bullard  had  received  orders  to  storm  the  im- 
portant position  of  Cantigny,  as  the  capture  of  this  for- 
tified village  would  wrest  from  the  enemy  a  dominating 
point  of  vantage,  and,  if  successfully  carried  out,  would 
even  endanger  his  line  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Avre.  At 
the  same  time,  it  would  provide  the  Americans  with  ad- 
vantages for  observation  into  the  deep  valley  of  this  river 
which  runs  winding  from  Montdidier  to  the  vicinity  of 
Amiens. 

The  plan  of  attack,  as  conceived  by  the  division  com- 
mander and  elaborated  by  his  youthful  staff,  was  sub- 
mitted to  the  French  high  command,  and  it  may  readily 
be  inferred  that  the  pupils  here  proved  equal  to  the 
masters,  for  no  changes  in  the  original  plan  were  sug- 
gested. And  it  now  remained  only  to  carry  out  the  first 
attack  with  limited  objectives  to  be  undertaken  by  Ameri- 
can troops  on  our  front. 

General  Pershing  appeared  on  the  eve  of  battle  to  in- 
vestigate the  operation  plans  and  await  the  result  of  this 
first  experiment. 


144     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

On  the  twenty-eighth  of  May,  shortly  after  daybreak, 
following  a  powerful  artillery  preparation  brief  and  well 
directed,  the  rolling  barrage  began  to  thunder,  sweeping 
the  ground  in  front  of  the  advancing  waves  of  Infantry, 
and  striking  progressively  further  and  further  as  the  foot 
soldier  pushed  forward. 

Some  French  tanks,  mingled  with  the  assaulting  troops, 
skilfully  aided  in  their  progress.  In  short,  the  attack, 
carried  through  absolutely  according  to  schedule,  was  a 
complete  success  with  all  objectives  reached. 

The  spectacle,  as  witnessed  from  the  advanced  artillery 
observatories,  was  of  Impressive  grandeur;  nor  could 
there  be  any  doubt  as  to  the  conclusion  which  must  in- 
evitably be  drawn  by  those  who  were  there  to  see  it. 
\  The  American  army  had  brought  Into  the  field  not 
numbers  only,  but  real  technical  value  and  tactical  skill. 
It  was  easy  to  deduce  from  this  experience  that  American 
Infantry  was  more  fitted  for  an  attack  carried  out  In 
depth  than  for  one  with  limited  objectives.  The  regi- 
ment which  took  Cantlgny  held  the  position  with  diffi- 
culty, being  subjected  to  a  heavy  bombardment  entailing 
pretty  severe  losses.  The  net  results  of  the  day  were, 
however,  greatly  in  excess  of  the  most  sanguine  expecta- 
tion.    Three  hundred  prisoners  were  counted. 

The  enemy,  infuriated  at  finding  his  forces  hurled  from 
an  important  position  by  young  and  hitherto  inexperienced 
troops,  resolved  to  regain  his  lost  ground,  and  at  once 
ordered  a  powerful  counter-attack.  The  two  columns 
which  were  charged  with  this  enterprise  were  caught 
under  the  withering  fire  of  the  Franco-American  guns, 
and  practically  annihilated. 

The  little  village  of  Mesnil-St.  Firmin,  divisional  head- 
quarters, was  for  a  few  days  the  scene  of  extraordinary 


spring  Defensive  145 

animation.  Not  only  was  General  Pershing  present  to 
extend  his  congratulations  to  the  troops,  but  all  the  com- 
manders of  neighboring  French  divisions  and  army  corps 
also  added  their  felicitations.  Hardly  had  those  who 
were  stationed  In  close  proximity  arrived  upon  the  scene, 
than  the  French  commander-in-chief  made  his  appearance, 
followed  by  the  Premier,  M.  Clemenceau,  both  eager  to 
assure  their  American  associates  of  the  profound  admira- 
tion which  such  a  success  had  Inspired  throughout  the 
land.« 

The  conquered  position  was  Immediately  consolidated; 
but,  as  is  customary  after  an  affair  of  this  sort,  the  enemy 
guns  hammered  for  several  days  against  the  ground  re- 
cently occupied.  Then  after  a  slight  let-up  in  the  bom- 
bardment, the  sector  once  more  assumed  the  normal  calm 
of  a  stabilized  front. 

On  June  5th,  however,  there  was  such  a  strong  re- 
crudescence of  activity  upon  the  German  side  that  It  led 
to  the  belief  that  a  fresh  and  powerful  offensive  was  about 
to  be  launched  against  our  lines. 

The  losses  to  which  the  First  Division  was  subjected 
during  the  Cantigny  affair  comprised  45  officers,  of  whom 
13  were  killed  and  1,022  men,  of  whom  185  were  killed."^ 

*  The  Twenty-eighth  Regiment  of  the  First  Division  was  mentioned  in 
the  following  terms  in  the  orders  of  the  French  Army  after  the  battle  of 
Cantigny: 

"  This  regiment  is  animated  by  a  magnificent  aggressive  spirit.  On  the 
twenty-eighth  of  May  it  attacked  under  the  orders  of  Colonel  H.  E.  Ely 
with  irresistible  dash  a  strongly  fortified  position,  reached  all  objectives, 
and  held  all  the  ground  gained." 

7  The  average  daily  losses  in  this  sector  were  twenty-five  men,  which 
losses  may  be  considered  inevitable,  considering  the  necessity  of  the 
defensive  organization  which  had  to  be  created  under  the  enemy's  guns. 
During  these  days  given  up  to  digging  entrenchments,  the  troops  displayed 
qualities  of  zeal  and  courage  which  are  beyond  praise. 

One  colonel  whose  post  of  command  had  been  subjected  to  continuous 
bombardment  refused  to  quit  his   position  which  he   maintained   during 


146     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

General  Bullard's  division  continued  to  occupy  the 
Mesnil-St.  FIrmin  sector,  which  they  hastened  to  improve 
from  the  defensive  standpoint,  and  which  later  extended 
as  far  as  Grivesne.  The  officers  were  now  anxious  to 
give  their  men  a  well-deserved  rest  and  to  give  the  benefit 
of  their  experience  to  their  troops  upon  the  training 
ground  and  thus  prepare  them  for  future  and  more  im- 
portant attacks. 

There  seemed  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  First 
Division  would  be  speedily  relieved,  especially  as  the 
Second  had  now  recently  arrived  in  the  immediate  neigh- 
borhood, and  was  expected  soon  to  replace  the  sister  unit. 

Transferred  on  May  8th  from  the  Eparges-Spada 
front,  this  unit  had  entrained  near  Bar-le-Duc  and  had 
been  transported  to  billets  near  Chaumont-en-Vexin,  in 
order  to  perfect  its  training. 

Like  its  fellow,  the  Second  Division  now  passed  into 
the  ranks  of  the  Fifth  Army,  where  it  at  once  produced  a 
like  excellent  impression. 

Although  it  perhaps  lacked  a  little  of  the  cohesion  of 
its  predecessor.  General  Micheler,  in  watching  the 
maneuvers,  was  perhaps  even  more  struck  by  the  fighting 
spirit  of  General  Bundy's  men  and  their  aptitude  for 
aggressive  action.^ 

The  division  commander,  whom  we  shall  find  later  on 

fifteen  days  under  a  rain  of  shells  of  all  calibers  as  well  as  gas  bom- 
bardment.    During  this  period  his  lieutenant-colonel  was  killed. 
8  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Second  Division  at  the  date  of  June  i,  1918. 
Major-General  Omar  Bundy,  Division  Commander 
Third  Infantry  Brigade  Fourth   Infantry  Brigade,   Marines 

Brigadier-General  E.  M.  Lewis         Brigadier-General  J.  G.  Harbord 
gth   Infantry   Regiment  i^h   Regiment,  Marines 

Colonel   Leroy   Upton  Colonel  A.  Catlin 


Spring  Defensive  147 

at  the  head  of  an  army  corps,  was  justly  proud  of  his  two 
infantry  brigades. 

One  of  them  (the  Fourth)  was  already  famous  in 
America  as  the  "  Marines."  It  was  made  up  of  the  5th 
and  6th  regiments  forming  the  Fourth  Brigade,  and  may 
be  compared  to  our  French  Colonial  infantry.  These 
picked  troops  were  under  the  command  of  General  Har- 
bord,  recently  chief  of  staff  to  General  Pershing,  whose 
name  will  frequently  recur  in  these  pages  not  only  as  a 
first-rate  leader  of  men  in  the  field  but  also  as  an  able  and 
expert  organizer. 

The  other  brigade  (the  Third)  under  General  Lewis, 
whom  we  shall  find  at  the  close  of  hostilities  in  command 
of  a  division,  included  the  9th  and  23d  regiments  of 
regulars.  Admirable  in  their  ''  tenue  "  it  was  easy  to  see 
that  these  men  were  eager  to  rival  the  famous  marines. 

The  artillery  brigade,  whose  equipment  was  now 
complete  and  which  also  had  the  good  luck  to  possess 
horses  in  fair  condition,  was  commanded  by  General 
Chamberlaine,  later  head  of  the  Railway  Artillery 
Reserve. 

Thus  constituted,  the  Second  Division  was  marching  by 
road  to  join  the  First  French  Army,  when,  on  the  night  of 
May  29-30th  it  suddenly  received  order  to  deflect  from 
its  course  and  to  proceed  rapidly  toward  Lizy-sur-Ourcq. 

2sd  Infantry  Regiment  9th  Regiment,   Marines 

Colonel  Paul  B,  Malone  Colonel  W.  C.  Neville 

Second  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General    W^.    Chamberlaine 

1 2th  Artillery  Regiment 

Colonel  M.  McCloskey 

15th  Artillery  Regiment 

Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  R.  Davis 

lyth  Artillery  Regiment 

Colonel  A.  J.  Bowley 


148     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

The  infantry  was  to  be  moved  by  trucks,  the  artillery  by 
rail. 

General  Bundy  ordered  his  brigade  commanders  to  re- 
port at  Meaux  where  they  would  receive  further  instruc- 
tions. 

Grave  and  unforeseen  events  had  indeed  taken  place, 
and  the  Second  Division  together  with  other  French  units 
were  suddenly  called  upon  to  face  a  new  invasion. 

On  the  morning  of  May  26th,  the  English  and  French 
divisions  in  line  on  the  Chemin-des-Dames  had  been  un- 
expectedly attacked  and  thrown  back. 

The  retreat  of  our  Sixth  Army  and  the  rapid  advance 
of  General  Von  Boehm's  Seventh  Army  operating  in  the 
vicinity  of  Soissons,  and  General  Von  Below's  First 
Army,  the  left  wing  of  which  extended  almost  to  Rheims, 
placed  our  lines  in  serious  peril. 

The  towns  of  Soissons,  Fere-en-Tardenois,  and  the  vil- 
lages on  the  Marne  from  Chatillon  to  Chateau-Thierry, 
successively  fell  into  the  enemy's  hands.  A  front  of 
thirty-five  miles,  extending  from  the  last-named  locality  to 
the  neighborhood  of  Fontenoy-sur-Aisne,  was  thus  con- 
stituted facing  the  French  capital.  This  moving  front 
once  more  menaced  Paris,  distant  some  fifty  miles  only, 
and  which  was  daily  subjected  to  long-range  artillery  fire 
and  nightly  to  frequent  air  raids.  General  Mangin's 
Tenth  Army  faced  the  northern  part  of  this  line;  the 
French  Sixth  Army  the  southern  section. 

Such  were  the  circumstances  under  which  the  Second 
American  Division  was  called  upon  to  deploy  along  the 
northern  bank  of  the  Marne,  astride  of  the  main  Paris- 
Metz  highroad  and  given  the  honor  (this  expression 
figures  in  the  American  daily  report  of  operations)  of 
barring  the  enemy's  access  to  the  capital. 


spring  Defensive  149 

If  the  troops  of  General  BuUard  had  been,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  first  great  American  unit  to  inaugurate  the  war 
of  semi-movement,  those  of  General  Bundy  were  about  to 
inaugurate  genuine  open  warfare.  No  trench  was  dug  on 
the  terrain  of  their  future  exploits. 

At  Meaux,  General  Bundy's  brigade  commanders  re- 
ceived new  instructions,  but  under  the  circumstances 
which  prevailed,  these  were  necessarily  modified  more 
than  once.  In  the  streets,  great  disorder  reigned.  A 
heavy  aerial  bombardment  had  taken  place  the  night  be- 
fore. The  roads  leading  to  the  town  were  encumbered 
with  the  retreating  and  advancing  troops.  Convoys  of 
peasants,  seeking  refuge  from  the  invading  hordes, 
blocked  the  ways.  In  fact  to  the  uninstructed  and  non- 
military  observer,  we  seemed  to  be  again  facing  the  con- 
ditions which  had  been  witnessed  before  the  first  battle 
of  the  Marne. 

When  we  consider  the  enormous  difficulties  with  which 
General  Bundy's  troops  were  confronted,  the  uncertainty 
of  debarkation  at  the  designated  points,  multiplicity  of 
counter-orders,  all  the  troubles  inherent  to  the  relief  of 
forces  who  speak  different  languages  and  the  ignorance 
prevailing  in  regard  to  the  enemy's  exact  whereabouts,  we 
may  be  astonished  at  the  comparative  order  with  which 
the  Second  Division  was  deployed  and  made  ready  for 
action. 

The  troops  were  at  first  held  in  reserve  behind  the 
French  Forty-third  Division,  but  on  the  second  of  June 
they  went  through  and  took  contact  with  the  enemy  upon 
a  wide  front  of  some  seven  miles.  One  regiment  (the 
Twenty-third)  belonging  to  the  Third  Brigade  and  about 
two  battalions  of  the  marines  had  been  detailed  to  fill  a 
gap  in  the  French  line  near  Coulombs.     But  on  the  fourth 


150     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

of  June  these  units  were  reassigned  to  the  American  divi- 
sion which,  at  that  time,  occupied  a  front  not  exceeding 
fivt  miles  in  length.^ 

During  these  first  sanguinary  engagements,  the  fighting 
took  the  form  of  infantry  skirmishes,  while  the  artillery 
sought  its  positions  and  stored  its  ammunition.  The 
American  troops  at  once  gained  the  upper  hand,  and, 
thanks  to  the  accuracy  of  their  rifle  fire  and  to  their 
superiority  in  attacking  with  the  bayonet,  they  bent  back 
the  German  line,  taking  Bouresches,  but  leaving  the 
enemy  in  possession  of  the  environs  of  Vaux,  Bouresches 
railway  station,  Belleau  Wood,  and  Hill  126,  south  of 
Torcy. 

The  two  American  brigades  found  themselves  in  close 
proximity.  General  Harbord  with  his  post  of  command 
at  the  Ferme  des  Loges,  held  a  two-mile  front  north  of  the 
Paris-Metz  road;  General  Lewis,  with  his  post  of  com- 
mand at  Domptin  held  the  portion  of  the  line  extending 
from  this  highroad  to  Hill  204,  the  latter  not  included. 
The  infantry  regiments  were,  generally  speaking,  disposed 
in  depth;  usually  one  battalion  was  in  line,  one  in  reserve, 
while  the  third  formed  part  of  the  "  divisional  reserve." 

General  Chamberlaine's  artillery  had  been  reenforced 
by  two  regiments  of  French  75's  and  one  group  of  155's. 

Such  was  the  situation  when  General  Bundy,  whose  post 
of  command  had  been  transferred  from  Montreull-aux- 
Lions  to  the  Genevrois  Farm,  began,  under  the  orders  of 
the  Twenty-first  Army  Corps  a  methodical  attack  aiming 
at  the  capture  of  several  fortified  positions. 

®When  the  Second  Division  arrived  this  sector  was  already  occupied 
by  the  Twenty-first  Army  Corps  under  General  Degoutte  and  belonged 
to  the  Sixth  Army  with  headquarters  at  Trilport.  On  June  15th,  General 
Degoutte  took  over  the  Sixth  Army  and  General  Naulin  was  charged  with 
the  command  of  the  Twenty-first  Corps,  which  was  replaced  on  June  aist 
by  the  Third  Corps  under  General  Lebrun. 


spring  Defensive  151 

The  first  of  these  objectives  was  the  Belleau  Wood, 
which  presented  a  vast  mass  nearly  rectangular  in  shape, 
and  apparently  thickly  planted  everywhere  with  lofty 
trees.  The  border  of  the  forest  facing  the  Americans 
extended  for  about  1,100  yards,  concealing  behind  its 
thick  screen  of  foliage  many  clearings  and  hollows  over- 
grown with  brush  and  underwood;  scattered  among  these 
thickets  were  to  be  found  large  rocks  and  bowlders  which 
offered  veritable  strongholds  on  which  the  enemy  had 
mounted  machine  guns  and  under  which  he  had  installed 
shell-proof  retreats  in  the  form  of  natural  caves  and 
grottoes. 

The  Germans  had  taken  advantage  of  the  natural 
strength  of  this  position  and  had  organized  it  artificially 
with  method  and  rapidity.  Nevertheless,  on  the  morning 
of  June  loth,  the  Second  Division,  after  bombarding  the 
whole  of  Belleau  Wood,  carried  a  portion  of  it  by  assault. 

In  the  course  of  the  artillery  preparation  and  during 
the  infantry  advance.  General  Chamberlaine's  guns  fired 
40,000  rounds,  of  which  12,000  were  large-caliber  shells, 
so  that,  when  the  American  troops  succeeded  in  gaining 
a  footing  in  an  important  section  of  the  wood,  a  large 
number  of  German  dead  were  found,  and  100  prisoners, 
together  with  many  machine  guns,  were  captured.  A 
very  successful  day.  On  the  eleventh  the  central  part  of 
the  wood  was  taken,  together  with  400  prisoners  and  37 
machine  guns. 

The  enemy  at  once  attempted  to  repair  the  breach 
made  in  their  line  by  launching  two  strong  counter-attacks 
on  the  twelfth  and  on  the  fifteenth. 

It  is  very  likely,  also,  that  offensive  actions  were  at- 
tempted by  the  Germans  on  the  fourteenth  and  nineteenth, 
but  on  these  two  occasions  the  assaulting  waves  were  not 


152     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

actually  seen  by  us,  so  that  the  enemy's  intentions  can  be 
only  guessed  at.  Many  movements  were  observed,  both 
on  his  first  and  second  line,  and  some  aggressive  action 
was  manifestly  contemplated.  After  violent  artillery  fire 
from  both  sides  the  original  lines  remained  unchanged. 

At  any  rate,  from  the  nineteenth  of  June  the  Germans 
seemed  to  have  renounced  any  intention  of  retaking 
Belleau  Wood  and  contented  themselves  with  reenforcing 
the  troops  who  still  held  the  northern  part  of  the  position. 

On  the  morning  of  the  twenty-first,  the  marines  under- 
took to  mop  up  this  corner.  Confident  in  their  unsup- 
ported strength  and  individual  courage  they  attempted  to 
storm  this  stronghold  without  any  serious  prepara- 
tory bombardment.  But  they  had  underestimated  the 
strength  of  the  enemy's  defenses  and  they  failed.  On 
the  twenty-fifth  the  operation  was  resumed  with  other 
methods. 

The  infantry  was  withdrawn  for  some  distance,  thus 
permitting  the  artillery  to  sweep  with  its  fire  the  enemy 
first  line.  The  result  was  a  complete  success;  the  narrow 
strip  of  woodland  which  constituted  the  Germans'  last 
defense  in  Belleau  Wood  was  captured  in  fine  style  to- 
gether with  309  prisoners.  American  casualties  were 
slight.^o 

10  The  marine  brigade  was  mentioned  in  the  orders  of  the  Sixth  Army 
in  the  following  terms: 

Fourth  Brigade  Infantry  (Marines). 

Thrown  into  a  battle  already  in  progress,  and  on  a  front  which  was 
being  violently  attacked  by  the  enemy,  at  once  proved  itself  to  be  a  unit 
of  the  very  highest  class.  No  sooner  entered  into  line  than  the  brigade 
in  conjunction  with  the  French  troops  checked  a  fierce  assault  upon  an 
important  section  of  our  position  and  at  once  began  a  series  of  offensive 
operations,  in  the  course  of  which,  thanks  to  the  brilliant  courage  and 
dash,  the  vigor  and  tenacity  of  its  men  who  were  discouraged  neither  by 
fatigue  nor  losses,  thanks  to  the  energy  of  all  its  officers,  and  thanks 
especially  to  the  personal  action  of  Brigade  Commander  General  James  G. 


spring  Defensive  153 

In  the  course  of  these  operations,  General  Harbord's 
brigade  had  taken  many  prisoners  and  given  the  foe  a 
high  opinion  of  the  fighting  quality  of  the  American 
troops.  This  fact  was  confirmed  by  frequent  conversa- 
tions with  German  captives,  who  had  had  disagreeable 
personal  experience  of  the  vigorous  methods  of  the  Ameri- 
can soldier  in  action  and  who  appeared  much  impressed 
by  his  work.  Chance  also  placed  in  our  hands  a  German 
army  bulletin  containing  an  Interesting  report  upqn  the 
quality  of  the  Second  American  Division  of  which  the  fol- 
lowing is  a  translation : 

"  The  Second  American  Division  must  be  considered  a  very 
good  one  and  may  even  perhaps  be  reckoned  as  a  storm  troop. 
The  different  attacks  on  Belleau  Wood  were  carried  out  with 
bravery  and  dash.  The  moral  effect  of  our  gunfire  can  not  seri- 
ously impede  the  advance  of  the  American  infantry.  The  Ameri- 
cans' nerves  are  not  yet  worn  out. 

"  The  qualities  of  the  men  individually  may  be  described  as 
remarkable.  They  are  physically  well  set  up,  their  attitude  is 
good,  and  they  range  in  age  from  eighteen  to  twenty-eight  years. 
They  lack  at  present  only  training  and  experience  to  make  for- 
midable adversaries.  The  men  are  in  fine  spirits  and  are  filled 
with  naive  assurance ;  the  words  of  a  prisoner  are  characteristic  — 

'  WE  KILL  OR  WE  GET  KILLED.'  " 

The  marines  had  hardly  completed  their  conquest  ^^ 
when  General  Lewis'  staff  began  to  work  out  a  plan  for 

Harbord,  every  effort  was  crowned  with  success.     In  close  touch  with  one 

another  both  regiments  with  their  machine-gun  battalion  realized  during 

ten   days   of    incessant   fighting    (from    the    second    to    the    thirteenth    of 

June,   1918)    over   extremely   difficult  ground,   an   advance  varying  from 

1,500   to   2,000   meters    on    a    four    kilometer    front,    capturing   important 

material,    taking    over    500    prisoners,    inflicting    severe    losses    upon    the 

enemy,  and  seizing  two  strongholds  of  paramount  importance:  the  village 

of  Bouresches,  and  the  strongly  fortified  position  of  Belleau  Wood. 

11  Sixth  Army.     General  orders.  „  „  .„„  ,.^„    t„„^  „^    ,„,o 

■'  Headquarters,  June  30,  1910. 

In  consequence  of  the  brilliant  conduct  of  the  Fourth  Brigade  of  the 


154     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

the  capture  of  Vaux  Village.  It  may  be  considered  as  a 
model  of  its  kind. 

It  was  not  possible  to  carry  out  this  operation  before 
July  1st  as  it  necessitated  the  shifting  from  left  to  right  of 
the  battle-field  of  an  entire  artillery  regiment.  But,  at 
this  date,  the  village  was  easily  carried. 

The  preparatory  bombardment  was  formidable,  the 
advancing  lines  of  infantry  followed  the  rolling  barrage 
at  a  distance  of  less  than  a  hundred  and  fifty  yards.  Six 
hundred  prisoners  were  taken,  and  the  losses  were  quite 
insignificant  when  compared  with  the  results  achieved.^^ 

Up  to  the  tenth  of  July,  on  which  day  it  was  relieved  by 
the  Twenty-sixth  Division  ^^  arriving  from  the  Woevre 

Second  Division,  U.  S.,  in  the  taking  of  Bouresches  and  the  important 
stronghold  of  Belleau  Wood,  hotly  contested  by  the  enemy  in  force,  the 
general  in  command  of  the  Sixth  Army  has  decided  that  henceforth  official 
documents  concerning  this  action  shall  replace  the  name  of  Belleau  Wood 
by  that  of  Wood  of  the  Marine  Brigade. 

12  Following  the  capture  of  Vaux  village,  the  Third  Brigade  was  cited 
in  general  orders  of  the  Sixth  Army  as  follows: 

"  During  the  operations  north  of  the  Marne  between  June  i  and  July  2, 
1918,  this  brigade,  stimulated  by  the  energy  of  its  commander.  General 
Lewis,  and  brilliantly  led  by  its  officers,  careless  of  the  heavy  losses 
sustained,  advanced  valiantly  and  carried  Vaux  in  a  fierce  hand-to-hand 
combat,  also  the  Wood  of  La  Roche,  giving  a  splendid  sample  of  aggres- 
sive spirit,  abnegation  and  contributing  in  no  small  measure  to  the  victory 
which  caused  the  enemy  to  evacuate  French  territory  and  eventually 
constrained  him  to  ask  for  an  armistice." 

13  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Twenty-sixth  Division  at  the  date  of  July 
xo,  1918. 

Major-General  Clarence  R.  Edwards,  Divisional   Commander 
Fifty-first  Infantry  Brigade  Fifty-second  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Peter  E.  Traub     Brigadier-General  Chas.  H.  Cole 
loist  Infantry  Regiment  103d  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  E.  L.  Logan  Colonel  Frank  M.  Hume 

J02d  Infantry  Regiment  104th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  J.  H.  Parker  Colonel  Geo.  H.  Shelton 

Fifty -fir  St  Artillery  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  D.  E.  Aultman 


spring  Defensive  155 

front,  the  Second  Division  had  been  engaged  for  over  a 
month  in  ceaseless  fighting;  8,500  sick  and  wounded  had 
been  sent  to  the  rear  during  this  time  and  1,250  dead  had 
been  left  on  the  field.  Its  mission  was  more  than  ful- 
filled; the  enemy's  advance  had  been  stopped  and  the 
maintenance  of  his  positions  seriously  menaced  by  the 
taking  of  Vaux,  and  Bouresches  and  the  Belleau  Wood 
where  1,400  prisoners  had  been  captured.  The  casual- 
ties of  the  enemy  were  large  and  distributed  among  five 
divisions,  which  in  their  entirety  or  in  detachments  had 
been  successively  opposed  to  the  Second  Division. 

An  American  journal  of  operations  now  before  us  esti- 
mates that  the  commencement  of  the  German  withdrawal 
on  July  1 8th  was  a  direct  consequence  of  the  action  above 
described.  There  is  excellent  reason  to  sustain  this 
opinion. 

Dating  from  July  4th  at  noon,  the  Second  Division  was 
transferred  to  American  command.  The  First  Army 
Corps  (General  Liggett)  with  his  headquarters  at 
Chateau  de  Lagny,  then  relieved  the  Third  French  Army 
Corps. 

This  First  American  Army  Corps  ^^  created  by  general 

loist  Artillery  Regiment 
Colonel  J.  H.  Sherburne 
I02d  Artillery  Regiment 
Colonel  Morris  E.  Locke 
lojd  Artillery  Regiment 
Colonel  P.  D.  Glassford 
1*  Order  of  Battle  of  the  First  Army  Corps  (American)  at  date  of 
July  4,  1918. 

Major-General  Hunter  Liggett,  Corps  Commander 

Colonel  Malin  Craig Chief  of  StaflF 

Major  George  Grunert  Chief  of  the  First  Section  (G-i) 

Lt.-Col.  R.  H.  V^^illiams Chief  of  the  Second  Section  (G-2) 

Colonel  A.  E.  Barber Chief  of  the  Third  Section  (G-3) 


156     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

orderi  dated  January  15,  191 8,  had^  up  to  that  timet  been 
operating  at  Neufchateau  with  adminiitrative  control 
over  the  Firit,  Second,  Twenty-fixth,  and  Forty-tecond 
Divitioni  while  theie  uniti»were  itationed  in  the  reipective 
lectori  that  have  already  been  deicribed. 

The  Firft  Corp»  wai  now  to  adminiiter  the  Firft, 
Second,  Third,  Fourth,  Twenty-iixth,  and  Twenty-eighth 
Divifioni.  When  General  Liggett  took  over  the  tactical 
command  ol  the  front  held  by  the  Second  American  and 
the  One  Hundred  and  Sixty-seventh  French  Divitioni,  the 
artillery  of  the  Firit  American  Corpi  under  General 
Laiiiter  relieved  the  artillery  ot  the  French  Third  Corpi* 

American  participation  in  the  defeniive  battle  of  June, 
1918,  wai  noi^  however,  confined  to  the  Firit  and  Second 
Diviiioni. 

The  Third  Diviiion  alio  (General  Dickman)  "  wai 
hurriedly  thrown  into  the  milee  and  afforded  powerful 
aiiiitance. 

Thii  unit  wai  completing  iti  training  in  the  Chateau- 

i^Ordff  tA  (he  Third  Ditlfkm  «t  ditf  ot  Miy  %t,  191! 

Majof-Gffieril  }tmp\i  T,  Dickman,  Dmmnat  Cammandif 
Fifth  Inlantry  Ifrifiade  Bi/tih  Infantry  Brigadt 

Bfigadier-Oeneml  Fred  W.  Iladffi      BfigadiffOcrieral  C,  Craw/ord 
4ih  Infantry  Reximent  jotft  Infantry  Rtgtmtnt 

Col<mcl  Halftead  Vot€y  Co\om\  Edmund  L,  Butt* 

7th  Infantry  Rigimtnt  /^M  Infantry  Rigimtnt 

Coloofl  T.  M.  AndcfMm  Colontl  UlffMi  O.  McAUxand«r 

Third  Artillery  Brigadt 
CoUmef  Wm.  M.  Cruikfbank 
loth  Artitliry  Rtgimtnt 
CoUmel  Chaf.  Rf e*  lAoyA 
/8th  Artitliry  Begimint 
Colonel  Otho  W,  B,  Vtrr 
76th  Artitliry  Kigimint 
Colonel  W,  C,  Rlver« 


spring  Defensive  157 

villain  area  (nc/dr  Har-siir-Auhr)  when  ordcri  arrived 
to  relieve  the  J  wcnty-sixth  Arncrican  Division  in  the 
•outhern  Wocvre  lector.  Preparations  to  this  effect  were 
well  under  way  when  new  orders  were  received  transfer- 
ring it  to  the  disposal  of  the  French  hij<h  command. 

In  conformity  with  these  new  inntructions,  the  division 
began  to  move  on  May  31st.  The  infantry  entrained  for 
Provin»-MonfrnIr;iiI;  while  those  elements  which  were 
provided  with  motor  truckn  were  directed  toward  Condc- 
en-Hrie  hy  rr>ad.  The  divi«ion  was  as  yet  without  its  en- 
j^iiM  MM  I'lni'  Ml,  nor  was  the  artillery  to  he  available  for 

ariof  her  rnorif  h. 

I  lardly  had  (k  n.  i;il  lJirkman*s  tfoops  detrained,  when 
the  division  was  assigned  to  the  group  of  armies  of  the 
Center,  '['hence  it  passed  under  the  command  of  the 
Sixth  Army  which,  in  turn,  ordered  the  Third  Division  to 
recnforce  the  Thirty-eighth  French  Army  Corps  whose 
front  cxtcmkil  from  Chateau-Thierry  to  Dormans. 

The  i'\r,i  '!( f;M  lirncnt  of  the  Third  nivi«ion  to  j^r)  into 
action  w;r.  iIj'  inoiori/cd  seventfj  rnachine-j^un  battalion. 
Without  making  any  halt  at  Condc,  an  it  was  HuppoHcd  to 
d"  'f"  l.iM  ilioii  pii  Im'I  <,n  directly  tr)  Chateau-Thierry 
wlicM   )i  .i/nv<<j  <Mi  ili(  rvin'inij^  of  May  3i8t. 

The  following  morning,  mixed  with  Cieneral  Mar- 
chand*s  troops,  it  gave  signal  service  in  repulsing  an 
enemy  attack  delivered  in  the  town  of  Chateau-Thierry, 
by  keeping  the  vicinity  of  the  bridge  over  the  Marne  under 
constant  fire,  and  effectually  preventing  the  passage  of  the 
river  at  this  point. 

The  Fifth  and  Sixth  Infantry  Brigades  which  composed 
this  division  went  into  action  successively,  generally 
battalion  by  battalion.  Posted  above  ChJtcau-Thierry, 
the  troops  facing  the  enemy  dug  themselves  in  and  pre- 


158     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

pared  to  hold  the  ground  obstinately.  Those  posted 
downstream  were  placed  in  the  second  line  guarding  the 
passage  over  the  different  bridges. 

Thus  the  division  after  June  ist  was  split  up.  But  the 
separate  units  were  extremely  active,  and  all  gave  an 
excellent  account  of  themselves  in  hardy  scouting,  daring 
patrol  duty,  and  audacious  minor  operations,  as  well  as 
by  their  vigor  in  trench  construction  while  occupying  the 
second  lines. 

The  7th  Infantry  Regiment,  for  example,  after  holding 
part  of  the  front  assigned  to  the  Thirty-eighth  Corps,  was 
transferred  to  the  One  Hundred  and  Sixty-fourth  Division 
to  guard  the  bridge  near  Nanteuil.  Thence  it  passed 
under  the  orders  of  General  Bundy,  who  made  use  of  it 
to  relieve,  for  a  few  days,  one  of  the  regiments  of  marines 
which  had  been  in  action  at  Belleau  Wood. 

The  30th  Infantry  Regiment  shared  with  the  Tenth 
French  Colonial  Division,  in  the  attack  on  Hill  204  west 
of  Chateau-Thierry.  Nor  did  the  division  commander 
remain  inactive.  General  Dickman  was  placed  by  Gen- 
eral de  Mondesir  at  the  head  of  a  reserve  which  the  com- 
mander of  the  Thirty-eighth  Corps  had  organized  behind 
the  lines.  He  later  took  command  of  the  American 
troops  grouped  in  the  center  of  the  Thirty-eighth  Corps, 
between  Hezy  and  Chierry.  This  detachment  had,  at 
this  moment,  the  strength  of  a  full  brigade,  spread  out  on 
a  front  of  five  miles  and  afterward  it  became  important, 
serving,  as  It  did,  for  a  nucleus  around  which  the  Third 
Division  was  regrouped  after  having  lost.  In  the  course 
of  these  operations  near  the  Marne,  34  officers  and  822 
men  killed  or  wounded. 

In  describing  the  role  played  by  the  First  Division  In 
the  Cantigny  sector,  we  have  attempted  to  indicate  the 


Summer  Counter-Offensive  159 

part  taken  by  the  Americans  in  those  operations  which 
finally  checked  the  first  German  drive  of  the  spring  of  1 9 1 8 . 
In  recording  the  actions  of  the  Second  and  Third  Divi- 
sions In  the  BoIs-de-Belleau  sector  and  along  the  Marne 
we  have  shown  the  assistance  given  by  the  American 
Expeditionary  Forces  to  the  allied  cause  In  the  affairs 
which  finally  brought  the  enemy's  second  offensive  to  a 
standstill.  It  now  remains  to  examine  In  what  manner 
the  American  troops  took  part  In  the  counter-offensive 
which  compelled  the  enemy,  for  a  second  time,  to  abandon 
the  banks  of  the  Marne. 

The  general  plan  of  the  battle  is  well  known.  It  con- 
sisted for  us  In  an  obstinate  resistance  along  the  front  held 
by  the  fourth  and  fifth  French  armies  (from  the  Argonne 
to  Chateau-Thierry  on  the  Marne)  during  the  German 
attack.  Once  the  enemy  forces  were  sufficiently  engaged, 
we  were  ourselves  to  assume  the  offensive,  and  with  the 
Tenth  and  Sixth  Armies  break  through  the  German  right 
flank. 

The  Forty-second  and  Third  American  Divisions,  with 
several  units  of  the  Twenty-eighth,  took  part  in  the 
strictly  defensive  action  of  July  15th. 

The  First,  Second,  Fourth,  and  Twenty-sixth  Divisions 
were  part  of  the  forces  engaged  on  July  i8th  when  the 
attack  was  launched  and  afterwards  cooperated  in  the 
exploitation  of  the  victory. 

The  Third,  Twenty-eighth,  Thirty-second,  Forty- 
second,  and  Seventy-seventh  Divisions  came  into  line  in 
the  course  of  the  fight. 

On  the  fifteenth  of  July,  when  the  enemy  started  their 
general  attack  from  the  Argonne  to  the  Marne,  precisely 
within  those  limits  where  the  French  command  expected 


i6o     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

them  to  strike,  the  American  troops  were  disposed  as 
follows : 

The  Forty-second  Division  ^^  in  the  region  near 
Suippes  was  placed  in  support  of  the  One  Hundred  and 
Seventieth  and  Thirteenth  French  Divisions.  The  de- 
fensive system  of  this  Champagne  sector  included  a  first 
position  which  was  not  to  be  occupied  in  force,  the  de- 
fenders being  authorized  at  certain  points  to  withdraw 
should  the  enemy's  pressure  become  intense;  an  inter- 
mediate position,  where  energetic  resistance  must  be  of- 
fered, and  a  third,  which  must  be  held  at  all  costs.  The 
artillery,  under  cover  of  this  third  line,  reenforced  the 
batteries  of  the  two  French  divisions  which,  at  the  start, 
were  placed  in  the  first  and  intermediate  positions  while 
the  American  division  held  the  third  position  with  its  two 
brigades  in  line  (the  Eighty-third  on  the  right  behind  the 
French  One  Hundred  and  Seventieth  Division,  the 
Eighty-fourth  Brigade  on  the  left  behind  the  Thirteenth 
French  Division). 

18  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Forty-second  Division  on  July  lo,  1918. 
Major-General   Chas.  T.  Menoher,   Division  Commander 
Eighty-third   Infantry   Brigade  Eighty-fourth  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  M.  J.  Lenihan       Brigadier-General   R.  A.   Brown 
165th  Infantry  Regiment  167th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  Frank  McCoy  Colonel  Wm.  P.   Screws 

j66th  Infantry  Regiment  l68th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  Benson  W.  Hough  Colonel  E.  R.  Bennet 

Sixty-seventh  Artillery  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  C.  McKinstry 
I4gth  Artillery  Regiment 
Colonel  Henry  J.  Reilly 
150th  Artillery  Regiment 
Colonel  R.  H.  Tyndall 
151st  Artillery  Regiment 
Colonel  George  £.  Leach 


Summer  Counter-Off ensive  i6i 

These  dispositions,  made  when  the  Forty-second  Divi- 
sion entered  the  line  on  July  5  th  were  altered  subsequently 
because  of  the  German  attack  having  been  delayed  longer 
than  was  expected.  Three  American  battalions  were 
transferred  to  the  intermediate  position;  and  thus  posted, 
the  Forty-second  Division,  on  July  15  th,  met  the  German 
onslaught. 

Meanwhile  on  the  Marne  the  Third  Division,  now  en- 
tirely reassembled,  and  in  possession  of  its  own  artillery 
reenforced  by  two  battalions  of  French  75's,  two  of  105's, 
and  one  of  155's  was  stretched  along  the  Marne  from 
Jaulgonne  to  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Chateau-Thierry 
(from  Mezey  to  Nesles  inclusive). 

The  four  regiments  of  the  division  were  ranged,  fol- 
lowing their  line  from  right  to  left,  thus:  the  Thirty- 
eighth,  Thirtieth,  Seventh,  and  Fourth.  Each  one  had 
detached  a  battalion  to  constitute  a  reserve  for  the  divi- 
sion and  also  for  the  corps  reserve  of  the  Thirty-eighth 
French  Army  Corps  to  which  the  American  division  was 
still  assigned. 

General  Dickman,  whose  post  of  command  was  at  the 
Chateau  de  la  Doultre,  had  placed  his  troops  in  depth 
formation  on  two  positions  of  which  we  need  only  examine 
the  one  nearest  the  enemy.  It  consisted  of  numerous 
trench  elements  in  front  of  which  individual  holes  for 
snipers  had  been  dug. 

His  right  covered  by  our  One  Hundred  and  Twenty- 
fifth  Division,  his  left  by  our  Thirty-ninth  Division,  Gen- 
eral Dickman  was  in  readiness  to  prevent  the  enemy  at 
all  costs  from  crossing  the  Marne.  Eastward,  and  on 
the  southern  bank  of  the  river,  there  still  remained  some 


iGi     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

American  detachments  from  the  Twenty-eighth  Divl- 
sion.^^ 

This  latter  had  been  split  up  since  its  arrival  from  the 
British  front;  when  it  detrained  in  the  region  of  Gonesse 
one  brigade  was  assigned  to  the  Thirty-ninth  French  Divi- 
sion, the  other  to  the  One  Hundred  and  Twenty-fifth. 
General  Muir  remained  with  his  staff  near  the  commander 
of  the  Thirty-ninth  French  Division.  His  Fifty-fifth 
Brigade  was  mingled  with  the  One  Hundred  and  Twenty- 
fifth  Division  during  the  attack  of  July  15th,  four  Ameri- 
can companies  being  placed  in  the  front  line  with  French 
troops.  The  remainder  were  engaged  in  organizing  and 
holding  a  second  position. 

Such  were  the  conditions  under  which  the  American 
troops  withstood  the  shock  on  July  15th. 

General  Petain  came  to  personally  Inspect  the  front  on 
which  an  assault  was  expected  and  during  the  course  of 
his  visit  he  particularly  dwelt  on  the  advantage  of  dispos- 
ing the  troops  —  artillery  as  well  as  infantry  —  In  depth. 

"^"^  Order    of    Battle    of    the    Twenty-eighth    Division    at    the    date    of 
August  I,  1918. 

Major-General  Charles  H.  Muir,  Division  Commander 

Fifty-fifth  Infantry  Brigade  Fifty-sixth  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  T.  W.  Darrah       Brigadier-General    Wm.   Weigcl 
109th  Infantry  Regiment  liith  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  M.  D.  Brown  Colonel  Ed.  C.  Shannon 

Iioth  Infantry  Regiment  112th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  George  M.  Kemp  Colonel  Geo.  C.  Richards 

Fifty-third  Artillery  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  Wm.  G.  Price 
107th  Artillery  Regiment 
Lieutenant-Colonel  A.  V.  Crookston 
Jo8th  Artillery  Regiment 
Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  St.  John  Greble,  Jr. 
logtk  Artillery  Regiment 
Colonel  Asher  Miner 


iCNf 


Summer  Counter-Ofensive  163 

He  recommended  also  that  the  combatants  should 
take  up  their  eventual  fighting  positions  before  the 
beginning  of  the  attack.  "  No  maneuvering  under  fire  " 
said  he  more  than  once  while  discussing  the  plan  with  the 
generals  in  command  of  the  army  groups,  armies,  and 
army  corps  assembled  to  meet  him. 

At  the  front  occupied  by  the  Forty-second  Division  the 
enemy  succeeded  in  reaching  the  intermediate  position 
only  toward  7  A.  M.  The  three  American  battalions  re- 
pulsed a  succession  of  attacks,  one  battalion  of  the  One 
Hundred  and  Sixty-sixth  as  many  as  seven.  Two  com- 
panies of  the  One  Hundred  and  Sixty-seventh  joined  with 
two  French  companies  in  a  brilliant  counter-attack  on  two 
center-s  of  resistance  in  the  intermediate  position  which 
had  temporarily  fallen  into  the  enemy  hands,  but  which 
was  recaptured.  On  the  whole  line  the  Germans  were 
driven  back  to  the  first  positions  upon  which  the  artillery 
at  once  directed  a  violent  fire. 

By  1 1 130  A.  M.  the  Eighty-third  Brigade  threw  for- 
ward another  battalion  on  the  intermediate  position  in 
reenforcement  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Seventieth  Divi- 
sion, and  the  Eighty-fourth  Brigade,  in  turn,  detached 
two  companies  from  the  i68th  Regiment  in  support  of 
our  Thirteenth  Division. 

In  this  glorious  affair  the  Forty-second  Division  had 
engaged  over  ^wt  battalions  and  the  American  troops  re- 
ceived the  unqualified  congratulations  of  all  the  French 
commanders  with  whom  they  had  served. 

General  Gouraud,  commanding  the  Fourth  Army,  Gen- 
eral Naulin  commanding  the  Twenty-first  Corps  —  of 
which  the  Forty-second  Division  formed  a  part  —  were 
much  struck  with  the  brilliant  behavior  of  the  American 
troops. 


164     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

As  for  General  Menoher,  who  was  to  have  taken  com- 
mand of  the  sectors  belonging  to  the  One  Hundred  and 
Seventieth  and  Thirteenth  Divisions,  as  well  as  that  of 
his  own,  if  the  day  had  gone  against  us,  and  if  the  enemy 
had  succeeded  in  forcing  our  troops  back  upon  the  third 
position,  he  did  not  have  to  set  his  staff  to  work  that  day 
on  defensive  projects  but  merely  observed,  from  an  ad- 
vanced post  of  command  on  the  battle  front,  the  splendid 
work  of  his  men  and  contented  himself  afterward,  with 
extending  to  them  their  due  meed  of  praise. 

It  may  be  interesting  to  give  below  the  opinion  of  one 
of  our  own  French  liaison  officers  who  witnessed  the  ac- 
tion and  who  thus  sums  up  his  impressions  of  the  Ameri- 
can fighting  qualities : 

"  The  behavior  of  the  American  troops  was  perfect,  and  elicited 
the  admiration  both  of  our  officers  and  men ;  calm  under  bombard- 
ment, supporting  with  great  endurance  hardships  and  privations, 
tenacious  in  defense  and  ardent  in  counter-attack,  they  show  an 
evident  desire  for  hand-to-hand  combat.  These  qualities,  which  I 
have  personally  observed,  have  been  commented  on  by  all  my 
comrades. 

"  The  American  artillery  behaved  splendidly  under  fire ;  though 
the  losses  were  heavy,  they  had  fine  opportunities,  firing  at  times 
directly  at  such  visible  objectives  as  columns  of  marching  infantry 
or  artillery. 

"  The  French  commanders  in  the  artillery  divisions  highly 
praise  the  work  of  the  gunners  of  the  Forty-second  Division,  re- 
marking that  the  firing  was  prepared  with  care  and  executed  with 
vigor." 

In  the  meantime,  on  the  front  of  the  Third  Division, 
the  enemy  was  subjected  also  to  a  severe  defeat. 

The  systems  of  defense  utilized  on  the  Marne  were, 
however,  altogether  different  from  those  employed  by  the 


Summer  Counter-Off ensive  165 

general  commanding  the  Fourth  French  Army.  On  the 
southern  bank  of  the  river  the  success  of  the  day  was 
mainly  due  apparently  to  the  fire  of  the  individual  infan- 
tryman, who,  posted  in  front-line  trench  elements  or  in 
separate  holes,  aimed  as  coolly  as  if  each  man  were  prac- 
ticing upon  his  own  rifle  range.  The  automatic  pistol  and 
bayonet  were  used  in  the  course  of  certain  counter-attacks 
carried  out  sometimes  by  companies,  sometimes  by 
platoons. 

It  must  be  added  that  the  artillery  played  an  effective 
part  in  the  fight,  but  this  was  less  striking  to  the  observers 
than  was  the  infantry  action.  The  guns  filled  the  small 
ravines  and  larger  valleys  with  a  rain  of  shells  so  that  the 
enemy  was  unable  to  concentrate  any  important  bodies  of 
men  or  to  press  forward  toward  the  river  under  cover. 
At  no  point  did  he,  indeed,  succeed  in  crossing  the  Marne 
in  force.  The  attempts  made  by  him  to  throw  bridges  to 
the  opposite  bank  were  foiled  by  our  artillery  fire,  his 
boats  were  almost  everywhere  stopped  by  the  sharp- 
shooters, and  where  small  elements  were  able  to  filter  into 
our  lines,  they  were  not  capable  of  penetrating  far,  be- 
cause they  were  not  reenforced. 

On  the  extreme  right,  the  38th  Infantry  Regi- 
ment, in  a  loop  of  the  Marne  near  Mezey,  where  the 
Surmelin  Brook  joins  the  river,  made  a  particularly  fine 
record.  Attacked  simultaneously  on  front  and  flanks  by 
enemy  troops,  who  were  afterward  found  to  belong  to 
six  different  regiments,  the  38th  repulsed  repeated 
assaults,  threw  the  enemy  back  into  the  Marne,  and 
captured  600  prisoners.  The  evening  following  this 
brilHant  action  a  French  officer  who  had  witnessed  it 
wrote  as  follows : 


1 66     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

"  The  youthful  soldiers  of  the  38th  Regiment  did  their  job 
finely,  showing  themselves  quite  equal  to  our  own  best  troops. 
Having  received  orders  to  hold  on  at  any  cost  they  got  killed  only 
after  having  accounted  for  at  least  three  times  as  many  of  the 
enemy  and  succeeded  in  maintaining  the  integrity  of  their  front. 

"  The  rifle  fire  from  the  railroad  line  was  directed  as  accurately 
as  during  a  maneuver.  A  certain  first  sergeant  of  Company  H 
verified  the  sights  and  pointed  out  the  objectives.  We  estimate  at 
over  a  thousand,  the  German  bodies  which  remained  before  our 
lines. 

"  The  grit  of  the  officers,  platoon  commanders  especially,  was 
admirable ;  one  second  lieutenant,  shot  through  the  chest,  remained 
at  his  post  all  day  refusing  to  allow  himself  to  be  relieved  until 
he  was  wounded  a  second  time.  One  company  commander  refused 
to  propose  his  men  for  any  recompense  for  exceptionally  dis- 
tinguished service,  stating  that  he  would  then  have  to  recommend 
all,  since  each  man  had  fought  like  a  hero.  To  sum  up:  These 
soldiers,  if  they  profit  as  they  surely  will  by  this  experience,  must 
count  as  first-class  troops  from  whom  their  officers  may  require 
anything. 

"  Colonel  McAlexander,  commanding  the  Thirty-eighth  In- 
fantry, showed  himself  to  be  a  remarkable  leader,  cool-headed  and 
efficient.  He  is  liked  and  respected  by  men  of  whom  he,  on  his 
side,  has  every  reason  to  be  proud." 

In  the  sector  adjoining  General  Dickman's  division  the 
four  companies  of  the  Fifty-fifth  Brigade  who  were  in  the 
first  line  had  a  hard  fight  and  were  compelled  to  fall  back 
on  their  reserves.  In  this  region  the  enemy  succeeded  in 
crossing  the  river  near  St.  Aignan  and  Chapelle-Monto- 
don.  Two  battalions  belonging  to  the  Fifty-fifth  Brigade 
(Twenty-eighth  Division)  counter-attacked  with  great 
vigor. 

On  July  1 6th  and  the  days  following  the  enemy  at- 
tempted to  renew  the  offensive  but  entirely  without  suc- 
cess; he  had  been  definitely  checked. 

Although  the  American  casualties  were  heavy  they  were 


Summer  Counter-Offensive  167 

more  than  compensated  by  the  results  achieved.  On  the 
evening  of  th-e  fifteenth  the  Forty-second  Division  re- 
ported 1,200  wounded  or  gassed  and  400  killed. 

America  had  thus  contributed  50,000  men  in  this  purely 
defensive  battle  which  was  imposed  upon  us  by  the  enemy. 

Three  days  later,  when  we  in  turn  assumed  the  offen- 
sive, 100,000  more  Americans  were  to  be  found  in  line, 
and  this  number,  already  imposing,  must  be  again  doubled 
in  order  to  justly  estimate  America's  effort  at  this  epoch 
of  the  war. 

It  is  indeed  impossible  to  draw  a  hard  line  of  demarca- 
tion between  the  attack  of  the  eighteenth  of  July  and  the 
pursuit  which  was  its  natural  consequence.  We  must 
therefore,  while  relating  the  part  played  by  the  Expedi- 
tionary Forces  in  our  first  counter-offensive,  take  into  ac- 
count the  share  they  had  later  in  the  exploitation  of  our 
success.  Consequently,  we  must  add  to  the  100,000  com- 
batants of  the  First,  Second,  Fourth,  and  Twenty-sixth 
Divisions  who  were  in  line  on  the  morning  when  the  battle 
started  the  125,000  more  belonging  to  the  Third,  Twenty- 
eighth,  Thirty-second,  Forty-second,  and  Seventy-seventh 
Divisions  who  came  into  action  during  the  pursuit  of  the 
enemy  to  the  Vesle. 

At  this  critical  moment  of  the  war's  history  America 
came  forward  with  all  her  might  and  we  may  incidentally 
mention  that  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Expeditionary 
Forces  needed  no  persuasion  to  make  him  comprehend  the 
urgency  of  the  vast  operations  which  the  Allies  were  con- 
templating. But  we  may  more  thoroughly  appreciate  the 
responsibility  which,  like  a  true  chief,  he  personally 
shouldered  when  we  have  made  clear  the  individual  situa- 
tion of  each  division  enumerated  above. 


1 68     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

General  Pershing  was  always  in  favor  of  an  offensive 
strategy  and  he  was  strongly  of  the  opinion  that  at  the 
present  time  a  powerful  counter-offensive  was  the  only 
course  open  to  the  Allies;  he  had  already,  on  the  twenty- 
second  of  June,  explained  his  theories  to  the  French  high 
command  and  the  prime  minister,  and  expressed  his  will- 
ingness to  take  his  full  share  in  the  task  before  them. 

That  his  task  was  not  an  easy  one  may  be  seen  as  we 
rapidly  pass  in  review  the  different  American  units  at  the 
date  of  July  17th;  that  is  to  say,  on  the  eve  of  our  great 
counter-offensive. 

The  First  Division  was  in  good  form.  It  had  left  the 
Cantigny-Grivesnes  front  on  July  8th  and  was  perfecting 
its  training  and  resting  in  the  region  of  Beauvals.  The 
last  days  spent  in  the  trenches  between  Amiens  and  Mont- 
didier  had  been  comparatively  quiet,  the  calm  of  the  sector 
only  being  broken  by  an  occasional  exchange  of  artillery 
fire.  General  Summerall  was  in  command  of  the  divi- 
sion, having  replaced  General  Bullard  promoted  to  the 
Third  Corps  command. 

The  Second  Division,  on  the  contrary,  had  been  fighting 
steadily  for  forty  days  and  had  hardly  been  relieved  and 
concentrated  near  MontreuIl-aux-LIons  in  order  to  pro- 
ceed to  the  rear  when,  on  the  fifteenth,  it  received  orders 
to  remain  in  the  vicinity  of  its  former  battle-ground,  and 
to  hold  Itself  In  readiness  for  a  strong  enemy  attack. 
This  could  not  therefore  be  considered  a  fresh  division. 
Moreover  It  had  just  changed  hands,  General  Harbord, 
the  victor  of  Belleau  Wood,  having  recently  replaced 
General  Bundy,  appointed  to  the  command  of  an  army 
corps. 

The  Third  Division  had  sustained  the  fierce  onslaught 


Effectives  Engaged  169 

of  July  15  th.  Although  the  losses  had  not  been  par- 
ticularly severe,  all  its  units  had  been  engaged  In  hard 
fighting,  and  one  regiment,  the  38th,  had  been  badly  cut 
up.  The  division  still  remained  on  the  positions  it  had 
held  in  face  of  the  German  attacks. 

The  Fourth  Division  had  been  brought  down  from  the 
British  front  at  the  time  when  it  had  seemed  advisable  to 
increase  the  density  of  our  troops  in  the  region  between 
Chateau-Thierry  and  Paris.  It  had  been  at  once  broken 
up  and  divided  among  the  Thirty-ninth  and  One  Hundred 
and  Sixty-fourth  French  Divisions  with  the  double  pur- 
pose of  receiving  practical  training  and  at  the  same  time 
strengthening  these  French  units.  Its  infantry  had  had 
but  few  occasions  to  drill,  the  sojourn  in  Flanders  having 
been  less  than  one  month;  its  artillery  was  still  in  the 
training  camps. 

The  Twenty-sixth  Division  was  where  we  left  it  on  July 
loth.  In  the  Torcy  Belleau  sector,  where  it  formed  the 
right  wing  of  the  First  American  Corps.  Its  attitude, 
as  we  have  seen,  although  aggressive,  had  not  caused  It 
an  abnormal  number  of  casualties,  so  that  we  may  count 
General  Edwards'  division  as  being  still  In  good  fighting 
condition  on  July  17th. 

The  Twenty-eighth  Division^  like  the  Fourth,  passed 
from  the  British  to  the  French  front  and.  In  greater 
degree  than  the  latter,  had  suffered  from  hasty  and  nu- 
merous displacements.  Up  to  the  moment  of  going  Into 
action,  the  troops  had  not  been  able  to  become  entirely 
conversant  with  massed  evolutions.  Neither  before  leav- 
ing America  nor  after  arriving  In  Europe  had  there  been 
much  time  for  maneuvers  or  fire-practice.  The  troops 
who  chiefly  made  up  this  unit  were  Pennsylvanlan  Na- 
tional Guards  who  had  been  employed  upon  the  Mexican 


i^o     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

border  and  this  division  still  lacked  its  artillery  brigade. 
Two  battalions  had  been  subjected  to  rather  severe  losses 
during  the  German  attack  of  the  Fifteenth,  and  four  of 
Its  companies  had  seen  hard  fighting  during  the  retire- 
ment of  the  One  Hundred  and  Twenty-fifth  Division, 
in  which  they  had  been  placed  as  reenforcement. 

Nevertheless  the  morale  was  good,  and  General  Muir, 
**  Uncle  Charlie  "  as  his  men  called  him,  was  impatient 
to  see  his  division  once  more  assembled  and  engaged  in 
action.  After  July  15th,  the  brigade  which  had  been 
detailed  with  the  French  One  Hundred  and  Twenty-fifth 
Division  rejoined  the  Fifty-ninth  Brigade  and  the  Twenty- 
eighth  Division  was  once  more  reconstituted. 

The  Thirty-second  Division  was  made  up  of  National 
Guard  elements  from  Michigan  and  Wisconsin,  and  came 
from  the  Alsace  front,  where  It  had  been  engaged  in 
operating  with  the  French  Fortieth  Army  Corps. 

Arriving  In  France  on  the  twentieth  of  February,  the 
men  had  been  trained  for  three  months  In  camps  situated 
In  the  interior  of  the  country  and  for  the  past  two  months 
had  been  enabled  to  complete  their  military  instruction 
In  a  quiet  sector.  The  divisional  artillery  joined  them 
on  the  eighteenth  of  May.^^ 

18  Order    of    Battle    of    the    Thirty-second    Division    on    the    first    of 
August,  1 9 18. 

Major-General  V^illiam  G.  Han,  Division  Commander 
Sixty-third  Infantry  Brigade  Sixth-fourth  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  W.  D.  Connor     Brigadier-General  Ed.  B.  Winans 
125th  Infantry  Regiment  127th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  Wm.  V.  Morrow  Colonel   C.  R.  Langdon 

126th  Infantry  Regiment  128th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  Jos.  B.  Westnedge  Colonel  Robert  McCoy 

Fifty-seventh  Artillery  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  LeRoy  G.  Irwin 
iiQth  Artillery  Regiment 
Colonel  C.  B.  McCormick 


Effectives  Engaged  171 

The  Forty-second  Division^  which  we  have  just  seen 
resisting  all  the  enemy  attacks  directed  against  it  up  to 
July  15th,  was,  in  spite  of  heavy  losses,  in  excellent  con- 
dition and  occupied  the  trenches  from  which  it  had  re- 
pulsed the  enemy. 

The  Seventy-seventh  Division  had  arrived  in  France 
on  April  13th  and  was  included  with  the  troops  which 
were  sent  to  the  British  front  for  training.  On  June 
1 6th  it  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  Rambervillers  and 
thence,  four  days  later,  was  placed  in  the  Baccarat  sec- 
tor, where  it  was  joined  by  the  divisional  artillery.  Gen- 
eral Duncan  had  had  therefore  the  advantage  of  forty 
days'  trench  experience  to  prepare  his  men  for  more 
active  warfare. ^^ 

Such  was  the  individual  condition  of  each  American 
unit  on  July  i8th  at  which  date  their  participation  in 
our  counter-offensive  was  to  begin. 

I20th  Artillery  Regiment 

Colonel  Carl  Penner 
147th  Artillery  Regiment 
Colonel  Boyd  Wales 
1^  Order    of   Battle    of    the    Seventy-seventh    Division    at    the    date    of 
August  19,  1918. 

Major-General  George  B.  Duncan,  Division  Commander 
153d  Infantry  Brigade  154th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier  Gen.  E.  Wittenmyer         Brigadier-General  E.  M.  Johnson 
305th  Infantry  Regiment  307th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  W.  R.  Smedberg,  Jr.  Colonel  Isaac  Irv^in 

306th  Infantry  Regiment  308th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  G.  Vidner  Colonel    N.   K.   Averill 

I52d  Artillery  Brigade 
Colonel  Manus  McCloskey 
304th  Artillery  Regiment 

Colonel  R.  N.  Briggs 

305th  Artillery  Regiment 

Colonel  Fred  C.  Doyle 

306th  Artillery  Regiment 

Lieutenant-Colonel  F.  H.  Smith 


172     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

The  general  situation  may  be  summed  up  as  follows: 
The  American  command  had  at  its  disposal  to  begin  and 
carry  on  the  attack  nine  divisions.  One  fresh  and  that 
had  already  given  an  excellent  account  of  itself  in  ac- 
tion: The  First  Division.  Two  very  good  divisions 
which  had  just  been  subjected  to  hard  fighting:  The  Forty- 
second  and  Twenty-sixth.  Two  which  were  incomplete, 
lacking  cohesion  and  training:  The  Fourth  and  Twenty- 
eighth.  Two  still  suffering  from  hard  and  recent  fight- 
ing: The  Second  and  Third.  Two  others  which  had 
occupied  quiet  sectors  but  had  not  yet  been  engaged  in 
active  fighting:  The  Thirty-second  and  the  Seventy- 
seventh. 

In  order  to  grasp  the  individual  part  taken  by  each 
of  these  units  in  the  great  counter-offensive  started  on 
July  1 8th  and  continued  well  into  the  month  of  August, 
let  us  describe  the  battle-front  from  north  to  south  and 
from  west  to  east,  along  that  semicircle  where  the  Sixth 
and  Tenth  French  Armies  were  drawn  up  from  Fontenoy- 
sur-Aisne  up  to  a  point  above  Chateau-Thierry  on  the 
Marne.  Such  a  method  seems  logical,  since  it  will  show 
us  first  the  decisive  action  undertaken  by  the  Tenth  Army 
which  broke  through  the  German  front,  then  the  subordi- 
nate action  of  the  Sixth  Army,  whose  movements  were 
regulated  upon  those  of  General  Mangin's  forces. 

The  role  of  the  Tenth  Army  was  to  rupture  the  enemy 
lines  between  the  Aisne  and  the  Ourcq,  and  to  push  ahead 
in  the  direction  of  Fere-en-Tardenois,  while  the  Sixth 
Army  conforming  to  this  movement  should  advance  its 
left  wing. 

General  Mangin  had  at  his  disposal  the  First  and 
Second  American   Divisions,   which  he   assigned  to   the 


Summer  Counter-Offensive  173 

Twentieth  French  Corps,  whose  commander,  General 
Berdoulat,  organized  his  front  from  left  to  right  as  fol- 
lows: The  First  American  Division;  the  Moroccan  Di- 
vision; the  Second  American  Division. 

General  Pershing  had  requested  that  the  i\merican 
divisions  might  be  maintained  side  by  side.  He  would 
even  have  preferred  to  group  them  into  one  purely 
American  army  corps,  and  in  view  of  this  junction  he 
had  ordered  General  Bullard  to  transfer  his  headquarters 
from  Remiremont  and  proceed  to  the  scene  of  the  active 
operations  which  were  about  to  begin. 

But  the  commander  of  the  Third  Corps  ^^  was  only 
able  to  arrive  in  the  zone  of  concentration  on  the  sixteenth 
of  July  and  with  a  greatly  reduced  staff;  furthermore, 
General  Pershing's  desire  could  not  be  carried  out  on 
account  of  the  rapidity  of  events.  General  Bullard 
therefore  acted  as  assistant  to  General  Berdoulat  and 
was  placed  in  administrative  control  of  the  First  and 
Second  American  Divisions. 

It  was  on  the  sixteenth  of  July  that  these  two  units 
then  in  process  of  transportation  got  their  orders  from 
the  Twentieth  Corps. ^^  The  First  Division,  coming 
from  the  Froissy-Beauvais  region,  was  being  concentrated 
behind  the  French  line,  the  infantry  having  been  trans- 
ported in  motor  trucks.     The   Second   Division,   which 

20  Composition  of  the  Third  American  Corps  Staff  at  the  date  of 
July  16,  1918. 

Major-General  Robert  L.  Bullard,  Corps  Commander 

Brigadier-General  A.  W.  Bjoranstad Chief  of  Staff 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Lorenzo  D.  Gasser Chief  of  G-i 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Offnere  Hope Chief  of  G-2 

Lieutenant-Colonel    Francis  W.   Clark Chief  of  G-3 

21  It  was  not  until  July  15th  at  2  p.  M.  that  the  general  commanding 
the  Third  Corps  learned  of  the  offensive  between  the  Aisne  and  the 
Ourcq  which  was  about  to  be  started. 


174     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

had  been  brought  from  Montreuil-aux-Lions,  the  mounted 
troops  by  road,  the  dismounted  troops  on  trucks,  was 
only  assembled  on  the  dark  and  rainy  night  of  the 
seventeenth  to  the  eighteenth  of  July.  By  a  curious  and 
picturesque  coincidence  of  war  time,  these  trucks  were 
driven  by  Anamite  soldiers.  Thus  the  ancient  civiliza- 
tion of  Asia  was  conducting  young  America  to  the  battle- 
field. 

The  placing  of  the  attacking  waves  was  effectuated 
with  great  difficulty.  Several  battalions  belonging  to  the 
marine  brigade  were  forced  to  take  the  "  double  quick  " 
for  a  mile  or  so  in  order  to  get  ahead  of  the  blocks  of 
ammunition  trucks  which  encumbered  the  paths  through 
the  forest.  On  the  evening  of  the  seventeenth  the  cross- 
roads of  Nemours,  in  the  Villers  Cotterets  Forest,  af- 
forded a  curious  spectacle.  On  the  torn-up  roadway 
three  files  of  wagons,  caissons,  ammunition  trucks,  lorries, 
and  tanks  moved  slowly  and  heavily  forward.  The 
American  infantrymen  in  their  yellowish  tunics,  much 
darker  in  color  when  the  troops  belonged  to  the  marine 
brigade,  clambered  in  Indian  file  along  the  embanked 
ditches  which  border  the  roadway  or  pushed  through  the 
undergrowth  of  the  adjacent  forest.  At  every  cross- 
road, serious  blocks  occurred  in  this  multifarious  traffic 
testing  the  patience  and  address  of  the  French  gendarmes 
and  the  American  military  police. 

As  for  the  artilleryman  of  the  American  forces  he 
displayed  an  initiative  quite  equal  to  that  of  his  infantry 
comrade.  While  the  latter  pressed  on  through  the  wood- 
land bypaths,  the  gunners  pushed  their  cannon  forward 
across  country,  reconnoitered  the  positions  prepared  the 
previous  day  and  got  ready  to  open  fire  according  to 
maps,  plans,  and  calculations  made  on  paper,  strict  orders 


Summer  Counter-Offensive  175 

having  been  issued  that  not  a  shot  must  be  fired  before 
the  general  attack. 

Nevertheless,  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  no  ranging  had 
been  possible,  when  the  hour  of  the  assault  came  the 
artillery  was  ready  with  a  rolling  barrage,  thereby  assur- 
ing the  early  success  of  the  day.  In  fact  all  the  diffi- 
culties Incident  to  the  taking  up  of  these  positions  were 
quite  forgotten  when,  at  4.35  A.  M.,  July  i8th,  the  entire 
front  of  the  Tenth  Army  began  to  push  forward. 

The  First  Division,  to  which  were  added  a  French 
75  mm.  regiment  and  forty-eight  Schneider  tanks,  now 
began  Its  impressive  advance.  The  four  regiments 
each  had  certain  elements  in  the  first  line  and  were 
echeloned  In  depth. 

The  Second  Division  also  was  reenforced  by  a  75  mm. 
regiment  and  had  fifty-four  St.  Chamond  tanks.  The 
brigades  were  placed  one  behind  the  other  and  took  the 
field  In  splendid  order.  A  few  units  which  had  not  been 
able  to  collect  their  machine-gun  sections,  nowise  em- 
barrassed by  the  lack  of  their  own  weapons,  threw  them- 
selves upon  those  of  the  enemy  and  fought  through  the 
entire  day  with  the  material  they  had  so  dashingly  con- 
quered! 

The  Intention  of  the  Twentieth  Corps  commander  had 
been  to  advance  In  three  successive  bounds  from  the 
line  of  departure,  situated  on  the  fringe  of  the  Villers 
Cotterets  Forest  to  a  line  running  approximately  from 
north  to  south  and  passing  through  the  villages  of  Sa- 
conln,  MIssy-aux-boIs,  and  Chaudun.  Thus  the  Solssons- 
Parls  highroad  would  have  fallen  Into  our  hands,  while 
that  of  Solssons-Chateau-Thlerry  would  have  been  se- 
riously threatened. 

At  7.45  A.  M.,  the  two  American  divisions  on  the  right 


176     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

and  left  wing,  with  the  Moroccan  division  occupying  the 
center,  had  attained  the  second  objective,  each  division 
covering  a  front  of  a  mile  and  a  quarter. 

In  the  course  of  the  day,  as  the  offensive  went  on, 
the  Americans  succeeded  in  everywhere  keeping  their 
line  level  with  that  of  our  valiant  Colonial  troops  when 
they  did  not  get  beyond  them.  At  an  early  hour  they 
were  ready  to  carry  the  guns  forward  in  support  of  the 
infantry  advance  which  now  bit  deep  into  the  enemy  line. 

In  the  evening.  General  SummeralPs  soldiers  had 
reached  the  Soissons-Chateau-Thierry  road  and  General 
Harbord's  men  were  on  the  western  outskirts  of  Ville- 
montoire  and  Tigny. 

On  the  following  days  the  attack  was  resumed  along 
the  entire  front  of  the  Tenth  iVrmy  and  the  American 
divisions  once  more  distinguished  themselves  by  the  ardor 
of  their  fighting  spirit. 

The  Second  Division  in  its  turn  reached  the  Soissons- 
Chateau-Thierry  road  southeast  of  Villemontoire. 

The  First  Division,  which  was  obliged  to  slacken  speed 
so  as  to  enable  the  neighboring  division  on  the  left  to 
come  up,  then  seized  Berzy-le-sec,  the  Buzancy  Mill,  and 
reached  the  edge  of  the  village  of  Chierry. 

It  is  estimated  that  10,000  men  and  officers  were  killed, 
wounded,  or  evacuated.  But  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the 
losses  were  numerous  this  fight  may  be  considered  one 
of  the  most  brilliant  of  the  entire  war,  especially  when 
we  compare  the  casualties  with  the  trophies  wrested  from 
the  enemy. 

On  July  20th,  when  the  Second  Division  left  the  field, 
and  on  the  24th,  when  the  First  Division  was,  in  Its  turn, 
relieved,  the  latter  carried  with  it  3,300  prisoners  and 


Summer  Counter-Off ensive  177 

71  cannons:  the  former  2,950  prisoners  and  75  cannons. 

The  American  soldier  had  fully  justified  the  confidence 
of  his  commander-in-chief;  the  infantry  had  been  splendid 
in  attack,  obstinate  in  its  sustained  effort,  and  excellent 
in  marksmanship.  But  the  passage  of  the  lines  had  been 
difficult  and  arduous,  the  long  pauses  upon  ground  freshly 
conquered  and  subjected  to  sharp  enemy  fire  had  been 
trying  to  these  inexperienced  troops,  more  especially  to 
the  Second  Division,  already  severely  tested  by  a  long 
night  march  before  entering  into  action.  To  sum  up, 
each  new  experience  proved  that  the  American  army  pos- 
sessed increasing  qualities  of  audacity  and  skill;  its  apti- 
tude for  attack  was  more  and  more  evident. 

The  Third  Corps  was  withdrawn  and  sent  to  rest  at 
the  Chateau  de  Valliere  near  Morte  Fontaine. 

The  First  and  Second  Divisions,  now  once  more  re- 
joined by  their  respective  artilleries  —  which  had  been 
obliged  to  remain  some  time  on  the  battle-field  after  the 
relief  of  the  infantry  —  were  regrouped  in  the  regions 
respectively  of  Dommartin-en-Goele  and  of  Nanteuil-le- 
Haudouin. 

Further  south,  on  the  front  of  the  Sixth  Army,  three 
regiments  of  the  Fourth  Division  took  part  in  the  general 
attack  with  the  same  fortune  which  attended  their  com- 
rades of  the  Thirty-ninth  and  One  Hundred  and  Sixty- 
fourth  French  Divisions.  The  47th  Regiment  was  held 
in  reserve  on  a  second  position. 

On  the  front  assigned  to  our  Thirty-ninth  Division,  the 
39th  Infantry  Regiment  shared  in  the  taking  of  Norroy 
on  the  eighteenth  and  continued  to  advance,  attaining 
on  the  nineteenth  the  three  successive  objectives  assigned 


1 78      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

to  it.  It  was  relieved  on  the  same  night  by  French 
troops. 

Along  the  front  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Sixty- 
fourth  Division,  the  entire  Eighth  Brigade,  although  split 
into  separate  groups,  took  part  in  the  offensive. 

On  the  eighteenth  the  Franco-Americans  captured 
Hautevesnes  at  five  A.M.,  Courchamps  at  eleven;  later, 
according  to  General  Gaucher's  report,  they  reached 
Chevillon  "  with  splendid  dash."  On  the  nineteenth  the 
advance  was  continued,  and  Priey  first,  then  the  farm  La 
Grenouillieres  were  taken  by  the  combined  forces.  The 
Americans  were  relieved  on  the  night  of  the  twenty- 
second  after  having  participated  in  the  storming  of 
Sommelans,  Petret,  and  Bois  de  Bonnes. 

On  the  twenty-fourth  the  Fourth  Division  was  re- 
grouped behind  the  fighting  line. 

This  division  was  not,  however,  to  remain  long  at  rest. 
It  was  obliged  the  same  day  to  detach  the  47th  Regiment 
to  mop  up  the  Chatelet  Wood.  The  39th  Regiment, 
which  occupied  a  position  between  Lacroix  and  Joncourt, 
was  also  detached  from  this  division. 

The  next  day  another  regiment,  the  58th,  was  given 
to  support  a  French  corps,  and  these  three  regiments 
did  not  rejoin  their  division  until  July  29th.  From  this 
date  on  the  Fourth  Division  will  be  found  solely  with 
the  First  American  Corps  in  whose  ranks  It  figures  after 
August  3d.^2 

Southward,  near  the  apex  of  our  offensive,  we  find 
the  First  American  Corps,  having  on  its  left  the  One 

22  The  Fourth  Division  before  relieving  the  Forty-second  Division,  de- 
tached several  battalions  in  support  of  this  unit.  Thus  it  was  that  troops 
of  the  Forty-seventh  were  mixed  with  those  of  the  Forty-second  Division 
during  the  severe  attack  on  Sergy. 


Slimmer  Counter-Off ensive  179 

Hundred  and  Sixty-seventh  Fpench  Division,  and  on  its 
right  the  Twenty-Sixth  American  Division. ^^  This  corps 
took  part  In  the  attack  of  July  i8th.  While  the  French 
were  engaged  before  Torcy  the  Americans  seized  upon 
the  village  of  Givry,  Belleau,  and  the  station  of  Bou- 
resches. 

South  of  Monthlers,  the  enemy  had  installed  a  great 
number  of  machine  gun  nests  which  made  our  progress 
most  difficult  and  during  the  two  days  immediately  fol- 
lowing the  first  successful  operations  the  advance  was 
quite  limited,  but  on  the  twenty-first  the  whole  front 
of  the  American  Army  Corps  went  forward  some  three 
miles  and  a  half,  attaining  the  region  of  Epieds-Trugny. 

On  the  twenty-fourth  a  new  forward  bound  of  three 
miles  carried  General  Liggett's  line  up  to  Beuvardes; 
from  the  twenty-fourth  to  the  twenty-sixth  the  advance 
was  slow  but  steady. 

The  Forty-second  Division,  relieving  the  Twenty-sixth, 
extended  its  front  In  order  to  take  In  that  of  the  One 
Hundred  and  Sixty-seventh  French  Division.  From  this 
time  until  the  Vesle  was  reached,  the  First  American 
Corps  had  but  one  division  in  line. 

On  July  28th  still  another  three  miles'  advance  was 
recorded  in  the  course  of  which  the  Ourcq  was  crossed 
on  a  two  mile  front  and  the  farm  of  Meurcy  and  the 
village  of  Sergy  taken.  After  debouching  from  this 
river  a  strong  enemy  resistance  was  encountered;  the 
Americans  ran  up  against  a  veritable  mass  of  automatic 
rifles.  A  strenuous  fight  ensued,  during  which  the  village 
of  Sergy  many  times  changed  hands. 

In  the  yellow  wheat-fields  which  covered  the  slopes 

23  On  the  twenty-second,  the  Fifty-sixth  Brigade  of  the  Twenty-eighth 
Division  relieved  the  right  brigade  of  the  Twenty-sixth  Division. 


i8o     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

adjacent  to  the  Meurcy  farm,  along  the  heights  above 
Fere-en-Tardenois,  bordering  the  httle  mud  road  between 
Sergy  and  "  the  Poplars  "  and  on  the  hills  extending 
from  these  trees  down  to  Cierges,  General  Liggett,  on 
visiting  the  scene  of  action,  found  the  bodies  of  his  own 
men  not  twenty  yards  from  the  German  lines;  the  khaki 
uniforms  were  stretched  beside  the  greenish  tunic  of  the 
emperor's  troops  up  to  the  very  entrenchments  of  the 
enemy  machine  guns  where  these  men  had  met  in  a  death 
grapple. 

On  August  2d  the  advance  was  again  resumed.  On 
the  third,  when  the  Fourth  Division  relieved  the  Forty- 
second,  the  American  troops  passed  almost  without  re- 
sistance through  Dole  Forest  and  the  Vesle  was  reached. 
At  the  same  time  the  Franco-British  contingents  of  the 
Tenth  Army  had  attained  the  heights  of  Grand  Rozoy, 
thus  facilitating  the  American  advance. 

The  river  was  crossed  on  August  6th.  The  First 
Corps  Headquarters  saw  the  Fourth  Division  relieved 
by  the  Seventy-seventh  and,  on  August  13th  were  placed 
in  reserve  at  La  Ferte-sous-Jouarre. 

During  twenty  days  of  unremitting  pursuit,  an  ad- 
vance of  twenty  miles  had  been  achieved  by  this  army 
corps  on  an  average  front  of  two  miles  and  a  half,  674 
prisoners  were  taken  from  twelve  different  German  di- 
visions. Seven  cannons  and  230  machine  guns  were 
counted. 

Still  further  south  and  slightly  to  the  east  we  find 
the  Thirty-eighth  French  Corps  posted  along  the  Marne 
with  the  Thirty-ninth  French  and  the  Third  American 
Divisions  in  line,  the  Twenty-eighth  Division  being  held 
in  reserve. 

On  this  section  of  the  front  no  unit  was  engaged  in 


Summer  Counter-Off ensive  i8i 

the  action  of  July  i8th.  Not  until  the  night  of  the  twen- 
tieth to  the  twenty-first,  when  the  enemy  yielded  to  the 
pressure  coming  from  the  west,  did  General  Mondesir 
push  his  troops  forward. 

Then  in  close  pursuit  of  the  enemy's  rear  guards  the 
Third  Division  crossed  the  Marne  and  took  Brasles, 
Gland,  Mont-St.  Pere,  Charteves,  and  Jaulgonne.  The 
vigorous  pursuit  was  only  interrupted  when  prolonged 
machine  gun  resistance  was  met  with. 

In  the  course  of  this  northward  march,  a  brigade  of 
the  Twenty-eighth  Division  relieved  the  Thirty-ninth 
French,  then  in  its  turn  the  Thirty-second  American 
Division  replaced  the  Third  Division,  which,  severely 
tried,  went  to  rest  and  recuperate  near  the  Marne. 

The  entrance  of  the  Thirty-second  Division  (July  27th) 
increased  the  activity  of  the  sector  and  hastened  progres- 
sion. 

On  August  1st,  the  Thirty-eighth  French  Corps,  con- 
sisting now  of  only  American  units  advanced  toward  the 
Vesle  with  the  Thirty-second  Division  in  line,  the  Twenty- 
eighth  in  support,^*  and  the  Third  in  reserve. 

Under  such  circumstances  it  became  natural  to  confide 
the  direction  of  operations  to  an  American  officer  and 
accordingly  General  Bullard  assumed  command.  On 
August  4th,  when  the  line  reached  up  to  Fismes,  the  head- 
quarters of  the  Third  American  Corps  was  established 
at  Coulanges. 

After  this  American  Army  Corps  had  lined  up  on 
the  Vesle,  it  extended  out  rightward  relieving  the  Fourth 
French  Division  with  part  of  the  Twenty-eighth. 

On  August  6th  the  Thirty-second  Division  encountered 
serious  resistance  when  attempting  to  debouch  north  of 

2*  This  division  had  a  few  elements  in  the  first  line. 


1 82     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

the  Vesle.  It  was  withdrawn  after  severe  fighting  and 
relieved  by  the  Twenty-eighth  Division  which  was  now 
completely   deployed. 

From  this  time  up  to  their  ultimate  departure  from 
the  Vesle  region  a  monotonous  period  of  stabilization, 
followed,  Interrupted  occasionally  by  sharp  attacks  whose 
object  was  to  establish  solid  bridgeheads  on  the  northern 
bank.  These  operations  were  long,  laborious,  and  costly. 
The  enemy  launched  a  succession  of  fierce  counter-attacks 
and  General  Bullard  had  difficulty  in  maintaining  his  ad- 
vanced posts  on  the  northern  side  of  the  river. 

On  August  13th  when  the  Seventy-seventh  Division 
came  Into  line  and  the  First  American  Corps  was  with- 
drawn, ^the  Third  Corps  extended  leftward  in  order  to 
take  Into  Its  sector  this  new  American  unit. 

Supported  on  the  right  and  left  by  French  troops  and 
having  the  Seventy-seventh  and  Twenty-eighth  Divisions 
in  line  and  the  Thirty-second  in  reserve.  General  Bullard 
endeavored  to  enlarge  his  bridgeheads  on  the  Vesle  and 
to  gain  a  footing  on  the  plateau  between  this  river  and 
the  Alsne. 

The  artillery  duel  was  particularly  fierce  at  this  point; 
patrols  advanced  with  difficulty  and  certain  daring  raids 
were  made  without  any  appreciable  result  being  achieved. 
Bazoches  and  Fismettes  changed  hands  many  times. 

It  now  became  necessary  either  to  await.  In  depth 
formation,  for  the  enemy  to  exhibit  any  sign  of  giving 
ground  or  to  secure  sufficient  artillery  reenforcements  to 
enable  a  strong  and  methodical  attack  on  the  enemy's 
heavily  garrisoned  position. 

The  formation  adopted  by  General  Bullard  was  prac- 
tically: Four  battalions  at  the  advanced  posts;  eight 
battalions  on  the  positions  of  resistance;  twelve  battalions 
back  of  the  barrage  line. 


Summer  Counter-Offensive  183 

On  September  seventh  the  Twenty-eighth  Division  was 
relieved  and,  on  the  following  day,  the  Third  Corps  was 
withdrawn  from  this  front  and  at  precisely  the  same  mo- 
ment the  enemy  began  to  loosen  his  grasp  of  the  heights 
between  the  Aisne  and  the  Vesle.  An  advance  was 
started  especially  toward  Bazoches.  The  successful  at- 
tacks which  were  taking  place  at  this  time  on  the  Franco- 
British  front  near  the  Oise  had  contributed  to  ameliorate 
conditions  on  the  Vesle,  and  General  Bullard  upon  leav- 
ing his  position  turned  over  to  the  Sixteenth  French  Corps 
a  greatly  improved  situation.  We  must  not  omit  to 
mention  that  during  August  the  Third  Corps  had  re- 
ceived two  regiments  of  its  own  artillery. 

While  the  Third  Corps  was  engaged  in  these  opera- 
tions the  Thirty-second  Division  which  had  been  with- 
drawn from  the  front  on  August  7th  in  order  to  be 
placed  in  rest  positions  along  the  Ourcq,  suddenly  re- 
ceived marching  orders  on  the  night  of  the  twenty-second 
and  twenty-third  of  August  and  was  transported  by  truck 
to  Vic-sur-Aisne,  where  it  was  placed  at  the  disposal  of 
the  Tenth  French  Army. 

General  Mangin  at  once  sent  it  into  action  on  August 
27th,  beyond  Tartiers  and  with  Juvigny  as  objective. 

The  Sixty-third  Brigade,  which  was  deployed  in  the 
first  line,  advanced  boldly  to  the  vicinity  of  Juvigny,  cap- 
turing more  than  500  prisoners.  However,  in  spite  of 
several  attempts,  it  was  found  impossible  to  take  the 
village,  and  at  this  point  the  Fifty-fourth  Brigade  re- 
lieved the  Sixty-third  and,  taking  advantage  of  an  ar- 
tillery preparation  which  had  continued  for  several  days, 
seized  Juvigny,  where  they  found  700  unwounded  pris- 
oners.    The  advance  was  resumed  on  the  day  following* 


184     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

This  same  brigade,  reenforced  by  one  battalion  and  a 
machine-gun  company  (from  the  125th  Regiment  and 
lent  by  the  Sixty-third  Brigade),  succeeded  in  gaining 
ground  toward  Terny-Sorny. 

The  next  day  they  continued  to  press  the  enemy  hard 
and  attained  the  road  from  Soissons  to  Coucy-le-Chateau 
in  the  immediate  neighborhood  of  Terny-Sorny.  The 
machine-gun  company  of  the  125th  Regiment  captured 
a  German  machine-gun  company  on  ground  east  of 
Juvigny  and  also  seized  a  battery  of  105  mm.  abandoned 
by  the  enemy  alongside  the  highroad. 

The  rapid  progression  of  the  Thirty-second  Division 
was  continued  by  the  Moroccans  of  our  Second  Division, 
who  went  through  the  Americans  and  followed  up  their 
success. 

For  several  days  longer  the  Thirty-second  Division  re- 
mained in  support  of  our  colonial  troops;  then,  after 
having  been  cited  by  General  Mangin  in  his  Tenth  Army 
orders,  this  division  was,  like  other  American  troops, 
withdrawn  from  the  Soissons  region. 

With  the  departure  of  the  Third  Army  Corps  from 
the  Vesle  sector  and  that  of  the  Thirty-second  Division 
from  the  Soissons  region  our  narrative  of  the  summer 
counter-offensive  of  191 8  is  naturally  brought  to  a  close. 

We  cannot,  however,  terminate  our  recital*  of  the 
American  share  in  the  July  counter-offensive  without  say- 
ing one  more  word  in  regard  to  the  masterly  manner 
in  which  General  Pershing  handled  his  large  and  growing 
formations,  and  in  calling  attention  once  more  to  his  firm 
and  decided  policy  in  these  matters. 

Each  time  that  he  saw  an  occasion  of  incorporating 
two  separate  brigades  into  one  fighting  division  he  did  so. 


Summer  Counter-Offensive  185 

Whenever  it  was  possible  to  place  two  American  divisions 
side  by  side  he  at  once  arranged  that  they  should  be 
formed  Into  an  American  Army  Corps. 

His  activity  In  this  direction  might  specially  have  been 
observed  during  the  first  days  of  August,  when,  at  La 
Ferte  sous  Jouarre,  he  himself  supervised  the  organiza- 
tion of  his  contingents  into  the  First  American  Army. 

From  this  time  on  the  American  forces  were  week  by 
week  augmenting  in  number,  new  units  were  daily  being 
disembarked  In  our  ports  and  sent  into  instruction  camps. 
The  lines  of  communication,  so  difficult  in  the  beginning 
to  establish,  were  now  rapidly  being  perfected  and  the 
moment  was  evidently  near  when  military  action  on  a 
vaster  scale  than  that  hitherto  contemplated  might  be 
looked  forward  to. 

The  keen  foresight  and  military  intuition  of  General 
Pershing  were  not  at  fault  In  his  rapid  estimation  of  the 
new  conditions  and  the  modifications  brought  about  by 
recent  events.  He  realized  at  once  that  America  was 
called  upon  to  center  her  energies  In  a  new  theater  of 
war  and  that  operations  more  difficult  and  more  impor- 
tant than  those  which  he  had  had  in  contemplation  upon 
the  Vesle  front  were  about  to  develop  in  quite  another 
sector. 

These  considerations  led  him  temporarily  to  abandon 
his  project  for  the  building  up  of  an  essentially  American 
army  on  the  Vesle  and  turn  his  attention  to  centralizing 
elsewhere  command  of  the  troops  available  for  combat. 

In  order  to  strike  a  decisive  blow  at  a  vital  spot  of 
the  German  line  It  was  necessary  to  group  together  the 
American  fighting  divisions  which  had  so  gallantly  won 
their  laurels  In  Champagne. 

Their  presence  was  now  required  elsewhere  no  less 
than  the  personal  direction  of  the  commander-in-chief. 


CHAPTER  VI 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  MAIN  SERVICES  OF  THE   EXPEDI- 
TIONARY   FORCES CHIEF    OF    ARTILLERY TANK 

CORPS CHIEF  ENGINEER AIR  SERVICE SIG- 
NAL CORPS MEDICAL  DEPARTMENT QUARTER- 
MASTER    ORDNANCE  CHEMICAL  WARFARE  

INSPECTOR  GENERAL JUDGE-ADVOCATE 

Practically  all  the  heads  of  the  main  services  of  the 
American  Expeditionary  Forces  were  for  a  few  months 
at  least  stationed  at  the  Chaumont  headquarters.  In 
making  this  decision  and  assembling  together  in  the  zone 
of  armies  the  administrative  departments  and  sections  of 
his  general  staff,  the  commander-in-chief  had  a  very  im- 
portant  object  in  view.  It  was  his  intention,  in  so  doing, 
to  give  to  the  organizations  which  were  to  handle  his 
army  a  unity  both  of  views  and  of  methods  which  could 
only  be  acquired  through  daily  work  undertaken  in  com- 
mon. He  desired  to  see  the  chiefs  of  all  the  main  serv- 
ices of  supply  fully  conversant  with  the  requirements  of 
the  field  combat  troops  and  with  the  demands  of  the 
General  Staff.  On  the  other  hand  it  was  his  wish  that 
all  the  staff  officers  selected  by  him  —  and  who  for  the 
most  part  were  new  to  their  work  —  should  be  thoroughly 
acquainted  with  the  details  of  the  operations  and  output 
possibilities  of  the  services  of  the  rear. 

He  foresaw  the  day  when  it  would  be  necessary  to 
separate  them;  in  fact,  he  was  quite  decided  not  to  allow 
his  headquarters  to  become  top-heavy.     He  would  de- 

i86 


Main  Services  187 

cide  when  the  time  came,  according  to  circumstances, 
whether  it  would  be  better  to  move  his  staff  nearer  to 
the  front  or  rather  maintain  it  at  Chaumont  and  transfer 
the  administrative  departments  to  the  rear. 

On  February  16,  191 8,  his  decision  was  taken.  The 
line  of  communication,  the  headquarters  of  which  was 
established  at  Tours  —  was  thoroughly  reorganized  and 
assumed  the  title  of  "  Services  of  Supply  "  shortened  to 
S.  O.  S.,  a  name  practically  equivalent  to  our  "  Direc- 
tion Generale  de  L'Arriere  "  or  rear  service.  This  was 
divided  into  eleven  sections  or  departments:  Quarter- 
master, Medical  Corps,  Engineer  Department,  Ord- 
nance, Signal  Corps,  Air  Service,  Chemical  Warfare, 
Transportation  Department,  Motor  Transport  Service, 
Provost  Marshal,^  General  Purchasing  Board. 

General  Pershing  maintained  at  his  headquarters  the 
departments  of  the  Inspector  General,  of  Artillery,  of 
Tanks,  and  finally  that  of  the  Judge-Advocate. 

The  departments  established  at  Tours  were  to  desig- 
nate the  necessary  number  of  officers  who  were  to  repre- 
sent them  at  Chaumont  in  order  to  remain  in  touch  with 
the  heads  of  the  sections  of  the  General  Staff. 

Thus  the  number  of  officers  stationed  at  headquarters 
was  considerably  diminished  and  the  staff  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief, while  maintaining  a  general  supervision 
and  control  over  the  services  of  supply,  was  placed  in 
a  position  where  it  could  turn  most  of  its  attention  to 
strictly  military  operations. 

The  General  Staff  was  thus  freed  from  the  petty  an- 
noyances, delays,  and  discussions  which  form  a  necessary 
part  of  business  routine  when  the  directive  departments 
are  placed  in  too  close  proximity  to  the  executive.     The 

1  Later  transferred  to  general  headquarters. 


1 88     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

latter  were  now  grouped  together  under  a  single  head  — 
the  general  commanding  the  S.  O.  S. —  who  remained 
alone  responsible  to  the  commander-in-chief  for  the 
working  of  the  services  of  the  rear.  According  to  the 
excellent  expression  of  the  American  regulations: 
The  armies  in  the  field  found  themselves  freed  from 
every  preoccupation  other  than  that  of  defeating  the 
enemy. 

If  we  were  to  imagine  that  our  direction  of  the  rear 
services  in  France  were  to  be  transferred  to  the  Ministry 
of  War  in  Paris  instead  of  operating  at  headquarters, 
and  afterward,  that  the  Ministry  of  War  thus  supple- 
mented should  be  placed  under  the  direct  control  of  the 
commander-in-chief  of  the  French  armies  we  would  evoke 
an  organization  similar  to  that  created  by  General  Persh- 
ing. 

Before  beginning  to  study  the  methods  and  working  of 
what  we  shall  denominate  American  ''  services  "  it  is  very 
important  to  observe  that  this  designation  covers  a  num- 
ber of  organizations  whose  ways  and  principles  are  very 
widely  divergent. 

Some  of  these  possess  a  considerable  range  including 
the  disbursement  of  funds  specifically  appropriated  for 
their  requirements.  Not  only  do  they  organize  and  in- 
struct their  own  personnel,  but  they  are  also  authorized 
to  procure  for  themselves,  either  by  purchase  in  Europe 
or  through  requisition  in  the  United  States,  the  divers 
materials  needed  in  order  to  carry  on  their  activities. 
Others,  on  the  contrary,  confine  themselves  to  the  train- 
ing and  employment  of  their  personnel,  and  the  neces- 
sary material  required  by  them  is  furnished  by  different 
departments;  from  the  French  point  of  view  they  are 
"  arms  "  rather  than  "  services." 


Artillery  189 

The  American  artillery  belongs  to  this  latter  category. 

Of  all  the  constituent  elements  of  which  modern 
armies  are  made  up  the  artillery  is  the  most  complex  as 
to  organization,  training,  and  equipment. 

Three  questions  call  for  the  closest  attention  on  the 
part  of  its  chiefs :  Personnel,  horses,  and  material.  In 
the  American  Army  the  responsibility  for  these  two  latter 
actually  rests  on  the  quartermaster  and  on  the  chief  of 
ordnance.  But  although  the  troops  themselves  which 
constituted  the  artillery  of  the  Expeditionary  Forces, 
were  drawn  from  the  United  States,  by  far  the  greater 
part  of  its  horses,  guns,  and  munitions  were  purchased 
in  France  and  in  Great  Britain.  It  was  therefore  neces- 
sary, once  the  troops  were  disembarked,  to  undertake 
the  formation  of  units.  This  was  the  first  and  most  im- 
portant duty  of  the  service  of  artillery. 

The  chief  of  this  service  was  entirely  responsible  for 
the  training  and  organization  of  all  the  units  up  to  the 
time  that  they  were  assigned  to  the  division,  army  corps, 
or  armies  to  which  they  normally  belonged.  But  they 
were  only  turned  over  to  these  when  the  batteries,  bat- 
talions, and  regiments  had  acquired  a  degree  of  instruc- 
tion that  enabled  them  to  give  a  good  account  of  them- 
selves on  the  battle-field.  It  was  therefore  the  duty  of 
the  chief  of  artillery  to  establish  all  the  camps,  firing 
ranges,  and  schools  that  were  necessary  for  the  training 
of  oflicers  and  men.  Finally,  for  all  matters  pertaining 
to  artillery  he  acted  in  the  capacity  of  technical  adviser 
to  the  commander-in-chief. 

Thirty-one  divisional  brigades  of  artillery,  seven  regi- 
ments of  army  corps  artillery,  giving  a  total  of  some 
7,500  officers  and  197,000  men,  have  thus  been  trained 
and  made  ready  for  combat  under  the  direction  of  the 


190     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

chief  of  artillery  of  the  American  Expeditionary  Forces. 

These  services  were  divided  into  four  sections :  Field 
artillery;  heavy  artillery;  material;  information  and  in- 
telligence. 

The  first  section  was  a  very  important  one.  It  con- 
trolled the  training  of  all  the  field  artillery  including 
not  only  the  batteries  of  75 's,  but  also  the  regiments  of 
155  mm.  howitzers  which  formed  part  of  the  divisional 
artilleries. 

The  principles  of  organization  and  the  general  pro- 
gram of  training  had  been  laid  down  by  General  March, 
and  when  he  left  France  for  the  United  States  upon  his 
appointment  as  chief  of  the  General  Staff,  the  instructions 
left  by  him  were  followed  without  any  modifications 
worth  mentioning. 

The  field  artillery  section  was  in  charge  of  the  tech- 
nical inspection  of  all  units  engaged  in  active  operations 
and  was  to  follow  very  closely  all  the  evolutions  of 
artillery  tactics.  It  also  supervised  the  work  of  the 
school  for  tractor  driving  that  had  been  established  at 
Le  Blanc,  with  a  view  to  the  motorization  of  the  regi- 
ments of  155  mm.  howitzers. 

The  duties  of  the  second  section  concerning  the  units 
of  heavy  artillery  (155  mm.  guns  and  heavier  calibers) 
and  also  trench  artillery  were  the  same  as  those  of  the 
field  artillery  section.  The  section  of  material  had  con- 
trol of  all  studies  and  work  pertaining  to  the  upkeep 
and  proper  adaptation  of  the  material  at  the  front,  to 
the  equipment  of  those  units  which  were  in  training  camps 
or  actually  engaged  in  combat,  to  the  perfecting  of  the 
existing  material  and  the  creation  of  new  types,  to  the 
arranging  and  equipment  of  the  organization  centers, 
and  finally  to  the  establishment  of  schools.     This  service 


Artillery  191 

also  directed  the  activities  of  the  ordnance  as  far  as 
manufacturing  artillery  material  was  concerned. 

The  section  of  information  centralized  all  intelligence 
concerning  allied  or  enemy  artillery.  It  spread  all  neces- 
sary information  by  means  of  a  bulletin  which  it  published 
and  widely  distributed  among  all  the  artillery  organiza- 
tions. 

As  soon  as  a  unit  of  field  or  heavy  artillery  was  ready 
for  combat,  it  was  removed  from  the  direct  control  of 
the  chief  of  artillery.  Thus  certain  regiments  and  bri- 
gades were  placed  at  the  disposition  of  the  general  com- 
manding the  artillery  of  the  First  Army  at  a  time  when 
that  army  had  not  yet  been  organized. 

This  was  also  the  case  for  the  railroad  artillery  in 
training  at  Mailly  which  was  turned  over  to  General 
McGlachlin,  commanding  the  artillery  of  the  same  First 
Army  long  before  the  Salnt-MIhlel  operation  was  actu- 
ally begun. 

General  Pershing  considered  this  system  advantageous 
in  that  it  gave  the  artillery  command  of  the  First  Army 
a  longer  time  in  which  to  prepare  for  its  important  func- 
tions. 

The  American  railroad  artillery,  placed  at  first  under 
the  orders  of  General  Coe,  then  under  those  of  General 
Ghamberlalne,  comprised  on  October  ist,  191 8,  two  bri- 
gades, of  which  one  only  had  received  its  material,  and  a 
detachment  of  naval  gunners. 

The  brigade  that  was  fully  equipped,  the  Thirtieth, 
possessed  sixteen  240  mm.  (9.4-inch)  guns,  thirty-two 
of  194  mm.  (7.6-inch),  twelve  of  320  mm.  (i2:6-Inch), 
two  of  340  mm.  ( 13  :4-inch) ,  four  of  400  mm.  guns  (16- 
Inch). 

All  these  guns  and  howitzers  were  of  French  model  and 


192     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

for  the  most  part  were  utilized  in  the  two  great  American 
offensives  of  the  fall  of  19 18.  The  detachment  of  naval 
gunners  assigned  to  the  railroad  artillery  was  under  com- 
mand of  Rear-Admiral  Plunkett  and  manned  five  i\mer- 
ican  fourteen-inch  guns. 

The  American  artillery  trained  and  commanded  by 
such  chiefs  as  Generals  Hinds,  McGlachlin,  and  Lassiter 
always  comported  itself  in  a  manner  deserving  all  praise 
and  earned  the  admiration  of  those  French  artillerymen 
who  were  privileged  to  find  themselves  by  its  side  in  com- 
bat. 

The  quickness  of  its  evolutions,  taking  up  battery  posi- 
tions, and  changes  of  firing  objectives,  the  care  and  vigor 
shown  in  the  preparation  and  execution  of  fire,  gave  it  at 
once  a  marked  superiority  over  the  German  artillery, 
and  this  the  enemy  himself  was  compelled  to  acknowledge 
on  several  occasions.  A  German  document  which  is  at 
present  before  our  eyes  states  that  their  troops  feared 
American  artillery  on  account  of  "  the  power  and  ac- 
curacy of  its  fire." 

It  should  be  incidentally  mentioned  that  for  a  long 
time  before  America  came  into  the  war  modern  methods 
of  artillery  fire  had  been  thoroughly  studied  and  widely 
discussed  in  the  military  circles  of  the  United  States.  A 
new  theory  had  been  developed  which  rejected  the  system 
of  brackets  in  range  firing,  considering  that  this  was  a 
method  which  involved  a  great  expenditure  both  of  time 
and  ammunition.  This  new  school  warmly  advocated 
the  immediate  attempt  at  a  direct  hit.  They  considered 
that  the  solution  of  this  problem  was  to  be  found  in  the 
careful  establishment  of  preliminary  calculations,  as  well 
as  in  the  perfecting  of  sighting  apparatus  which,  according 
to  their  ideas,  should  be  made  so  as  to  indicate  the  amount 


Tank  Corps  193 

of  distance  by  which  the  hit  had  missed  the  target,  and  not, 
according  to  prevailing  systems,  merely  whether  the  shot 
had  been  too  long,  too  short,  too  much  to  the  right,  or  to 
the  left. 

/  Possessing  as  it  did  a  nucleus  of  officers  having  a  very 
great  technical  ability,  provided  with  observers  who  not 
only  on  the  ground,  but  also  in  the  air,  gave  proof  of  an 
absolute  contempt  for  danger,  manned  by  crews  who  were 
full  of  aggressive  ardor,  confidence  in  their  material,  and 
lavish  in  expenditure  of  ammunition,  the  American  ar- 
tillery never  ceased  for  one  instant  to  make  its  presence 
felt  in  the  most  brilliant  manner  upon  the  battle-field, 
where  it  proved  itself  a  most  redoubtable  adversary  for 
the  German  batteries. 

The  tank  service  created  in  France  during  the  present 
war  did  not,  of  course,  exist  in  the  American  Army. 

Immediately  upon  the  entry  of  the  United  States  into 
the  war  the  Washington  authorities  took  up  the  question 
of  organizing  this  new  branch  of  the  service,  the  im- 
portance of  which  appeared  to  be  rapidly  increasing. 

Prior  to  the  arrival  of  the  American  Expeditionary 
Forces,  the  American  military  mission  in  Paris  had,  by 
direction  of  the  chief  of  the  War  College,  investigated 
and  submitted  a  report  under  date  of  May  21,  19 17, 
giving  the  latest  British  and  French  technical  and  tactical 
Ideas  on  the  use  of  tanks. 

The  French,  at  that  time,  had  only  two  types  of  tanks; 
the  St.  Chamond  and  the  Schneider.  Neither  were  tanks 
In  the  sense  of  later  development.  They  were,  more 
properly  speaking,  artillery  carriers.  They  had  numer- 
ous defects,  suffered  from  frequent  hitches  in  the  engine, 
progress  over  rough  ground  was  difficult,  their  vulner- 


194     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

ability  was  great,  and  their  field  of  vision  narrow.  At 
this  time  the  French  had  under  construction  a  light  tank 
of  the  Renault  type  designed  for  employment  in  very 
close  contact  with  the  infantry. 

The  British,  on  the  contrary,  preferred  the  heavy  tank 
to  be  used  far  in  advance  of  the  first  line  of  skirmishers. 

Upon  his  arrival  in  France  General  Pershing  made  very 
thorough  investigations  into  this  subject.  The  result  of 
his  study  led  to  the  conclusion  that  the  American  Expedi- 
tionary Forces  should  be  equipped  with  two  types  of  tank, 
a  heavy  type  and  a  light  one.  His  representative  at 
the  Inter-Allied  Committee  was  instructed  accordingly. 
Negotiations  undertaken  with  the  British  Government 
had  a  satisfactory  result  as  far  as  heavy  tanks  were  con- 
cerned. Choice  was  definitely  made  of  a  powerful  model 
called  "Mark  8,"  whidh  was  neither  more  nor  less  than 
a  Renault  tank  greatly  augmented  in  size  and  provided 
with  a  Liberty  engine.  The  American  Government  ap- 
proved of  this  decision,  and  decided  that  1,500  Liberty 
engines  were  to  be  reserved  for  a  like  number  of  tanks, 
the  latter  to  be  constructed  in  Europe  by  October  i,  19 18. 

In  the  meanwhile,  negotiations  were  undertaken  with 
the  Renault  firm  with  a  view  to  manufacturing  their  light 
tank  in  the  United  States,  as  it  appeared  to  possess  ex- 
cellent fighting  qualities.  On  December  23,  19 17, 
Colonel  Rockenbach,  since  promoted  to  the  rank  of 
brigadier-general,  arrived  at  general  headquarters  and 
was  detailed  as  chief  of  the  tank  corps. 

As  far  as  heavy  machines  were  concerned,  the  only 
course  open  to  him  was  to  approve  what  had  been  done 
previous  to  his  arrival.  It  was  evident  that  a  long  period 
must  necessarily  elapse  before  the  time  when  the  United 
States  would  be  in  a  position  to  manufacture  such  engines 


Tank  Corps  195 

and  their  equipment.  He  therefore  decided  to  limit 
orders  to  the  manufacture  of  the  Anglo-American  model, 
"Liberty  No.  8." 

As  to  the  light  tanks  the  French  Renault  model  was 
definitely  adopted  with  some  minor  improvements:  addi- 
tion of  a  bulkhead  separating  the  gun  room  from  the 
engine,  so  that  the  crew  would  not  run  the  danger  of 
being  burned,  and  of  a  self-starter;  the  machine  was  to 
have  its  gasoline  tank  double-cased  with  a  felt  interlining 
one  inch  thick  so  that,  if  penetrated  by  a  bullet,  there 
would  be  no  leakage  of  gas.  It  was  also  to  be  equipped 
with  an  interchangeable  mount,  so  that  the  same  tank 
could  carry  either  a  machine  gun  or  a  37  mm.  gun 
(1.5  inch). 

The  organization  of  units,  as  far  as  personnel  was  con- 
cerned, was  based  on  the  idea  that  war  could  be  won  only 
by  taking  the  offensive  for  prolonged  periods;  therefore 
the  tanks  must  have  an  organization  providing  reliefs  so 
that  the  crews  who  fought  one  day  would  not  be  required 
to  go  into  action  the  next;  it  was  therefore  necessary,  back 
of  the  companies,  battalions,  and  brigades,  to  have  re- 
placement units  able  to  step  in  as  substitutes  for  ex- 
hausted or  disabled  men. 

A  revised  project  for  a  combat  tank  corps  was  ap- 
proved by  the  general  headquarters  on  February  i8th, 
and,  by  the  War  Department  on  the  twenty-first  of 
March.  It  provided  for  the  necessary  headquarters  5 
battalions  of  heavy  ^  and  20  of  light  ^  tanks,  repair,  sal- 
vage, and  depot  organizations,  training  centers,  and  re- 
placement companies  in  France  equal  to  twenty-five  per 

2  The  heavy  battalion  consisted  of  69  combat  and  4  signal  tanks, 
giving  a  total  of  146  6-pounder  guns  and  584  Hotchkiss  machine  guns. 

3  The  light  battalion  was  composed  of  72  combat  and  4  signal  tanks, 
having  an  armament  of  30  37  mm.  guns  and  42  Hotchkiss  machine  guns. 


196     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

cent,  of  the  combat  forces.  Twenty-five  per  cent,  more 
were  to  be  kept  in  reserve  in  the  United  States. 

By  July,  the  importance  of  tanks  was  becoming  ever 
greater  and  an  increase  of  five  heavy  battalions  was  au- 
thorized, these  to  be  organized  with  already  projected 
battalions  into  ten  brigades  each  consisting  of  one  heavy 
battalion,  two  light  battalions,  one  repair  and  salvage 
company.  All  tank  corps  troops  were  classed  as  head- 
quarter troops  and  were  to  be  allotted  to  armies  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  of  the  ground  on  which  operations  were 
to  take  place.  Allotment  for  an  army  was  normally: 
Army  tank  corps  headquarters,  five  brigades,  one  heavy 
artillery  ordnance  mobile  repair  shop. 

Each  group  of  the  above  composition  was  to  have  at 
its  disposal  one  training  center.  This  organization  was 
to  give  a  total  of  750  heavy  fighting  tanks,  1,450  light 
fighting  tanks  with  a  reserve  of  fifteen  per  cent  a  month. 

Such  were  the  plans;  circumstances,  as  we  shall  see, 
considerably  modified  their  execution. 

In  June,  191 8,  the  Inter-Allied  Tank  Committee  which 
periodically  met  at  Versailles,  had  reached  the  conclusion 
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  count  upon  the  importation 
from  the  United  States  of  any  considerable  number  of 
American-made  tanks  before  19 19.  The  French  then 
undertook  to  equip  two  American  battalions  with  light 
tanks,  the  British  agreed  to  equip  the  battalion  that  had 
completed  its  training  in  England  with  heavy  tanks,  pro- 
vided that  it  should  be  attached,  for  operation,  to  the 
British  armies  in  France. 

These  three  battalions  were  the  only  American  tank 
units  to  appear  on  the  battle-field  prior  to  the  close  of 
hostilities. 

The  Three  Hundred  and  Fourth  Brigade,  consisting 


Chief  Engineer  1 97 

of  the  two  light  Renault  battalions,  took  a  glorious  share 
in  the  Saint-Mihiel  battle  and  in  the  operations  between 
the  Meuse  and  the  Argonne. 

The  Three  Hundred  and  First  Battalion,  equipped  with 
British  tanks,  was  engaged  in  constant  lighting  on  the 
British  front.  From  September  29th  to  October  23d  it 
took  part  in  many  attacks  and  behaved  in  a  way  to  de- 
serve the  unqualified  praise  of  the  British  high  command. 

On  the  day  of  the  armistice,  the  tank  corps  of  the 
Expeditionary  Forces  disposed  of  755  officers  and  9,222 
non-commissioned  officers  and  men,  all  of  whom  were 
thoroughly  trained.  The  material  on  hand  consisted 
altogether  of  36  British  heavy  tanks  of  three  different 
models,  and  of  208  French  tanks,  all  of  the  Renault  type. 
The  first  American-made  machines  arrived  in  France 
only  in  the  last  days  of  November. 

Thus,  the  end  of  hostilities  prevented  the  tank  corps 
from  giving  full  measure  of  its  value.  Nevertheless,  the 
personnel  had  already  had  sufficient  time  to  impress  both 
friends  and  enemies  with  their  intrepid  conduct  on  the 
battle-field  and  their  technical  skill  in  handling  such  com- 
plicated machines. 

The  duties  of  the  engineer  service  of  the  American 
Expeditionary  Forces  ^  as  determined  by  General  Order 
No.  31,  dated  February  16,  19 18,  and,  as  they  were  — 
with  a  few  minor  changes  —  to  remain  up  to  the  end  of 
the  war,  were  as  follows:  Mines,  field  fortifications, 
surveys  and  maps  not  otherwise  assigned,  searchlights, 
engineer  supplies,  engineer  depots,  storehouses,  and  shops, 
water  supply  and  installation,  supply  of  electric  light  and 
power,  supply  of  personnel  and  material  for  gas,  etc.  (this 

*  Brigadier-General  Taylor  was  at  the  head  of  this  service. 


198      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

service  was  later  taken  over  by  the  chemical  warfare 
service),  construction  and  repair  (except  that  assigned  to 
the  transportation  department),  technical  inspection  of 
engineer  organizations,  sewage  disposal  plant  and  opera- 
tions, camouflage. 

During  active  operations  the  engineer  service  was 
divided  into  the  department  of  construction  and  forestry, 
the  department  of  military  engineering  and  engineering 
supplies,  the  department  of  light  railways  and  roads. 

The  first  of  these  took  charge  of  all  construction  of 
ports,  depots,  camps,  hospitals,  railroads,  production  of 
lumber  for  construction,  and  fuel. 

Under  the  able  direction  of  General  E.  Jadwin,  one  of 
the  builders  of  the  Panama  Canal,  the  engineer  corps 
executed,  both  in  England  and  France,  innumerable  works 
of  which  the  most  Important  were  undertaken  at  Montoir, 
St.  Sulplce,  Gievres,  described  in  the  chapter  dealing  with 
the  Line  of  Communications. 

At  the  date  of  the  armistice  American  engineers  were 
at  work  on  some  four  hundred  projects  and  employed 
150,000  men,  consisting  of  100,000  Americans,  33,000 
civilians  of  divers  nationalities,  17,000  German  prisoners. 

Work  in  the  ports  Included  the  construction  of  docks 
with  the  warehouses  thereon,  railroad  connections,  and 
lighters. 

Storage  comprised  supply  depots  in  the  intermediate 
and  advanced  sections,  special  ammunition  and  aviation 
depots,  coal  storage  yards,  gasoline  and  oil  stations,  motor 
transport  parks,  remount  depots,  veterinary  hospitals, 
refrigerating  plants,  bakeries,  and  salvage  depots. 

In  the  provision  of  shelter  for  troops  16,000  barracks 
were  erected  capable  of  housing  742,000  men.  When 
the  armistice  was  signed,  space  in  hospitals  had  been  pro- 


Chief  Engineer  199 

vided  for  280,000  beds  or  14.02  per  cent,  of  the  entire 
strength  of  the  Expeditionary  Forces. 

Lumber  production  commenced  in  December,  19 17,  and 
was  increased  until  in  October,  191 8,  eighty-one  sawmills 
were  in  operation.  The  total  production  to  May  i, 
1919,  amounted  to  217,884,337  feet  board  measure  of 
lumber,  3,955,678  railroad  ties,  2,954,563  piling  and 
round  products,  and  431,147  cords  of  fuel  wood. 

Road  work  in  the  S.  O.  S.  except  in  the  advance  section, 
was  executed  by  the  department  of  construction  and  for- 
estry. Previous  to  the  armistice,  over  three  hundred 
miles  of  roads  were  repaired  and  ninety  miles  of  new 
roads  constructed. 

The  light  railway  operations  of  American  Expedi- 
tionary Forces  began  in  August,  1917,^  when  the  12th  and 
14th  Regiments  of  engineers,  immediately  on  their  ar- 
rival in  France,  were  sent  to  take  over  the  maintenance 
operations  of  certain  sixty  centimeter  lines  in  the  British 
sector  of  the  front.  From  this  time  on,  the  work  of  the 
division  spread  gradually  throughout  the  front-line  area, 
and  with  the  entry  of  American  combat  troops  in  19 18,  it 
became  an  important  factor  in  operations.  At  the  date 
of  signing  the  armistice,  the  division  of  light  railways 
had  under  its  control  about  1,400  miles  of  sixty  centi- 
meter track.  Of  this  total  170  miles  had  been  originally 
constructed  by  the  French,  but  rebuilt  by  the  A.  E.  F. ; 
140  miles  had  been  entirely  built  by  the  A.  E.  F.,  and 
1,090  miles  had  been  taken  from  the  Germans. 

The  road-service  section  of  this  department  operated 
exclusively  in  the  advance  section;  at  the  close  of  active 
operations  the  total  troops  it  employed  amounted  to 
28,260  men. 

5  This  service  was  directed  by  General  McKinstry. 


200     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Among  the  numerous  subdivisions  of  the  special  en- 
gineer services,  the  following  should  be  particularly  men- 
tioned. 

The  Camouflage  Section  was  authorized  on  December 
4,  19 1 7.  Its  main  installations  were  located  at  Dijon, 
Paris,  and  Nancy.  More  than  3,000,000  square  yards 
of  camouflage  material  were  produced  by  these  work- 
shops. 

The  Searchlight  Service  had  some  advanced  elements 
in  France  as  early  as  August,  19 17,  but  was  actually  or- 
ganized only  in  the  early  part  of  19 18.  At  the  close  of 
hostilities,  it  had  at  the  front  a  regiment  of  ten  companies 
split  up  into  operating  units  of  i  officer  and  50  men  each. 
Searchlight  troops  were  charged  with  the  defense  of  con- 
gested forward  areas  and  of  important  advance  S.  O.  S. 
installations.  During  the  Argonne-Meuse  operations 
these  troops  effectually  sealed  with  their  lights  an  area 
covering  approximately  390  square  miles  stretching 
northwest  from  Dieulouard. 

The  37th  Engineers,  Colonel  T.  H.  Dillon  command- 
ing, authorized  in  December,  19 17,  was  responsible  for 
the  installation,  operation,  maintenance,  inspection,  trans- 
fer, and  salvage  of  all  stationary,  electrical,  and  mechani- 
cal plants  other  than  those  controlled  by  staff  departments 
or  other  services  not  included  within  the  engineer  depart- 
ment. 

The  Water  Supply  Service  was  charged  with  water  sup- 
ply in  the  zone  of  the  armies.  It  also  investigated  the 
underground  water  possibilities  in  the  areas  where  Ameri- 
can hospitals,  depots,  or  camps  were  to  be  located.  A 
considerable  number  of  wells  were  drilled  at  various 
points. 

A  special  Geological  Section  was  organized  in  19 18. 


Chief  Engineer  20 1 

It  supplied  data  to  the  staff  and  to  the  services  on  geologi- 
cal conditions  at  and  near  the  front,  and  also  compiled 
information  on  French,  Belgian,  and  German  coal,  iron, 
and  other  mineral  resources. 

The  varied  and  important  works  carried  out  in  France 
by  the  American  engineer  service  required  enormous 
quantities  of  material;  3,948,101  short  tons  altogether; 
1,606,332  tons  were  procured  through  importation  from 
the  United  States,  the  rest,  i.  e.,  2,341,569,  was  almost  en- 
tirely supplied  in  France.  A  certain  portion  of  purchases 
were,  however,  made  in  England,  and  some  others  on  a 
smaller  scale  in  Switzerland  and  in  Spain.  Portugal  sup- 
plied 600,000  railroad  ties.  Important  contracts  were 
drawn  up  in  Paris  by  the  representative  of  the  service  of 
engineers  in  the  General  Purchasing  Board.  And  in  this 
connection  it  may  be  interesting  to  mention  a  fact  which 
shows  the  elasticity  of  the  American  services  in  dealing 
with  divers  circumstances.  Take  for  example  the  ques- 
tion of  cement  supply.  At  first  it  was  brought  from 
French,  English,  Swiss,  and  Spanish  mills.  Later  on, 
three  French  cement  mills  were  leased  from  their  owners 
by  the  American  Expeditionary  Forces  and  operated  en- 
tirely by  American  engineer  troops.  In  addition,  four 
other  French  mills  were  supplied  with  coal  and  labor  in 
return  for  the  cession  of  a  portion  of  their  output. 

Every  one  profited  in  a  combination  of  this  kind.  The 
French  manufacturer  was  no  longer  confronted  with  the 
possibility  of  seeing  his  mill  remain  inactive  on  account  of 
shortage  in  labor  or  fuel.  By  manufacturing  itself,  the 
American  engineer  service  found  the  best  guarantee 
against  delayed  production  or  poor  quality  of  material. 
Finally,  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic,  the  services  in 
charge  of  sea  transportation  were  freed  from  the  anxiety 


102      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

caused  by  the  shipment  of  the  215,000  tons  of  cement 
which  the  American  engineers  had  found  in  Europe. 

This  is  merely  one  instance  selected  from  a  large  num- 
ber of  equally  striking  ones.  We  believe  it  to  be  of 
interest  illustrating  as  it  does  the  way  in  which  this  great 
department,  thanks  to  the  elasticity  of  its  methods,  was 
able  to  face  all  difficulties,  and  to  justify  the  high  reputa- 
tion which  American  engineers  have  always  enjoyed  in 
Europe. 

General  Pershing  had  thoroughly  taken  into  account 
the  importance  of  the  air  service;  from  his  personal 
studies  of  aviation  in  the  British  and  French  armies  he 
was  able  to  form  an  idea  of  the  ever-increasing  develop- 
ment of  aerial  warfare.  From  the  time  that  his  head- 
quarters were  organized  at  Chaumont  he  entrusted  Gen- 
eral Kenly,  with  Colonel  Mitchell  as  his  assistant,  with 
the  duty  of  laying  down  the  first  organization  projects,  of 
preparing  contracts  for  material,  and  of  directing  the 
training  and  recruiting  of  the  personnel.^ 

When  General  Kenly  was  called  upon  to  perform  other 
duties  in  the  United  States  he  was  replaced  by  General 
Foulois.  Towards  the  middle  of  January,  19 18,  the  new 
chief  of  the  American  air  service  distributed  his  depart- 
ment among  eight  sections,  some  of  which  were  located 
at  Chaumont  (interior  services,  administrations,  opera- 
tions), some  at  Paris  (technical  section,  supplies),  and 
some  at  Tours  (training,  personnel,  aerostatics). 

At  the  end  of  February,  the  Chaumont  sections  were 
transferred  to  Colombey-les-Belles,  near  Toul,  and  there 
only  remained  at  American  headquarters  three  officers 

®The  contracts  were  made  by  Colonel  Boiling,  killed  on  the  battle- 
field March  25,  1918. 


Air  Service  203 

belonging  to  the  air  service  who  were  charged  with  liaison 
duty  between  their  service  and  the  sections  of  the  General 
Staff. 

In  the  early  part  of  June,  when  American  aviation  en- 
tered into  a  period  of  active  production  and  operations, 
General  Pershing  slightly  altered  its  organization. 

General  Patrick,  appointed  to  the  post  of  chief  of  air 
service  at  Chaumont,  was  especially  in  charge  of  the  or- 
ganization of  aviation  units. 

The  training  sections  remained  at  Tours;  those  con- 
cerned with  the  production  of  material  were  stationed  in 
Paris. 

The  services  in  the  advance  section  were  directed  by 
General  Foulois,  whose  headquarters  were  established 
first  at  Colombey-les-Belles,  later  at  Toul. 

With  a  view  to  explaining  as  clearly  as  possible  the 
necessarily  complicated  question  of  organization  of  the 
American  air  service,  we  shall  examine  first  the  steps 
taken  to  secure  material,  then  those  relating  to  the  re- 
cruiting and  training  of  personnel,  and  finally  we  shall 
observe  the  manner  in  which  material  and  personnel  were 
brought  together  to  form  the  aviation  units,  and  how  the 
latter  were  provided  with  the  organizations  necessary  for 
supplying  repairs.  To  conclude,  we  shall  see  what  use 
was  made  of  them  during  action. 

During  19 17  large  contracts  for  machines  and  motors 
were  drawn  up  by  the  American  Government  with  manu- 
facturers in  the  United  States.  The  machines  which 
were  ordered  belonged  to  the  following  foreign  types  "^ 
(not  including  instruction  planes)  : 

7  To  this  list  may  be  added  the  two-seater  Lepere  pursuit  plane,  the 
construction  of  which  was  stopped  by  the  armistice  before  it  was  com- 
pletely under  way. 


204     ^^^  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Pursuit  plane,  Bristol  and  S.  E.  V. 

Day  bombardment  and  observation,  De  Haviland 

IV  and  IX. 
Night  bombardment,  Caproni  and  Handley-Page. 

In  January,  191 8,  it  was  believed  that  the  following 
machines  would  be  available  by  July  ist: 

2,000  Bristol. 

5,500  De  Haviland  IV  or  IX. 

1,250  Caproni  and  Handley-Page. 

As  to  the  engines,  22,500  Liberty  motors  had  been 
ordered  including,  2,500  for  the  navy.  15,000  were  to 
be  delivered  by  the  end  of  May. 

These  provisions  were  not,  however,  realized.  As  is 
generally  known,  these  figures  did  not  sufficiently  take 
into  account  the  difficulties  involved  in  starting  such  manu- 
factures on  so  gigantic  a  scale,  and  the  anticipated  results 
were  far  from  being  achieved. 

In  fact  the  first  planes  of  American  make  arrived  in 
France  only  in  May,  19 18.  By  July  ist  some  two  hun- 
dred of  the  De  Haviland  IV  type  were  available.  The 
first  one  arrived  at  Colombey-les-Belles  on  July  4th.  At 
that  date,  beside  the  engines  which  formed  part  of  a 
constructed  machine,  there  were  a  very  limited  number 
of  replacement  engines. 

The  lengthy  delays  which  had  to  be  reckoned  with  in 
the  importation  of  American-made  airplanes  had  not 
been  overlooked  by  the  heads  of  the  American  air  service 
in  France,  and  from  the  start  every  endeavor  was  made 
to  palliate  the  shortage  by  purchase  in  Europe. 

The  contracts  signed  with  the  French  Ministry  of 
Aeronautics  provided  for  the  delivery  of  a  certain  num- 


Air  Service  205 

ber  of  antiquated  models  which  might  nevertheless  be  used 
by  the  air  squadrons  which  were  engaged  in  training,  as 
well  of  some  machines  of  recent  model  (Spad,  Salmson, 
Breguet,  and  Nieuport  28)  for  the  squadrons  engaged  in 
actual  fighting. 

As  a  result  of  the  very  considerable  requirements  of 
the  French  aviation  at  that  time,  the  delivery  of  planes  to 
the  American  services  was  at  first  subjected  to  certain 
delays;  but  from  the  month  of  May  on,  they  were  made 
with  great  regularity.  From  the  entry  of  the  United 
States  into  the  war  up  to  the  date  of  the  armistice,  the 
air  service  of  the  American  Expeditionary  Force  received 
in  all  6,364  airplanes,  3,210  of  which  were  service  and 
3,154  instruction  machines: 

4,874  supplied  from  France, 
258   supplied  from  England, 
19  supplied  from  Italy, 
1,213   supplied  from  America  and  which  were  all 
of  the  De  Haviland  IV  type  and  pro- 
vided with  Liberty  engines. 

Furthermore,  870  replacement  Liberty  engines  were 
sent  from  the  United  States. 

The  American  pilots  were  of  two  categories : 

The  first  class  arrived  from  America  already  possess- 
ing a  good  elementary  notion  of  their  work  and  having 
obtained  an  R.  M.  A.  license. 

The  second  category  was  recruited  from  the  forces  of 
the  American  Army  in  France  and  at  once  received  ele- 
mentary instruction  either  in  Chateauroux  (in  the 
French  school)  or  at  the  American  school  at  Tours. 
Both  classes  were  given  final  complementary  instruction 


2o6     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

at  Issoudun,  with  the  exception  of  those  which,  being 
destined  for  bombardment  duty,  were  sent  for  a  course 
of  special  instruction  to  Clermont-Ferrand. 

In  the  month  of  January,  191 8,  40  pilots  graduated 
from  Issoudun  with  a  thorough  knowledge  of  their  busi- 
ness; in  April  of  the  same  year,  270  were  ready  for 
service.  In  all,  from  November,  19 17,  to  the  signing 
of  the  armistice  the  Issoudun  instruction  center  formed 
2,200  pilots  while  that  of  Clermont  turned  out  279. 

The  observers  also  came  from  two  categories : 

Those  coming  directly  from  America,  where  they  had 
received  a  summary  training,  were  for  the  most  part  at 
once  sent  on  to  Tours  for  preparation  in  their  specialty.^ 
From  Tours  the  observers  intended  for  bombardment 
went  to  complete  instruction  at  Clermont-Ferrand,  while 
those  destined  to  "  observation,"  properly  speaking,  ter- 
minated their  course  at  Chatillon-sur-Seine  and  in  the 
artillery  instruction  camps.  A  certain  number  were  also 
sent  to  complete  a  course  of  aerial  gunnery  at  Cazeaux 
first,  and  at  St.  Jean  des  Monts  —  dating  frOm  June, 
1918. 

Other  observers  were  recruited  directly  in  the  American 
Expeditionary  Forces.  Up  to  October  i,  191 8,  when 
General  Foulois  took  command  of  the  air  services  in  the 
zone  of  the  rear  the  recruiting  of  the  latter  class  of  ob- 
servers presented  many  difficulties.  After  that  time  a 
fair  number  of  good  observers  were  selected  among  the 
officers  who  had  recently  graduated  from  Saumur.  Ob- 
servers of  the  latter  category,  who  were  exclusively  in- 
tended to  carry  out  artillery  observation  work,  perfected 
their  training  —  as  was  also  the  case  for  certain  graduates 

8  Some  were  sent  directly  to  Chatillon-sur-Seine. 


Air  Service  207 

of  the  Tours  school  —  in  the  training  centers  of  Coetqui- 
dan,  Souge,  Meucon,  Valdahon. 

The  school  at  Tours  graduated  876  aviators,  Chatillon- 
sur-Seine  400  observers,  of  all  arms;  Clermont-Ferrand 
328  bombardment  observers;  the  artillery  training  centers 
trained  150  artillery  observers  taken  from  the  Expedi- 
tionary Forces. 

In  the  beginning  the  formation  of  aerial  squadrons  was 
carried  along  the  following  lines : 

The  personnel  and  material  which  were  to  form  the 
observation  and  bombardment  units  were  concentrated  at 
Amanty.  The  squadrons  which  were  at  first  equipped 
only  with  planes  of  antiquated  type  continued  their  train- 
ing up  to  the  time  when  planes  of  more  modern  type  be- 
came available.  Training  was  permitted  with  these  new 
machines,  up  to  the  departure  for  the  front;  during  that 
period  expert  observers  and  pilots  helped  in  the  instruc- 
tion of  those  more  recently  arrived.  Up  to  the  latter 
part  of  January,  191 8,  a  French  squadron  was  stationed 
at  Amanty  and  assisted  in  the  training  of  the  American 
units.  By  April  ist  five  squadrons  had  thus  been  or- 
ganized; four  for  observation,  one  for  day  bombardment. 

Pursuit  squadrons  were  organized  after  the  same  prin- 
ciples. But  their  personnel  and  material  were  assembled 
at  Epiez.  By  April  15th,  four  units  of  that  type  had 
been  formed. 

It  must  now  be  recalled  that  already  and  even  long 
before  the  entrance  of  America  into  the  war,  an  American 
aerial  unit  had  been  fighting  in  France  whose  name  will 
be  forever  remembered  in  the  history  of  aerial  warfare : 
The  Lafayette  squadron. 

Consisting  almost  entirely  of  American  personnel,  this 


2o8     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

unit  was  incorporated  into  the  American  air  service  with 
the  number  103,  after  the  French  personnel  heretofore 
attached  to  it  had  been  replaced  entirely  by  Americans. 

It  continued,  however,  its  service  in  a  French  combat 
group  up  to  June,  191 8,  when  it  was  transferred  to  the 
first  American  combat  group. 

From  April,  19 18,  on,  the  methods  according  to  which 
air-service  units  had  been  organized,  were  modified.  The 
personnel  and  material  which  were  destined  to  the  make- 
up of  new  squadrons  whatever  the  ultimate  destination 
of  the  unit  might  be,  were  assembled  at  Colombey-les- 
Belles.  There  they  remained  for  a  period  of  about  three 
weeks,  during  which  time  they  perfected  training  and 
afterwards  departed  for  the  front. 

Thus  up  to  the  date  of  the  armistice  the  following  units 
were  organized: 

20  pursuit  squadrons  {fivt  groups), 
6  day  bombardment  squadrons  (two  groups), 
I  night  bombardment  squadron,^ 

18  army  or  army  corps  squadrons, 
3  Instruction  squadrons. 
Total,  48. 

Twelve  of  these  were  equipped  with  American-made 
planes;  besides,  on  November  11,  19 18,  six  squadrons  — 
three  for  pursuit  and  three  for  observation  —  were  in 
process  of  organization  at  Colombey-les-Belles. 

The  general  system  for  supplies  and  repairs  adopted  by 
the  American  air  service  was  based  on  two  principles : 

Firstly:  To  establish  at  the  rear  a  big  assemblage  and 
repair  shop  whose  duty  was  to  mount  the  planes  which 

^  This    squadron    was    never    actually    employed    on    account    of    the 
armistice. 


Air  Service  209 

were  sent  from  America  in  separate  parts  and  to  execute 
important  repairs.  This  shop  was  organized  at  Romo- 
rantin  on  a  large  scale.  The  body  and  engines  imported 
from  the  United  States  were  thoroughly  looked  over  and 
definitely  mounted.  The  machines  were  equipped  in 
machine  guns,  in  photograph  and  telegraph  apparatus; 
they  were  then  subjected  to  tests,  after  which  they  were 
sent  to  the  front.  Airplanes  that  had  been  seriously 
damaged  at  the  front  were  thoroughly  overhauled  in  these 
shops.  Out  of  a  total  of  1,213  ^^  Haviland  IV  planes 
received  from  the  United  States  by  November,  19 18, 
7,087  were  mounted  at  Romorantin,  and  628  were  for- 
warded from  there  to  the  front.  In  the  course  of  the 
same  period  the  Romorantin  shops  repaired  308  machines. 

At  Orly  an  important  "  acceptance  "  park  was  estab- 
lished for  the  tests  of  airplanes  purchased  in  Europe  — 
3,300  planes  went  through  their  tests  at  this  place.  On  a 
certain  date,  91  machines  were  sent  to  the  front  by  the 
reception  park  at  Orly.  This  is  believed  to  be  a  record 
in  operations  of  this  kind. 

Secondly:  To  establish  in  the  zone  of  advance  and  for 
each  army  and  for  each  pursuit  or  bombardment  group,  a 
park  intended  to  do  ordinary  repairs  and  ensure  the  daily 
supply  of  fighting  units.  Behind  these  parks  were  to  be 
established  a  certain  number  of  air  depots  whose  role 
was  to  execute  more  important  repairs  and  to  supply 
completely  mounted  planes.  Finally  '^  aerial  reception 
centers  "  were  to  group  the  material  intended  for  dis- 
tribution to  the  air  depots,  while  the  schools  were  to  re- 
pair their  damaged  planes  by  means  of  their  own  re- 
sources. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  army  and  group  parks  were 
never  organized. 


2IO     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Out  of  the  five  air  depots  contemplated,  only  one 
(Colombey-les-Belles),  which  started  operations  in  the 
month  of  April,  was  actually  completely  organized. 

At  the  date  of  the  armistice  it  had  overhauled  237 
planes,  and  held  298  ready  for  employment. 

Four  aerial  reception  centers  had  been  foreseen.  One 
was  begun  at  Is-sur-Tille,  but  was  never  brought  to  com- 
pletion; it  was  afterward  replaced  by  a  large  depot,  the 
construction  of  which  was  begun  at  Latrecey  in  August, 
19 1 8,  and  was  well  under  way  at  the  time  of  the  armistice. 

Thanks  to  the  value  of  American  pilots  the  air  service 
of  the  American  Expeditionary  Forces  was  able  to  render 
excellent  service  in  all  the  branches  of  aviation  which 
called  for  audacity  and  skill.  The  pursuit  squadrons 
scored  as  well  on  the  American  front  as  on  those  of  the 
French  and  British  armies  a  very  great  number  of  vic- 
tories.^^ 

The  bombardment  squadrons  also  greatly  distinguished 
themselves  in  the  attack  of  enemy  rear  organization.^^ 

The  technical  training  of  observers  (employment  of 
wireless  telegraphy,  photography,  use  of  machine  gun) 
has  always  been  excellent.^^ 

From  a  tactical  point  of  view  great  difficulties  were 
encountered  by  the  Americans  in  the  work  on  the  '^  plan 
directeur ''  on  account  of  their  ignorance  of  the  metric 
system. 

Two  pursuit  squadrons  were  engaged  at  the  British 

10  753  planes  and  71  enemy  balloons  were  brought  down.  Total  losses 
of  the  aviation  of  the  American  Expeditionary  Forces,  357  planes. 

11  American  bombardment  squadrons  executed  on  the  Western  front  a 
total  of  150  raids  in  the  course  of  which  115  tons  of  high  explosives  were 
dropped  on  the  enemy. 

12  i8,ocx)  photographic  negatives  were  taken  and  585,000  reproductions 
made. 


Air  Service  2 1 1 

front  from  March  to  September,  191 8.  From  January 
to  the  end  of  August  all  other  American  units  were  en- 
gaged on  the  French  front  as  soon  as  organized :  the  pur- 
suit squadrons  individually  at  first,  afterward,  incorpo- 
rated in  groups,  took  a  very  brilliant  part  in  the  defense 
of  the  Lorraine  front,  and  later  in  the  operations  on  the 
Marne  and  Aisne.  The  bombardment  squadron  No.  96 
was  employed  in  the  blockade  of  the  mineral  basin  of 
Lorraine.  The  observation  squadrons  were,  as  soon  as 
ready,  assigned  to  American  divisions,  and  later  to  army 
corps;  they  took  part  in  the  operations  carried  out  in  the 
Vosges,  in  Lorraine,  and  were  afterward  engaged  with  the 
first  American  Army  Corps  in  the  region  of  Chateau- 
Thierry. 

When  the  first  American  Army  was  organized  all  the 
aviation  units  then  available  were  assigned  to  it,  i.  e. : 

3  pursuit  groups  (12  squadrons), 
Bombardment  squadron  No.  96, 
2  army  squadrons, 
9  army  corps  squadrons. 

These  forces  were  naturally  insufficient  to  carry  out 
the  amount  of  aerial  warfare  involved  in  such  extensive 
operations  as  the  Saint-Mihiel  and  Meuse-Argonne  offen- 
sives, therefore  French  aviation  units  to  the  extent  of 
some  fifteen  artillery  squadrons  and  one  night-bombard- 
ment group  returned,  on  this  occasion,  to  the  American 
Expeditionary  Forces  the  powerful  assistance  which  they 
had  given  to  the  French  air  service  in  the  operations  on 
the  Marne.  Moreover  the  French  aerial  division  par- 
ticipated in  the  activities  of  the  American  aviators.  As 
soon  as  American  squadrons  had  been  formed  in  sufficient 
numbers,  the  French  units  were  turned  back  to  their  nor- 


212     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

mal  destination.  At  the  date  of  the  armistice  the  aviation 
of  the  three  armies  which  then  composed  the  American 
Expeditionary  Forces  exclusively  consisted  of  American 
units. ^^ 

Aerostation  followed  a  development  parallel  to  that  of 
the  aviation.  However,  it  should  be  mentioned  that  al- 
most all  its  material  was  imported  from  the  United  States, 
and  that  it  always  was  available  in  sufficient  quantities  to 
meet  requirements. 

The  observers,  part  of  whom  were  recruited  in  the 
artillery  brigades  and  trained  in  the  centers  of  Valdahon, 
Meucon,  Coetquidan,  La  Courtine,  Clermont-Ferrand, 
Le  Courneau,  Mailly,  and  in  the  beginning  at  Vadenay 
while  the  others  underwent  a  preliminary  course  of  train- 
ing in  America  and  afterward  perfected  their  instruction 
at  Souge,  always  gave  most  complete  satisfaction. 

The  balloon  companies  were  grouped  by  fours  in 
America,  and  upon  their  arrival  in  France  went  into  train- 
ing schools  where  observers  were  assigned  to  them;  after- 
ward they  were  sent  to  the  front. 

The  first  American  balloon  company  appeared  at  the 
front  in  Lorraine  in  February,  191 8. 

When  the  first  American  Army  was  organized  fifteen 
balloon  companies  were  assigned  to  it,  all  of  which  had 
been  engaged  with  American  divisions  and  army  corps  on 
different  parts  of  the  French  front. 

This  number  being  insufficient,  some  ten  French  com- 
panies were  in  the  beginning  assigned  to  the  First  Army, 
and  afterward  turned  back  to  the  French  command  as 
soon  as  American  companies  became  available  for  service. 

At  the  date  of  the  armistice  there  existed  in  France  a 

IS  General  William  Mitchell,  well  known  to  his  French  comrades  for 
his  admirable  energy  in  action,  commanded  the  active  operations  of  the 
American  aviation. 


Signal  Corps  213 

total  of  thirty-five  companies,  twenty-four  of  which  were 
at  the  disposal  of  the  fighting  forces. 

In  all  295  balloons  were  received;  20  had  been  supplied 
by  France,  275  came  from  the  United  States. 

Of  all  the  component  parts  of  a  large  army  obliged  to 
organize  itself  at  the  same  moment  as  it  goes  into  action, 
perhaps  the  most  difficult  to  handle  and  engage  is  the  serv- 
ice of  aviation.  The  material  as  well  as  the  mode  of 
employment  were  constantly  being  modified  in  the  course 
of  the  war.  The  big  units,  i.  e.,  the  pursuit  and  bom- 
bardment groups,  can  only  be  thoroughly  efficient  if  the 
squadrons  of  which  they  are  composed  are  absolutely 
conversant  with  concerted  maneuvers  and  possess  pilots 
and  observers  fully  qualified  by  their  tactical  and  technical 
training. 

To  conclude,  it  must  be  mentioned  that  no  time 
whatever  was  lost,  since  General  Pershing  always  gave 
the  allied  armies  the  assistance  which  was  consistent  with 
the  means  which  he  had  at  hand,  lending  American  ma- 
chines to  fill  up  the  losses  in  the  French  aerial  ranks  while 
waiting  for  the  formation  of,  strictly  speaking,  American 
units. 

To  the  Signal  Corps  of  the  American  Army  falls  the 
work  of  providing  methods  and  means  for  the  communi- 
cation of  intelligence  for  military  purposes  by  telegraph, 
telephone,  radio,  or  otherwise;  and  also  of  providing  the 
personnel  for  the  construction  necessary  to  these  com- 
munications as  well  as  for  their  operation. 

Its  sphere  of  activities  extended  from  seaport  to  front. 

It  had  representatives  as  well  in  every  territorial  zone 
of  the  rear  as  in  the  main  fighting  units  —  armies,  army 


214     T^^  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

For  practical  purposes  the  work  of  the  signal  corps 
may  be  divided  into  two  fields  which  we  will  in  turn 
examine : 

First:  The  construction,  operation,  and  maintenance 
of  every  sort  of  electrical  communication  from  base  ports 
through  the  zones  of  the  S.  O.  S.  up  to  the  front. 

Second:  Communication  by  every  practicable  means 
within  and  between  the  units  of  the  fighting  forces. 

The  first  of  these  requirements  rendered  necessary  the 
provision  of  a  network  of  lines  of  communication  be- 
tween ports,  depots,  hospitals,  aviation  centers,  and  train- 
ing camps;  in  short,  a  complete  system  on  a  large  scale 
connecting  all  points  where  units  or  offices  of  the  Ameri- 
can Expeditionary  Forces  were  located. 

This  called  for  the  construction,  installation,  and 
operation  of  telegraph,  telephone,  and  radio  equipment 
analogous  in  every  way  to  that  necessary  in  commercial 
systems  such  as  those  in  the  United  States. 

The  facilities  which  the  French  were  able  to  place  at 
the  disposal  of  the  signal  corps  were  early  found  to  be 
inadequate,  and  signal  corps  lines  built  with  American 
material  by  their  own  personnel  were  constructed  in 
steadily  increasing  numbers. 

From  the  twenty-fourth  of  June,  19 17,  when  the  signal 
corps  commenced  Its  function,  up  to  the  first  of  May, 
19 19,  there  had  been  over  40,000,000  local  telephone 
calls  and  upward  of  1,350,000  long  distance  telephone 
calls  handled  by  its  services. 

Since  the  signal  corps  telegraph  system  began  its  work 
on  August  9,  19 1 7,  there  have  been  handled  more  than 
12,000,000  telegraph  messages. 

The  long  distance  telephone  and  telegraph  system 
which  they  constructed  were  entirely  maintained  by  a 


Signal  Corps  215 

signal  corps  personnel.  In  addition  19,800  miles  of 
leased  wires  were  also  maintained  by  it. 

Although  the  main  duty  of  the  signal  corps  is  to  pro- 
vide communication,  a  large  part  of  its  activity  had  to  do 
with  Its  own  supplies.  These  consisted  of  all  the  imple- 
ments and  material  for  constructing  lines  of  communica- 
tion, including  equipment  of  central  stations  and  telegraph 
offices,  as  well  as  all  the  instruments  and  apparatus  used 
for  signaling  in  combat.  Finally,  the  signal  corps  was 
charged  with  meteorological  and  photographic  services  to 
the  entire  army,  and  supplies  for  these  activities  were 
under  its  control. 

The  second  field  of  activity  of  the  signal  corps  was 
concerned  with  the  provision  of  tactical  units  fully 
equipped  and  trained  in  the  use  of  every  practicable 
method  of  signaling  promptly  and  despite  enemy  inter- 
ference, with  the  interception  of  enemy  communications 
and  the  location  of  enemy  radio  stations,  whether  on  the 
ground  or  on  airplanes.  The  interception  of  communi- 
cations and  the  location  of  radio  stations  of  the  enemy 
was  done  by  carefully  trained  personnel  working  with 
special  apparatus  in  cooperation  with  the  intelligence  sec- 
tion of  the  General  Staff.  The  utility  of  this  organiza- 
tion, by  means  of  which  we  were  able  to  learn  the  enemy's 
plans  in  advance,  and  to  gain  valuable  information  upon 
the  character  and  distribution  of  his  units  in  the  battle 
line,  is  to-day  widely  known. 

At  the  time  of  its  greatest  activities  the  signal  corps 
operated  in  Europe  14,854  telephone  stations  and  396 
exchanges.  The  total  length  of  wire  employed  for 
telephone  or  telegraph  purposes  was  13,000  miles 
—  over  five  times  the  length  of  the  terrestrial 
meridian. 


2i6     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

The  construction  and  operation  of  such  a  system  called 
for  a  personnel  possessing  a  very  high  degree  of  technical 
skill.  Most  of  it  came  from  the  personnel  of  the  tele- 
phone and  telegraph  companies  in  the  United  States. 

Units  of  the  signal  corps  were  of  two  types : 

telegraph  battalions, 
field  signal  battalions. 

A  telegraph  battalion  consisted  of  lo  officers  and  212 
men;  they  were  very  completely  equipped. 

They  were  charged,  in  the  zone  of  the  S.  O.  S.  with 
construction  and  maintenance  of  the  pole  lines  and  buried 
cable  lines  generally  established  along  roads  and  railroads. 
Telegraph  battalions  attached  to  armies  and  army  corps 
installed  telephone  and  telegraph  systems  connecting 
headquarters  in  the  zone  of  the  armies.  Since  most  of 
the  personnel  of  these  battalions  had  been  engaged  on 
similar  work  in  civil  life,  no  very  extensive  or  special 
training  had  been  necessary  for  them,  aside  from  that 
of  a  military  character. 

Field  signal  battalions  were  especially  charged  with 
service  at  the  front.  One  of  them  was  assigned  to  each 
army,  army  corps,  or  division  of  infantry. 

It  is  interesting  to  say  a  few  words  about  their  organi- 
zation.    They  consisted  of: 

I   headquarters  and  supply  section.. 3   officers     29  men 

I   wire  company 3  officers     75  men 

I   radio  company 3   officers     75  men 

I   outpost  company 5   officers  280  men 

Total,  14  officers  495  non-commissioned  officers  and 
men. 

The  headquarters  and  supply  section  performed  the 


Signal  Corps  217 

administrative  services  of  the  field  signal  battalion.  It 
distributed  accumulators  and  carrier  pigeons. 

The  wire  company  installed,  maintained,  and  operated 
telephone  and  telegraph  systems  from  division  head- 
quarters inclusive  to,  but  not  including,  regimental  head- 
quarters. Besides  it  was  prepared  to  handle  all  forms 
of  visual  signaling  when  other  means  failed. 

The  radio  company  installed  and  operated  radio  sta- 
tions at  brigade  headquarters,  division  posts  of  command, 
and  at  those  of  the  artillery  battalion.  It  also  operated 
the  wireless  ground  telephone  sets  and  listening  sets,  as 
well  as  gonio  stations  Installed  in  the  division  area. 

The  outpost  company  was  divided  into : 

I   headquarters  detachment,  i  captain  and  20  men 
4  regimental  platoons  each  of  i  lieutenant  and 
6^  men. 

The  headquarters  detachment  was  available  for  the 
purpose  of  strengthening  the  regimental  platoons  when 
necessary. 

During  the  period  of  trench  warfare,  each  regimental 
platoon  was  permanently  assigned  to  a  regiment  of  the 
division.  In  open  warfare  the  outpost  company  was 
divided  into  two  sections,  which  were  charged  with  main- 
taining the  liaison  between  brigades  and  regiments. 

The  training  of  this  personnel  for  signaling  In  combat, 
especially  the  training  of  the  different  groups  of  the  field 
signal  battalions,  was  carried  on  partly  In  the  United 
States  and  partly  at  signal  corps  schools,  in  training  areas, 
and  in  quiet  sectors  of  French  front.  Besides  learning 
the  duties  of  a  soldier,  each  man  was  to  gain  an  intensive 
knowledge  of  his  own  special  functions,  also  a  well- 
grounded  experience  In  signaling  generally.     While  sig- 


2i8     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

nal  corps  troops  are  not  combat  units,  they  endured  all 
the  dangers  Incident  to  combat  and  gave  repeated 
examples  of  their  courage  and  resourcefulness  under  the 
enemy  fire. 

The  first  members  of  the  signal  corps  to  reach  France 
arrived  on  June  13,  19 17.  Besides  the  chief  signal  offi- 
cer, Colonel  Russell,^^  there  were  six  officers,  six  soldiers, 
and  two  civilians.  On  November  i,  19 18,  the  total 
reached  1,462  officers,  33,038  soldiers,  and  323  civilians, 
including  women  telephone  operators. 

One  of  the  chief  accomplishments  of  the  signal  corps 
during  the  war  was  the  successful  equipment  of  combat 
divisions  with  the  special  signaling  apparatus  required  in 
modern  warfare.  Much  of  this  apparatus,  especially 
radio  equipment,  was  new  to  America,  and  consequently 
had  to  be  found  in  Europe.  Approximately  four  and  a 
half  millions  of  dollars  were  spent  on  material  purchased 
in  France. 

The  telegraph  and  telephone  equipment  was  imported 
from  the  United  States.  In  order  to  minimize  the  effect 
of  the  submarine  warfare  on  the  supply  of  these  most 
important  materials,  shipments  were  made  in  ten-mile 
lots.  Each  ten-mile  lot  of  material  contained  everything 
for  that  distance  of  line  ^^  and  was  loaded  on  a  separate 
ship. 

The  signal  corps  operated  seven  supply  depots  and  three 
army  parks  when  the  armistice  was  signed.  The  total 
tonnage  of  supplies  received  amounted  to  approximately 
100,000  tons,  62,000  being  from  the  United  States, 
37,000  from  France,  and  1,000  from  Great  Britain. 

13  Colonel  (afterward  General)  Russell  was  chief  signal  officer  through- 
out the  entire  war. 

1*  With  the  exception  of  poles  which  were  obtained  in  France. 


Medical  Department  219 

From  December  i,  19 17,  to  November  i,  19 18,  the 
signal  corps  photographic  division  exposed  in  the  field 
and  developed  in  its  laboratory  seventy-five  miles  of 
original  moving-picture  films. 

In  the  course  of  the  war  the  signal  corps  had  recourse 
on  a  large  scale  to  the  resources  of  France.  In  this  con- 
nection it  is  perhaps  sufficient  to  mention  radio  and  radio- 
goniometric  equipment.  Let  us  incidentally  recall  the 
fact  that  the  allied  armies  made  a  constant  appeal  to 
French  industry  for  the  supply  of  photographic  cameras, 
and  of  all  high  grade  optical  glass. 

This  being  said,  we  will  be  the  more  at  liberty  to 
acknowledge  that  upon  one  point  —  and  a  very  important 
one  —  we  have  everything  to  learn  from  the  American 
signal  corps.  We  mean  in  the  organization  and  opera- 
tion of  the  telephone  system.  No  one  that  has  had  occa- 
sion to  put  in  a  call  from  Coblenz  to  Bordeaux  from 
Chaumont  to  Brest  or  to  London  on  the  American  Hnes 
will,  in  our  opinion,  contradict  this  statement.  It  may  be 
remembered  that  the  personnel  and  material  on  these  lines 
were  the  same  as  those  which,  in  the  United  States,  en- 
sured communication  by  telephone  between  New  York  and 
San  Francisco. 

What  may  we  suppose  are  the  reasons  for  American 
superiority  in  this  branch?  Are  they  to  be  found  in  a 
better  quality  of  material,  in  greater  professional  skill 
on  the  part  of  the  operators?  Are  they  due  to  better  or- 
ganization, or  more  efficient  methods  of  operation? 

We  will  leave  it  to  our  own  technical  specialists  to  seek 
the  answer  to  the  above  questions. 

When  the  first  elements  of  the  American  Expeditionary 
Forces  arrived  in  France,  their  chief  surgeon,  Colonel 


220     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

(later  Brigadier-General)  Alfred  E.  Bradley,  found  him- 
self confronted  with  a  very  heavy  task. 

The  soldiers  from  the  United  States,  very  recently 
drafted,  were  about  to  enter  into  active  operations  in  a 
country  the  climate  of  which  was  very  different  from  their 
own;  they  were  furthermore  quartered  in  billets,  a  thing 
entirely  new  to  them.  Therefore  not  taking  into  account 
the  casualties  arising  from  enemy  action  it  was  certain 
that  the  sick  rate  among  the  troops  would  be  fairly  high. 
On  this  account  it  was  necessary  to  foresee  and  organize 
a  very  important  system  of  hospitalization. 

As  was  natural  most  of  the  large  buildings  in  France 
which  would  have  been  appropriate  to  such  a  service, 
were  already  utilized  for  the  requirements  of  the  allied 
armies.  It  was  therefore  necessary  to  erect  new  shelters 
and  the  material  for  the  construction  of  barracks  was  in 
those  days  very  scarce. 

As  soon  as  the  United  States  had  declared  war,  Colonel 
Wadhams,  then  a  member  of  the  American  Mission  of 
Observers,  had  approached  the  French  Minister  of  Public 
Health  in  regard  to  the  measures  to  be  taken.  In  close 
cooperation  with  Chief  Surgeon  Castelll  (French  Army) 
he  had  made  very  thorough  investigations  of  the  facilities 
which,  by  cutting  down  their  own  requirements  In  every 
way,  the  French  service  could  place  at  the  disposal  of  the 
American  Expeditionary  Forces. 

From  that  time  on,  a  period  of  constant  and  Intimate 
cooperation  was  initiated  between  the  medical  authorities 
of  the  two  armies;  the  results  were  of  the  most  satisfac- 
tory character. 

We  must  here  limit  ourselves  to  a  description  of  the 
activities  of  the  American  medical  corps  In  Its  opera- 
tions carried  on   from  February,    191 8,   under  the  sue- 


Medical  Department  221 

ccssive  direction  of  Generals  Bradley,  Ireland,  and 
McGraw. 

As  every  one  knows,  sanitary  organizations  are  divided 
into  two  main  categories :  Those  which  are  mobile  and 
follow  all  the  displacements  of  the  troops  to  whom  they 
are  attached;  the  others  which  are  fixed  and  naturally 
offer  greater  advantages  for  the  treatment  of  patients. 

The  chief  surgeon,  whose  headquarters  were  at  Tours, 
was  especially  preoccupied  with  questions  pertaining  to 
general  organizations,  to  personnel,  supplies,  and  the  es- 
tablishment of  fixed  hospitals  intended  for  the  care  of 
patients  coming  from  the  French  front  or  from  other 
points. 

Although  his  authority  extended  to  all  American  sani- 
tary formations  in  Europe,  by  reason  of  the  great  distance 
which  separated  his  headquarters  from  the  front,  it  was 
necessary  for  him  to  delegate  to  a  deputy  stationed  at 
headquarters  the  portion  of  that  authority  which  had 
more  especially  to  do  with  the  armies  in  the  field. 
Colonel  Wadhams  was  appointed  to  that  very  important 
position.  He  was  made  a  member  of  the  fourth  section 
of  the  General  Staff,  and,  in  the  name  of  the  commander- 
in-chief,  coordinated  all  medical  activities  at  the  front. 

In  the  American  Army  the  medical  department  was  or- 
ganized by  divisions  at  the  headquarters  of  each  of  those 
units,  a  lieutenant-colonel  belonging  to  the  medical  corps 
was  in  charge  of  all  the  sanitary  personnel  operating  with 
the  division.  Under  his  orders  was  the  divisional  sani- 
tary train  consisting  of : 

4  ambulance  companies,^^ 
4  field  hospitals,^^ 

^^  Three  automobile  and  one  horse-drawn  ambulances. 
16  Three  automobile  and  one  horse-drawn  ambulances. 


222     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

I   medical  supply  unit, 
I   mobile  laboratory. 

Each  ambulance  company  had  fifteen  vehicles,  twelve 
ambulances  and  three  trucks.  The  field  hospitals  were 
equipped  with  tents  and  an  important  material  trans- 
ported on  trucks  or  wagons;  each  of  them  could  take  care 
of  216  patients.  Thus  the  divisional  sanitary  train  had 
a  total  strength  of  50  officers  and  901  enlisted  men. 

Besides  each  regiment  disposed  of  a  medical  detach- 
ment ^^  the  sanitary  train  of  the  army  corps  comprised, 
not  including,  of  course,  the  sanitary  formations  of  the 
division : 

3  field  hospitals, 

3  ambulance  companies. 

The  army  sanitary  train,  besides  the  sanitary  forma- 
tions of  the  corps,  included  in  the  army,  comprised: 

4  field  hospitals, 

4  ambulance  companies. 

Besides,  the  army  surgeon  disposed  of: 

2  evacuation  hospitals,^^ 
I  mobile  hospital  ^^ 

per  division  included  in  the  army. 

Furthermore  the  chief  army  surgeon  disposed  of 
mobile  surgical  and  degassing  units,  several  sections  of 
army    ambulance    service,    convalescent    depots,    medical 

17  Seven  surgeons  and  48  enlisted  men  by  infantry  regiment. 

18  These  were  generally  established  under  tents  and  had  a  capacity  of 
500  to  i,o<X)  beds;  they  were  well  equipped  and  were  able  to  undertake 
surgical  operations  of  the  greatest  delicacy  under  the  most  favorable 
conditions. 

19  Established  along  the  same  lines  as  the  French  auto-surgical 
ambulances. 


Medical  Department  223 

supply  parks,  field  laboratories,  special  operating  teams 
(shock,  gas,  etc.)  and  hospital  trains  for  the  evacuation  of 
patients  to  the  rear. 

At  the  time  of  the  Meuse-Argonne  offensive,  the  facili- 
ties controlled  by  Colonel  Stark,  army  surgeon  of  the 
First  Army,  approximated  30,000  medical  department 
personnel.  When  an  American  soldier  was  wounded  in 
the  firing  line,  he  was  at  first  taken  to  the  battalion  or 
regimental  first-aid  station  which  was  the  most  advanced 
post  of  the  sanitary  service.  From  there  he  was  trans- 
ferred to  the  ambulance  bandaging  station,  which  was  in- 
stalled at  the  extreme  limit  of  the  zone  accessible  to  motor 
transportation.  Men  who  were  only  slightly  wounded 
came  unaided  to  this  station,  the  others  were  carried  by 
stretcher  bearers.  From  there  the  wounded  were  trans- 
ported to  the  sorting  station  which  was  directed  by  one  of 
the  field  hospitals  of  the  divisional  sanitary  train. 

Slight  cases,  especially  those  affected  with  "  psycho- 
neurosis  "  or  shell  shock,  were  held  at  the  sorting  station; 
the  more  serious  cases  were  divided  among  the  other 
three  field  hospitals  of  the  division.  From  there  the 
sanitary  train  belonging  to  the  army  corps  reenforced,  in 
case  of  emergency  by  ambulance  companies  belonging  to 
the  army,  transported  them  to  a  mobile  evacuation  hos- 
pital, both  of  which  were  army  organizations;  they  were 
then  placed  on  board  hospital  trains  and  taken  to  the  base 
hospitals  of  the  interior. 

It  had  been  agreed  in  principle  that,  when  American 
troops  were  to  take  over  a  sector  at  the  front,  they  would 
take  charge  of  all  existing  French  formations  and  pro- 
vide for  the  care  and  evacuation  of  their  own  patients. 
The  hospitalization  of  the  American  Army  was  therefore 
organized  upon  this  basis. 


224     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Practically,  some  difficulties  were  encountered.  As  a 
consequence  of  the  German  drive  of  March,  191 8,  which 
compelled  the  high  command  to  engage  American  divi- 
sions on  different  points  of  the  front,  the  working  of  this 
system  was  extremely  complicated.  The  American  medi- 
cal corps  was  not  in  a  position  to  supply  evacuation  hos- 
pitals and  hospital  trains  to  all  American  divisions  who 
were  isolated  among  the  French  armies.  It  was  there- 
fore found  necessary  to  receive  American  patients  in 
French  sanitary  formations,  and  to  evacuate  them  in 
French  hospital  trains  toward  the  interior.  It  was 
agreed  that  as  soon  as  their  state  of  health  would  per- 
mit, these  patients  should  be  transferred  from  the  French 
hospitals  which  had  received  them  to  the  nearest  Ameri- 
can hospital.  On  the  other  hand,  American  hospitals 
receiving  French  patients  were  to  transfer  them  as  soon 
as  possible  to  French  sanitary  formations.  As  a  whole, 
and  notwithstanding  the  difficulties  arising  out  of  the 
difference  in  languages,  these  arrangements  worked  in  a 
most  satisfactory  way.  Nevertheless  it  seemed  desirable 
that  the  Americans  might,  as  soon  as  practicable,  be  in 
a  position  to  provide  for  the  entire  care  and  evacuation 
of  their  own  patients  from  the  time  when  a  sector  of  the 
front  should  be  definitely  assigned  to  them.  This  was 
the  case  from  date  of  August,  19 18,  before  the  battle  of 
Saint-Mihiel.  From  that  time  on,  the  American  Army 
itself  provided  for  the  care  and  evacuation  of  its  own 
sick  and  wounded. 

In  some  cases  at  Chateau-Thierry,  in  Champagne,  and 
later  on  in  Flanders,  it  was  even  possible  to  establish 
American  evacuation  hospitals  in  the  rear  of  those  Ameri- 
can divisions  which  were  fighting  in  the  ranks  of  French 
armies. 


Medical  Department  225 

Difficulties  were  experienced  in  securing  hospital  trains. 
The  American  medical  department  was,  however,  able  to 
purchase  twenty-one  of  these:  Two  in  France,  nineteen 
in  England.^^ 

But  this  number  was  insufficient  to  meet  the  require- 
ments of  the  Expeditionary  Forces  during  the  summer  and 
fall  of  19 1 8.  It  was  therefore  necessary  for  the  French 
Government  to  place  at  the  disposition  of  the  American 
medical  department  a  very  considerable  number  of  hos- 
pital trains.  In  the  latter  period  of  the  war  the  number 
of  such  French  trains  in  the  American  service  was  forty- 
five. 

We  must  now  leave  the  zone  of  the  armies  and  deal 
with  medical  corps  activities  In  the  interior.  The  organi- 
zation was  adapted  to  the  zone  of  the  rear  in  base,  inter- 
mediate, and  advance  sections. 

In  each  a  section  chief  surgeon  controlled  the  existing 
permanent  sanitary  formations:  Base  and  American 
Red  Cross  hospitals,  convalescent  depots,  laboratories, 
stores,  centers  of  muscular  reeducation,  shops  for  repair 
of  sanitary  material,  workshops  for  erection  of  sanitary 
automobile  material,  schools  for  medical  and  surgical 
specialties.  As  has  already  been  said,  the  French  au- 
thorities had  put  at  the  disposal  of  the  medical  depart- 
ment all  available  permanent  constructions  and  barracks. 
Moreover,  the  French  engineers  gave  great  assistance  by 
drawing  up  plans  for  such  establishments  and  laying  down 
railway  tracks. 

The  number  of  beds  thus  made  available  increased 
rapidly.     Following  figures  include  only  those  permanent 

20  Each  of  these  trains  was  capable  of  transporting  from  300  to  400 
stretcher  cases. 


226     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

hospitals  located  in  the  interior;  those  with  the  armies 
being  temporary  installations  are  not  mentioned. 

The  week  ending  November  7,  19 18,  saw  the  greatest 
number  of  patients  in  A.  E.  F.  hospitals,  when  a  total  of 
190,888  beds  were  occupied.  On  the  day  the  armistice 
was  signed,  there  was  a  total  of  283,553  beds  in  the  hos- 
pitals of  the  interior.  On  the  same  date  there  were  in 
operation  153  base  hospitals,  66  camp  hospitals,  and  12 
convalescent  camps.  From  December  1 1  to  December  5, 
191 8,  the  total  number  of  beds  was  increased  to  296,835. 
The  construction  and  installation  work  under  way  was  to 
raise  that  figure  to  423,772  normally,  and  541,000,  in 
case  of  emergency. 

At  the  time  of  the  armistice,  the  American  medical  de- 
partment in  France  had  grown,  so  that  there  were  with 
the  Expeditionary  Forces  16,407  medical  officers,  8,593 
nurses,  and  126,231  enlisted  men.  Moreover,  there 
were  in  the  United  States  nearly  as  many  more  awaiting 
transportation  to  France. 

The  medical  supplies  on  hand  were  sufficient  to  meet 
all  requirements.  Let  us  mention  in  passing:  190,280 
pounds  of  sulfuric  ether,  275,075  gallons  of  alcohol, 
1,135  gallons  of  iodine,  41,372,640  gauze  bandages, 
3,081,727  first-aid  packets.  At  the  close  of  hostilities, 
the  American  medical  department  had  most  successfully 
overcome  all  the  difficulties  incident  to  the  beginning  of 
operations,  and  it  may  be  unhesitatingly  affirmed  that 
should  the  war  have  been  continued  it  would  certainly 
have  been  in  a  position  to  provide,  under  the  best  and 
most  comfortable  conditions,  for  the  care  and  hospitaliza- 
tion of  the  large  number  of  casualties  which  might  reason- 
ably be  expected  from  the  very  rapidly  growing  combat 
strength  of  the  American  armies. 


Quartermaster  227 

We  have  seen,  in  a  preceding  chapter,  how  numerous 
were  the  duties  devolving  upon  the  quartermaster  corps. 
During  the  process  of  organization  which  took  place  in 
the  Expeditionary  Forces  the  quartermaster  corps  was 
called  upon  to  drop  certain  of  its  attributions  and  take 
over  others. 

It  may  be  remembered  that  as  early  as  September, 
19 17,  the  organization  of  the  transportation  department 
had  taken  from  the  quartermaster  corps  the  burden  of 
railway  transit.  Later  on,  the  D.  G.  T.  [Director  Gen- 
eral of  Transportation]  also  took  charge  of  operations  of 
base  ports.  Finally,  in  February,  191 8,  the  motor  trans- 
portation service  was,  in  its  turn,  made  independent. 

At  the  time  when  its  chief,  Quartermaster  General 
Rogers,^^  transferred  his  headquarters  to  Tours,  the 
duties  of  the  quartermaster  corps  were  as  follows: 

Payment  of  personnel  and  general  disbursements,  sub- 
sistence, fuel  and  forage,  clothing,  remount  service, 
laundries  and  baths,  disinfection  of  clothing,  salvage  ser- 
vice, quartermaster  shops,  depots  and  storehouses,  cold 
storage  and  refrigeration,  graves  registration  service,  in- 
spection of  quartermaster  activities.  To  these  manifold 
duties  were  later  added :  Garden  service,  all  disinfection 
for  troops  in  the  zone  of  advance  with  the  exception  of 
that  carried  out  in  hospitals,  finally,  organization  of  rail- 
head supply  units. 

In  order  to  carry  out  so  many  divers  and  important 
functions.  General  Rogers  had  organized  his  central  office 
as  follows: 

21  General  Harry  L.  Rogers  was  appointed  quartermaster  general  of  the 
United  States  Army  on  July  22,  1918.  He  remained  in  France  up  to  the 
end  of  the  war,  and  left  Tours  on  January  31,  1919,  to  take  over  his  new 
post  in  Washington. 


228     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

The  inspection  service  reported  on  such  matters  as  sup- 
ply of  divisions,  finance,  conditions  of  remount  service, 
bakeries,  etc.  This  important  work  was  carried  out  by  a 
varying  number  of  traveling  inspectors. 

The  administrative  section  included  the  handling  of  all 
records,  mail,  telegrams  and  cablegrams,  precedent  and 
research,  and  administrative  action  on  contracts. 

The  personnel  division  handled  all  matters  pertaining 
to  the  quartermaster  personnel,  such  as  organization  of 
new  units,  including  labor  formations. 

The  finance  division  included  the  supply  to  disbursing 
officers  of  the  funds  which  they  controlled,  instructed  these 
officers  in  the  nice  legal  points  of  their  studies,  and  ad- 
justed certain  classes  of  claims. 

The  accounting  division  included  the  examination  and 
analysis  of  accounts  —  property  and  funds  —  and  audit 
of  subsistence  returns  of  the  quartermasters  in  Europe. 

The  supplies  division.  The  most  important  of  the 
chief  quartermasters  organizations,  its  activities  being 
divided  into  fifteen  sub-branches:  Miscellaneous,  cloth- 
ing, subsistence,  bakeries,  animal-drawn  transportation, 
traffic,  traveling-officers,  supplies  and  stationery,  fuel, 
forage,  cold  storage  and  refrigeration,  administration, 
garden  service,  storage  and  warehousing,  gasoline  and  oil. 

Quartermaster  supplies  were  provided  from  three  dif- 
ferent sources :  requisition  in  the  United  States,  purchase 
made  directly  in  France,  by  the  purchasing  agent  of  the 
quartermaster,  contracts  made  with  the  French  and  Brit- 
ish governments. 

The  salvage  service  operated  in  France  seventeen 
depots  and  shops  with  a  personnel  of  150  officers  and 
17,000  male  and  female  employees. ^^     It  ran  the  shops 

22  Sixty-seven   per  cent,   of  the   day  shifts  were  composed   of  French- 
■women. 


Quartermaster  229 

for  recuperation  of  fats,  laundries,  and  disinfecting 
plants,  finally  It  took  charge  of  the  sanitation  of  battle- 
fields, a  service  In  which  tens  of  thousands  of  men  were 
employed  simultaneously. 

The  remount  division,  with  a  strength  of  400  officers 
and  8,000  enlisted  men,  operated  sixteen  depots  at  the 
date  of  the  armistice. 

The  graves  registration  service  Included  the  acquisi- 
tion, maintenance,  and  control  of  cemeteries;  Identifica- 
tion of  the  dead;  registry  of  burials,  and  correspondence 
with  relatives  of  deceased  soldiers. 

All  these  services  were  again  subdivided  into  numerous 
branches;  such  division  of  labor  being  necessitated  by 
the  immense  volume  of  work  involved  and  the  need 
of  having  tasks  so  apportioned  as  to  secure  intelligent 
supervision,  by  commissioned  heads  of  various 
branches. 

Many  of  these  officers  were  men  who.  In  civil  life, 
were  accustomed  to  handling  extensive  business  opera- 
tions, and  were  usually  specialists  in  the  branches  as- 
signed to  them. 

The  quartermaster  corps  was  represented  in  the  vari- 
ous sections  of  the  services  of  supply  by  a  chief  quarter- 
master on  the  staff  of  the  commanding  general  of  the 
section.  Armies, ^^  army  corps,^*  and  divisions  ^^  each 
had  their  quartermasters  on  the  staffs  of  their  respective 
commanders. 

Such  were  the  general  lines  of  an  organization  which, 
at  the  close  of  hostilities,  provided  for  the  supply  of 
2,000,000  men,  and  operated  a  total  of  844  installations 
distributed  among  267  different  localities. 

23  Members  of  G-4. 

24  Members  of  G-4. 

25  Members  of  G-i  (division  headquarters  had  no  G-4). 


230     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Let  us  glance  at  the  results  achieved. 

The  bakeries  which  were  distributed  in  sixty-seven 
towns  had  a  daily  output  of  1,000  tons  of  bread.  Seven- 
teen refrigerating  plants  were  in  operation  with  a  ca- 
pacity of  10,000  tons,  fifteen  others,  with  a  capacity  of 
16,000  tons,  were  under  construction  or  projected. 
Fifty-eight  quartermaster  corps  gardens  had  produced, 
up  to  November  15,  19 18,  approximately  75,000,000 
pounds  of  vegetables  at  a  cost  (not  counting  the  labor 
of  enlisted  men)  of  about  one-third  of  the  prevailing 
prices. 

A  total  of  1,016,622  tons  of  coal  had  been  imported 
from  England  between  October  i,  19 17,  and  October 
31,  191 8.  The  shipment  of  British  coal  for  the  A.  E.  F. 
had  grown  from  28,338  tons  in  October,  1917,  to 
207,630  tons  in  October,  19 18.  There  were  eight  cold 
storage  yards  in  the  A.  E.  F.  with  a  total  capacity,  ulti- 
mate storage,  of  1,219,000  tons. 

The  gasoline  and  oil  storages  established  in  the  vi- 
cinity of  the  base  ports  had  a  total  capacity  of  6,323,290 
gallons;  those  in  the  intermediate  section  a  capacity  of 
2,300,290  gallons.  There  was  a  total  of  twenty-seven 
storage  and  distribution  stations  in  operation  with  sixty- 
six  similar  installations  projected.  Finally,  seven  French 
depots  and  oil  refineries  were  utilized  by  the  Expedition- 
ary Forces.  The  strongest  deliveries  to  the  army  serv- 
ices were  made  in  October,  1918:  9,675,200  gallons  to 
the  motor-transport  service;  1,458,600  to  the  aviation; 
374,900  gallons  of  kerosene  to  the  bulk  of  the  services; 
150,000  gallons  of  castor  oil  and  503,600  pounds  of 
grease. 

The  service  of  remounts  had  been  confronted  with 
grave  difficulties  originating  in  the  lack  of  sea  tonnage 


Quartermaster  231 

and  the  scarcity  of  animals  on  the  European  markets. 
A  total  number  of  243,560  horses  and  mules  were  de- 
livered to  the  A.  E.  F. :  136,114  were  bought  or  requisi- 
tioned In  France;  21,259  came  from  Great  Britain; 
18,462  from  Spain;  67,725  had  been  Imported  from  the 
United  States. 

Up  to  the  date  of  November  11,  191 8,  there  had  been 
Imported  to  France  145,000  tons  of  hay,  215,000  tons 
of  oats;  17,300  tons  of  bran. 

The  salvage  service,  created  on  January  16,  191 8, 
secured  results  which  It  Is  worth  while  to  mention.  The 
percentage  of  salvage  recoveries  from  articles  shipped 
to  depots  requiring  both  renovation  and  repair  aggre- 
gated 91  per  cent,  up  to  December  31,  19 18.  The  re- 
maining 9  per  cent,  was  largely  used  as  raw  material  In 
patching,  mending,  and  renovation. 

The  total  cost  of  the  operations  of  the  salvage  service 
as  compared  with  the  value  of  output  of  depots  and 
shops  was  1 1  per  cent. 

The  total  value  of  the  output  of  the  service  up  to 
January  31,  1919,  was  $85,469,573.41. 

We  cannot  better  sum  up  the  accomplishments  of  the 
salvage  service  of  the  A.  E.  F.  than  by  quoting  the  fol- 
lowing lines  extracted  from  the  report  of  Its  chief,  Colonel 
T.  B.  Hacker: 

"  What  was  in  former  wars  a  distinct  liability  has  developed 
Into  a  tremendous  asset.  Tonnage  space  and  raw  materials  have 
been  conserved  and  an  unlimited  field  opened  for  the  utilization 
of  by-products  heretofore  regarded  as  waste." 

The  graves  registration  service  installed  In  France 
more  than  two  hundred  military  cemeteries.  They  are 
scattered  all  over  the  country  from  the  historic  battle- 


232     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

fields  of  Chateau-Thierry  and  the  Argonne  to  the  base 
ports  on  the  Atlantic  coast.  The  most  important  of 
these  are  located  at  Romagne-sous-Montfaucon,  near 
Beaumont-sur-Meuse,  and  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of 
Paris  near  the  Mont  Valerian.  There  are  also  eighty- 
five  American  military  burying  grounds  in  England,  a 
similar  number  in  Italy  and  Belgium,  and  a  few  in  north- 
ern Russia. 

The  quartermaster  personnel  of  16  officers,  12  field 
clerks,  and  10  enlisted  men  who  landed  in  Liverpool  on 
June  7,  19 17,  had  grown  on  December  15,  19 18,  to 
4,229  officers  and  96,541  enlisted  men.  These  figures 
do  not  include  about  600  officers  and  18,000  enlisted 
men  transferred  to  the  motor-transport  corps  and  about 
300  officers  and  13,000  enlisted  men  transferred  to  the 
transportation  department. 

The  total  amount  disbursed  by  the  quartermaster  corps 
of  the  Expeditionary  Forces  from  the  time  of  the  arrival 
of  the  first  troops  in  France  up  to,  and  including,  Feb- 
ruary 28,  1919,  was  approximately  $568,444,000. 

The  ordnance  department  supplied  to  the  American 
Army  its  armament  and  munitions.  It  was  charged  with 
the  choice  or  design  of  all  types  and  models  and  with 
their  procurement  either  by  purchase  or  by  manufacture 
in  its  own  arsenals.  It  was  responsible  for  the  issuing 
of  material  to  the  troops  and  for  its  inspection  and  main- 
tenance. 

We  will  not  give  here  a  list  of  different  materials  per- 
taining to  the  ordnance  (examined  elsewhere)  ;  but  limit 
ourselves  to  the  mention  of  tractors,  tanks,  mobile  repair 
shops,  and  all  machinery  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of 
ordnance  material  in  the  field. 


Ordnance  233 

During  the  war,  the  different  types  of  material  were 
determined  in  Washington,  but  the  ordnance  department 
of  the  Expeditionary  Forces  was  very  frequently  con- 
sulted; it  acted  in  the  capacity  of  a  technical  adviser  for 
the  Washington  authorities ;  and  ensured  liaison  with  the 
allied  governments. 

The  establishment  of  the  ordnance  department  in 
France  dates  from  the  middle  of  June,  19 17,  when  Gen- 
eral (then  Lieut.-Colonel)  Williams,  to-day  chief  of 
ordnance  in  Washington,  arrived  with  General  Pershing. 
The  organization  has  been  subject  to  a  few  rather  un- 
important changes;  we  will  here  give  a  description  of  its 
definite  form;  that  is,  the  one  it  had  from  May,  19 18, 
to  the  armistice.  The  department  was  grouped  into  ^yt 
main  divisions: 

administration, 

requirements, 

supply, 

construction  and  maintenance, 

engineering. 

The  Administration  Division  was  charged  with  record- 
ing and  filing  correspondence,  auditing  of  all  ordnance 
accounts,  publication  and  distribution  of  bulletins  of  in- 
formation and  orders,  and  execution  of  the  general  ad- 
ministration of  the  office  of  the  chief  of  ordnance. 

The  requirements  division  was  charged  with  prepara- 
tion of  all  schedules  for  ordnance  material  and  the  plac- 
ing of  requisitions  with  the  ordnance  purchasing  officer. 
It  was  also  charged  with  the  compilation  of  the  various 
monthly  reports  required,  and  the  complete  record  and 
follow  up  of  requisitions  placed,  and  the  tonnage  allotted 
to  the  ordnance. 


234     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

The  supply  division  was  charged  with  the  supervision 
of  all  depots  for  the  receipt,  storage,  and  issue  of  ord- 
nance material,  and  for  their  efficient  and  safe  operation; 
with  the  maintenance  of  stocks  and  the  preservation  of 
material  in  the  depots,  with  a  maintenance  of  relations 
with  forces  in  the  field  necessary  for  the  satisfactory 
supply  of  their  needs. 

The  construction  and  maintenance  division  controlled 
the  provision  and  maintenance  of  buildings  and  their 
equipment,  also  the  supervision  of  construction  and  the 
actual  work  of  upkeep  and  repair.  Construction,  how- 
ever, was  performed  by  the  engineer  corps.  The  di- 
vision was  further  charged  with  the  installation,  inspec- 
tion, and  maintenance  of  machinery  for  the  shops  and  the 
mobile  and  semi-permanent  ordnance  repair  shops  at- 
tached to  line  organizations :  and  finally  cooperated  with 
the  salvage  corps  in  the  repair  and  salvage  of  ordnance 
material. 

The  engineering  division  was  entrusted  with  the  work 
of  advising  and  instructing  other  divisions  in  all  tech- 
nical matters  relating  to  procurement,  handling,  storage, 
and  transportation  of  ordnance  stores  and  supplies;  with 
investigation  of  causes  of  defects  in  ordnance  material, 
and  determination  of  the  necessary  remedy;  with  the 
conduct  of  research  work  and  tests  at  proving  grounds; 
with  the  handling  of  matters  of  design,  determination  of 
types,  developing  of  new  or  modification  of  old  mate- 
rial; with  the  preparation  of  technical  pamphlets,  draw- 
ings, and  charts;  with  preparation  of  tables  of  spare 
parts.  It  had  another  role  of  great  importance  in  the 
work  of  instructing  personnel. 

The  task  of  supplying  the  Expeditionary  Forces  in 
armament,  in  ammunition,  in  spare  parts,  coming  both 


Ordnance  235 

from  Europe  and  from  the  United  States,  was  perhaps 
the  most  difficult  that  confronted  any  administrative  de- 
partment of  the  American  Army.  The  list  of  items  in- 
cluded in  ordnance  supplies  amounts  to  32,000  articles. 
Ordnance  material  was  divided  into  eight  homogeneous 
groups  with  a  special  organization,  office,  and  record  sys- 
tem for  each  group.  Incoming  requisitions  were  broken 
up  into  group  issue  orders,  each  one  of  which  covered 
only  the  material  listed  under  one  group.  The  system 
of  **  automatic  supply  "  was  adopted  for  the  procure- 
ment of  ordnance  material;  it  involved  the  maintenance  in 
France  of  a  three  months'  supply  of  all  kinds  of  mate- 
rial and  spare  parts.  This  method,  which  seems  simple 
as  a  general  theory,  proved  extremely  difficult  when  ap- 
plied to  this  special  branch  of  the  service.  It  is  com- 
paratively easy  to  foresee  what  will  be  the  consumption 
of  canned  goods  In  an  army  of  1,000,000  men  during  a 
specified  time ;  it  Is,  on  the  contrary,  extremely  difficult  to 
determine  how  many  rounds  of  ammunition  of  different 
calibers  will  be  consumed  or  how  many  machine  guns 
will  need  replacement   or  repair. 

Nevertheless,  the  ordnance  established  *'  automatic 
supply  tables  "  computed  for  each  article.  In  the  number 
of  units  necessary  to  supply  25,000  men  for  one  month, 
allowing  a  liberal  percentage  for  losses  in  transit  or  in 
storage.  But,  on  account  of  the  intensity  of  mlhtary 
operations  and  of  the  Importance  of  unforeseen  require- 
ments put  in  by  units  in  the  field,  the  system  was  never 
completely  brought  into  application. 

The  ordnance  has  never  operated  any  manufacturing 
plant  in  France;  the  material  of  the  A.  E.  F.  was  pur- 
chased In  Europe  or  imported  from  the  United  States. 
On  the  contrary,  at  the  time  of  the  armistice  it  had  sev- 


236     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

eral  erection,  repair,  and  charging  plants  in  operation, 
or  in  process  of  construction. 

Its  most  important  installation  —  not  completely  fin- 
ished at  the  close  of  the  war  - —  was  the  repair  shop  at 
Mehun-sur-Yevre,  the  plans  of  which  were  drawn  up  to 
meet  the  requirements  of  an  army  of  2,000,000  men. 
There  also  existed  an  advance  shop  at  Is-sur-TIlle,  and 
twenty-two  installations  of  lesser  importance. 

In  the  field,  repairs  were  made  by  means  of  mobile 
repair  shops  belonging  to  two  types :  a  heavy  and  a  light 
one.  Those  of  the  first  type  were  equipped  with  3-ton 
trucks  (called  tool  room,  air  compressor,  and  forge 
trucks  respectively)  and  five  5-ton  trailers  of  the  machine- 
shop  type  (called  lathe,  welding  set,  drill  press,  shaper, 
and  milling  machine  trailers) .  They  were  assigned  to 
the  brigades  of  heavy  army  artillery  and  to  tank  units. 
Repair  shops  of  the  light  type  somewhat  less  Important 
were  assigned  to  army  and  army-corps  artillery  parks 
and  to  divisions  of  infantry. 

Eight  heavy  mobile  ordnance  repair  shop  organiza- 
tions and  twenty-five  of  the  lighter  sort  were  working  at 
the  time  of  the  armistice. 

Almost  all  artillery  material  and  ammunition  used  by 
the  Expeditionary  Forces  were  procured  In  France  and 
to  a  much  smaller  extent  in  Great  Britain.  Only  a  few 
heavy  guns  and  109  75  mm.  were  Imported  from  the 
United  States  by  November  11,  19 18.  A  few  figures 
here  will  give  an  Idea  of  the  importance  of  the  contracts 
made  in  Europe  by  the  ordnance  department: 

3>035  IS  "^"^-  (3-i"ch)  guns  in  France, 
1,190  155  mm.  (6-inch)   howitzers  In  France, 
2,550  Stokes  mortars  in  Great  Britain. 


Ordnance  237 

Deliveries  were  made  at  a  satisfactory  and  regular 
rate.     By  November  30,  1 9 1 8 ,  the  actual  deliveries  were : 

1,978  75  mm.  guns,  from  France, 

346    guns    and    814    155    mm.    howitzers,    from 
France, 

209  8-Inch  howitzers,  from  Great  Britain, 
1,597  3-Inch  mortars  (Stokes),  from  Great  Britain, 

559  6-inch  Newton  mortars,  from  Great  Britain. 

Over  10,000,000  rounds  of  75  ^6  and  1,250,000  rounds 
of  155  2^  were  In  the  same  lapse  of  time  delivered  to  the 
American  Forces. 

Now,  to  the  question  of  portable  weapons.  France 
supplied  4,658  Hotchkiss  machine-guns  and  40,000 
Chauchat  automatic  rifles.  These  contracts  were  made 
to  meet  the  requirements  pending  the  time  when  the 
United  States  should  have  a  sufficient  output  of  Browning 
light  and  heavy  machine-guns  (two  weapons  which  may 
be  considered  as  being  by  far  the  most  perfect  at  present 
in  existence),  which  were  Imported  In  great  quantities 
after  the  summer  of  19 18. 

Not  including  the  portable  weapons  with  which  Amer- 
ican soldiers  were  equipped  in  the  United  States  and  which 
they  carried  with  them  when  they  came  to  France  the 
ordnance  department  secured  as  well  In  America  as  In 
Europe  a  total  of  93,326  machine  guns,  600,000  rifles, 
and  75,000  automatic  rifles. 

The  very  large  contracts  made  In  Europe  were  only 
rendered  possible  thanks  to  the  activity  displayed  by  the 
ordnance  department  In  securing  from  America  the  enor- 
mous quantity  of  raw  materrals  necessary.     In  the  period 

264,111,000  have  been  fired. 
27  760,000  have  been  fired. 


238      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

between  April  i,  19 18,  and  the  armistice  only,  a  total 
of  440,000  tons  were  actually  Imported  In  France. 

The  war  came  to  an  end  before  the  ordnance  depart- 
ment had  had  a  chance  to  see  great  numbers  of  American- 
made  guns  firing  against  the  enemy  American-made  am- 
munition. 

Nevertheless  its  role  has  been  a  very  useful  one.  The 
chiefs  who  were  at  its  head  had  the  merit  of  foreseeing 
the  delay  which  must,  of  necessity,  elapse  between  the 
entry  of  the  United  States  into  the  war  and  the  time  when 
their  system  of  war  material  manufacture  would  reach 
a   sufficient    output. 

They  seized  the  right  moment  to  adopt  materials  of 
allied  make,  and  among  these  they  always  selected  the 
best. 

The  recruiting  of  ordnance  personnel  was  of  necessity 
rather  difficult.  American  industry  had  not  turned  the 
bulk  of  its  activities  toward  intense  production  of  war 
material.  The  army  of  the  United  States  had  nothing 
to  compare  with  the  excellent  personnel  of  gun  repairers 
and  skilled  artificers  that  the  French  artillery  had  trained 
in  peace  time. 

Hardly  had  hostilities  begun  when  a  very  active  cam- 
paign was  undertaken  in  the  American  universities  and 
factories  with  a  view  to  bringing  about  enlistment  of  a 
personnel  whose  technical  knowledge  and  professional 
skill  would  furnish  to  the  ordnance,  officers,  non- 
commissioned officers,  and  soldiers  that  it  so  much 
required. 

The  great  factory  owners,  civil  engineers,  overseers, 
skilled  workmen  thus  enlisted  generally  underwent  a 
course  of  training  In  ordnance  arsenals.  They  were 
afterward  formed  Into  provisional  units  which,  on  their 


Chemical  Warfare  239 

arrival  in  France,  were  broken  up  and  distributed  by  de- 
tachments in  the  installations  where  want  of  personnel 
was  most  acutely  felt.  Let  us  incidentally  recall  the 
fact  that,  in  the  course  of  the  summer  of  19 18,  hardly 
any  personnel  except  infantry  troops  were  transported 
from  America  to  France,  which  fact  greatly  handicapped 
ordnance  activities  in  Europe. 

On  the  day  of  the  armistice  the  total  strength  of  the 
department  present  in  France  was  only  1,803  officers  and 
12,205  enlisted  men. 

However,  the  very  high  technical  skill  and  efficiency 
of  this  personnel  made  up  in  a  certain  measure  for  their 
small  numbers. 

No  sooner  had  he  arrived  in  France  than  General 
Pershing  gave  orders  with  a  view  to  the  organization  of 
the  chemical  warfare  service,  the  growing  importance 
of  which  was  daily  demonstrated  by  the  military  opera- 
tions under  way. 

On  July  5,  19 1 7,  the  service  of  engineers  was  charged 
to  supply  personnel  and  material  for  gas  and  flame  offen- 
sives and  the  medical  corps  for  gas  defensives.  All  gas 
shell  and  other  similar  material  were  to  be  supplied  by 
the  ordnance. 

On  September  3,  19 17,  the  gas  service  was  made  an 
independent  organization.  Its  chief,  Lieut.-Colonel 
Fries,  later  brigadier-general,  was  charged  with  every- 
thing concerning  chemical  warfare,  as  well  for  offensive 
as  for  defensive  purposes,  organization  and  training  of 
personnel,  supply  and  conduct  of  operations. 

One  regiment,  called  ist  Gas  Regiment  (formerly 
30th  Regiment  of  Engineers)  was  organized.  It  com- 
prised: 


240     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

8  headquarters, 

2  Stokes  companies, 

4  Cylinder  and  Livens  projector  companies. 

It  was  later  increased  to  six  battalions  each  of  three 
companies. 

On  March  5,  19 18,  the  chemical  warfare  service,  the 
headquarters  of  which  were  then  at  Tours,  was  reor- 
ganized into  three  main  divisions: 

military, 

technical, 

production  and  supply. 

On  June  3,  19 18,  considering  the  ever-growing  impor- 
tance of  chemical  warfare,  General  Pershing  recom- 
mended to  his  government  that  a  special  service  intended 
for  this  kind  of  war  be  established  in  the  National  Army. 
On  June  28th  the  War  Department  authorized  the  or- 
ganization of  the  "  Chemical  Warfare  Service."  The 
gas  service  of  the  Expeditionary  Forces  became  the  over- 
seas division  of  the  new  formation,  with  a  total  author- 
ized strength  of  916  officers  and  7,624  enlisted  men,  and 
was  increased  on  October  8,  191 8,  to  1,315  officers  and 
17,205  enlisted  men.  The  war  came  to  an  end  before 
the  latter  increase  had  been  realized. 

Two  general  orders  dated  May  27,  and  July  2,  19 18, 
organized  the  details  of  the  operations  of  the  chemical 
warfare  service  in  the  A.  E.  F.  Army,  army  corps,  and 
divisions;  gas  officers  were  to  be  appointed  by  the  chief 
of  the  service. 

Regimental  and  battalion  gas  officers  were  to  be 
chosen  by  the  unit  commanders  among  those  having  fol- 
lowed special  courses  instituted  at  the  gas  school. 


Chemical  Warfare  241 

The  chief  of  chemical  warfare  procured  material  either 
through  requests  made  from  the  other  services  (quarter- 
master and  ordnance)  through  requisition  from  the 
United  States,  or  through  purchase  in  Europe. 

He  had  representatives  in  the  general  purchasing  board 
and  on  the  inter-allied  committee  for  chemical  warfare 
supplies  organized  on  March  6,  19 18. 

Important  deliveries  of  gas  masks  {mark  M  2)  were 
made  by  France;  400,000  respirator  boxes  were  pur- 
chased in  Great  Britain. 

Supplies  were  stored  in  central  depots,^^  whence,  ac- 
cording to  requisitions  made  by  regulating  officers,  they 
were  forwarded  to  army  depots  established  in  the  zone 
of  field  operations.  At  the  time  of  the  armistice  these 
central  depots  had  on  hand,  among  other  items,  1,850,- 
000  respirator  boxes,  4,095  projectors,  36,468  Livens 
cylinders,  and  39,105  Stokes  trench-mortar  bombs  filled 
with  aquinite  and  Collongite. 

Manufactures  organized  in  Europe  by  the  American 
service  of  chemical  warfare  were  not  yet  greatly  devel- 
oped at  the  end  of  the  war:  2,000  cylinders  were  filled 
with  gas  at  Pont-de-Claix :  a  mask  salvage  plant  was  in 
operation  at  Chateauroux,  200,000  Connell  canisters  had 
been  produced  in  England. 

As  for  shells,  bombs,  and  grenades,  the  service  limited 
its  activities  to  the  supply  of  gas  envelopes;  that  is  to 
say,  the  projectiles  themselves  being  supplied  by  the 
ordnance.  Twenty  per  cent,  of  all  projectiles  that  were 
being  produced  in  the  United  States  at  the  close  of  hos- 
tilities, up  to  and  including,  220  mm.  shells  were  filled 
with  gas.  This  proportion  was  to  be  increased  to  25 
per  cent,  after  January  i,  1919. 

28  The  most  important  of  these  were  established  at  Montoir,  St.  Sulpice, 
and  Gievres. 


242     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

A  chemical  laboratory  for  the  study  of  technical  prob- 
lems was  established  at  Puteaux.  Sag  paste,  an  excellent 
preventative  for  mustard  gas  burns,  was  turned  out  there. 

Near  Chaumont,  the  service  had  at  its  disposal  an 
experimental  field  for  the  tests  pertaining  to  allied  or 
enemy  chemical  warfare  material. 

A  school  for  officers  was  annexed  to  it;  the  course, 
which  was  of  varied  duration,  was  at  the  time  of  the 
armistice  being  followed  by  228  officers. 

American  gas  troops  took  a  most  active  part  in  the 
great  military  operations  that  developed  between  June, 
191 8,  and  the  armistice. 

On  the  Marne  and  the  Vesle  from  June  30th  to  Sep- 
tember 1 8th,  they  utilized  among  others,  229  Stokes 
thermit  bombs,  718  smoke  bombs,  and  executed  eight 
important  gas  projector  attacks. 

During  the  Meuse-Argonne  offensive,  six  companies 
of  the  1st  Gas  Regiment  were  assigned  to  the  First 
Army,  and  organized  into  three  battalions.  They  em- 
ployed 1,185  Stokes  smoke  bombs,  1,345  Thermit  bombs, 
489  gas  bombs,  236  Livens  cylinders,  130  of  which  were 
filled  with  gas  and  206  with  high  explosives.  As  the  at- 
tacks progressed,  more  and  more  gas  was  used,  the  confi- 
dence of  attacking  troops  in  the  units  of  the  gas  service 
was  constantly  proved  by  the  requests  sent  in  ever-in- 
creasing numbers  for  the  collaboration  of  the  personnel 
of  the  gas  service  in  their  attacks. 

More  cannot  be  said  in  proof  of  the  value  of  this  serv- 
ice and  the  skill  and  courage  of  its  personnel. 

The  inspector-general^ s  department  is  a  very  ancient 
institution  in  the  United  States  Army,  having  been  or- 
ganized in  1775  under  General  Washington. 


Inspector  General  243 

Its  sphere  of  activity  extends  over  every  branch  of 
military  affairs  excepting  purely  tactical  operations. 

According  to  existing  regulations,  inspectors  exercised 
a  comprehensive  and  general  observation  over  all  that 
pertains  to  the  efficiency  of  the  army:  camps,  billets, 
transportation,  clothing,  armament  and  equipment,  ac- 
counts, supplies,  morale  of  the  troops.  They  condemn 
unserviceable  property,  verify  money  accounts,  expendi- 
ture of  public  funds,  and  report  as  to  irregularities  dis- 
covered, making  suggestions  as  to  the  correction  of  de- 
fects coming  under  their  observation.  They  also  under- 
take special  investigations  when  required. 

It  is  easy  to  conceive  of  the  importance  of  the  part 
played  by  such  a  department  in  an  organization  of  the 
size  of  the  Expeditionary  Forces  whose  activities  cov- 
ered so  many  points  of  our  territory.  Therefore,  twice 
in  succession.  General  Pershing  was  led  to  increase  the 
scope  of  these  activities. 

On  November  9,  19 17,  he  authorized  the  inspector- 
general  to  give  all  orders  which  might  be  found  necessary 
to  secure  prompt  correction  of  any  irregularities  or  de- 
ficiencies noted  at  inspection  of  troops.  On  June  5,  19 18, 
when  the  American  Army  entered  the  period  of  active 
operations  on  a  large  scale,  he  charged  the  inspector  gen- 
eral with  the  supervision  of  discipline  throughout  the 
American  Expeditionary  Forces. 

In  the  course  of  the  great  offensive  which  marked  the 
ultimate  phase  of  the  war,  the  inspector  generals  were 
to  keep  the  high  command  constantly  informed  touching 
the  fighting  value  of  the  troops  at  the  time  when  they 
entered  the  field  of  battle  or  were  withdrawn  from  the 
fight. 

The  department  was  during  the  entire  course  of  the 


244     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

war  commanded  by  General  Brewster;  it  was  organized 
by  army,  army  corps,  and  division. 

Divisional  inspectors  were  to  keep  in  touch  with  troops 
engaged  in  line;  thus  they  reported  only  upon  such  facts 
as  they  had  personally  observed,  and  their  daily  reports 
kept  the  high  command  most  exactly  informed  as  to  the 
material  and  moral  conditions  of  the  troop  and  their 
leaders. 

In  the  American  Army,  the  activities  of  the  judge- 
advocate  are  very  much  the  same  as  those  of  the  "  Service 
du  Contentieux  et  de  la  Justice  Militaire  "  in  the  French 
Army. 

General  Bethel,  who  was  at  the  head  of  this  depart- 
ment during  the  whole  war,  organized  his  central  office 
at  Chaumont  in  five  sections.  The  first  considered  gen- 
eral questions  of  military  law  and  administration,  the 
application  of  war  legislation,  matters  of  naturalization, 
and  repatriation.  It  supplied  private  and  gratuitous 
legal  advice  to  members  of  the  Expeditionary  Forces. 
The  second  section  supervised  the  work  of  the  field  judge- 
advocates,  reviewed  the  proceedings  of  general  courts- 
martial,  and  sat  upon  disciplinary  questions  and  those 
connected  with  the  administration  of  military  justice. 

The  third  section  was  concerned  solely  with  those  cases 
of  conviction  by  military  courts  which  involved  the  penal- 
ties of  dishonorable  discharge,  the  dismissal  of  an  officer, 
or  death. 

The  fourth  section  was  concerned  with  the  legal  aspects 
of  army  finance,  with  questions  of  purchase  and  supply, 
contracts,  accounts,  claims,  pay  and  allowances,  insur- 
ance, and  workmen's  compensation. 

The  fifth  section  studied  and  advised  upon  questions 


Judge  Advocate  245 

of  international  law,  the  interpretation  of  treaties  and 
international  agreements,  matters  of  foreign  law,  of  re- 
lations with  the  Allies  and  the  enemy,  prisoners  of  war, 
and  the  military  occupation. 

With  troops  in  the  field,  each  army  had  Its  army  judge- 
advocate,  each  corps  a  corps  judge-advocate,  and  each 
division  normally  two  judge-advocates. 

In  the  zone  of  the  interior,  there  was  a  judge-advocate 
of  the  S.  O.  S.  stationed  at  Tours,  under  whom  operated 
judge-advocates  for  each  of  the  sections  of  the  S.  O.  S. 
He  was  also  the  director  of  the  renting,  requisitions,  and 
claims  service. 

Before  terminating  this  chapter  it  may  be  of  Interest 
to  point  out  two  important  features  of  the  administration 
of  military  justice  by  American  courts-martial.  The 
first  consists  in  the  power  wielded  by  the  authority  which 
prescribed  the  reunion  of  a  court-martial  to  modify,  but 
only  in  a  mitigating  sense,  any  sentence  that  does  not 
involve  death  penalty  or  dismissal  from  the  army. 

The  other  one  involves  the  very  frequent  application 
of  suspension  of  pay,  this  kind  of  punishment  being  very 
effective  by  reason  of  the  high  pay  rates  in  the  xA.merican 
Army. 

In  order  to  complete  this  summary  description  of  the 
main  administrative  departments  existing  in  the  A.  E.  F. 
at  the  close  of  hostilities,  three  more  ought  to  be  men- 
tioned here : 

The  Military  Board  of  Allied  Supply ^  the  General  Di- 
rection of  transportation,  and  the  motor  transport  serv- 
ice. 

But  the  first  of  these,  by  reason  of  Its  regional  ac- 
tivities, was  very  closely  linked  to  the  territorial  organiza- 


246     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

tion  of  the  service  of  supplies.  The  second  whose  main 
duty  consisted  in  connecting  the  advance  section,  the  inter- 
mediate section,  and  the  base  section,  had  its  activities 
spread  all  along  the  American  lines  of  communication. 
The  third,  forming  as  it  did  the  complement  and  pro- 
longation of  the  service  of  railways,  naturally  falls  under 
the  subject  of  this  latter  treated  elsewhere  and  conse- 
quently these  three  branches  are  grouped  together  in 
Chapter  XI  under  the  heading,  ''  Development  of  the 
Lines  of  Communication** 


CHAPTER  VII 

SITUATION  OF  THE  EXPEDITIONARY  FORCES  AT  THE 
BEGINNING  OF  SEPTEMBER,    1918 

During  the  first  days  of  September,  General  Pershing 
found  himself  at  the  head  of  an  army  of  1,400,000  of 
whom  1,000,000  at  least  were  combatants. 

But  if  we  wish  to  form  a  real  idea  of  the  strength 
of  the  Expeditionary  Forces  at  this  time,  these  numbers 
require  careful  commentary.  For,  as  may  be  easily  un- 
derstood, the  commander-in-chief  could  only  dispose  in 
the  active  offensive  operations,  imminent  at  this  date,  of 
those  units  already  organized  and  sufficiently  trained. 

Should  the  war  be  prolonged,  the  number  of  divisions 
would,  of  course,  constantly  increase.  The  arrival  of 
troops  was  being  effectuated  practically  without  either 
delay  or  serious  hindrance.  Thanks  to  the  application 
of  the  system  of  replacements  which  had  been  adopted, 
no  great  diminution  in  the  strength  of  the  fighting  units 
could  be  foreseen.  It  was  easy  for  General  Pershing 
to  establish  with  relative  accuracy,  after  the  following 
manner,  the  exact  military  situation  of  his  forces.  To 
those  divisions  which,  after  having  already  fought,  were 
withdrawn  from  the  line  in  order  to  rest  and  incorporate 
the  replacements  automatically  furnished  by  the  divisional 
depots,  were  to  be  added  those  divisions  not  yet  engaged 
but  whose  training  was  or  was  about  to  be  terminated. 
General  Pershing  had  also  to  take  into  account  the  actual 
position  of  his  troops  and  their  employment  either  in  the 

247 


248     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

rear  or  in  the  advance  zone.  This  situation,  such  as  it 
appeared  In  the  early  days  of  September,  we  shall  en- 
deavor to  place  before  the  reader. 

On  the  twenty-second  of  August,  at  which  time  the 
commander-in-chief  contemplated  forming  a  purely  Amer- 
ican Field  Army  composed  of  his  First  and  Third  Corps, 
placed  side  by  side  upon  the  Vesle,  the  army  headquarters 
were  established  at  La  Ferte-sous-Jouarre,  thence  trans- 
ported to  Neufchateau,  where  they  awaited  the  occasion 
to  direct  the  operations  which  were  to  be  attempted  by 
the  American  troops. 

As  yet  no  one  had  been  designated  to  take  command 
of  the  first  field  army,  and  this,  for  reasons  which  may 
easily  be  explained:  up  to  this  time,  the  numerous  ac- 
tivities In  which  American  troops  had  been  engaged  were 
carried  on  with  units  which.  In  size,  weire  never  superior 
to  a  division  or  at  most  a  corps.  No  American  chief 
had,  as  yet,  been  obliged  to  grapple  with  the  difficulties 
and  complications  entailed  by  a  command  over  a  very 
extensive  front,  where  obstacles  to  communication  and 
supply  in  a  foreign  land  were  added  to  all  those  Inherent 
to  active  combat. 

The  situation  was  particularly  delicate  for  the  first 
American  army  chief  who  should  be  called  uDon  to  face 
it,  especially  as  the  French  Government  had  asked  and 
obtained  from  America,  at  the  moment  of  the  spring 
offensive,  the  placing  of  infantry  transport  at  the  head 
of  the  priority  schedule,  to  the  detriment  of  any  other 
arm  or  service.  The  difficulties  and  responsibilities  of 
the  chief  of  the  first  field  army,  thus  deorived  of  part  of 
the  resources  necessary  for  the  life  of  an  army,  were 
bound  to  be  very  great.     General  Pershing  considered 


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American  Ejfectives  in  September,   igi8        249 

that  he  alone  should  assume  such  an  onerous  burden,  and 
reserved  to  himself  the  direct  command  of  the  first  Amer- 
ican Army  which  was  now  to  take  the  field.^ 

Already  seven  army  corps  existed  or  were  in  process  of 
formation : 

The  First  Corps,  under  General  Liggett,  which  had 
already  taken  part  in  active  operations  in  the  Marne  and 
Vesle  campaigns,  and  was  at  this  time  between  Saizerais 
and  Toul.  This  corps  possessed  its  organic  artillery  and 
a  portion  of  its  services  of  the  rear. 

The  Second  Corps  may  be  simply  noted  here  as  operat- 
ing upon  the  British  front.  General  Read,  who  was  in 
command,  had  established  his  headquarters  at  Fruges 
where  he  administered  the  American  divisions  which  were 
in  line  or  else  undergoing  instruction  in  the  British  zone. 

The  Third  Corps,  commanded  by  General  Bullard, 
still  remained  at  Chateau-de-Fresnes,  south  of  the  Vesle, 
from  whence  they  were  soon  to  be  transported  to  Souilly, 
near  Verdun.  Like  the  First,  the  Third  Corps  had  al- 
ready been  proven;  like  it  it  also  possessed  its  own  artil- 
lery and  other  services,  and  might  therefore  be  considered 
as  ready  for  action. 

The  Fourth  Corps  of  much  more  recent  formation  was 
under  the  orders  of  General  Dickman,  former  com- 
mander of  the  Third  Division;  his  staff  was  newly  as- 

1  Order  of  Battle  of  the  First  Army  at  the  date  of  September  i,  1918. 
General  John  J.  Pershing,  Army  Commander 

Colonel  Hugh.  A.  Drumm Chief  of  Staff 

Colonel  A.   B.   Barber Chief  of  the  First  Section 

Colonel  Charles  L.  Hall Chief  of  the  Second  Section 

Colonel  R.  McCleave  Chief  of  the  Third  Section 

Colonel  J.   L.    DeWitt Chief  of  the  Fourth  Section 

Colonel  Lewis  H.  V^atkins Chief  of  the  Fifth  Section 


250     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

sembled  at  Toul  with  supervision  over  operations  in  the 
southern  Woevre  sector.^ 

The  Fifth  Corps  had  been  for  several  days  at  Benoite- 
Vaux,  near  Dieue-sur-Meuse.  Its  chief,  General  Cam- 
eron, lately  at  the  head  of  the  Fourth  Division,  during 
operations  between  the  Marne  and  Vesle,  had  but  re- 
cently constituted  his  staff. ^ 

The  Sixth  Corps  which  was  at  Bourbonne-les-Bains 
recently  organized  and  consequently  not  ready  for  action. 
It  was  commanded  by  General  Bundy,  lately  at  the  head 
of  the  gallant  Second  Division  which  had  checked  the 
enemy  before  Chateau-Thierry.* 

The  Seventh  Corps  was  operating  in  the  Vosges  under 
General  Wright,  formerly  commanding  the  Fifth  Corps, 
with  headquarters  at  Remiremont.     This  Seventh  Corps 

2  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Fourth  Army  Corps  at  the  date  of  September 
I,  1918. 

Major-General  Joseph  T.  Dickman,  Commanding  the  Army  Corps 

Colonel  Stuart  Heintzelman Chief  of  Staff 

Major  James   Ulio Chief  of  First  Section,  G  i 

Major  Joseph   Stillwell Chief  of  Second  Section,  G  2 

Lieutenant-Colonel  W.  H.  Haskell Chief  of  Third  Section,  G  3 

3  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Fifth  Army  Corps  at  the  date  of  September 
I,  1918. 

Major-General  George  H.  Cameron,  Commanding  the  Army  Corps 

Brigadier-General   W.  B.   Burtt Chief  of  StaflF 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Albert  W.  Forman Chief  of  First  Section,  Gi 

Lieutenant-Colonel  George    M.    Russell Chief  of  Second  Section,  G2 

Lieutenant-Colonel  T.   H.  Emerson Chief  of  Third  Section,  G  3 

*  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Sixth  Army  Corps  at  the  date  of  September 
I,  1918. 

Major-General  Omar  Bundy,  Commanding  the  Army  Corps 

Brigadier-General  Briant  H.  Wells Chief  of  Staff 

Colonel    Charles    H.    Bridges Chief  of  First  Section,  Gi 

Lieutenant-Colonel  S.  T.  Mackall Chief  of  Second  Section,  G2 

Colonel  George  F.  Baltzell Chief  of  Third  Section,  G3 


American  Effectives  in  September,   igi8        251 

was  formed  from  elements  of  the  old  Fifth  Corps  whose 
place  It  took.^ 

General  Wright's  administrative  supervision  extended 
over  all  the  American  forces  under  instruction  or  occupy- 
ing sectors  in  the  rear  of  the  French  eastern  group  of 
armies. 

In  fine,  out  of  seven  army-corps  staffs,  we  may  con- 
sider that  two  were  immobilized  —  the  Second  upon  the 
British  front;  the  Seventh  on  the  front  of  our  eastern 
group  of  armies  —  and  the  Sixth  was  not,  for  the  mo- 
ment, capable  of  being  utilized.  Consequently,  we  can- 
not count  It  at  this  time,  more  than  four  army  corps  ready 
for  active  service  upon  the  Lorraine  Front;  namely, 
the  First,  Third,  Fourth,  and  Fifth. 

Among  the  divisions  which  could  be  considered  at  this 
time  as  fighting  units;  that  Is  to  say,  which  had  partici- 
pated in  action  or  occupied  the  trenches  for  a  sufficient 
period  to  have  become  accustomed  to  being  under  fire, 
and  which  had  also  the  advantage  of  possessing  their 
own  artillery  services,  fourteen  could  be  counted  upon 
in  the  action  which  was  shortly  to  take  place. 

Three  on  the  Vesle,  where  they  formed  part  of  the 
Third  American  Army  Corps,  the  Twenty-eighth,  Thirty- 
second,  and  Seventy-seventh. 

Three  in  defensive  sectors  in   the  southern  Woevre 

5  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Seventh  Army  Corps  at  the  date  of  September 
I,  1918. 

Major-General  William  W.  Wright,  Commanding  the  Army  Corps 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Gordon  Johnson    Chief  of  Staff 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Ward    S.    Dabney Chief  of  First  Section,  Gi 

First  Lieutenant  James  W.  Barney Chief  of  Second  Section,  Ga 

Captain  John  H.  Prentice Chief  of  Third  Section,  G3 


252     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

region  north  of  Nancy:  the  Eighty-second,^  Eighty-ninth  J 
and  Ninetieth;*  only  the  first  of  these  possessed  its  ar- 
tillery.    But  in  order  to  hasten  the  entry  of  the  two  lat- 

6  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Eighty-second  Division  at  the  date  of  September 
I,  1918. 

Major-General  William  P.  Burnham,  Commanding  the  Division 
163d  Infantry  Brigade  164th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  M.  D.  Cronin       Brigadier-General  J.  R,  Lindsey 
325th  Infantry  Regiment  327th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  Walter  M.  Whitman  Colonel  Frank  D.  Ely 

326th  Infantry  Regiment  328th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  John  C.  McArthur  Colonel  H.  B.  Nelson 

157th  Artillery  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  C.  D.  Rhodes 
3JQth  Artillery  Regiment 
Colonel  E.  d'A  Pearce 
320th  Artillery  Regiment 
Colonel  H.  C.  Williams 
321st  Artillery  Regiment 
Colonel  Clarence  Deems,  Jr. 

"^  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Eighty-ninth  Division  at  the  date  of  September 
I,  1918. 

Brigadier-General  Frank  L.  Winn,  Commanding  the  Division 
(This  division  had  not  yet  received  its  artillery). 

177th  Infantry  Brigade  178th  Infantry  Brigade 

Colonel  James  H.  Reeves  Brigadier-General  T.  G.  Hanson 

353d  Infantry  Regiment  355th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  Conrad  S.  Babcock  Colonel  James  D.  Taylor 

354th  Infantry  Regiment  356th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  Americus  Mitchell  Colonel  L,  M.  Nuttman 

*  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Ninetieth  Division  at  the  date  of  September 
I,  1918. 

Major-General  Henry  T.  Allen,  Commanding  the  Division 
(This  division  had  not  yet  received  its  artillery). 

179th  Infantry  Brigade  l8oth  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General   J.  P.   O'Neil  Brig.-Gen.  V.  S.  McAlexander 

357th  Infantry  Regiment  359th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  Ed.  T.  Hartman  Colonel  W.  A.  Cavanaugh 

368th  Infantry  Regiment  360th  Infantry  Regimert 

Colonel  E.  M.  Leary  Colonel  H.  C.  Price 


American  Effectives  in  September,   igi8        253 

ter  into  line,  the  organic  artillery  destined  for  the  Ameri- 
can divisions  operating  with  the  British  could  be  assigned 
to  these  units. 

Eight  withdrawn  from  the  front  for  rest  and  instruc- 
tion had  taken  part  in  the  operations  of  July  and  August 
or  had  been  engaged  in  active  sectors.  These  included 
the  First,  Second,  Third,  Fourth,  and  Fifth,^  the  Twenty- 
sixth,  Thirty-fifth,^^  and  Forty-second. 

»  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Fifth  Division  at  the  date  of  September  i,  1918. 
Major-General  John  McMahon,  Commanding  the  Division 

Qth  Infantry  Brigade  loth  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  J.  C.   Castner  Colonel  Paul  B.  Malone 

50th  Infantry  Regiment  6th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  F.  B.  Hawkins  Colonel   Henry  J.   Hunt 

6lst  Infantry  Regiment  llth  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  Hugh  D.  W^ise  Colonel  John  B.  Bennet 

5th  Artillery  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  C.  A.  F.  Flagler 
19th  Artillery  Regiment 
Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  P.  Hollingsworth 
20th  Artillery  Regiment 
Colonel  Brooke  Payne 
2lst  Artillery  Regiment 
Colonel  H.  MacMaster 
10  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Thirty-fifth  Division  at  the  date  of  September 
I,  1918. 

Major-General  Peter  E.  Traub,  Commanding  the  Division 

69th  Infantry  Brigade  70th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  N.  F.  McClure    Brigadier-General  Chas.  I.  Martin 
137th  Infantry  Regiment  139th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel   Clad.  Hamilton  Colonel  Kirby  Walker 

138th  Infantry  Regiment  14.0th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  George  P.  White  Colonel  Pierce  A.  Murphy 

60th  Artillery  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  L.  G.  Berry 
128th  Artillery  Regiment 
Colonel  F.  M.  Rumbold 
129th  Artillery  Regiment 
Colonel  Karl  D.  Klemm 
130th  Artillery  Regiment 
Lieutenant-Colonel   James  E.   Wilson 


254     T^^  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Four  divisions  more  were  placed  on  the  Vosges  front 
either  framed  in  with  French  troops  or  brigaded  with 
French  divisions.  They  were  the  Thirty-seventh,^^ 
Ninety-second,^^  Sixth, ^^  and  Twenty-ninth. 

The  Thirty-seventh  and  the  Sixth  expected  to  receive 
their  artillery  in  the  middle  of  September,  whereas  that 

11  Order    of    Battle    of    the    Thirty-seventh    Division    at    the    date    of 
September  i,  1918. 

Major-General  C.  S.  Farnsworth,  Commanding  the  Division 

(This  division  had  not  yet  received  its  artillery). 

73d  Infantry  Brigade  74.th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brig-Gen.  C.  X.  Zimmerman  Brigadier-General  W.  P.  Jackson 

145th  Infantry  Regiment  J47th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  Sanford  B.  Haubery  Colonel  F.  W.  Galbraith 

146th  Infantry  Regiment  148th  Infantry  Regiment 
Colonel  James  N.  Pickering  Colonel  J.  A.  Lynch 

12  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Ninety-second  Division  at  the  date  of  September 
X,  1918. 

Major-General  Charles  C.  Ballou,  Commanding  the  Division 

(This  division  had  not  yet  received  its  artillery). 

183d  Infantry  Brigade  184th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General   M.   H.  Barnum     Brigadier-General  Wm.   H.  Hay 

S6sth  Infantry  Regiment  367th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  V.  A.  Caldwell  Colonel  James  A.  Moss 

366th  Infantry  Regiment  368th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  Ralph  B.  Parrott  Colonel  Fred  R.  Brown 

13  Order   of   Battle   of   the    Sixth   Division    at    the    date   of    September 
I,  1918. 

Major-General  Walter  H.  Gordon,  Commanding  the  Division 

(This  division  had  not  yet  received  its  artillery). 

Ilth  Infantry  Brigade  12th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Wm.  R.  Dashiell   Brigadier-General  James  B.  Erwin 

51st  Infantry  Regiment  53d  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  Isaac  Newell  Colonel  F.  G.  Stretzinger 

52d  Infantry  Regiment  54th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  Ernest  V.  Smith  Colonel  M.  Crowley 


American  Effectives  in  September,   igi8        255 

of  the  Twenty-ninth  ^^  was  only  to  be  furnished  at  the 
end  of  the  month. 

As  to  the  five  divisions  distributed  In  the  British  zone, 
two  —  the  Twenty-seventh  and  the  Thirtieth  —  were 
engaged  In  active  operations,  after  which,  regrouped  and 
reorganized,  they  were  to  constitute  the  Second  Corps 
when  this  was  to  operate  with  the  British.  The  Thirty- 
third,^^  Seventy-eighth,^^  and  Eightieth  having  practically 

1*  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Twenty-ninth  Division  at  the  date  of  September 
I,  1918. 

Major-General  Charles  G.  Morton,  Commanding  the  Division 
(This  division  had  not  yet  received  its  artillery). 

Syth  Infantry  Brigade  58th  Infantry  Brigade 

Colonel  Milton  A.  Reckord  Brigadier-General  H.  H.  Bandholtz 

113th  Infantry  Regiment  115th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  Harry  C.  Jones  Lieutenant-Colonel  Wm.  R.  Pope 

114th  Infantry  Regiment  Il6th  Infantry  Regiment 

Lieutenant-Colonel  G.  M.  Buttle  Colonel  A.  J.  Harris 

IS  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Thirty-third  Division  at  the  date  of  SeptemHer 
I,  1918. 

Major-General  George  Bell,  Commanding  the  Division 
(This  division  had  not  yet  received  its  artillery). 

65th  Infantry  Brigade  66th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General   Edw.   L.   King  Brigadier-General  Paul  A.  Wolf 

129th  Infantry  Regiment  131st  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  E.  A.  Myer  Colonel  Joseph  B.  Sanborn 

130th  Infantry  Regiment  I32d  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  J.  v.  Clinnin  Colonel  Abel  Davis 

i«  Order    of    Battle    of    the    Seventy-eighth    Division    at    the    date    of 
September  i,  1918. 

Major-General  James  H.  McCrae,  Commanding  the  Division 

(This  division  had  not  yet  received  its  artillery). 

155th  Infantry  Brigade  156th   Infantry   Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Mark  L.  Harsey  Brigadier-General  James  T.   Dean 

309th  Infantry  Regiment  3 nth  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  John   M.   Morgan  Colonel  Marcus  B.  Stokes 

310th  Infantry  Regiment  312th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel   Walter   C.  Babcock  Colonel   Alvord   V.  P.   Anderson 


256     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

completed  their  training  were  ready  to  be  withdrawn 
from  the  British  zone  and  sent  to  rejoin  the  bulk  of  the 
American  contingents  at  the  French  front,  should  General 
Pershing  think  fit.  Accordingly  at  the  end  of  August 
orders  were  given  to  that  effect. 

The  Thirty-third  was  sent  near  Esnes  (in  the  Verdun 
district),  the  Seventy-eighth  to  Bourbonne-les-Bains,  the 
Eightieth  ^"^  to  Chatillon-sur-Seine. 

One  colored  division  (the  Ninety-third)  was  split  up 
and  distributed  among  the  French  forces,  a  regiment  or 
two  by  division. ^^ 

The  six  depot  divisions  were  to  serve  as  a  reservoir 
to  be  drawn  upon  for  filling  up  the  ranks  of  the  fighting 
units,  and  need  simply  be  noted  here;  they  were  the 
Thirty-ninth,  Fortieth,  Forty-first,  Seventy-sixth,  Eighty- 
third,  and  Eighty-fifth. 

Six  more  divisions  recently  disembarked  had  just 
begun  training;   these   were   the   Ninety-first,^^   Seventy- 

i'^  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Eightieth  Division  at  the  date  of  September 
I,  1918. 

Major-General  Adelbert  Cronkhite,  Commanding  the  Division 
(This  division  had  not  yet  received  its  artillery). 

159th  Infantry  Brigade  i6oth  Infantry  Brigade 

Brig.-Gen.    George   H.   Jamerson     Brigadier-General   Lloyd   M.   Brett 

317th  Infantry  Regiment  319th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  Howard  R.  Perry  Colonel  Frank  S.  Cochon 

318th  Infantry  Regiment  320th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel   Ulysses  G.  Worillow  Lt.-Col.  Ephraim  G.  Peyton 

1®  The  369th  Infantry  reenforced  the  French  One  hundred  Sixty-first 
Division;  the  370th  the  French  Fifty-ninth  Division;  the  371st  and  372d 
reinforced  the  One  hundred  Fifty-seventh  French  Division. 

i»  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Ninety-first  Division  at  the  date  of  September 
I,  1918- 

Major-General  William  H.  Johnston,  Commanding  the  Division 
(This  division  had  not  yet  received  its  artillery). 

18 1  St  Infantry  Brigade  J82d  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  J.  B.  McDonald         Brigadier-General  F.  S.  Foltz 


American  Effectives  in  September,   igi8        257 

ninth,2o     Thlrty-slxth,2i     Seventh,22     Eighty-first,^^     and 
Eighty-elghth.24 

The  Ninety-first  was  expected  to  be  ready  in  mid-Sep- 
tember, and  capable,  if  General  Pershing  so  decided,  to  go 
directly  into  line  without  passing  through  that  prepara- 
tory school  of  combat,  the  quiet  sector. 

S6ist  Infantry  Regiment  sdsd  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  Wm.  D.  Davis  Colonel  H.  LaT.  Cavanaugh 

362d  Infantry  Regiment  364th  Infantry  Regiment 

Lt.-Col.  J.  B.  Woolnough  Colonel  Geo.  MacD.  Weeks 

20  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Seventy-ninth  Division  at  the  date  of  September 
I,  1918. 

Major-General  Joseph  E.  Kuhn,  Commanding  the  Division 
(This  division  had  not  yet  received  its  artillery). 

157th  Infantry  Brigade  158th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brig.-Gen.    Wm.    J.    Nicholson  Brigadier-General  K.  H.  Noble 

313th  Infantry  Regiment  315th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel   Claude  B.   Sweezey  Colonel  Alden  C.  Knowles 

3i4.th  Infantry  Regiment  316th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  Wm.  H.  Oury  Colonel  Oscar  J.  Charles 

21  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Thirty-sixth  Division  at  the  date  of  September 
I,  1918. 

Major-General  William  R.  Smith,  Commanding  the  Division 
(This  division  had  not  yet  received  its  artillery). 

yist  Infantry  Brigade  y2nd  Infantry  Brigade 

Brig.-Gen.  Pegram  Witworth  Brigadier-General   John   A.   Halen 

141st  Infantry  Regiment  143d  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel   W.  E.  Jackson  Colonel  John  S.  Hoover 

I42d  Infantry  Regiment  144th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  A.  W.  Bloor  Colonel  Wm.  K.  Wright 

22  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Seventh  Division  at  the  date  of  September 
1,  1918. 

Brigadier-General  C.  H.  Barth,  Commanding  the  Division 
(This  division  had  not  yet  received  its  artillery). 

13th  Infantry  Brigade  14th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  C.  H.  Barth  Brigadier-General   Lutz   Wahl 

55th  Infantry  Regiment  34th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  J.  V.  Heidt  Colonel  Fred.  L.  Munson 

56th  Infantry  Regiment  64th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  W.  O.  Johnson  Colonel  E.  A.  Lewis 


258     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

The  Seventy-ninth  could  be  expected  to  undertake  ac- 
tive operations  at  about  the  same  time. 

The  Thirty-sixth  had  arrived  in  France  only  in  the 
last  days  of  July  and  could  hardly  be  ready  for  active 
service  before  October.  The  three  other  divisions  which 
figure  in  this  enumeration  —  that  is  to  say,  the  Seventh, 
Eighty-first  and  Eighty-eighth  —  were  only  sent  into 
camp  at  about  the  middle  of  August  and  could  not  be 
counted  on  before  the  latter  part  of  October. 

To  sum  up  the  situation :  General  Pershing  might  count 
upon  having  at  the  end  of  August,  ready  for  active  serv- 
ice, one  field  army  staff,  four  army  corps  staffs,  fourteen 
divisions  able,  in  case  of  necessity,  to  take  the  field. 
These  divisions  possessed  their  artillery.  Four  divisions 
might,  in  case  of  emergency,  also  take  part  in  the  battle 
since  they  already  were  in  sectors  and  were  expecting  to 

23  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Eighty-first  Division  at  the  date  of  September 
I,  1918. 

Major-General   Charles  J.  Bailey,   Commanding  the   Division 
(This  division  had  not  yet  received  its  artillery). 

l6ist  Infantry  Brigade  l62d  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General    G.    W.    Mclver        Brigadier-General  M.  McFarland 

321st  Infantry  Regiment  323d  Infantry  Regiment 

Col.  Frank  Halstead  Colonel   Thomas   A.   Pearce 

322d  Infantry  Brigade  324th  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  L.  T.  Richardson  Colonel  G.  W.  Moses 

2*  Order  of  Battle  of  the  Eighty-eighth  Division  at  the  date  of  September 
I,  1918. 

Major-General  William  Weigel,  Commanding  the  Division 
(This  division  had  not  yet  received  its  artillery). 

i7Sth  Infantry  Brigade  176th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  M.  B.   Stewart         Brigadier-General  W.   O.  Beach 

349th  Infantry  Regiment  351st  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  G.  Sturdevant  Colonel  H.  B.  Crosby 

350th  Infantry  Regiment  352d  Infantry  Regiment 

Colonel  H.  J.  Price  Colonel   Clyde  E.   Hawkins 


American  Effectives  in  September,   igi8        259 

be  joined  by  their  artillery  before  the  end  of  September. 
Three  divisions  might  be  transferred  from  the  British 
front  and  two  more,  whose  instruction  was  almost  fin- 
ished (the  Ninety-first  and  Seventy-ninth)  could  be  con- 
sidered as  utilizable  in  case  of  necessity. 

The  following  month,  four  fresh  divisions  might 
be  expected  to  leave  camp  for  the  fighting  line;  conse- 
quently America  could  calculate  on  placing  600,000  com- 
batants in  the  field  during  the  first  days  of  September, 
100,000  more  at  the  end  of  this  same  month  or,  at  the 
latest,  during  October. 

In  order  to  complete  this  enumeration,  we  should  also 
say  a  word  on  the  situation  of  the  artillery  in  the  Ameri- 
can Army. 

At  the  date  of  which  we  are  speaking,  fifteen  brigades 
—  that  is  to  say,  the  organic  formations  of  fifteen  divi- 
sions —  had  quitted  their  training  camps  and  were  ready 
to  support  their  infantry  in  battle.  By  modifying  the 
ultimate  designation  of  some  of  these  units  —  as  was  done 
in  certain  divisional  formations,  and  reenforcing  the  di- 
visions ready  for  combat  on  the  French  front  with  certain 
artillery  brigades  which  had  been  destined  to  divisions 
operating  on  the  British  front,  or  with  those  whose  di- 
visions were  not  scheduled  to  participate  in  the  forth- 
coming battle,  it  was  found  possible  to  bring  into  line 
for  the  great  offensive  which  General  Pershing  was  about 
to  undertake  almost  the  total  artillery  forces  of  which  the 
American  Army  at  this  time  disposed. 

During  the  month  of  September,  nine  more  divisional 
artilleries  might  be  expected  to  quit  camp,  after  their 
first  phase  of  training,  if  they  were  able  to  find  the  req- 
uisite number  of  horses,  and,  during  the  month  of  Octo- 
ber, three  more  brigades  might  be  counted  upon. 


26o     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

The  heavy  artillery  of  the  American  forces  which  was 

sufficiently  trained  to  enter  the  field  comprehended  seven 

regiments,  of  which  four  were  armed  with  the  long  155 

G.    P.   F.,    two  with   the   8-inch   Anglo-American   guns, 

.and  one  with  the  British  9.2  inch  guns. 

The  railroad  artillery  which  was  now  also  in  readiness 
was  constituted  by  one  entire  regiment  and  a  portion  of 
two  others. 

Taken  together,  all  the  above-mentioned  units  — 
staffs,  divisions,  infantry,  or  artillery  regiments  —  might 
be  said  to  share  in  the  same  qualities  and  possess  the 
same  defects. 

Eager  for  combat,  sufficiently  instructed,  and  absolutely 
decided  to  win,  their  equipment  was  necessarily  inade- 
quate. They  lacked  horses,  transport  wagons,  trucks, 
ambulances,  all  the  rolling  stock,  in  short,  and  those  ac- 
cessories which,  in  previous  wars,  were  found  cumber- 
some to  the  fighting  units,  but  which  were  now  essential 
in  the  kind  of  warfare  which  the  Americans  were  about 
to  carry  on. 

The  larger  the  unit,  the  more  it  must  necessarily  suffer 
from  a  shortage  such  as  we  have  mentioned.  The  divi- 
sion better  able  to  suffice  to  itself  could,  when  it  was 
possible  to  reenforce  it  with  a  fraction  of  French  artillery, 
superposed  upon  the  groupings  of  the  American  batteries, 
sustain  a  lengthy  action.  But  in  the  army  corps  the  non- 
divisional  elements  found  themselves  in  a  much  more  pre- 
carious position  and  in  the  First  Army  the  same  difficult 
situation  was  to  be  found  as  has  been  noticed  in  the  army 
corps,  only  more  aggravated. 

The  commander-in-chief  of  the  Expeditionary  Forces 
found  himself  therefore  face  to  face  with  a  condition  of 


American  Effectives  in  September,   igi8        261 

things  resulting  from  the  early  decisions  which  had  been 
taken  under  the  stress  of  circumstances  made  necessary 
by  the  military  happenings  of  the  spring  of  19 18.  At 
which  time,  as  we  have  seen,  the  French  and  British  au- 
thorities requested  the  American  Government  to  hasten 
the  transport  of  infantry  troops  to  the  detriment  of  any 
other  form  of  service.  The  lack  of  horses  was  now  felt 
to  an  alarming  degree.  The  United  States  had  held 
over  those  which  were  ready  to  be  embarked  and  France 
was  no  longer  able,  by  requisition,  to  furnish  the  necessary 
number. 

Thus  it  Is  easy  to  understand  —  and  upon  this  remark 
we  may  terminate  this  chapter  —  the  American  Expedi- 
tionary Forces  disposed  of  a  splendid  offensive  instrument 
In  the  early  days  of  September,  but  one  which  lacked,  if 
it  were  to  give  its  full  measure  of  success,  certain  essential 
organs,  and  the  larger  the  unit  the  more  this  want  was 
felt.  This  condition  of  things  was  particularly  aggra- 
vated in  the  army  corps  and  in  the  field  army. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

the  american  army  during  the  general  offensive 

september-november,  i918.     (battle  of  st. 

mihiel operations     between     meuse     and 

argonne) 

From  the  time  the  Sixth  French  Army  reached  the 
Vesle,  the  enemy  made  manifest  his  intention  of  clinging 
to  his  positions  on  the  right  bank  of  this  river,  and  it  soon 
became  evident  that  the  Franco-American  troops  under 
General  Degoutte  would  have  to  mark  time  for  a  certain 
period  on  this  part  of  the  front. 

Although  the  American  commander-in-chief  had  ex- 
pected personally  to  take  over  the  direction  of  the  army 
in  this  sector,  thereby  relieving  the  French  Sixth  Army  by 
a  fresh  allied  contingent;  in  view  of  the  circumstances 
which  indicated  a  let-up  of  active  operations  hereabout 
f  and  a  tendency  toward  stabilization,  his  attention  was 
naturally  turned  elsewhere,  and,  since  the  foe  Intended 
holding  firmly  to  his  center  it  became  clear  that  good 
strategy  on  our  side  demanded  a  maneuver  on  the  wings. 

General  Pershing  naturally  turned  toward  the  St. 
Mihiel  salient. 

For  more  than  a  year,  a  plan  affecting  this  section  of 
;  the  front  had  been  projected  by  the  Chaumont  head- 
quarters, studied  and  discussed  between  the  French  and 
American  commanders,  and  even  touched  upon  during  the 

262 


September  Offensive  263 

second  interview  between  Generals  Petain  and  Pershing 
at  Compiegne  in  June,  19 17.  The  idea  was  therefore 
by  no  means  a  new  one. 

It  now  presented  a  triple  advantage :  that  of  extending 
the  front  of  our  attack;  that  of  giving  an  appropriate 
objective  to  the  American  troops  of  whom  many  were 
still  inexperienced,  and  finally,  to  turn  the  bulk  of  the  ^ 
Expeditionary  Forces  into  a  portion  of  the  front  which ' 
was  in  direct  line  with  its  communications  by  road  and 
rail,  which  covered  its  depots,  its  training  camps;  in  short, 
which  was  in  close  touch  with  the  various  centers  of 
American  activity. 

All  these  points  being  in  its  favor,  the  plan  encountered 
unanimous  support;  it  remained  merely  with  the  high 
command  to  arrange  the  details  and  fix  the  day  for  the 
great  assault. 

Marshal  Foch,  who  wished  to  give  the  enemy  a  mini- 
mum time  to  recuperate  from  the  effects  of  the  blows 
already  dealt  him  in  other  theaters,  desired  that  the 
attack  on  the  St.  Mihiel  salient  might  be  undertaken  as 
soon  as  practicable. 

General  Petain  and  General  Pershing  shared  these 
views,  more  especially  as  the  autumnal  rainy  season  was 
near  at  hand  when  the  plains  of  the  Woevre,  the  scene  of 
future  maneuvers,  would  be  transformed  into  a  vast 
swamp  unfavorable  to  troop  movements. 

As  to  the  possible  extension  which  ought  to  be  given  to 
this  affair,  opinions  differed  somewhat. 

The  American  general  contemplated  lining  up  his  forces 
on  the  southern  Woevre  front  east  of  St.  Mihiel  and  on 
the  Meuse  Heights  north  of  St.  Mihiel,  debouching  from 
these  two  separate  starting  points  and  seizing  afterward 
by    a    surprise    attack  —  his    two    masses    united  —  the 


264     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

second  German  position  known  as  the  Hindenburg  Line. 
Thus  he  would  find  himself  in  a  position  to  threaten  not 
only  the  mineral  basin  of  Briey,  but  also  the  adversary's 
communication  lines  in  this  neighborhood. 

The  French  high  command  considered  limiting  the 
offensive  action  to  the  taking  of  the  Hindenburg  Line. 

The  allied  high  command  reduced  the  plan  in  order  to 
take  in  less  distant  objectives.  Marshal  Foch  did  not 
wish  to  see  the  American  Army  engaged  too  far  in  a 
direction  so  divergent  from  that  on  which  he  intended 
action,  as  he  soon  might  have  need  of  the  cooperation  of 
American  troops  at  another  point. ^ 

The  prerogatives  appertaining  to  each  individual  com- 
mander during  these  operations  arranged  themselves  as  a 
matter  of  course.  Thanks  to  the  attitude  of  General 
Pershing  and  his  devotion  to  the  greater  good  of  the 
cause,  all  minor  difficulties  were  smoothed  away.  In  the 
same  spirit  which  had  caused  him  to  accept  a  command 
under  General  Fayolle  when  he  was  to  direct  limited 
operations  on  the  Vesle  front,  he  now  willingly  placed 
himself  under  the  orders  of  the  commander-in-chief  of  the 
French  armies.  From  the  first  days  of  September  a 
most  close  and  intimate  cooperation  between  General 
Petain  and  General  Pershing  was  established.  All  de- 
cisions were  rapidly  taken  and  in  complete  accord. 

Following  is  an  enumeration  of  some  of  the  arrange- 
ments made  to  facilitate  the  heavy  task  imposed  upon 
the  American  commander-in-chief  who,  at  this  moment, 
was  obliged  not  only  to  elaborate  and  to  execute  the  plans 
under  contemplation,  but  also  to  create  an  entire  army, 

1  Already  on  the  second  of  September,  Marshal  Foch  had  confided  to 
General  Pershing  his  intention  of  including  the  American  forces  in  his 
projected  offensive  between  Verdun  and  Rheims. 


September  Offensive  265 

improvise  its  staff  and  services,  and  that  during  the  lapse 
of  one  month's  time. 

One  French  officer  was  charged  with  the  liaison  be- 
tween Generals  Pershing  and  Petain  in  order  to  expedite 
the  solution  of  the  many  questions  which  constantly  arose. 

The  eastern  group  of  armies,  and  more  especially  the 
Eighth  French  Army,  were  to  furnish  the  services  —  rear 
and  supplies  —  which  were  lacking  to  the  American  forces 
operating  in  the  Woevre. 

In  the  same  manner,  the  Second  French  Army  was  to 
furnish  what  was  essential  to  the  American  contingents 
operating  on  the  Meuse  Heights  In  the  vicinity  of  Les 
Eparges  and  Combres. 

The  Second  Colonial  Corps,  maintained  at  a  strength 
of  three  divisions,  was  to  remain  posted  before  St.  Mihiel 
in  order  to  link  the  two  American  attacks  which  were 
scheduled  for  the  same  day. 

A  fourth  French  division  was  also  placed  under  Gen- 
eral Pershing's  orders  to  take  part  In  the  offensive  near 
Les  Eparges. 

Still  more  French  effectives  were  turned  over  to  the 
Americans  on  this  occasion. 

580  French  75  mm.  guns, 

793  heavy  cannons  and  mortars  of  various  calibers, 

182  trench  mortars, 

273  tanks,^ 

192  airplanes. 
Added  to  these,  we  may  reckon  the  Independent  aerial 
division  which  operated  with  the  Americans  during  the 
action  of  September  i2th.^ 

2  Thirty-four  Schneider,  thirty-six  St.  Chamond,  and  the  rest  Renaults. 
The  American  Army  disposed  of    144  Renault  tanks  manned   by  their 
own  crews. 

^  The  aerial  division  included   550  airplanes.     The  American   aviation 


266     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

General  Pershing  was  also  authorized  to  employ  a  con- 
siderable number  of  automobile  trucks  which  were  held 
in  reserve  near  Toul  and  Bar-le-Duc* 

With  these  resources  added  to  those  of  the  American 
Army,  General  Pershing  was  enabled  to  mount  a  power- 
ful offensive;  he  could  dispose  of  four  French  divisions, 
twelve  American  divisions,  2,900  guns. 

The  operations  were  to  be  kept  extremely  secret.  The 
commander-in-chief  had  concealed  his  departure  from  La 
Ferte-sous-Jouarre  and  had  not  allowed  his  change  of 
intention  concerning  his  taking  over  the  command  on  the 
Vesle  to  be  known.  Rumors  were  spread  tending  to  in- 
dicate that  the  Americans  were  preparing  important  con- 
centrations in  High  Alsace,  near  Belfort.  General 
Pershing  had  chosen  Ligny-en-Barrois  as  his  own  head- 
quarters, but  he  installed  temporarily  his  chief  of  staff. 
General  Drumm,  at  Neufchateau  with  all  his  services, 
and,  in  order  to  give  weight  to  these  fictitious  maneuvers, 
he  made  frequent  appearances  at  Chaumont  and  was  also 
seen  in  the  Vosges. 

Equal  care  was  taken  to  mask  the  heavy  troop  concen- 
trations which  were  being  executed  around  the  St.  Mlhiel 
salient.  The  nearer  they  approached,  the  greater  were 
y  the  precautions  taken.  Infantry  and  artillery  columns 
marched  by  night.  In  the  daytime,  men,  horses,  and 
material  were  concealed  in  the  woods. 

On  August  30th,  General  Pershing  took  command  of 
the  First  American  Army  sector,  extending  over  fifty 
miles  from  Port-sur-Seille,  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Moselle,     to     Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes,     near     Verdun. 

was  under  the  orders  of  Brig.  General  William  Mitchell  and  disposed  of 
610  machines  which  could  be  utilized  on  the  St.  Mihiel  front. 

*  In  his  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  General  Pershing  graciously 
acknowledged  the  aid  which  we  had  brought  on  this  occasion. 


Battle  of  St.  Mihiel  267 

Naturally,  this  line  was  but  thinly  held.  Every  precau- 
tion was  taken  not  to  awaken  the  suspicion  of  the  foe  by 
any  ostensible  change  upon  the  front.  The  relief  of  the 
troops  who  were  not  to  participate  in  the  attack  was 
effected  as  late  as  possible.  Numerous  artillery  for- 
mations were  placed  in  battery  positions  during  the  nights 
immediately  preceding  the  attack.  But  some  important 
artillery  reenforcements  had  to  be  placed  on  their  posi- 
tion beforehand,  so  as  not  to  block  the  roads,  and  when 
it  was  known  that  the  difficulties  attending  their  emplace- 
ment would  be  too  great  to  be  rapidly  overcome. 

At  the  time,  the  First  American  Army  entered  upon 
the  scene  of  action,  its  staff  was  at  Ligny-en-Barrois, 
having  arrived  as  late  as  possible  in  order  not  to  excite 
suspicion.  As  we  have  already  remarked  above,  all 
plans  and  documents  which  such  an  action  called  for  had 
been  elaborated  at  Neufchateau. 

Remarkable  work  was  accomplished  by  General 
Drumm,  chief  of  staff  of  this  First  Army,  and  also  by  his 
collaborators  who  had  been  chosen  scarcely  a  month 
before.  No  unforeseen  or  disagreeable  accidents  checked 
the  troop  movements  either  by  rail  or  by  road.  During 
these  concentration  marches,  500,000  men  and  important 
material  had  reached  the  zone  of  operations. 

As  for  the  numerous  "  plans  of  employment  "  which 
were  necessary  to  carry  out  this  attack,  enough  may  be 
said  in  praise  of  their  value  and  precision  when  we  state 
that  those  presented  to  General  Petain  were  neither  criti- 
cized nor  modified  in  the  slightest  degree  by  him. 

The  plan  of  attack  conceived  by  General  Pershing  in- 
cluded three  distinct  operations: 

Firstly:  A  main  attack  starting  from  the  line  Fey-en- 
Haye-Xivray,  which  should  advance  in  three  successive 


26B     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

bounds  from  south  to  north,  clean  up  the  plain  of  the 
Woevre  as  far  as  the  line  passing  through  the  villages  of 
VigneuUes,  St.  Benoit,  and  Jaulny.  This  operation  was 
confided  to  the  First  and  Fourth  American  Corps. 

Secondly:  A  secondary  attack  starting  from  the 
Meuse  Heights  between  Mouilly  and  Tresauvaux,  di- 
rected toward  the  southeast  was,  at  the  end  of  this  maneu- 
ver, to  bring  the  assailants  up  to  the  front  of  Tresauvaux- 
Vigneulles,  where  contact  would  be  established  with  the 
left  wing  of  the  main  attack.  This  secondary  operation 
was  to  be  launched  by  the  Fifth  American  Corps. 

Thirdly:  A  general  demonstration  was  to  be  made 
all  along  the  enemy  front  included  in  these  attacks;  that 
is  to  say,  around  the  entire  point  of  the  salient  from 
Xlvray  to  Mouilly,  passing  through  Apremont,  St. 
Mihiel,  La  Morville,  and  Seuzey.  This  was  to  be  en- 
trusted to  the  Second  Colonial  Corps  (French)  which 
was  to  cover  both  the  left  flank  of  the  main  attack  and  the 
right  flank  of  the  subsidiary  one. 

The  converging  of  the  two  attacks  as  they  closed  In 
from  behind  on  the  eastern  slopes  of  the  Hauts-de-Meuse, 
would  naturally  liberate  the  town  of  St.  Mihiel,  important 
both  on  moral  and  tactical  grounds. 

This  plan  had  many  advantages.  Even  in  case  only 
one  of  the  American  attacks  was  successful,  the  town  of 
St.  Mihiel  and  the  heights  of  the  Meuse  would  be  freed. 
In  case  of  a  complete  success,  the  entire  defensive  organi- 
zation of  the  enemy  from  his  front  lines  in  the  salient 
reaching  back  far  into  the  Woevre  plain  would  fall  into 
American  hands.  In  both  alternatives,  the  Paris- 
Nancy  railway  would  be  disengaged  and  made  ready  for 
traffic. 

In  order  to  execute  this  plan,  the  First  Army,  under 


Battle  of  St.  Mihiel  269 

the  direct  orders  of  General  Pershing,  was  distributed  as 
follows : 

On  the  southern  face  of  the  salient  at  the  extreme 
right  of  the  front  of  attack  we  find  the  First  Corps  under 
General  Liggett's  orders,  the  same  chief,  with  the  same 
staff,  whom  we  have  already  seen  operating  on  the  Ourcq, 
the  Marne,  and  the  Vesle.  Only  his  commanding  officer 
of  artillery  was  changed.  General  Lassiter  having 
passed  on  to  the  Fourth  Corps  artillery,  being  better  ac- 
quainted with  the  ground  covered  by  that  section  of  the 
attack.  A  French  officer.  General  Vincent,  had  replaced 
General  Lassiter  at  the  artillery  direction  of  the  First 
Corps.  Headquarters  were  at  Saizerais,  and  the  corps 
comprised  the  Eighty-second,  Ninetieth,  Fifth,  and 
Second  Divisions,  lined  up  from  Port-sur-Seille  to  Limey 
with  the  Seventy-eighth  Division  which  was  held  in  re- 
serve near  Dieulouard.  The  Eighty-second  Division, 
although  deployed,  took  no  part  in  the  initial  assault. 
Astride  of  the  Moselle  near  Pont-a-Mousson,  this  divi- 
sion simply  covered  the  right  flank  of  the  general  offen- 
sive. On  the  thirteenth  of  September,  we  will  find  its 
left  wing  moving  forward  in  order  to  conform  to  the 
advance  of  the  main  forces. 

The  Fourth  Corps  was  linked  to  the  First,  being  placed 
on  its  left.  General  Dickman,  whom  we  have  seen  di- 
recting the  Third  Division  during  recent  engagements  on 
the  Marne  and  the  Ourcq,  was  in  command  and  had  taken 
up  his  headquarters  at  Toul.^  His  corps  stretched  from 
Limey  to  Richecourt  and  comprised  the  Eighty-ninth, 
Forty-second,  and  First  Divisions  in  first  line,  and  the 
Third  Division  in  reserve,  near  Royaumeix. 

5  An  advanced  post  of  command  had  been  organized  in  the  village  of 
Royaumeix. 


270     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Further  west  came  the  Second  Colonial  French  Corps, 
under  General  Blondlat  (headquarters,  Ernecourt),  its 
Thirty-ninth  Division  holding  all  the  line  between  Riche- 
court  and  St.  Aignant;  its  Twenty-sixth  Division  stretch- 
ing from  the  latter  to  the  Selouze  Wood  on  a  ten-mile 
front,  taking  in  the  point  of  the  salient  as  well  as  the 
town  of  St.  Mihiel;  its  Second  Cavalry  Division  was  be- 
tween the  Selouze  Wood  and  Mouilly  Village.  Of  the 
three  aforenamed  units,  the  Second  Cavalry  Division 
alone  was  sufficiently  concentrated  and  capable  therefore, 
as  we  shall  see,  of  taking  an  efficacious  part  in  the  general 
offensive. 

Proceeding  to  the  northward,  we  find  the  Fifth  Ameri- 
can Corps  with  General  Cameron  in  command.  His 
activities  as  chief  of  the  Fourth  Division  during  the  eigh- 
teenth of  July  offensive  has  been  already  described. 

General  Alexandre,  detached  from  our  Twentieth 
Corps,  had  charge  of  the  artillery. 

The  Fifth  American  Corps  (headquarters,  Ancemont) 
comprised  the  Twenty-sixth  American,  the  Fifteenth 
French,  and  the  Fourth  American  Divisions  holding  the 
Mouilly-Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes  front.  The  latter  was 
to  take  a  limited  part  in  the  general  attack,  its  mission 
consisting  merely  in  covering  the  left  flank  of  the  troops 
marching  toward  Vigneulles,  and  operating  small  raids  in 
the  Woevre  toward  Fresnes  and  Manheulles. 

The  army  held  in  reserve  two  divisions,  the  Thirty-fifth 
at  Liverdun  and  the  Ninety-first  at  Void.  We  should, 
however,  remark  that  the  Eightieth'  Division  at  Prouville 
and  the  Thirty-third  near  Verdun  were  not  engaged  at 
this  moment  in  any  action  and,  if  necessary,  could  be 
called  upon.  We  may  therefore  consider  these  two  divi- 
sions as  part  of  the  army  reserve. 


Battle  of  St.  Mihiel  271 

The  artillery  was  split  into  three  large  groupings  which 
corresponded  approximately  to  the  fronts  occupied  by  the 
three  American  attacking  corps. 

The  northern  grouping  which  supported  the  Fifth 
Corps  offensive  was  commanded  by  General  Alexandre. 

The  two  southern  groupings  were  under  the  direct  com- 
mand of  General  McGlachlin  who  also  controlled  Gen- 
eral Chamberlaine's  railroad  artillery.  The  fire  of  the 
southern  groupings  was  intended  more  especially  to  sup- 
port the  advance  of  the  First  and  Fourth  Corps. 

The  resources  of  the  staff  were  severely  tested  during 
this  attack,  with  its  complicated  material  and  wide  troop 
movements.  In  order  to  carry  it  through,  General 
Drumm  and  his  associates  were  obliged  to  study  the  con- 
dition of  the  roads  and  transport  facihties  in  the  two 
French  Army  groups  contiguous  to  the  American  zone  of 
operation  and  also  to  take  into  consideration  the  severe 
regulations  governing,  at  that  moment,  the  transports  by 
rail.  All  these  difficulties  served  more  effectually  to 
demonstrate  the  zeal  and  ability  with  which  General 
Pershing's  staff  managed  these  vast  preparations. 

Let  us  now  glance  beyond  the  lines. 

Facing  the  army  enveloping  the  St.  Mihiel  salient  and 
observing  from  east  to  west,  the  enemy  order  of  battle 
seemed  on  the  twelfth  of  September,  as  far  as  could  be 
judged,  the  following:  Two  Hundred  and  Fifty-fifth 
Division,  Seventy-seventh  Reserve  Division,  Tenth  Divi- 
sion, Fifth  Landwehr  Division  and  One  Hundred  and 
Ninety-second  Division,  then  the  Thirty-fifth  Austro- 
Hungarian  Division,  and  finally  the  thirteenth  and 
eighteenth  German  Landwehr  divisions. 

Since  the  beginning  of  the  month,  numerous  troop 
movements  had  been  observed  in  the  enemy's  rear. 


272     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

The  examination  of  prisoners  led  us  to  believe  that  the 
/  evacuation  of  the  St.  Mlhiel  salient  was  contemplated  and 
had  even  perhaps  begun. 

Under  these  circumstances,  rapid  action  was  impera- 
tive. The  order  to  attack  was  given  by  General  Pershing 
after  having  consulted  with  General  Petain  as  to  the  hour. 
He  also  asked  the  opinion  of  his  subordinates  as  to 
whether  a  preliminary  bombardment  would  be  advisable 
and  whether  It  should  be  of  long  or  short  duration.  He 
then  retired  to  his  office  alone  and  shortly  after  gave 
orders  that  the  attack  would  commence  on  the  following 
morning,  September  twelfth,  at  five  A.  M.  for  the  First 
and  Fourth  Corps  who  were  stationed  in  the  Woevre  and 
who  were  to  march  northward  toward  Thiaucourt  and 
St.  Benolt,  at  eight  o'clock  for  the  Fifth  Corps,  whose 
action  was  to  take  in  the  Meuse  heights. 

All  the  assaults  were  to  profit  by  a  four-hour  prepara- 
tory bombardment.  General  Pershing  deemed  this  bom- 
bardment necessary  both  for  the  demoralization  of  the 
foe  and  the  preliminary  destruction  of  his  solid  and 
numerous  redoubts.  He  also  authorized  a  few  shots  dur- 
ing the  afternoon  of  the  eleventh  In  order  to  find  the 
range  which  would  enable  the  75-mIllImeter  batteries  to 
adjust  on  the  morrow  their  rolling  barrage. 

When  the  twelfth  of  September  dawned,  the  com- 
mander-in-chief sought  an  advantageous  post  of  observa- 
tion on  a  high  plateau  overlooking  the  Woevre,  and  there 
he  was  joined  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Newton  D. 
Baker. 

The  mist  which  mingled  with  the  smoke  prevented  a 
view  of  the  troops  moving  across  this  moist  plain,  but  on 
all  sides  of  the  vast  battle-ground  and  above  the  clouds 
overhanging  the  Woevre,  there  could  be  perceived  long 


Battle  of  St.  Mihiel  273 

trails  of  sparks  which  flowered  in  stars  of  green  and 
yellow,  code  rocket  signals  sent  up  by  the  first  infantry 
assault  waves  and  which  cried  out  to  the  supporting  ar- 
tillery: "Lengthen  your  fire,  our  objectives  have  all 
been  reached." 

Although  the  enemy  was  expecting  an  attack  in  the 
near  future,  he  was  greatly  surprised  when  the  bombard- 
ment really  began.  He  had  supposed  that  his  retirement, 
which  the  high  command  was  preparing,  would  be 
effectuated  before  the  American  attack.  In  reality,  the 
abandonment  of  the  St.  Mihiel  salient  had  been  for  a 
long  time  in  contemplation.  Orders  had  even  been  given 
to  bring  many  of  the  heavy  ordnance  to  the  rear  and 
dispose  the  field  guns  in  depth  formation.  The  retreat, 
thus  begun,  was  on  certain  points  being  effectively  carried 
out  when  the  American  gunners  opened  fire  on  trenches, 
villages,  strongholds,  and  roads  both  on  front  and  rear 
on  batteries  and  the  wooded  areas.  The  long-range 
guns  attained  the  railway  station  of  Metz.  The  enemy, 
completely  immobilized,  was  obliged  to  interrupt  his 
movement  of  retreat  and  face  the  attack  to  the  best  of 
his  ability. 

The  assault  was  indeed  superbly  carried  out.  Al- 
though the  tanks  had  a  hard  time  in  the  inextricable  sys- 
tem of  trenches  which  four  years  of  occupation  had 
accumulated  on  this  ground,  the  foot  soldier  went  over 
the  top  in  great  style.  The  barbed  wire,  considerably 
rusted,  was  easily  severed  by  the  soldiers  with  the  aid  of 
wire-cutters.  Often  complicated  entanglements  were 
leaped  or  scrambled  over  without  having  been  destroyed. 
The  advance  was  accomplished  with  such  remarkable 
rapidity  that  the  charges  prepared  in  view  of  destroying 
the  enemy's  defenses  were  not  even  exploded. 


274     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

The  general  progression  was  made  without  any  un- 
toward accident.  Vigneulles,  the  goal  where  the  two 
American  attacks  were  to  converge,  was  first  entered  by 
patrols  of  the  Twenty-sixth  Division  (Fifth  Corps)  and 
then  occupied  in  force  by  the  First  Division  (Fourth 
Corps).  This  march  of  General  Dickman's  left  wing, 
where  the  First  Division  was  operating,  may  be  taken 
as  a  model  of  a  well-conducted  attack.  The  divisional 
artillery,  whose  accurate  fire  accompanied  the  infantry 
advance,  was  pushed  forward  at  an  early  hour,  one 
battalion  of  artillery  accompanying  each  regiment.  The 
telephone  wires  linking  the  front  and  rear  were  progres- 
sively unrolled  so  that  the  commander  of  the  First  Divi- 
sion was  kept  in  touch  with  his  first-line  battalions  as  they 
marched  northward. 

It  would  be  unfair  to  dwell  only  upon  the  role  taken  by 
the  First  and  Twenty-sixth  American  Divisions  in  these 
vast  operations,  and  pass  over  in  silence  what  was  accom- 
plished by  other  units.  The  Second  Division  seized 
Thiaucourt  in  a  splendid  rush;  the  Ninetieth  Division 
drove  the  enemy  out  of  the  Norroy  quarries  which  were 
reputed  impregnable.  The  Fifth  Division,  thanks  to  a 
well-conceived  maneuver,  executed  practically  without 
losses,  stormed  Vieville-en-Haye.  The  Eighty-ninth 
Division,  deploying  from  the  Mort-Mare  Wood,  attacked 
Euvezin  and  Bouillonville ;  the  Forty-second  Division  cap- 
tured four  villages  among  which  were  included  Essey  and 
Pannes.  The  Fifteenth  French  Division  showed  much 
tenacity  in  the  attack  on  Eparges  and  Combres;  as  to  our 
Second  Division  of  dismounted  cavalry,  it  progressed  all 
the  way  to  Dompierre-aux-Bois,  taking  more  than  2,500 
prisoners  and  only  losing  130  men,  of  whom  but  14  were 
mortally  wounded. 


Battle  of  St.  Mihiel  275 

The  American  Army  harvested  that  day  an  Important 
booty —  16,000  prisoners,  443  guns  of  all  calibers,  and 
an  Immense  quantity  of  war  material.  Very  few  losses 
were  suffered,  consisting  of  some  7,000  men,  of  whom  the 
greater  number  were  but  slightly  wounded. 

To  the  tangible  results  above  enumerated  may  be 
added  the  Immense  moral  effect  obtained  by  this  bril- 
liant action.  The  strength  of  the  American  Army  thus 
proved,  heartened  and  encouraged  men,  officers,  and  staff 
of  all  the  Expeditionary  Forces. 

In  the  same  measure,  these  qualities  were  recognized 
by  the  common  enemy,  who  was  correspondingly  dis- 
couraged. 

The  German  high  command  was  Indeed  much  struck  by 
the  manner  In  which  the  ensemble  of  the  action  had  been 
carried  out.  Here  Is  the  account  given  by  the  general 
headquarters  of  the  beaten  German  Army,  regarding  the 
conduct  of  the  victors  of  September  12th: 

"  Three  French  divisions  and  at  least  nine  American  divisions 
took  part  in  the  attack  under  General  Pershing's  orders.  How 
many  divisions  remained  in  reserve  we  have  not  ascertained. 
Among  those  counted,  three  (First,  Second,  and  Forty-second) 
were  first-class  attacking  troops;  two  (Fourth  and  Twenty-sixth) 
were  good  fighting  troops  which  had  already  done  good  work  in 
other  important  affairs;  three  (Fifth,  Eighty-ninth,  and  Ninetieth) 
had  been  in  line  on  other  sections  of  the  front  before,  having  been 
opposed  to  our  detachment,  and  one  in  reserve,  the  Thirty-fourth, 
had  not  yet  been  brought  into  line. 

**  The  attack  was  preceded  by  an  artillery  preparation  lasting 
four  hours  to  which  was  added  a  short  bombardment  with  trench 
mortars. 

**  The  batteries  fired  with  great  precision,  not  only  on  our  first 
lines  but  also  on  our  rear  communications. 

"  The  principal  attack  was  directed  against  the  face  of  the 
salient  between  Richecourt  and  Fey-en-Haye,  on  a  ten-mile  front. 


276     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

"  Eight  American  divisions  with  one  French  took  part  in  the 
assault. 

"  The  enemy  advanced  to  a  point  north  of  Thiaucourt,  thus 
rendering  our  tenure  of  the  St.  Mihiel  salient  impossible.  As  a 
result  of  this  situation  we  received  orders  to  leave  the  positions 
and  to  retire  on  our  Michael  line  (Hindenburg)  which  was  done 
according  to  instructions. 

*'  The  Americans  proved  clever  with  their  machine  guns  and  are 
tenacious  in  defense  and  depend  much  on  these  instruments  which 
they  possess  in  great  number. 

"  The  artillery  preparation  preceding  the  assault  was  ably  con- 
ducted, and  the  artillery  was  well  directed  —  the  gunners  suc- 
ceeding in  changing  objective  in  minimum  time  and  with  great 
precision.  The  linking  between  artillery  and  infantry  was  done 
without  fault.  If  the  infantry  encountered  a  nest  of  machine 
guns,  they  rapidly  retreated  to  the  rear  and  a  renewed  fire  was 
immediately  started  against  our  machine-gun  emplacements. 
Many  tanks  took  part  or  were  ready  to  take  part  in  the  action;  it 
was  unnecessary,  as  the  masses  of  infantry  had  already  made 
victory  certain." 

On  September  13th,  in  the  morning,  General  Pershing 
and  General  Petaln  entered  St.  Mihiel  side  by  side.  They 
had  scarcely  crossed  the  Meuse  on  a  rough  wooden  bridge 
hastily  thrown  over  the  river  near  the  spot  where  stood 
the  old  stone  arches  blown  up  In  19 14,  than  the  civil  por- 
tion of  the  population,  which  had  remained  In  this  locality 
since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  received  them  with  en- 
thusiastic greetings.  The  streets  were  hung  with  flags, 
even  the  ruins  were  bright  with  bunting  In  honor  of  these 
two  liberators.  What  seemed  even  more  extraordinary 
to  the  Inhabitants,  cut  off  as  they  had  been  from  all  news 
of  political  events,  was  the  appearance  among  the  Ameri- 
cans of  their  Secretary  of  War,  anxious  to  follow  the 
operations  and  to  investigate  the  extent  of  the  damage 


operations  Between  Meuse  and  Argonne       277 

caused  to  our  towns  and  country  by  the  enemy's  occupa- 
tion.^ 

In  the  last  house  at  the  end  of  the  town,  pillaged  like 
the  rest  and  in  lamentable  plight,  he  noticed  on  a  bare 
wall  one  engraving  still  suspended.  This  engraving  rep- 
resented General  Lafayette. 

In  the  United  States,  the  victory  of  St.  Mihiel  will  be 
long  remembered  and  history  will  recount  that  here,  on 
this  foreign  soil,  four  thousand  miles  from  home,  was 
seen  for  the  first  time  so  powerful  an  American  army. 
The  battle  of  St.  Mihiel  will  gradually  efface  the  memory 
of  Gettysburg  where  Lee,  less  adroit  than  Pershing,  tried 
to  strike  at  the  apex  of  a  triangle,  instead  of  sapping  it  at 
the  base,  and  as  time  goes  on  these  forces,  500,000  strong, 
drawn  from  South  and  North  united  in  a  common  effort 
will  cause  the  discords  of  the  past  to  be  forgotten. 


During  the  first  days  of  September,  General  Pershing 
had  also  to  prepare,  on  another  part  of  the  front,  a 
vaster  operation  and  set  on  foot  an  attack  whose  execu- 
tion entailed  more  serious  difficulties. 

In  view  of  these  extensive  operations,  it  became  neces- 
sary to  change  the  center  of  gravity  of  the  American 
forces  immediately  after  the  Woevre  attacks,  and  make 
it  possible  to  take  the  offensive  between  the  river  Meuse 
and  the  Argonne  forest. 

The  Fourth  French  Army  was  to  give  battle  on  almost 
the  whole  of  its  front  at  about  the  end  of  September  — 
from  the  Aisne  opposite  Servon  as  far  as  the  Suippe. 

« The  '*  Grande  Rue,"  in  olden  days  the  name  of  the  principal  street 
of  the  town,  now  bears  the  title  "  Rue  du  General  Pershing." 


278     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Westward,  the  Fifth  French  Army,  profiting  by  this 
operation,  was  to  gain  ground  in  a  turning  movement 
west  and  north  of  Rheims. 

Marshal  Foch  desired  the  Americans  to  take  the 
offensive  toward  the  east,  thus  prolonging  the  line  of 
attack  and  to  advance  in  the  direction  of  Buzancy  and 
Sedan.  These  orders,  as  interpreted  and  transmitted 
by  General  Petain  to  the  Fifth  and  Fourth  French  Armies 
and  the  First  American  Army,  caused  a  new  line-up  of 
General  Pershing's  forces. 

In  order  to  break  through  the  front  at  the  point  where 
the  Americans  were  about  to  strike,  as  well  as  to  be  able 
to  rapidly  exploit  the  ground  gained  toward  Buzancy  and 
later  toward  Sedan,  it  was  necessary  to  place  important 
effectives  in  line,  the  more  numerous  where  the  quality  of 
the  troops  was  not  presumably  of  the  best. 

It  was  necessary  to  select  the  divisions  which  were  to 
be  left  on  the  newly  conquered  Woevre  front,  designate 
those  asked  for  by  the  French  command  in  order  to  re- 
enforce  General  Gouraud's  attack,  and  eliminate  those 
who,  whether  on  account  of  insufficient  training  or  lack  of 
transportation,  were  judged  incapable  of  fighting.  It 
was  considered  possible  to  bring  into  the  theater  of 
operations  fifteen  divisions  of  which  three  at  least  might 
join  the  rest  some  days  after  the  initial  attack,  if  this 
battle  were  to  take  place,  as  was  contemplated,  on  the 
twenty-second  of  September,  1918. 

A  close  study  of  the  front,  of  the  nature  of  the  offen- 
sive about  to  be  undertaken,  the  extent  of  the  ultimate 
objectives,  decided  General  Pershing  to  engage,  from  the 
first,  nine  divisions.  These  were  naturally  chosen  from 
among  those  whose  entry  into  line  might  take  place  with- 
out too  great  difficulties  in  transportation  and  concentra- 


operations  Between  Meuse  and  Argonne        279 

tion  and  without  hindrance  to   the   operations   already 
under  way. 

The  nine  divisions  which  were  to  take  an  initial  part  in 
the  future  offensive  were  accordingly  selected  rather  by 
necessity  and  circumstances  than  by  a  free  choice  in  the 
matter. 

We  desire  here  to  underline  the  immense  effort  fur- 
nished by  General  Pershing  and  his  staff  to  set  this  attack 
on  foot.  A  glance  at  the  effectives  about  to  come  into 
line  is  therefore  essential. 

Out  of  these  nine  divisions,  three  alone  possessed  their 
own  artillery  services  and  had  participated  in  active  opera- 
tions. Two  had  been  occupying  quiet  sectors  during  less 
than  two  months,  another  had  experienced  but  ten  days 
of  trench  life,  still  another  only  sixteen  days,  and  two 
divisions  had  never  been  under  fire. 

Considering  that  at  the  last  moment  contingents  coming 
from  the  severely  tried  region  of  the  Aisne  and  Marne 
had  to  be  completed  with  green  troops  we  may  suppose 
that  among  the  future  combatants  there  were  more  than 
100,000  men  who  had  not  yet  been  at  the  front. 

Four  of  these  nine  divisions  were  only  made  acquainted 
with  their  artillery  on  the  battle-field.  We  may  add  that 
the  lack  of  proper  transport  facilities  and  horses  rendered 
the  troops  inelastic,  for  the  units  possessed  but  70  per 
cent,  of  the  animals  and  wagons  which  should  normally 
complete  their  war  equipment. 

The  divisions  ultimately  placed  in  reserve  with  army 
and  corps  possessed  more  experienced  troops,  but  even 
they  lacked  their  own  services,  their  batteries  having  been 
taken  to  reenforce  the  divisions  ranged  in  the  first  line. 

General  Pershing  was  obliged  to  test  the  capacity  of 
his  contingents  to  the  utmost.     It  was  also  difficult  to  find 


28o     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

the  requisite  number  of  officers  for  these  units.  Once 
again,  circumstances  necessarily  influenced  his  decisions. 

The  Third  Corps  was  brought  from  the  Aisne  front, 
and,  from  the  St.  Mihiel  sahent,  General  Pershing 
transferred  the  First  and  Fifth  Corps.  He  thus  pro- 
cured a  staff  direction  which,  though  lacking  in  knowledge 
of  the  ground  on  which  they  were  to  work,  possessed  ex- 
perience of  active  operations. 

Such  was,  at  this  time,  the  situation  of  the  American 
effectives.  The  numerical  aid  brought  us  by  our  new  ally 
was  greater  than  could  have  been  expected. 

General  Petain,  without  waiting  for  the  St.  Mihiel 
affairs  to  be  concluded,  had  placed  at  the  disposition  of 
the  American  commander-in-chief  the  staff  services  of  the 
Second  French  Army  whose  front  stretched  from  the 
Meuse  heights  to  the  Argonne  and  took  in  Verdun."^ 

This  staff  was  to  attend  to  the  execution  of  the  plan  for 
transport  and  concentration,  ordering  into  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  the  front  lines  the  infantry  and  artillery  which 
were  to  take  part  in  the  battle. 

The  American  divisions  which  were  to  participate  in  the 
initial  assault,  with  the  exception  of  those  already  in  line, 
were  first  to  be  posted  in  the  rear  of  their  ultimate  posi- 
tion, masked  by  a  thin  curtain  of  men  in  horizon  blue 
uniforms.  These  were  to  remain  in  place  up  to  the  night 
preceding  the  attack,  when  they  were  to  disappear,  leaving 
to  the  soldiers  in  khaki  the  possession  of  the  parallels 
from  which  their  surprise  was  to  be  launched. 

By  the  twenty-second  of  September,  the  French  Second 

"^  The  placing  of  the  forces  above  enumerated  on  the  Meuse-Argonne 
front  necessitated  the  withdrawal  of  eleven  divisions,  French  or  Italian, 
and  the  entry  into  line  of  fifteen  American  divisions  sustained  by  a 
powerful  artillery.  All  these  movements  had  to  be  executed  between  the 
fourth  and  twenty-fourth  of  September. 


operations  Between  Meuse  and  Argonne       281 

Army,  whose  name  Is  Immortally  associated  with  that  of 
Verdun,  had  quitted  the  front  of  Its  past  exploits,  and 
General  Pershing's  lines  extended  as  far  as  la  Harazee  in 
the  Argonne  Woods.  The  American  First  Army,  con- 
taining, nevertheless,  several  French  units,  was  now  es- 
tablished on  a  seventy-mile  front. 

When  all  the  shifts  necessary  for  the  future  attack  and 
the  installation  of  troops  on  the  conquered  Woevre  posi- 
tion had  been  made,  the  American  Army  was  disposed  as 
follows : 

General  DIckman's  Fourth  Corps,  with  its  right  across 
the  Moselle  at  Port-sur-Sellle,  its  left  at  Le  Chauffour-en- 
Woevre,  had  in  line  the  Ninetieth,  Seventy-eighth,  and 
Forty-second  Divisions.  In  reserve,  it  held  the  Fifth. 
Thus  its  effectives  were  formed  exclusively  of  American 
units. ^  The  Seventh  Division  was  on  the  march  to  re- 
join the  corps  whose  headquarters  were  installed  at  Menil- 
la-Tour. 

From  Le  Chauffour  to  Menil  in  the  Woevre,  the 
Second  Colonial  Corps,  minus  one  French  division  (the 
Twenty-sixth)  but  plus  the  Twenty-sixth  American  Divi- 
sion, was  commanded  by  General  Blondlat  with  his  head- 
quarters at  St.  Mlhiel. 

Continuing  northward,  the  Seventeenth  French  Corps, 
with  headquarters  at  Fort  Regret,  held  the  Verdun  salient 
from  Mesnil  to  the  Meuse. 

The  First  American  Division,  placed  behind  and 
slightly  westward  of  the  Seventeenth  French  Corps,  may 
be  considered  In  this  instance  as  filling  the  role  of  corps 
reserve  while  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  Twenty-sixth 
French  Division  coming  from  the  Second  Colonial  Corps. 

8  The  sixty-ninth  French  division  prolonged  the  Fourth  Corps  along 
the  right  wing  and  was  later  included  in  the  American  First  Array. 


282      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Finally,  from  Meuse  to  La  Harazee,  all  along  the 
future  front  of  attack,  we  find  the  forces  disposed  as 
follows : 

To  the  right,  on  the  Meuse-Malancourt  front,  the 
Third  Corps  with  General  Bullard's  headquarters  at 
Rampont,  having  in  line  the  Thirty-third,  Eightieth,  and 
Fourth  Divisions,  in  reserve  the  Third  Division. 

In  the  center,  on  the  Malancourt-Vauquois  front,  the 
Fifth  Corps  with  General  Cameron  at  Ville-sur-Cous- 
sances,  held  in  line  the  Seventy-ninth,  Thirty-seventh,  and 
Ninety-first  Divisions,  in  reserve  the  Thirty-second  Divi- 
sion. 

To  the  left,  on  the  Vauquois-La  Harazee  front,  the 
First  Corps,  with  General  Liggett's  headquarters  at 
Rarecourt,  held  the  line  with  the  Thirty-fifth,  Twenty- 
eighth,  and  Seventy-seventh  Divisions,  in  reserve  the 
Ninety-second.^ 

During  the  actions  between  the  Meuse  River  and  the 
Argonne  Forest  begun  on  the  twenty-sixth  of  September 
and  continued  until  the  armistice,  these  three  corps  occu- 
pied the  same  relative  positions.  The  Third  Corps  al- 
ways advanced  with  its  right  flank  along  the  river;  the 
First  Corps  operated  with  its  left  engaged  in  the  wooded 
Argonne  region  in  liaison,  more  or  less  close,  with  the 
Fourth  French  Army;  the  Fifth  Corps  always  occupied 
the  center  of  the  line  of  battle. 

The  general  reserve  of  the  army  was  composed  of  three 
divisions:  the  First  in  the  neighborhood  of  Blercourt,  the 
Twenty-ninth  near  Osches,  and  the  Eighty-second  In  the 
Clermont-en-Argonne  region. 

» The  artillery  of  the  First  American  Corps  had  been  concentrated 
under  the  orders  of  General  Walch,  detached  from  the  Seventeenth 
French  Corps. 


operations  Between  Meuse  and  Argonne       283 

On  September  25  th,  the  Fifth  Cavalry  Division 
(French)  had  been  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  First 
Army  commander,  receiving  orders  to  proceed  during  the 
night  of  the  twenty-fifth  to  the  Passavant  neighborhood 
close  to  the  future  field  of  action,  and  from  whence  it 
could  be  ready  to  intervene,  if  necessary,  in  the  coming 
battle. 

The  Franco-American  artillery,  whose  fire  was  to 
second  the  attack,  comprised  army  batteries  and  the  rest 
of  the  artillery  divided  between  the  corps  and  the 
divisions. 

The  army  artillery  under  General  McGIachlin  was 
grouped  in  five  commands,  the  names  alone  indicating 
their  normal  sphere  of  activity: 

The  Verdun  command. 

The  Meuse  command, 

The  Aire  command, 

The  Aisne  command, 

The  command  of  railway  artillery. 

The  groups  of  Verdun,  Meuse,  Aire,  and  Aisne,  In  all, 
disposed  of  340  pieces  of  all  calibers  from  the  145  mm.  to 
the  270  mm.  The  railway  artillery  under  General 
Chamberlaine  counted  40  pieces,  varying  from  305  to 
400  mm. 

The  divisional  and  corps  artillery  attained  in  round 
numbers  2,400  guns  of  which  1,000  were  75 's.  These 
numbers  do  not  include  the  trench  mortars  of  small 
caliber.  The  Franco-American  artillery,  if  lined  up, 
could  have  placed  a  cannon  at  every  ten  yards. 

As  the  woods  of  Cheppy  and  Malancourt  were  at  the 
center  of  the  American  attack  and  the  Argonne  Forest  at 


284     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

its  left,  this  permitted  an  economy  of  fire  in  these  regions 
to  the  advantage  of  progress  in  the  open  ground. 

Thus  it  can  be  said  that  the  Americans  were  well  fur- 
nished in  artillery.  The  corps  posted  in  the  Woevre  and 
on  the  Meuse  heights,  which  covered  the  right  flank  of 
this  attack  —  that  is  to  say,  the  Fourth  American  Corps, 
the  Second  Colonial,  and  the  Seventeenth  French  —  had 
not  been  deprived  of  their  guns  to  any  notable  extent,  so 
that  they  were  able  to  help  the  main  offensive  by  prolong- 
ing the  fire  on  their  own  fronts  and  also  by  making,  on  the 
day  set  for  the  assault,  numerous  raids  in  enemy  terri- 
tory.i<> 

Such  were  the  dispositions  taken  when  the  night  of  the 
twenty-fifth  fell.  It  was  impossible  to  prepare  the  attack 
for  an  earlier  date.  Besides  this  date  accorded  with 
that  on  which  the  Fourth  French  Army  would  be  ready  to 
take  the  offensive.  Consequently  General  Petain  gave 
the  order  to  attack  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-sixth 
from  Meuse  to  Suippe,  on  a  front  of  some  forty-five 
miles.  According  to  his  idea  the  French  Army  advancing 
northward  would  approach  the  American  forces  with  its 
right;  on  the  other  hand,  the  flow  of  the  Meuse  River 
would  oblige  the  Americans  in  their  march  toward  Buz- 
ancy  to  incline  to  their  left.  Thus  the  two  masses  would 
find  themselves  in  touch  at  the  Grand  Pre  Pass,  while 
pursuing  their  mutual  advance  toward  Mezieres  and 
Sedan.  The  common  object  of  the  two  armies  was  to 
throw  the  enemy  across  the  Meuse  and  force  him  to  beat 

10  The  French  artillery  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  American  forces  for 
these  operations  consisted  of: 

75  mm.  cannons     Heavy  cannons     Trench  mortars 

September    26    456  1,002  254 

October  14   132  607  48 

November    i    300  3x9  48 


operations  Between  Meuse  and  Argonne       285 

a  retreat  through  the  Ardennes  where  the  lack  of  roads 
and  communications  would  oblige  the  Germans  to  a  more 
accentuated  and  perilous  withdrawal. 

The  French  high  command  founded  its  hopes  espe- 
cially upon  the  American  troops  in  this  combat,  for  it 
was  to  be  supposed  that  the  Fourth  Army  would  meet 
with  enormous  difficulties  in  crossing  the  Aisne  if  General 
Pershing's  troops  had  not  succeeded,  as  they  passed  up 
the  right  bank  of  the  river,  in  freeing  the  passage  at  cer- 
tain points.  It  might  also  be  foreseen  that  the  enemy 
would  make  a  particularly  fierce  resistance  between  the 
Meuse  and  Argonne,  as  this  was  the  vital  point  of  their 
line. 

The  front  of  the  Fourth  Army's  attack  did  not  extend 
to  the  Aisne  Valley,  and  as  the  American  front  was 
limited  to  the  Argonne,  the  commander-in-chief  of  the 
French  forces  constituted,  between  the  river  and  the 
forest,  a  liaison  detachment  which  included  two  infantry 
regiments,  of  which  one  (the  368th,  colored  troops)  came 
from  the  Ninety-second  Division.  The  artillery  was 
French. 

This  detachment  was  to  link  the  two  attacks  and  neu- 
tralize the  western  fringes  of  the  Argonne. 

Let  us  now  return  to  the  First  American  Army.  On 
the  twenty-second  of  September,  headquarters  (advanced 
echelons)  were  installed  at  Souilly.  There  the  special 
train  of  the  army  commander  was  side-tracked  and  in  the 
offices  which  had  successively  served  Generals  Petain, 
Nivelle,  Guillaumat,  and  Hirschauer,  great  activity 
reigned.  In  spite  of  all  the  diligent  endeavor  which  we 
ourselves  can  testify  to,  it  was  materially  impossible,  as 
we  have  already  explained,  to  prepare  an  attack  before 
September  25th. 


286     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Work  went  on  night  and  day  In  the  staff  offices;  the 
same  lamps  which  lighted  General  Barescut's  map  during 
the  heroic  months  of  the  Verdun  defense  now  for  many- 
nights  served  to  illuminate  that  of  General  Drumm. 

General  Petain  had  not  set  any  hour  for  the  attack,  nor 
fixed  the  duration  of  the  preparatory  bombardment,  judg- 
ing that  on  so  extensive  a  front  the  simultaneity  of  assault 
was  not  a  necessary  condition  of  success.  He  left  each 
army  commander  free  to  determine  the  hour  on  which 
each  would  set  their  troops  In  motion,  and  left  to  each, 
also,  the  mode  of  preparing  his  artillery  attack. 

General  Gouraud  ordered  a  six-hour  bombardment; 
General  Pershing  prescribed  a  three-hour  preparation, 
and  he  also  authorized  his  field  artillery  —  as  he  had  done 
at  St.  Mihlel  —  to  verify  the  range  of  their  barrage  on 
the  day  of  the  twenty-fifth.  In  case  of  necessity,  he  even 
permitted  his  counter  batteries  to  act  six  hours  before  the 
general  attack. 

The  Seventeenth  Corps  and  the  Second  Colonial,  to- 
gether with  the  Fourth  American,  were  all  to  execute 
some  deep  raids  from  the  Meuse  Heights  north  of  Ver- 
dun to  Pont-a-Mousson  on  the  Moselle  —  these  were  to 
be  preceded  by  a  six-hour  bombardment  In  conformity 
with  the  plans  of  the  Fourth  French  Army. 

The  enemy  order  of  battle  was  at  this  time  known. 
He  had  eleven  divisions  in  an  extended  line  fronting  the 
Americans  posted  on  the  Woevre  and  Meuse  Heights 
who  were  not  to  participate  in  the  attack.  Five  divisions 
only  held  the  front  between  Meuse  and  Argonne  against 
which  the  main  assault  was  to  be  directed. 

Eleven  divisions  (of  which  four  were  In  process  of  re- 
constitutlon)  were  reported  In  the  Metz  region,  so  that 
it  was  easy  to  conclude  that  the  enemy,  much  shaken  by 


operations  Between  Meuse  and  Argonne       287 

the  fight  at  St.  Mihiel,  feared  an  American  attack  in  the 
Woevre  even  more  than  an  offensive  in  Champagne.  He 
had,  however,  along  a  front  which  extended  from  the 
Meuse  to  Rheims,  disposed  his  forces  in  depth,  officers 
and  soldiers  had  been  warned  by  their  high  command 
against  a  Franco-American  offensive  announced  for  the 
twenty-ninth  of  September. 

As  much  to  facilitate  the  study  of  this  battle  which, 
beginning  on  September  26th,  finished  only  with  the 
armistice,  as  to  obtain  a  clear  account  of  proceedings  from 
reports  of  those  officers  who  participated  in  the  divers 
phases  of  this  great  operation,  the  American  high  com- 
mand decided  to  divide  the  action  into  three  distinct 
periods.  We  shall  naturally  adopt,  with  slight  modifi- 
cations as  to  the  length  of  each  phase,  this  perfectly  logi- 
cal division. 

In  the  first  phase,  we  shall  include  the  initial  attack 
and  the  advance  which  brought  the  American  infantry, 
engaged  well  ahead  of  its  artillery,  in  contact  with  the 
enemy  reserves.  This  brief  and  brilliant  period  may  be 
designated  as  the  "  Success  of  late  September." 

The  second  phase  is  that  of  a  perpetual  combat  during 
which  the  Americans,  although  they  gained  ground  only 
foot  by  foot,  continued  steadily  to  advance,  wearing  out 
the  enemy  and  enlarging  the  front  of  attack.  This 
period  covered  the  whole  following  month  and  we  may 
call  it  the  "  Incessant  fighting  of  October." 

The  third  and  last  phase  is  naturally  that  of  the 
"  pursuit."  Beginning  on  November  ist  by  a  general 
assault,  the  first  American  Army,  reconstituted  in  view  of 
a  definite  operation,  conducted  a  regular  advance  in  con- 
stant touch  with  the  enemy,  which  forced  him  back  until 
the  eleventh  of  November,  at  which  date,  and  for  reasons 


288      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

entirely  Independent  of  the  will  of  the  soldier,  a  speedy 
termination  of  hostilities  was  reached. 

Let  us  take  up  our  narrative  where  we  broke  off  when, 
after  a  bombardment  of  three  hours,  perhaps  the  most 
violent  of  the  war,  and  which  carried  unprecedented  con- 
sternation .Into  the  enemy  ranks,  the  American  infantry 
attacked  on  the  morning  of  September  26th  at  5.30. 

Advancing,  as  we  have  previously  seen  them  do,  close 
upon  the  rolling  barrage,  the  troops  rapidly  traversed  the 
furrows  formed  by  the  abandoned  trenches,  ground  honey- 
combed with  shell-holes,  overturned  by  a  rain  of  shot  dur- 
ing four  years  when  it  had  been  constantly  battered  by 
both  sides  and  to  which  the  British  have  given  the  name 
of  "  No  Man's  Land."  With  almost  equal  celerity  they 
crossed  the  first  enemy  lines  and  the  auxiliary  defenses 
which,  although  bristling  with  barbed  wire,  were  but 
thinly  manned. 

On  the  entire  front,  the  second  lines  were  reached  and 
held.  In  spite  of  fierce  enemy  resistance,  becoming  more 
and  more  accentuated  as  the  waves  pressed  on.  The 
Americans  pushed  forward,  attaining  a  four-mile  advance 
at  points  where  the  defense  had  been  particularly  strong, 
and  as  much  as  six  miles,  where  the  German  machine  guns 
had  made  less  havoc  in  the  advancing  ranks. 

During  the  first  day  the  troops  had  taken  the  villages 
of  Drillancourt,  Septsarges,  Culsy,  Malancourt,  Very, 
Cheppy,  and  Varennes. 

Unfortunately,  toward  the  center,  the  advance  of  the 
Fifth  Corps  was  checked  before  it  had  attained  Mont- 
faucon.  Great  difficulty  was  experienced  in  debouching 
from  the  Malancourt  and  Cheppy  Woods.  The  infantry 
which  had  traversed  these  thickets  was  no  longer  In  force 


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SITUATION  AT  THE  BEGINNING  OP  THE  SECOND  PHASE 

•situation  AT  THE  BEGINNING  OFTHE  THIRD  PHASE  


Operations  between  Meuse  and  Argonne 


Meuse-Argonne  Battle  (First  Phase)  289 

sufficient  to  scale  the  redoubtable  heights  upon  which  this 
village  is  perched.  The  tanks  in  many  spots  had  difficulty 
in  getting  into  the  enemy  lines,  in  others  they  rendered 
excellent  service,  preceding  the  infantry  and  doing  good 
work  not  only  on  the  twenty-sixth  but  also  during  the 
following  days.^^ 

On  the  twenty-seventh  and  twenty-eighth,  the  attacks 
continued  along  the  entire  front  of  the  First  Army,  where 
considerable  progress  was  made.  Montfaucon,  Epinon- 
ville,  Charpentry,  and  Apremont  were  taken.  The  three 
army  corps  either  attained  or  passed  beyond  the  objectives 
which  they  had  been  assigned. 

Such  violent  infantry  combats  were  engaged  for  the 
possession  of  these  latter  strongholds  that  General 
Pershing  thought  best  to  organize  defensively  the  line 
Gercourt  —  Drillancourt  —  Bois-Jure  —  Dannevoux  — 
Namtillois  —  Eclisfontaine-Charpentry  —  Montblain- 
ville  —  Apremont. 

The  first  bound,  which  inaugurated  the  lengthy  combat 
between  Argonne  and  Meuse,  had  been  effected  with 
rapidity  and  precision.  Success  crowned  the  American 
efforts;  the  enemy  had  lost  during  the  last  days  of  Sep- 
tember all  his  first  and  second  positions,  he  had  been  con- 
strained to  retreat  without  shelter  into  the  open  country, 
and  he  had  lost  9,000  prisoners  and  left  more  than  100 
cannons  in  our  hands. 

If  we  may  judge  by  the  number  of  troops  which  he  had 
thrown  into  the  fight  in  order  to  back  up  his  units  which 
had  sustained  the  shock  of  the  twenty-sixth  of  September, 
we  may  suppose  that  his  anxiety  had  been  extreme.  The 
following  divisions  successively  passed  before  the  Ameri- 

i^The  number  of  tanks  of  which  the  American  Army  disposed  on 
September  26th  was  381,  of  which  239  were  French. 


290      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

can  front:  Second  Landwehr,  Thirty-seventh  Reserve, 
Fifth  Bavarian  Reserve,  Seventy-sixth  Reserve,  Fifty-sec- 
ond Division,  so  that  on  the  thirtieth  of  September,  at  the 
conclusion  of  this  first  phase,  the  forces  of  the  defender 
were  about  equal  to  those  of  the  assailant. 

General  Pershing,  on  his  side,  was  obliged  to  relieve  the 
Thirty-seventh  Division  by  the  Thirty-second  and  the 
Seventy-ninth  by  the  Third. 

The  cavalry  could  not  be  utilized,  as  no  opportunity 
was  given  for  operating  in  open  country.  The  aviation, 
on  the  contrary,  had  been  extremely  active  in  spite  of  bad 
weather  conditions.  Often  flying  extremely  low,  the 
aviators  were  able  to  report  on  the  infantry  advance  and 
the  defensive  arrangements  of  the  enemy.^^ 

The  liaison  detachment  had  encountered  many  obstacles 
to  its  progress  between  the  Aisne  and  Argonne;  the 
Fourth  Army  had  realized  the  advance  expected  of  it 
by  the  high  command. 

During  this  first  phase,  the  young  American  Army,  even 
that  portion  which  had  not  before  seen  fire,  had  justified, 
by  its  fine  qualities  of  energy  and  dash,  the  most  sanguine 
hopes  of  all  who  had  felt  confidence  in  its  future. 

Would  it  now  add  qualities  of  endurance  and  tenacity 
to  those  already  exhibited?  Would  it  be  easily  adaptable 
to  the  exigencies  of  an  incessant  battle  in  open  country 
and  in  the  woods?  The  study  of  the  second  phase  of 
this  combat  may  give  us  the  answer  to  these  questions. 

The  first  bound  which  the  Americans  had  made  during 
the  initial  days  placed  the  infantry  on  an  advanced  line 

12  The  aviation  service  of  the  First  American  Array  comprised,  at  this 
date,  660  machines  manned  by  American  pilots  and  180  machines  manned 
by  French  pilots. 


Meuse-Argonne  Battle  (Second  Phase)         291 

fronting  a  multitude  of  German  machine  guns,  installed  in 
depth  formation,  and  which  were  hard  to  destroy  without 
the  support  of  cannon. 

In  every  hollow  or  thicket  on  the  fringe  of  every  wood, 
the  foot  soldier  came  up  against  these  deadly  weapons, 
backed  by  countless  others.  Progress  was  slowed  up, 
and  just  at  the  moment  when  the  infantry  had  most  need 
of  artillery  support,  the  guns  were  checked  by  the  diffi- 
culties of  changing  their  emplacements. 

The  rain-soaked  ground  was  deep  in  mud  and  extremely 
slippery,  so  that  to  draw  the  guns  across  country  was 
practically  impossible. 

Moreover  the  zone  which  included  the  old  defense  sys- 
tems of  trench  warfare  was  like  the  No  Man's  Land 
above  described,  filled  with  ridges  and  shell-holes. 

All  transportation  and  artillery  movements  were  thus 
obliged  to  keep  to  the  roads  which  were  far  from 
numerous,  and  it  was  scarcely  possible  for  each  army 
corps  to  have  at  its  exclusive  disposition  even  one  narrow 
way  permitting  a  continuous  line  of  travel. 

At  the  spots  where  the  roads  crossed  the  abandoned 
trenches,  it  was  necessary  to  make  bridges,  inclines,  etc., 
in  order  to  permit  passage.  The  American  engineers  and 
our  territorial  battalions  vied  with  each  other,  night  and 
day  during  many  weeks,  to  better  the  condition  of  the 
ways  which  linked  the  network  of  roads  between  front 
and  rear.  Blocks  in  the  traffic  rendered  the  supplying  of 
the  troops  precarious  and  checked  the  movements  of  the 
allied  artillery. 

The  American  military  police,  charged  with  the  main- 
tenance of  order,  circulation,  and  transport,  came  against 
all  sorts  of  obstacles,  augmented  by  the  essential  ones  of 


292      The  American  Army  In  the  European  Conflict 

language,  climate,  Ignorance  of  the  ground.  We  who 
have  seen  the  Americans  overcome  so  many  of  the  diffi- 
culties placed  in  their  way,  should  do  justice  to  the  efforts 
made  by  them  under  these  circumstances. 

Every  one  worked  with  zeal  and  ardor.  The  artillery, 
so  as  not  to  block  the  roads,  often  put  a  crew  of  men  at 
the  wheels  of  the  stalled  cannon  and  succeeded  thus  in 
helping  the  heavy  pieces  through  No  Man's  Land,  thereby 
accomplishing  the  first  forward  bound  of  their  batteries. 

The  commander-in-chief  himself  again  set  the  example 
of  activity,  hurrying  forward  the  repairs,  hastening  from 
one  command  post  to  the  next  in  order  to  push  on  the 
fighting. 

The  enemy,  on  the  contrary,  as  he  retreated  farther 
and  farther  back,  found  himself  in  easier  ground,  where 
traffic  on  the  roads  was  only  interrupted  by  the  harassing 
fire  of  the  American  batteries. 

By  the  time  the  second  phase  of  combat  had  begun  in 
the  zone  of  the  First  Army,  circulation  was  once  more 
normally  established  and  permitted  the  steady  advance  of 
artillery  and  prompt  arrival  of  munitions. 

We  have  already  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  only 
a  small  number  of  American  divisions  which  took  part  in 
this  affair  disposed  of  their  own  artillery.  It  was  not 
until  the  very  day  of  attack  that  some  of  the  infantry  was 
linked,  for  the  first  time,  with  its  supporting  guns.  The 
difficulties  of  a  divisional  artillery  called  upon  to  re- 
establish communications  with  a  green  infantry  from  the 
advanced  positions  attained  after  their  first  forward 
bound  may  be  easily  imagined. 

In  spite  of  all  these  obstacles,  at  which  we  have  only 
hinted  because  a  complete  enumeration  would  be  imprac- 
ticable, there  was  no  let-up  in  the  fighting.     It  became  a 


Meuse-Argonne  Battle  (Second  Phase)         293 

question  merely  as  to  which  opponent  would  be  able  to 
wear  out  his  adversary.  During  all  October,  the  Ameri- 
cans hammered  away  at  the  German  positions,  gaining 
ground  foot  by  foot,  now  bombarding,  now  attacking  the 
machine-gun  nests,  now  organizing  a  general  attack  which 
would  at  least  immobilize  the  foe  if  not  pierce  his  line. 

The  commander-in-chief  had  ordered  a  general  attack 
for  October  4th.  The  day  was  a  hard  one  and  progres- 
sion limited. 

On  the  right,  the  Third  Corps  advanced  at  an  oblique 
angle  toward  the  west  up  to  the  BrieuUes-Cunel  road, 
where  it  was  checked. 

At  the  center,  the  Fifth  Corps  seized  the  village  of 
Gesnes,  but  could  not  proceed  beyond. 

Toward  the  left,  in  the  winding  Aire  Valley  and  on  the 
wooded  slopes  of  the  Argonne,  the  First  Corps  realized 
a  two-mile  advance. 

On  the  seventh  of  October,  this  same  corps  took 
Chatel-Chehery  and  went  forward  as  far  as  Cornay, 
where  on  the  following  day  the  Americans  penetrated. 
After  this  new  advance,  it  became  evident  that  the  enemy 
was  strengthening  his  defense  so  as  to  render  it  impos- 
sible to  pierce  his  lines  on  the  section  of  the  front  where 
the  First  Army  was  now  engaged,  and  it  was  easy  to 
foresee  that  the  process  of  wearing  him  out  would  be  a 
long  one. 

General  Pershing  thoroughly  understood  the  situation. 
He  had  discussed  the  phases  of  the  combat  with  General 
Petain  and  had  decided  to  widen  his  attacking  front  by  an 
action  which  should  be  confided  to  the  Seventeenth  French 
Corps  operating  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Meuse. 

Accordingly,  General  Claudel  received  orders  to  attack 
between  Beaumont  and  Samogneux,  and  to  push  forward 


294      ^^^  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

on  the  crest  separating  the  Meuse  basin  from  the  Loison 
Valley. 

The  Seventeenth  Corps,  already  reenforced  with  the 
Twenty-sixth  French  Division,  had  at  its  disposal  the 
Twenty-ninth  American  Division  and  most  of  the  ele- 
ments of  the  Thirty-third  Division  engaged  west  of  the 
river  on  the  wing  of  the  Third  Corps,  and  which  could 
cooperate  usefully  in  this  action. 

In  order  to  give  General  Claudel  a  greater  facility  to 
carry  out  his  operation,  the  front  of  attack  was  limited 
on  the  right  by  Beaumont  and  the  Thirty-third  French 
Corps  was  interpolated  between  this  village  and  Menil 
where  the  Second  Colonial  Corps  had  established  its  left. 
General  Leconte,  chief  of  the  Thirty-third  Corps,  thus 
took  direct  command  of  the  Tenth  and  Fifteenth  French 
Divisions  and  established  his  headquarters  at  Belrupt. 

The  Seventeenth  Corps  was  ready  to  attack  on  October 
8th,  thus  participating  in  the  larger  operations  which 
General  Pershing  had  planned. 

On  the  eighth  and  ninth,  the  German  positions  were 
once  more  subjected  to  a  violent  bombardment  from  the 
Argonne  to  and  beyond  the  right  bank  of  the  Meuse. 

On  the  Seventeenth  Corps  front,  progress  was  made  as 
far  as  the  Haumont  Wood;  3,000  prisoners  were  cap- 
tured, but  the  attack  which  had  gone  smoothly  at  the  start 
encountered  the  same  obstacles  as  had  already  been  met 
with  on  the  left  bank. 

The  enemy,  strongly  entrenched  In  the  Cosenvoye  and 
Haumont  Woods,  made  a  deadly  use  of  his  machine-gun 
concentrations,  so  that  the  fight  was  particularly  arduous 
and  sanguinary. 

The  Third  Corps  penetrated  as  far  as  Brieulles,  while 
the  Fifth  Corps  captured  Fleville. 


Meuse-Argonne  Battle  (Second  Phase)         295 

On  the  tenth,  the  advance  was  continued,  following  an 
enveloping  movement  which  was  executed  In  conjunction 
with  the  Fourth  Army,  and  thanks  to  which  the  entire 
Argonne  Forest  fell  Into  our  hands. 

General  Gouraud's  right  wing  had  reached  the  con- 
fluence of  the  Aisne  and  the  Aire. 

The  historian  desirous  of  finding  the  most  dramatic 
episodes  of  the  war  would  have  to  seek  them  in  Argonne. 
From  September  26th  to  October  loth,  the  Americans 
fought  in  these  wooded  regions  with  a  courage  and  a 
tenacity  worthy  of  their  French  predecessors  who  In  the 
terrible  months  of  191 5  had  held  in  the  Grurle,  at  Baga- 
telle, Marle-Therese,  and  the  Four-de-Paris. 

We  will  give  but  an  example :  Following  the  attacks 
of  early  October,  six  companies  belonging  to  the  308th 
Regiment  and  commanded  by  Major  Whittlesey  were  cut 
off  from  the  Seventy-seventh  Division  and  surrounded  by 
an  enemy  force  superior  in  number.  Officers  and  men  re- 
fused to  surrender.  After  four  days  of  resistance  and 
privations  during  which  their  own  airplanes  succeeded  in 
dropping  a  few  loaves  of  bread,  but  during  which  a  rain 
of  bullets  and  shells  came  from  every  direction  and  caused 
heavy  losses,  this  handful  of  brave  troops  succeeded  in 
maintaining  their  position  until  their  comrades  forced  a 
passage  to  their  relief. 

The  operations  were  now  amplified  on  almost  every 
front.  The  addition  of  the  Thirty-third  French  Corps 
brought  the  number  of  army  corps  under  the  direct  orders 
of  General  Pershing  up  to  seven.  A  large  number  of 
American  divisions  had  been  engaged  in  other  theaters, 
and  the  chief  of  the  American  forces  now  decided  to  form 
a  second  army. 

His    staff    resources    recently    augmented    with    the 


296      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

graduates  from  the  school  of  Langres,  were  now  sufficient 
to  form  the  headquarter  services  of  the  extensive  units 
about  to  be  constituted. 

The  First  Army,  which  had  so  brilliantly  fought  under 
his  orders,  capturing  more  than  30,000  prisoners,  now 
passed  to  General  Liggett,  who  took  command  on 
October  12th. 

On  the  same  day.  General  Bullard  was  placed  in  com- 
mand of  the  Second  American  Army,  and  at  the  head  of 
this  new  formation  he  established  headquarters  at 
Toul. 

The  First  Army  continued  to  Include  the  Thirty-third 
and  Seventeenth  French  Corps,  the  Third,  Fifth,  and 
First  American  Corps.  It  proceeded  to  carry  out  its 
offensive  mission  remaining,  however,  stationary  on  Its 
right  wlng.^^ 

The  Second  Army  maintained  a  comparatively  passive 
attitude  between  Port-sur-Sellle  and  Menil-en-Woevre, 
where  from  right  to  left  we  find  in  line  the  Fourth  Ameri- 
can Corps  and  the  Second  French  Colonial  Corps.  The 
Sixth  American  Corps,  In  process  of  formation  at 
Saizerals,  was  attached  to  this  army. 

We  have  seen  with  what  method  and  logical  sequence 
the  commander-in-chief  of  the  American  forces  grouped 
his  units  and  disposed  his  staffs.  In  order  to  better  his  or- 
ganization and  prepare  an  American  sector  constantly 
spreading  and  acquiring  daily  a  more  national  character. 

General  Pershing  had  shown  no  hesitation  in  assuming 
the  responsibility  of  a  direct  command  at  a  time  when 
there  was  every  reason  to  be  anxious  In  regard  to  the 

13  General  Maistre,  commanding  the  French  Central  Army  group,  was 
charged  with  coordinating  the  action  of  the  First  American  Army  and 
that  of  the  Fourth  French  Army. 


Meuse-Argonne  Battle  (Second  Phase)         297 

success  of  his  enterprise.  Any  doubt  as  to  the  final  out- 
come was  at  present  laid  to  rest.  He  knew  that  he  might 
rely  upon  his  two  army  commanders  and  content  himself 
with  a  general  supervision  of  the  fighting  forces.  His 
headquarters,  those  of  an  army  group,  were  established 
at  LIgny-en-BarroIs,  and  from  this  moment  all  the  Ameri- 
can operations  were  carried  on  under  his  Immediate  sur- 
veillance, and  under  the  supreme  authority  of  Marshal 
Foch. 

Consequent  upon  the  promotions  of  Generals  Liggett 
and  Bullard,  General  DIckman  now  took  command  of  the 
First  American  Corps,  General  Summerall  that  of  the 
Fifth  Corps,  and  General  Hines  that  of  the  Third  Corps. 

The  First  Army  continued  to  exercise  pressure  on  the 
enemy  front,  thus  provoking  the  fall,  one  by  one,  of  the 
strongholds  maintained  by  the  enemy  machine  guns. 

On  October  14th,  a  general  attack  was  launched,  meet- 
ing, however,  with  a  veritable  dike  of  machine-gun  fire. 
In  spite  of  this  the  First  Corps  succeeded  In  taking 
St.  Juvin  and  penetrated  with  certain  elements  Into 
Grandpre. 

The  Kriemhilde  position,  last  line  of  the  enemy's  de- 
fense, was  attained. 

On  the  eighteenth,  fighting  was  particularly  violent  to 
the  east  of  the  Meuse  and  In  the  Caures  and  Ormont 
Woods,  where  our  Seventeenth  French  Corps  fought  with 
admirable  tenacity. 

On  the  twenty-third,  the  Third  and  Fifth  Corps 
reached  the  line  of  Banthevllle;  divers  local  actions  and 
reconnoltering  raids  procured  the  army  valuable  Informa- 
tion, all  of  which  tended  to  show  that  the  enemy,  while 
still  continuing  a  desperate  resistance,  was  meditating  an 
eventual  retreat. 


298     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Accordingly,  General  Liggett  decided  to  regroup  his 
forces  in  order  to  produce  a  more  vigorous  and  coordinate 
effort.  Persuaded  that  a  strong  pressure  exerted  along 
the  entire  front  would  obtain  a  striking  result,  he  hastened 
to  place  his  troops  in  posture  to  deal  the  enemy  a  hard 
blow  and  to  follow  up  his  advantage. 

Believing  the  moment  of  a  German  withdrawal  nearer 
than  it  actually  proved  to  be,  he  even  gave  directions  and 
marching  orders  to  his  five  corps  in  case  of  this 
eventuality. 

The  Thirty-third  Corps  was  to  engage  upon  the  Etain 
Road,  the  Seventeenth  on  Damvillers,  the  Third,  Fifth, 
and  First  toward  Stenay,  Beaumont,  and  Stonne.  The 
indispensable  relief  of  certain  units  proceeded  in  order 
that  the  commander  might  have  at  hand  an  instrument 
capable  of  dealing  the  final  blow. 

The  Eighty-second  and  Forty-second  Divisions,  which 
had  both  been  subjected  to  heavy  losses,  were  withdrawn. 
The  artillery  was  completely  reformed,  the  number  of 
field  guns  considerably  augmented,  many  heavy  guns  sup- 
pressed. Everything  was  prepared  for  pursuit  after  the 
enemy  line  had  been  broken,  on  the  last  day  of  October, 
when  we  may  date  the  termination  of  the  second  phase  of 
the  combat  between  the  Meuse  and  the  Argonne. 

It  is  difficult  to  follow  the  progress  of  a  battle  which 
took  place  on  such  a  vast  area,  over  broken  ground  and 
which  covered  thirty  consecutive  days.  An  idea  may  be 
had  of  the  extreme  severity  of  the  conflict  if  we  examine 
the  effectives  lined  up  by  both  adversaries. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  second  phase,  the  Americans 
had  In  line  between  the  Meuse  and  Argonne  eight  divi- 
sions (from  October  23d  to  November,  their  front  was 
held  by  seven  divisions  only) .     To  these  American  con- 


Meuse-Argonne  Battle  (Third  Phase)  299 

tingents,  eleven  German  divisions  were  opposed.  By  a 
clever  utilization  of  their  effectives  the  Americans  sent 
twelve  of  these  new  or  reconstituted  units  into  line  while 
the  enemy  on  his  side  deployed  twenty-one  divisions. 

In  allowing  for  the  difference  between  the  effectives  of 
an  American  unit  and  a  similar  German  one,  it  may  be  said 
that  the  Americans  during  the  long  process  of  '*  wearing 
out  "  the  adversary  possessed  an  approximately  equal 
number,  and  constantly  maintained  the  upper  hand.  The 
incessant  fighting  of  October  had  enabled  them  to  bring 
In  7,000  prisoners  and  50  cannons  which  increased  the 
booty  taken  by  the  first  army  since  the  St.  Mlhiel  offensive 
to  32,000  prisoners  and  600  guns.  The  number  of 
prisoners  alone  thus  greatly  exceeded  the  number  of 
Americans  killed. 

Neither  -during  this  second  phase  of  the  conflict,  nor 
during  the  first,  did  the  cavalry  division,  stationed  near 
BInarville  with  a  view  to  pushing  forward  should  a  breach 
be  made,  have  the  opportunity  of  taking  part  in  these 
encounters.  The  cavalry  quitted  the  American  sector  on 
October  24th. 

Durlns:  the  last  days  of  the  month,  the  Thirty-third 
French  Corps  was  also  withdrawn  from  the  American 
command,  but  Its  divisions  remained  In  line,  merely  pass- 
ing under  the  orders  of  the  Seventeenth  French  Corps. 

The  First  Army  was  ready  for  the  decisive  stroke  and 
from  the  first  of  November  we  may  date  the  beginning 
of  the  third  phase  of  the  Meuse-Argonne  battle. 

The  French  Fourth  Army,  stationed  on  the  left  wing, 
waited  only  the  order  for  attack.  The  Third  Corps  held 
In  line  the  Fifth  and  Ninetieth  Divisions.  The  Fifth 
Corps,  the  Eighty-ninth  and  Second  Divisions;  the  First 


300     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Corps,  the  Eightieth,  Seventy-seventh,  and  Seventy-eighth 
Divisions.  This  battle  order  remained  unchanged  during 
the  first  five  days  of  pursuit. 

Men  and  officers  were  keen  for  the  fight,  the  morale 
was  extremely  high;  news  had  come  of  the  liberation  of 
the  Belgian  coast,  of  the  crossing  of  the  Hindenburg 
Line  by  the  British  who  had  taken  Lille,  and  of  the 
French  occupation  of  Laon.  Many  methods  of  prosecut- 
ing a  war  of  movement  had  been  successfully  experi- 
mented during  the  periods  of  rest.  The  men  had 
practiced  marching  and  maneuvering  by  night.  The 
small  units  had  learned  how  to  advance  in  columns  along 
the  roads  to  penetrate  into  the  villages  without  firing  a 
shot  and  to  surprise  the  defenders.  With  his  recent 
training  in  the  use  of  cold  steel,  the  American  infantryman 
was  eager  for  a  chance  of  employing  his  bayonet. 

The  attack  began  at  5.30  A.  m.,  after  a  two-hour 
preparation  by  the  artillery.  The  plan  was  to  seize  the 
heights  of  Cunel  and  those  to  the  north  of  Andevanne  by 
a  clever  turning  movement,  during  which  maneuver  the 
right  wing  was  to  deliver  the  principal  effort.  The  plan 
took  in  Bayonville  and  Chemery,  the  village  called  Sivry- 
les-Buzancy  and  a  portion  of  the  Loges  Forest. 

Even  more  distant  objectives  were  indicated  in  the  or- 
ders; Buzancy,  Barricourt,  and  Boult-au-Bois  where  the 
lines  would  come  in  touch  with  the  French  Fourth  Army. 

The  maneuver  was  carried  out  just  as  projected.  The 
Third  Corps  on  the  right  seized  Aincreville,  Doulcon,  and 
Andevanne;  the  Fifth,  in  the  center,  conquered  Landres- 
Saint-Geor^es,  Bayonville  and  Chemery;  the  First,  which, 
at  the  left,  had  met  with  an  obstinate  resistance  south  of 
Champigneulles  near  the  "  Bois  des  Loges  "  advanced 
little.     But,   excepting  on  the   front  of  this  corps,  the 


Meuse-Argonne  Battle   (Third  Phase)  301 

enemy  made  only  a  feeble  reaction  and  his  artillery  had 
remained  practically  silent. 

The  first  day's  success  encouraged  General  Liggett  to 
vigorously  pursue  the  offensive.  Orders  were  given  to 
take  a  strong  grip  on  the  foe  and  hurl  him  into  the  Meuse. 

The  Third  Corps  was  to  push  toward  Stenay,  the  Fifth 
Corps  toward  Beaumont,  the  First  Corps  toward  Rau- 
court.  On  the  other  side  of  the  river,  the  Seventeenth 
French  Corps  was  to  multiply  attacks  with  the  object  of 
forcing  the  Germans  to  loosen  their  grip  on  the  Meuse 
Heights  to  which  they  were  still  obstinately  clinging. 

On  the  second  of  November,  the  First  Corps  found 
its  front  freed  by  the  advance  of  the  American  right  and 
seized  Thenorgues  as  well  as  Buzancy. 

The  next  day,  the  Third  Corps  reached  Halles,  the 
Fifth  Fosse  and  Nouart,  the  First  Authe  and  St. 
Pierremont. 

The  long-range  guns,  keeping  up  with  the  advance,  took 
under  their  fire  the  railway  junctions  of  Montmedy, 
Longuyon,  and  Conflans.  The  American  advance  seemed 
to  be  breaking  up  the  last  resistance.  The  Germans  were 
obliged  to  pass  the  bulk  of  their  forces  to  the  right  bank 
of  the  Meuse,  abandoning  an  accumulation  of  material  so 
as  not  to  embarrass  their  rapid  retreat.  The  trees  bor- 
dering the  road  were  cut  down  to  obstruct  the  passage  of 
the  pursuing  troops. 

On  November  4th,  the  Third  Corps  reached  the  Meuse 
between  Villefranche  and  Stenay  and,  crossing  the  river, 
established  two  solid  bridgeheads  level  with  Brieulles  and 
Clery.i* 

i*The  Fifth  American  Division  was  the  first  to  cross  the  Meuse,  foot 
bridges  being  established  at  Brieulles  and  Clery,  notwithstanding  a  forci- 
ble enemy  resistance. 


302      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Then  came  the  turn  of  the  Fifth  and  First  Corps  to 
reach  the  river  in  the  vicinity  of  Mouzon  and  Bazeilles, 
near  Sedan.  In  this  retreat,  the  enemy  abandoned  250 
cannons  and  2,000  machine  guns. 

On  seeing  that  General  Hines's  troops  had  crossed  the 
river,  the  adversary  yielded  ground  before  the  Second 
Colonial  Corps,  whose  staff  had  now  replaced  that  of  our 
Seventeenth.  Hard  fighting  took  place  on  these  last  ram- 
parts of  the  Meuse  Heights  south  of  Stenay;  we  had 
the  best  of  it  and  on  the  Tenth  the  final  advantage 
was  gained.  The  enemy  was  hurled  back  Into  the 
plain. 

This  same  evening.  General  Liggett  ordered  the  First 
Army  to  cross  the  Chiers,  and  to  gain  the  line  Montmedy- 
Longuyon-Spincourt-Etain. 

This  movement  was  already  in  process  of  execution 
when,  on  the  eleventh  of  November,  at  1 1  A.  M.,  the  ar- 
mistice brought  hostilities  to  an  end. 

At  this  date  and  at  this  hour,  the  line  of  the  American 
sector  extended  from  Port-sur-Seille  to  Sedan,  passing 
through  Vandieres  and  Bezonvaux,  thence  bordering  the 
eastern  edge  of  the  Meuse  Heights,  continued  north- 
ward through  the  Woevre,  and  rejoined  the  Meuse  at 
Mouzay,  followed  the  river  up  to  the  vicinity  of  Sedan 
where  it  came  in  touch  with  the  right  of  the  Fourth 
French  Army. 

The  First  American  Corps  no  longer  having  frontal 
space  between  the  corps  of  General  Summerall  and  the 
Fourth  Army  was  withdrawn  to  the  vicinity  of  Chierry. 

The  booty  of  the  First  Army  now  Included  37,000 
prisoners  and  850  guns.^^ 

15  16,000  prisoners  and  450  cannon  taken  at  St.  Mihiel.      9,000  prisoners 
and  100  cannon  taken  during  first  phase.     7,000  prisoners  and  50  cannon 


Meuse-Argonne  Battle   (Third  Phase)  303 

The  American  front  from  Seille  to  Meuse,  near  Sedan, 
on  the  eleventh  of  November,  19 18,  was  held  by  fifteen 
divisions  of  which  two  were  French.  Opposite  the  Ger- 
mans maintained  in  line  thirty-eight  divisions  often  Incom- 
plete, and  lapping  over  one  another  In  such  a  manner  that 
identification  was  rendered  extremely  difficult  which 
proved  the  confusion  in  which  the  enemy's  forces  had 
been  thrown. 

The  Americans  had  engaged  twenty-two  divisions  in 
the  operations,  which  we  called  the  battle  between  Meuse 
and  Argonne  as  well  as  in  the  fighting  which  took  place  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Meuse.  Fifteen  divisions  went 
twice  into  line.^^ 

The  French  cooperated  in  this  action  to  the  extent  of 
six  divisions,  two  of  which  went  into  line  twice.,  They 
also  furnished  the  artillery  material,  tanks,  aviation,  and 
divers  rear  services  of  which  we  have  already  spoken. 

During  these  engagements,  the  Americans  lost  100,000 
men.  Among  this  number  many  were  sent  to  the  rear  for 
slight  wounds,  many  for  illness,  as  the  season  had  been 
rainy,  cold,  and  unwholesome. 

taken  during  second  phase.  5,000  prisoners  and  250  cannon  taken  during 
third  phase. 

The  American  Army  captured  during  the  whole  war  49,841  German 
prisoners  and  833  Austrian  prisoners  (statistics  of  the  general  headquar- 
ters). 

1^  American  divisions  engaged: 

First,  Second,  Third,  Fourth,  Fifth,  Seventh,  Twenty-sixth,  Twenty- 
eighth,  Twenty-ninth,  Thirty-second,  Thirty-third,  Thirty-fifth,  Thirty- 
seventh,  Forty-second,  Seventy-seventh,  Seventy-eighth,  Seventy-ninth, 
Eightieth,  Eighty-second,  Eighty-ninth,  Ninetieth,  and  Ninety-first. 

Among  these  the  following  were  engaged  more  than  once: 

First,  Fifth,  Twenty-sixth,  Twenty-eighth,  Thirty-second,  Thirty-third, 
Thirty-fifth,  Thirty-seventh,  Forty-second,  Seventy-seventh,  Seventy- 
eighth,  Seventy-ninth,  Eightieth,  Eighty-ninth,  and  Ninetieth  Divisions. 

Seventy-eight  German  divisions  were  engaged  either  as  a  whole  or  in 
part  on  this  same  front. 


304     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

While  the  First  Army  was  engaged  in  this  constant 
fight,  the  Second  Army  unceasingly  harassed  the  enemy 
along  a  wide  front.  From  Port-sur-Seille  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Moselle  as  far  as  the  village  of  Fresnes-en- 
Woevre,  General  Bullard  multiplied  his  concentrations  of 
fire  and  organized  raids  and  '*  soundings  "  in  order  to  fix 
the  enemy  and  seek  to  know  his  intentions. 

By  November  8th,  he  was  ready  to  take  the  offensive 
on  both  sides  of  the  Rupt-de-Mad  and  to  advance  two 
brigades  in  the  direction  of  Gorze  and  Chambley,  when 
the  order  for  a  general  attack  reached  him. 

The  high  command  supposed  that  the  enemy  was  pre- 
paring to  retreat  in  this  region. 

From  the  tenth  to  the  eleventh  of  November  (at 
eleven  o'clock)  the  troops  sounded  the  enemy  from  Port- 
sur-Seille  to  Fresnes-en-Woevre ;  after  a  series  of  com- 
bats the  advanced  posts  of  the  adversary  were  pushed 
back,  and  a  resistance  was  encountered  which  prevented 
any  serious  advance. 

At  the  extreme  right  of  the  Second  Army,  the  Sixth 
Corps  penetrated  with  its  Ninety-second  Division  (col- 
ored) into  the  woods  of  Frehaut,  Voivrotte,  and  Chemi- 
not.  At  the  center,  the  Fourth  Corps  advanced  close  to 
the  edge  of  Monplaisir  Farm  and  Bonseil  Wood,  while, 
to  the  left,  the  Seventeenth  Corps  (French)  took  Butgne- 
ville,  St.  Hilaire,  Chateau  d'Aulnoy,  and  part  of  the  vil- 
lage of  Marcheville. 

During  these  operations  several  hundred  prisoners 
were  captured. 

General  Pershing,  acceding  to  the  request  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief of  the  French  forces,  had  detached  on 
October  ist  two  divisions  in  reenforcement  of  the  Fourth 


General  Offensive  of  September-November,  igi8    305 

Army.  The  Second  and  Thirty-sixth  played  an  Impor- 
tant part  on  General  Gouraud's  front.  The  Second  Di- 
vision, after  two  brilliant  assaults,  took  the  '*  Blanc- 
Monts,"  and  having  repulsed  furious  counter-attacks,  car- 
ried the  village  of  St.  Etienne. 

The  Thirty-sixth  Division  relieved  the  Second  on  Octo- 
ber 9th,  and  in  Its  first  experience  under  fire  supported  a 
violent  bombardment  without  flinching,  subsequently  par- 
ticipating in  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  now  In  full  retreat 
toward  the  Alsne. 

The  Second  Division,  after  operating  with  the  Fourth 
French  Army,  was  scarcely  regrouped  when  It  was  again 
engaged  upon  the  American  front. 

According  to  Marshal  Foch's  orders,  two  more  divi- 
sions, the  Thirty-seventh  and  Ninety-first,  which  had  both 
taken  part  In  the  first  attacks  between  the  Meuse  and  the 
Argonne,  were  transported  by  rail  and  engaged  with  the 
two  French  Army  Corps  operating  in  Belgium. 

The  Thirty-seventh  Division  had  scarcely  detrained 
near  Ypres  when  It  was  sent  at  once  into  battle,  reaching 
the  Escaut  which  was  crossed  In  Its  pursuit  of  the  enemy. 
As  for  the  Ninety-first  Division,  It  also  reached  the  river 
and  later  penetrated  in  Audenarde. 

To  conclude  our  hasty  enumeration  of  the  many  deeds 
of  prowess  performed  by  these  various  American  divi- 
sions and  to  give  a  fair  Idea  of  America's  effort  on  the 
Continent  at  this  time,  we  should  also  give  a  brief  account 
of  those  divisions  which  operated  in  the  British  lines. 
This  narrative  will  be  found  in  the  tenth  chapter. 

The  armistice  surprised  the  American  forces  at  the  mo- 
ment of  success,  and  just  as  a  new  operation  was  about 
to  be  attempted. 

General  Pershing  had  proposed  to  Marshal  Foch,  who 


3o6     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

agreed  with  his  view,  to  take  the  offensive  between  the 
Meuse  and  the  Moselle,  march  with  his  First  Army  to- 
ward Longwy,  while  his  Second  Army  should  essay 
to  reach  the  Briey  region. 

Orders  to  this  effect  had  been  already  given. 

In  addition  six  American  divisions  had  been  placed  un- 
der General  Bullard's  orders  to  prolong  the  right  of  the 
Second  American  Army  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Mos- 
elle. Thus  General  Bullard's  offensive  and  that  which 
General  Mangin  was  about  to  undertake  with  his  Tenth 
Army  in  the  Sarre  basin  would  be  linked. 

Had  the  project  been  carried  out,  thanks  to  this  con- 
certed maneuver  —  the  forts  of  Metz  would  have  prac- 
tically been  invested  by  American  troops. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE   MARCH    TO   THE   RHINE 

General  Orders  France,  November  12,  1918. 

No.  203 

The  enemy  has  capitulated.  It  is  fitting  that  I  address  myself 
in  thanks  directly  to  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  American  Expe- 
ditionary Forces  who  by  their  heroic  efforts  have  made  possible 
this  glorious  result.  Our  armies,  hurriedly  raised  and  hastily 
trained,  met  a  veteran  enemy,  and  by  courage,  discipline,  and  skill 
always  defeated  him.  Without  complaint  you  have  endured  inces- 
sant toil,  privation,  and  danger.  You  have  seen  many  of  your 
comrades  make  the  supreme  sacrifice  that  freedom  may  live.  I 
thank  you  for  the  patience  and  courage  with  which  you  have  en- 
dured. I  congratulate  you  upon  the  splendid  fruits  of  victory 
which  your  heroism  and  the  blood  of  our  gallant  dead  are  now 
presenting  to  our  nation.  Your  deeds  will  live  forever  on  the  most 
glorious  pages  of  America's  history. 

Those  things  you  have  done.  There  remains  now  a  harder 
task  which  will  test  your  soldierly  qualities  to  the  utmost.  Succeed 
in  this  and  little  note  will  be  taken  and  few  praises  will  be  sung; 
fail,  and  the  light  of  your  glorious  achievements  of  the  past  will 
sadly  be  dimmed.  But  you  will  not  fail.  Every  natural  ten- 
dency may  urge  toward  relaxation  in  discipline,  in  conduct,  in 
appearance,  in  everything  that  marks  the  soldier.  Yet  you  will 
remember  that  each  officer  and  each  soldier  is  the  representative  in 
Europe  of  his  people  and  that  his  brilliant  deeds  of  yesterday  per- 
mit no  action  of  to-day  to  pass  unnoticed  by  friend  or  by  foe.  You 
will  meet  this  test  as  gallantly  as  you  have  met  the  tests  of  the 
battle-field.  Sustained  by  your  high  ideals  and  inspired  by  the 
heroic  part  you  have  played,  you  will  carry  back  to  our  people  the 
proud  consciousness  of  a  new  Americanism  born  of  sacrifice. 
Whether  you  stand  on  hostile  territory  or  on  the  friendly  soil  of 

307 


3o8      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

France,  you  will  so  bear  yourself  in  discipline,  appearance,  and  re- 
spect for  all  civil  rights  that  you  will  confirm  for  all  time  the  pride 
and  love  which  every  American  feels  for  your  uniform  and  for  you. 

John  J.  Pershing, 
General,  Commander  in  Chief. 


In  such  terms  did  General  Pershing,  while  thanking 
his  troops  on  the  morrow  of  the  armistice,  exhort  them  to 
show  themselves  worthy  of  their  past  record  during  the 
period  which  was  about  to  begin  after  the  German  capitu- 
lation. 

Would  the  American  forces  during  their  march  toward 
the  Rhine  bridgeheads  be  obliged  to  engage  in  fresh  com- 
bats? The  hypothesis  was  scarcely  probable.  The  en- 
emy had  undergone  a  series  of  costly  defeats  and  had 
been  In  constant  retreat,  leaving  400,000  prisoners  In  the 
hands  of  the  Allies. 

The  resisting  force  of  the  Imperial  armies  seemed  defi- 
nitely broken. 

The  haste  shown  by  the  enemy's  high  command  to  ac- 
cept the  terms  of  the  armistice  of  November  nth  in- 
dicated that  they  considered  their  cause  as  irrevocably 
lost. 

It  seemed  unlikely  that  the  American  advance  should 
encounter  any  very  severe  opposition;  some  minor  col- 
lision might,  of  course,  occur,  for  the  German  forces  were 
S  rapidly  disintegrating  and  getting  beyond  their  officers' 
control,  but  considering  the  delay  which  had  been  allowed 
them  for  their  retirement,  no  such  trouble  was  expected. 

According  to  the  terms  of  Marshal  Foch's  instruc- 
tions the  victorious  armies  were  to  halt  upon  the  line 
which  they  had  attained  on  November  nth  and  remain 
there  six  days  before  continuing  their  forward  march. 


March  to  the  Rhine  309 

This  delay  having  elapsed  they  were  to  move  forward 
and  reach  by  two  days  of  march  a  second  line  on  which 
they  were  to  remain  until  the  twenty-first  of  November. 
Thence,  proceeding  by  four  more  stages,  they  were  to 
reach  the  boundary  which  separates  Germany  from  Bel- 
glum,  Luxembourg,  and  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  there  await 
new  orders. 

During  these  successive  advances,  the  Importance  of 
the  effectives  maintained  In  the  first  line,  as  well  as  the 
distribution  of  the  troops  In  depth  along  the  line  of  march, 
were  to  be  determined  by  the  breadth  of  front  allotted  to 
each  army,  the  number  and  condition  of  the  roads,  sup- 
ply facilities,  etc.  Orders  were  given  each  army  to  be 
prepared  to  assume  the  offensive,  if  necessary,  within  a 
maximum  delay  of  forty-eight  hours. 


We  have  seen  In  the  preceding  chapter,  the  line  at- 
tained by  the  American  troops  on  the  morning  of  Novem- 
ber I  ith.  The  front  toward  which  they  were  directed  on 
the  seventeenth  —  six  days  after  the  armistice  —  was 
marked  by  Longwy,  Audun-le-Roman,  and  Briey.  After 
the  2 1  St,  they  were  to  proceed  toward  the  front  between 
Germany  and  Luxembourg.  Their  marching  zone  was 
bounded  on  the  north  by  Mouzon,  Carignan,  Florenville, 
Jamolgne,  Etalle,  Habay-La-Neuve,  Rodange,  Grosbois, 
DIeklrch;  on  the  south  by  Thiaucourt,  Chambley,  Con- 
flans,  Moyeuvre,  Gondrlngen,  Thionville,  Malllngen  and 
Scheng,  all  Inclusive.  Thus  almost  the  whole  of  Luxem- 
bourg and  a  small  portion  of  northern  Lorraine  were  re- 
served to  the  American  contingents  in  the  course  of  their 
march  toward  the  German  border. 

No  sooner  had  General  Pershing  received  full  instruc- 


3IO      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

tlons  from  Marshal  Foch,  than  he  at  once  took  steps  to 
insure  their  execution.  For  the  occupation  of  the  terri- 
tory evacuated  by  the  enemy  he  designated  the  Third 
Army  under  General  Dickman,  whose  staff,  constituted 
since  November  7th,  was  at  that  moment  at  Ligny-en-Bar- 
rois.  This  army  was  to  include  the  Third  and  Fourth 
Army  Corps  ^  minus  their  artillery,  and  in  addition  the 
Sixty-sixth  Brigade  of  field  artillery,  the  Three  hundred 
and  twenty-second  Field  Signal  Battalion,  the  Fifty-first 
and  Four  hundred  and  seventeenth  Telegraph  Battalions. 
All  these  troops  passed  into  the  ranks  of  the  Third  Army 
at  5  A.M.  on  November  17th.  General  Dickman's  or- 
ders were  to  advance,  maintaining  four  divisions  in  the 
front  line,  succeeded  by  two  others  at  an  interval  of  not 
more  than  two  days'  march.  Thus,  according  to 
Marshal  Foch's  instructions,  the  Third  Army  would  be 
able,  if  occasion  arose,  to  take  the  offensive  at  forty-eight 
hours'  notice.^ 

The  First  and  Second  Armies  were  provisionally  in- 
stalled in  rest  billets. 

The  French  troops  which  had,  up  to  that  time,  been 
incorporated  in  the  First  Army  were  returned  to  the  con- 
trol of  French  headquarters  on  November  I7th.^ 

On  the  eve  of  the  day  fixed  for  the  forward  march,  the 
commander-in-chief  of  the  allied  forces  completed  his  in- 
structions by  a  supplementary  note  in  regard  to  the  occu- 
pation of  the  Rhine  provinces. 

iThe  Third  Army  Corps  was  made  up  of  the  Second,  Thirty-second, 
and  Forty-second  Divisions,  the  Fourth  Array  Corps  was  composed  of  the 
First,  Third,  and  Fourth  Divisions. 

2  On  Noveraber  22d  the  Third  Army  was  reenforced  by  the  Seventh 
Army  Corps  containing  the  Fifth,  Eighty-ninth,  and  Nineteenth  Divisions. 

3  Seventeenth  Army  Corps,  Second  Colonial  Array  Corps,  Tenth  and 
Fifteenth  Colonial  Divisions. 


March  to  the  Rhine  311 

This  document  specified  that  all  troops  not  employed 
in  the  occupation  of  German  territory  should  be  main- 
tained in  Belgium,  in  Luxembourg,  or  in  Alsace-Lor- 
raine. A  portion  of  these  forces  were,  however,  to  re- 
main ready  to  march  at  a  moment's  notice,  and  pene- 
trate into  German  territory  at  the  slightest  alarm.  It 
was  also  prescribed  that  the  American  contingents  should 
be  kept  up  to  a  minimum  force  of  ten  divisions  and  should 
be  stationed  beyond  a  line  marked  by  the  river  Meuse  as 
far  as  Mezieres,  then  the  road  Mezieres-Hirson-Mau- 
beuge.  The  territorial  zone  in  Germany  which  was  as- 
signed to  the  American  troops  was  bounded  on  the  north 
by  the  limit  separating  the  districts  of  Coblenz  and  of 
Treves,  from  those  of  Cologne  and  Aix-la-Chapelle  ^ ; 
and  on  the  south  by  the  line  Sierck-Taben,  on  the  Sarre, 
Frommersbach,  Rheinsfeld-Thalfang,  Marbach,  Kirch- 
berg-Simmern-Rheinbollen-Heimbach-on-the-Rhine.^ 

The  bridgehead  of  Coblenz  was  to  be  held  by  an  army 
corps.  In  the  rear  two  army  corps  of  two  divisions  each 
were  to  remain  in  reserve,  hold  the  intermediary  pas- 
sages on  the  Rhine,  and  assure  the  occupation  of  the  coun- 
try. 

Finally,  in  the  American  zone,  an  army  corps  com- 
posed of  two  divisions  was  to  be  billeted  in  the  region  of 
Treves. 

The  orders  of  the  marshal  commander-in-chief,  dis- 
tributed the  duties  incumbent  on  each  of  the  Allies  pro- 
portionately to  their  effectives.  He,  however,  requested 
the  Belgians  and  x'\merlcans  to  furnish  to  the  troops  of 

*This  line  is  marked  approximately  by  Lammersweiller,  Manderfeld, 
Kronenburg,  Rheinbach,  and  Oberwinter. 

5  Sierck  allotted  to  the  French  troops,  the  other  localities  to  the 
Americans. 


312      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

occupation  a  more  important  contribution  than  had  been 
asked  of  the  French  and  British  armies,  on  account  of  the 
forces  which  these  latter  were  obliged  to  maintain  in 
other  theaters  of  war. 

Such  were  the  general  plans  for  the  occupation  of  the 
territory  vacated  by  the  vanquished  foe. 

An  important  modification  was  shortly  to  be  made, 
however,  in  these  arrangements.  The  lack  of  discipline 
which  had  been  apparent  for  some  time  in  the  ranks  of  the 
German  services  of  the  rear  reached  more  serious  propor- 
tions near  the  front;  in  many  units  the  officers  had  quite 
lost  control  over  their  men,  and  it  seemed  probable  that 
the  numerous  deserters  and  stragglers  from  the  retreat- 
ing armies  might  provoke  scenes  of  disorder  in  the  evacu- 
ated regions,  during  the  time  still  to  run  between  the  de- 
parture of  the  last  German  troops  and  the  arrival  of  the 
first  allied  contingents.  The  German  command  itself 
here  solicited  the  intervention  of  the  Allies  in  order  to 
obviate  this  danger.  On  the  eighteenth  of  November, 
Marshal  Foch,  after  an  understanding  to  this  effect  with 
the  adverse  command,  authorized  his  armies  to  penetrate 
at  once  into  the  evacuated  territory,  leaving,  however,  be- 
tween their  advance  guards  and  the  rear  of  the  retreating 
armies  a  minimum  distance  of  six  and  one-half  miles. 
This  change  of  plan,  which  authorized  our  armies  to 
accelerate  their  advance,  in  no  way  permitted  them  to 
retard  it. 

On  November  17th,  at  5.30  in  the  morning  the  ad- 
vance guards  of  the  Third  Army  crossed  the  line  defined 
by  the  armistice,  on  the  entire  front. 

The  march  was  effected  so  that  a  rapid  deployment  was 
possible,  in  case  of  any  alarm  or  untoward  happening. 

On  the  right  the  Fourth  Corps  (General  Muir)  main- 


March  to  the  Rhine  313 

tained  In  first  line  the  Third  Division  (General  Brown), 
and  the  First  (General  Parker).  The  Fourth  (General 
Hersey)  was  held  in  reserve. 

On  the  left  the  Third  Corps  (General  Hines)  marched 
in  a  similar  formation,  the  Thirty-second  Division  (Gen- 
eral Hahn),  the  Second  Division  (General  Lejeune) 
in  first  line  and  the  Forty-second  Division  (General  Mc- 
Arthur)  in  support. 

The  first  stage  of  this  march  was  marked  by  absolutely 
no  untoward  incident,  nor  was  any  enemy  detachment  en- 
countered; the  rear  guards  of  the  vanquished  army  were 
already  distant.  The  following  days  passed  in  the  same 
manner.  In  the  course  of  their  march  toward  the  Rhine 
the  Americans  found  the  country  entirely  freed  from 
enemy  troops  in  conformity  with  the  provisions  of  the 
armistice.  We  may  therefore  limit  ourselves  to  a  mere 
mention  of  the  stages  of  the  Third  Army's  advance. 

On  November  21st  General  Dickman's  troops  at  three 
in  the  afternoon,  occupied  the  city  of  Luxembourg,  and 
the  grand  duchy  was  crossed  in  the  same  order  as  has 
been  hitherto  indicated;  after  the  Twenty-second  the 
Seventh  Corps,^  which  was  then  part  of  the  Third  Army, 
followed  in  the  traces  of  the  first-line  corps. 

The  Eighty-ninth  Division  followed  the  Fourth  Corps, 
the  Ninetieth  behind  the  Third. 

After  the  completion  of  this  stage  the  Third  Army, 
on  November  23rd,  edged  the  entire  frontier  between 
Luxembourg  and  Germany  and  there  rested,  the  first 
phase  of  the  march  toward  the  Rhine  over  friendly  and 
neutral  territory  being  thus  terminated. 

*  Reduced  to  two  divisions,  the  Eighty-ninth  (General  Winn)  and  the 
Ninetieth  (General  Allan)  as  the  Fifth  (General  Ely)  had  been  employed 
on  construction  work  on  the  line  of  communication. 


314     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

On  the  morning  of  December  ist  the  occupation  of  the 
German  territory  was  to  begin. 

The  Third  Army  "^  crossed  over  Into  the  German  Em- 
pire, one  of  Its  columns  traversing  the  very  bridge  at 
Wasserblllig  where  in  August,  19 14,  the  first  troops  of 
the  Eighth  German  Corps  had  entered  the  Luxembourg 
territory. 

The  same  day  the  Americans  occupied  Treves,   and 
during  the  following  days  the  advance  continued  without 
changes,  two  army  corps  being  maintained  in  the  first  line 
with  one  in  reserve. 
(       The  headquarters  of  the  army  of  occupation,  at  first 
/  stationed  at  Luxembourg,  now  moved  to  Bitburg,  while 
/   General  Pershing  established  at  Treves  an  advanced  post 
of  command.     On  December  7th,  a  battalion  of  Infantry 
was  sent  forward  by  rail  to  Coblenz  in  order  to  keep 
order  in  that  town.     On  the  eighth  the  first  cavalry  pa- 
trols arrived  on  the  Rhine  at  Remagen;  on  the  tenth  the 
Third  Army  reached  the  river  upon  its  entire  front.     The 
headquarters,  removed  from  Bitburg,  were  now  estab- 
lished at  Mayen.     There  remained  only  for  the  Amer- 
icans to  take  possession  of  the  bridgehead  at  Coblenz. 

This  Coblenz  bridgehead  Included  an  arc  of  a  circle 
whose  radius  was  some  nineteen  miles,  having  as  central 
point  the  eastern  end  of  the  Pfaffendorf  bridge.  On  this 
line  the  advance  posts  were  to  be  established. 

We  have  already  seen  that  on  December  ist  two 
French  divisions  were  temporarily  attached  to  the  Third 
Army  in  order  to  participate  in  the  occupation  of  the 
Coblenz  bridgehead.     The  units  in  question  were  now 

"^  Reenforced  temporarily  by  two  French  divisions,  the  Second  (Chasseurs 
a  pied),  and  the  Forty-eighth  Infantry  Division,  assigned  to  the  Third 
Corps. 


March  to  the  Rhine  315 

placed  to  the  right  of  the  American  line,  and  it  was  nat- 
ural to  join  them  to  the  French  Tenth  Army  now  occu- 
pying the  neighboring  zone.  This  was  done  on  Decem- 
ber 1 2th.  Thus  the  American  sector  was  somewhat  nar- 
rowed, its  southern  limit  being  formed  by  the  admin- 
istrative frontier  line  separating  the  districts  of  Bern- 
castel,  Wittlich,  Cochem,  Mayen,  Coblenz,  and  Wester- 
berg  from  those  of  Wimmern,  Zell,  St.  Goar,  St.  Goars- 
hausen,  Diez,  and  Limburg. 

On  the  thirteenth  of  December  at  7  A.  M.,  the  Third 
Corps,  designated  to  occupy  the  bridgehead  itself,  sent  its 
first  elements  across  the  Rhine  and  pursued  this  operation 
during  the  following  days  without  the  smallest  incident. 
On  the  sixteenth  the  American  advance  posts  were  estab- 
lished along  the  exterior  circumference  of  the  bridgehead, 
with  the  corps  headquarters  fixed  at  Neuwied.^ 

On  the  left  bank  the  Fourth  Corps  ^  with  headquarters 
at  Cochem  on  the  Moselle,  was  stationed  in  support. 
Further  rearward,  the  Seventh  Corps  ^^  with  headquar- 
ters at  Grevenmacher,  was  placed  in  reserve  near  Treves. 

The  army  headquarters  were  now  transported  from 
Mayen  to  Coblenz. 

On  December  17th,  the  occupation  of  the  enemy  terri- 
tory, as  it  had  been  foreseen  and  laid  down  by  the  armis- 
tice conventions,  was,  in  so  far  as  the  Americans  were  con- 
cerned, completely  terminated.  The  zone  of  the  rear, 
occupied  by  the  Third  Army,  ceased  at  the  Luxembourg 
frontier,  and  the  troops  stationed  in  the  territory  of  the 

8  Now  formed  with  the  First,  Thirty-second,  and  Second  Divisions. 

^  Now  formed  with  the  Third,  Fourth,  and  Forty-second  Divisions. 

10  Reenforced  by  the  Thirty-third  Division  under  General  Bell  from 
December  12th.  The  artillery  of  the  army  included  the  Fifty-fifth,  Fifty- 
eighth,  Sixty-sixth,  One  Hundred  Fifty-eighth,  One  Hundred  Sixty-fourth 
field  artillery  brigades. 


3i6     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

grand  duchy  were  attached,  fopv  administration  and  for 
instruction,  to  the  Second  Army  whose  headquarters  were 
at  TouL 

In  the  entire  course  of  their  march  on  German  territory 
the  American  troops  never  encountered  an  enemy  detach- 
ment, but,  in  order  to  complete  the  account  of  their  do- 
ings, it  is  necessary  here  to  say  a  word  about  their  rela- 
tions with  the  civil  population  in  the  occupied  regions. 

On  first  entering  Germany,  the  American  soldier  was 
indeed  somewhat  astonished  by  the  warm  welcome  which 
he  received.  Knowing  the  Germans  by  what  he  had  seen 
of  them  on  the  field  of  battle  and  by  the  atrocities  he  had 
read  of  and  heard  recounted,  as  well  as  by  the  far  from 
flattering  portrait  given  him  by  his  chiefs,  he  was  now  sur- 
prised to  find  himself  in  a  country,  not  as  he  had  been 
led  to  suppose,  torn  by  revolution  and  civil  discord  and 
on  the  brink  of  starvation,  but  in  a  land  of  comparative 
plenty,  among  people  of  amiable  appearance,  exceedingly 
submissive  to  all  orders,  and  even  anticipating  his  wants. 
Order  reigned  everywhere.  In  the  villages,  when  the 
troops  passed,  the  civilians  lined  up  to  watch  them  defile, 
showing,  especially  the  women  and  children,  quite  a 
friendly  curiosity  in  their  movements. 

The  line  of  conduct  which  the  Germans  had  traced  for 
themselves  was  simplicity  itself. 

The  burgher  intended  to  show  himself  as  pleasant  and 
cordial  as  possible,  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  thereby  the 
benefit  of  a  very  lenient  occupation. 

With  that  spirit  of  discipline  which  has  always  char- 
acterized the  masses  in  Germany,  every  one  worked  to 
keep  up  this  tacit  understanding,  and  endeavored  to  the 


March  to  the  Rhine  317 

best  of  his  ability,  individual  and  collective,  to  fructify 
various  more  or  less  clever  schemes  for  "  fraternization." 

In  the  long  run  these  attempts  met  with  absolutely  no 
success. 

In  the  first  place,  it  was  impossible  for  the  German 
civilian  to  sustain  for  a  long  period  the  part  he  had  chosen 
to  assume;  the  bitterness  of  his  hate  and  disappointment 
soon  made  themselves  felt,  resistance  was  made  to  certain 
necessary  requisitions,  and  in  the  towns,  the  American 
officers  were  frequently  lodged  in  a  most  inferior  man- 
ner. This  sudden  change  of  front  sufficed  to  open  the 
eyes  of  the  few  who  had  allowed  themselves  to  be  de- 
ceived by  the  first  friendly  demonstrations,  under  which  it 
was  easy  to  perceive  a  hypocritical  attitude,  and  the  Amer- 
ican who  has  a  natural  contempt  for  the  man  who  volun- 
tarily humiliates  himself  before  his  adversary  was  unfa- 
vorably impressed  with  what  he,  day  by  day,  observed. 
Relations  between  the  two  nationalities  became  less  and 
less  frequent. 

The  Third  Army  issued  stringent  orders  against  fra- 
ternization of  any  sort,  the  different  brigades  and  divi- 
sions followed  suit.  According  to  the  rules  prescribed, 
communications  between  the  soldier  and  the  citizen  were 
to  be  limited  strictly  to  business  and  to  the  service 
and,  in  order  to  reduce  even  such  direct  dealings  there 
was  established  in  each  unit  —  division  brigade  or  regi- 
ment —  a  special  bureau  of  civilian  affairs  to  treat  with 
the  population  of  the  occupied  regions.  In  this  way  no 
officer  or  trooper  had  occasion  to  address  himself  directly 
to  enemy  civilians. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  soldier's  day  was  taken  up  by 
such  a  complete  program  of  Instruction  that  little  time 


3i8     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

was  left  for  anything  but  the  work  laid  down  for  him  to 
do.  It  is  an  ungrateful  task  to  attempt  to  occupy  the 
time  of  a  soldier  who  has  just  been  making  war,  but  it  was 
one  of  which  the  American  officers  acquitted  themselves 
with  rare  tact. 

The  programs  had  a  double  object;  to  keep  the  troops 
well  in  hand,  and  at  the  same  time  prepare  them  for  a  re- 
turn to  civil  life.  Many  schools  were  created  with  this 
object  in  view.  Even  in  the  regiments,  enough  instruc- 
tors were  found  to  give  courses  in  applied  mechanics, 
electricity,  telephone  and  telegraph  service,  history  and 
modern  languages.  Thus  the  American  combatant  who 
has  been  through  the  war  comes  out  of  it  not  only  with 
his  experience  wonderfully  enlarged,  but  also  with  his  gen- 
eral instruction  greatly  improved  over  what  it  was  upon 
entering  the  army. 

The  great  benevolent  societies  which  we  shall  describe 
elsewhere  took  a  prominent  part  in  the  education  of  the 
soldier  and  did  much  to  keep  him,  while  occupying  Ger- 
man territory,  away  from  the  unwholesome  influence  of 
enemy  propaganda.  The  Red  Cross,  the  Young  Men's 
Christian  Association,  the  Knights  of  Columbus,  and  the 
Salvation  Army  all  established  comfortable  clubs  which 
the  men  of  the  occupation  forces  regularly  frequented  and 
where  they  found  amusements,  dances,  theatricals,  and 
lectures  to  keep  them  among  their  own  compatriots. 

Thus,  In  mid  December,  191 8,  our  American  associates 
had  concluded  without  the  slightest  hitch,  and  within  the 
specified  time,  the  occupation  of  the  German  territory 
allotted  to  them. 

Solidly  established  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine,  and 
disposing  of  powerful  effectives  which  would  have  made  it 


March  to  the  Rhine  319 

possible  at  a  moment's  notice  to  take  up  arms,  the  Amer- 
ican soldiers  quietly  prepared  to  resume  the  occupations 
of  peace  time,  equally  ready  to  plunge  once  more  into 
active  operations  at  the  first  alarm. 


CHAPTER  X 

PART  TAKEN  BY  AMERICAN  UNITS  IN  THE  OPERATIONS 
ON  BRITISH  FRONT AND  IN  SECONDARY  THEA- 
TERS OF  THE  WAR 

It  was  perfectly  natural,  the  British  navy  having  gener- 
ously come  to  the  aid  of  the  Americans  in  order  to  facili- 
tate their  arrival  in  Europe/  that  at  the  moment  of  the 
enemy  offensive  toward  Amiens,  certain  units  should  be 
sent  into  this  threatened  area  rather  than  to  points  of 
the  French  front.  These  divisions,  while  training  at  the 
rear  and  in  some  of  the  quiet  front  sectors,  would  serve 
to  augment  the  density  of  the  troops  and  at  the  same  time 
strengthen  the  resistance. 

General  Pershing  arranged  with  the  British  authorities 
that  ten  divisions  should  be  thus  distributed  in  the  British 
cantonments,  maneuver  and  training  camps,  and  subse- 
quently trained  for  trench  warfare  at  the  front  pending 
the  day  when  they  would  be  regrouped  and  become  a  part 
of  the  great  American  Army. 

These  divisions;  the  Fourth,  Twenty-seventh,  Twenty- 
eighth,  Thirtieth,  Thirty-third,  Thirty-fifth,  Seventy-sev- 
enth, Seventy-eighth,  Eightieth,  and  Eighty-second,  ar- 
rived in  France  at  the  end  of  April  during  the  month  of 
May  and  in  the  first  days  of  June,  1 9 1 8 . 

No  sooner  were  they  disembarked  than  their  training 
began.     The  program  of  instruction  had  been  drawn  up 

I48.5  per  cent,  of  the  effectives  disembarked  in  Europe  were  carried 
overseas  by  British  tonnage. 

320 


British  Front  321 

by  the  American  general  headquarters  at  Chaumont. 
They  differed  slightly  from  those  imposed  upon  the  troops 
who  were  assembled  in  the  American  zone. 

It  had  been  necessary  to  modify  the  American  regu- 
lations slightly  considering  that  these  new  contingents, 
and  in  particular  the  infantry,  were  armed  with  English 
equipment.  For  it  was  with  the  British  army  rifle  and 
machine  gun  that  these  American  divisions  made  their  first 
essay  in  arms. 

It  was  also  imperative  to  take  into  account  the  very 
special  situation  in  which  the  British  Army  found  itself 
at  this  moment  from  the  point  of  view  of  its  organization. 
After  the  German  attacks  of  March  and  April  our  allies 
were  obliged  to  suppress  one  battalion  out  of  three  in 
many  of  their  brigades.  Besides,  in  several  divisions  the 
infantry  had  been  withdrawn.  These  units  lacking 
troops  kept  their  officers,  their  services,  their  trains,  and 
found  themselves  at  rest  awaiting  the  arrival  of  reen- 
forcements.     They  were  called  "  Cadre  Divisions." 

Thus,  when  the  American  units  arrived  in  the  Brit- 
ish zone  to  perfect  their  training,  the  services  and  trans- 
portation facilities  of  these  Cadre  Divisions  were  at  once 
turned  over  to  the  American  divisions.  The  one  pos- 
sessed all  that  was  lacking  in  the  other.  The  name  given 
by  the  British  to  such  units  working  side  by  side  and  com- 
pleting one  other  was  ''  Affiliated  Divisions." 

During  these  periods  of  instruction  the  British  officers 
without  troops  were  placed  near  the  American  officers  of 
the  same  rank  and  served  as  "  text-book,"  according  to 
another  of  the  British  expressions. 

As  soon  as  the  American  troops  were  pronounced  fit 
for  sector  duty,  it  was  decided  to  send  them  into  line  b^ 
battahon,   and  this  measure  would  have  permitted  the 


322     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

British  brigades  to  recuperate  their  missing  third  bat- 
talion. 

This  primary  phase  being  terminated,  the  American 
battalions  were  to  have  been  returned  to  their  own  regi- 
ment, and  these  units  also  were  then  to  pass  a  certain 
length  of  time  in  the  front  line.  As  a  matter  of  fact  it 
was  impossible  to  realize  this  program,  at  least  for  the 
ten  divisions  in  question. 

When  the  enemy  broke  through  our  lines  along  the 
Chemin-des-Dames  and  advanced  toward  Chateau- 
Thierry,  it  seemed  prudent  to  post  between  Paris  and  the 
front  the  Fourth  and  Twenty-eighth  Divisions,^  and  to 
send  into  the  quiet  sectors  of  Lorraine  and  the  Vosges, 
the  Thirty-fifth,  Seventy-seventh,  and  Eighty-second  Divi- 
sions in  order  that  they  might  relieve  French  units,  thus 
rendering  these  trained  troops  available  for  action. 

When  these  movements  had  been  effected,  there  re- 
mained only  five  American  divisions  in  the  British  zone. 
These  units  went  into  service  at  the  front  on  the  follow- 
ing dates : 

The  Twenty-seventh  on  July  22nd. 

The  Thirtieth  on  July  i6th. 

The  Thirty-third  on  July  3rd. 

The  Seventy-eighth  on  August  12th. 

The  Eightieth  on  July  2 2d. 

The  commander-in-chief,  in  an  order  dated  June  25th, 
had  organized  the  Second  American  Army  Corps  and 
had  placed  General  Read  at  its  head.  Fruges  became  the 
headquarters  of  this  new  corps,  whose  mission  was  to  ad- 
minister the  American  divisions  scattered  in  the  British 
zone,  to  superintend  their  instruction  awaiting  the  day  — 

2  See  Chapter  IV,  the  role  of  the  Fourth  and  Twenty-eighth  Divisions 
during  the  spring  defensive. 


British  Front  323 

which  was  now  approaching  —  when  the  corps  would  as- 
sume the  direction  of  tactical  operations. 

During  the  last  week  of  August,  General  Pershing  di- 
rected the  Thirty-third,  Seventy-eighth  and  Eightieth  Di- 
visions to  proceed  by  rail  to  the  American  zone,  having 
decided  to  utilize  these  units  for  the  general  offensive 
which  he  was  contemplating  in  the  autumn.  During  their 
training  in  the  British  zone  these  divisions  had  had  but  a 
single  chance  to  accustom  themselves  to  trench  warfare. 
But  they  had  nevertheless  been  able  already  to  signalize 
themselves  in  a  way  which  called  forth  the  admiration 
of  their  British  comrades  for  the  courage  and  audacity 
which  they  had  there  displayed. 

The  Thirty-third  Division,  in  particular,  had  brilliantly 
distinguished  itself. 

On  Independence  Day,  July  4th,  one  of  its  battalions, 
joined  with  some  Australian  troops,  participated  in  a  raid 
near  Villers-Bretonneux  which  was  remarkably  prepared 
and  carried  out.  1,400  prisoners  were  brought  home, 
and  these  acknowledged  having  been  so  completely  .taken 
by  surprise  that  they  had  not  even  been  able  to  snatch 
their  muskets. 

One  of  the  British  generals  present  in  this  affair  con- 
fided to  us  that  the  original  thousand  Americans  forming 
the  assault  battalion  had  been  greatly  augmented  by  the 
impromptu  enlistment  of  a  quantity  of  "  Sammies  "  who^ 
posted  in  the  second  line,  could  not  resist  the  tempta- 
tion of  joining  their  comrades  which  they  had  been 
able  to  do  by  carefully  evading  the  vigilance  of  their 
chiefs. 

The  departure  from  the  British  front  of  the  three  divi- 
sions which  we  have  enumerated  left  to  the  second  Ameri- 
can corps,  operating  at  Fruges,  the  Twenty-seventh  and 


324     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Thirtieth  only.     General  Read  then  assumed  command 
of  these  divisions.^  * 

During  July,  19 18,  these  two  divisions  were  to  be  found 
in  the  first  line,  engaged  totally  or  In  fractions  before 
Poperinghe,^   Ypres,^   Lake    Dlckbusch,"^    Voormezeele,* 

3  In  the  course  of  the  operations  in  which  the  Twenty-seventh  and  Thir- 
tieth Divisions  participated,  they  were  incorporated  in  the  ranks  of  the 
Second  British  Army.  Thus  the  staff  of  the  American  corps  exercised 
over  them  only  administrative  control. 

*        ORDER  OF  BATTLE  OF  THE  SECOND  ARMY  CORPS 
Major-General  G.  W.  Read  commanding  the  corps 

Chief  of  Staff Colonel  G.  Simonds 

Chief  of  First  Section  (G-i) Colonel  R.  K.  Hale 

Chief  of  Second  Section   (G-2) Lt.-Col.  K.  T.  Riggs 

Chief  of  Third  Section  (G-3) Col.-  F.  E.  Buchan 

Chief  of  Fourth  Section  (G-4) .Col.  H.  S.  Herrick 

Tiventy-seventh  Division 

Major-General  J.  F.  O'Ryan  commanding  the  division 

Chief  of  Staff:  Colonel  Stanley  H.  Ford 

53d  Infantry  Brigade  54th  Infantry  Brigade 

Col.  G.  M.  Andrews  Brig.-Gen.  P.  E.  Pierce 

105th  Infantry  Regiment  loyth  Infantry  Regiment 

Major  C.  W.  Berry  Col.  C.  T.  de  Bevoise 

106th  Infantry  Regiment  108th  Infantry  Regiment 

Col.  W.  A.  Taylor  Col.  E.  S.  Jennings 

Thirtieth  Division 

Major-General  E.  M.  Lewis  commanding  the  division 

Chief  of  Staff:  Lt.-Col.  J.  K.  Herr 

SQth   Infantry   Brigade  60th   Infantry   Brigade 

Brig.-Gen.  L.  D.  Tyson  Brig.-Gen.  S.  L.  Faison 

Iiyth  Infantry  Regiment  ligth  Infantry  Regiment 

Col.  C.  F.  Spence  Col.  J.  Van  B.  Metts 

118th  Infantry  Regiment  120th  Infantry  Regiment 

Col.  O.  R.  Wolfe  Col.  S.  W.  Minor 

5  Twenty-seventh  Division  totally  engaged  from  July  9th  to  August  20th. 

6  Thirtieth  totally  engaged  from  July  17th  to  August  9th. 

7  Twenty-seventh  totally  engaged  from  August  21st  to  August  30th. 

®  First  brigade  of  the  Thirtieth  Division  engaged  from  August  31st  to 
September  2d. 


British  Front  ^2^ 

The  Lankhof  Farm,^  and  the  heights  of  Vierstraat.^^ 

When  these  operations  were  brought  to  a  close  the 
Twenty-seventh  and  Thirtieth  Divisions  which  had 
counted  in  the  ranks  of  the  Second  British  Army  returned 
to  General  Read's  command. 

The  Second  American  Corps  had  been  designated  to 
take  part  in  the  offensive  of  the  Fourth  British  Army. 
The  mission  of  General  Rawlinson  consisted  in  exerting 
pressure  upon  the  enemy's  front  between  Cambrai  and 
St.  Quentin,  and  it  may  be  remembered  that  toward  the 
middle  of  September  the  progression  of  Rawlinson's  army 
which,  working  In  conjunction  with  the  French  left  wing, 
followed  the  line  of  the  Somme  Valley  had  arrived  at 
the  Hindenburg  Line,  where  it  met  with  obstinate  resist- 
ance. 

Here  the  enemy  occupied  a  position  along  the  edge  of 
the  St.  Quentin  Canal.  Near  the  environs  of  Bellicourt 
and  between  this  village  and  Vendhullle  —  that  is  to  say, 
on  that  part  of  the  front  held  by  the  Australian  corps  — 
this  canal  passes  under  a  tunnel  six  kilometers  long. 

The  second  American  corps  was  placed  at  the  disposi- 
tion of  General  Rawlinson,  on  the  twenty-first  of  Septem- 
ber, that  it  might  aid  In  the  taking  of  that  portion  of  the 
enemy  line  which  It  appeared  would  be  fiercely  disputed. 

The  British  general  conceived  the  following  plan  for 
the  employment  of  his  own  elite  troops,  and  also  of  the 
American  infantry  which  before  long  was  to  show  itself 
equal  in  courage  and  daring  to  the  Australians.  General 
Read's  soldiers  were  to  alternate  with  those  of  General 

9  First  brigade  of  the  Thirtieth  Division  engaged  from  August  31st  to 
September  2d. 

10  Numerous  elements  of  the  Twenty-seventh  DivisioD  engaged  from 
August  31st  to  September  ist. 


326     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Monash  for  the  conduct  of  the  fight,  the  Initiative  of 
which  was  to  be  left  with  the  Americans. 

The  Second  Corps  commander  placed  his  divisions  side 
by  side,  the  Twenty-seventh  at  the  left,  the  Thirtieth  at 
the  right,  and  moved  them  on  September  27th  fronting 
their  objectives.  Their  mission  was  to  seize  the  first 
HIndenburg  Line,  and  after,  to  storm  the  villages  of 
Nauroy  and  Gouy.  As  soon  as  the  German  line  was 
broken,  General  Monash  with  his  Australians  was  to  pass 
through  the  American  lines  and  exploit  this  first  success. 

From  the  twenty-second  to  the  twenty-ninth  of  Septem- 
ber preliminary  operations  were  undertaken  with  the  ob- 
ject simply  of  establishing  the  first  attacking  lines  on  a 
solid  basis. 

On  the  twenty-ninth  the  attack  was  launched.  A  heavy 
fog  favored  the  surprise,  helped  in  the  tank  action,  but 
rendered  very  difficult  the  mopping  up  of  the  battle-field, 
back  of  the  first  assault  waves.  For  the  ground  especially 
that  which  the  Twenty-seventh  Division  was  to  traverse 
bristled  with  defenses  of  all  kinds.  The  trenches  were 
deep,  ditches  and  sunken  roads,  cleverly  concealed  by 
camouflage,  crossed  It  In  every  direction.  The  enemy 
made  use  also  of  subterranean  passages  in  order  to  reach 
the  tunnel  of  which  we  have  spoken  and  which  served 
them  as  a  strong  position  for  the  concentration  of  troops. 

While  the  assailant  was  precipitating  himself  upon  the 
successive  objectives  his  adversary  remained  concealed 
under  ground  while  the  wave  broke,  then  leaped  forth  and 
engaged,  under  cover  of  the  mist.  In  a  confused  hand-to- 
hand  combat.  The  Twenty-seventh  Division  was  unable 
to  attain  its  objectives  that  day  on  account  of  these  ob- 
stacles. On  the  other  hand,  the  Thirtieth  Division, 
whose  way  led  them  over  a  less  difficult  and  cut-up  region, 


British  Front  327 

not  only  succeeded  in  gaming  the  Hindenburg  Line,  but 
went  beyond,  taking  the  position  Le  Catelet  Nauroy. 

On  September  30th,  according  to  plan,  General  Mon- 
ash,  at  the  head  of  the  Australians,  went  through  the 
Second  American  Corps,  and  completed  the  mopping  up 
of  the  battle-field.  But  the  work  of  General  Read's  men 
was  not  yet  finished.  A  short  breathing  spell  only  was 
accorded  them  before  they,  in  their  turn,  replaced  the 
Australian  division. 

The  sixth  of  October  found  the  Americans  again  in  line, 
the  Thirtieth  Division  in  contact  with  the  enemy  on  an 
advanced  position  west  of  Montbrehain. 

Continuing  the  offensive  these  valiant  troops  pursued 
their  success  up  to  the  Selle,  where  they  encountered  a 
powerful  resistance,  and  the  Twenty-seventh  came  to 
their  aid.  At  this  moment  the  Second  Corps  found  it- 
self placed  at  the  extremity  of  a  salient  which  bit  into 
the  enemy  line  to  a  depth  of  twenty-five  kilometers. 
Progress  continued  nevertheless  and,  after  a  good  ar- 
tillery preparation,  the  Thirtieth  Division  succeeded  in 
forcing  the  line  of  the  Selle.  On  October  20th  the 
vicinity  of  Catillon  was  attained  where  the  ground  occu- 
pied dominates  the  Sambre  Canal.  Here  the  Twenty- 
seventh  Division  at  the  left  was  deployed  along  the  St. 
Maurice  River,  linking  the  Americans  with  the  Thirteenth 
Army  Corps  at  Bazuel. 

These  fine  American  divisions,  whose  aid  had  been  ex- 
tremely valuable  to  the  allied  cause,  had  suffered  greatly 
during  these  combats.  Losses  were  heavy;  more  than 
8,000  men  had  been  evacuated  in  the  course  of  the  fight- 
ing and  2,225  dead  were  left  on  the  field. 

The  Second  Corps  had  helped  to  penetrate  the  Hinden- 
burg Line  at  one  of  the  vital  points  where  it  was  the  most 


328      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

strongly  organized  and  had  even  carried  the  fight  far 
forward  into  the  enemy's  ground,  on  an  average  front  of 
5,500  yards.  It  had  advanced  sixteen  miles,  capturing 
the  villages  of  Bellicourt,  Nauroy,  Brancourt,  Fremont, 
Busigny,  Rocquigny,  Escaufort,  St.  Souplet,  St.  Martin, 
Ecaillons,  Ribeauville,  and  Mazinghem.  A  large  amount 
of  booty  was  taken;  6,000  prisoners  of  whom  150  were 
officers,  73  field  guns,  9  heavy  guns,  400  machine  guns,  a 
complete  train  on  rails,  and  supplies  of  all  sorts. 

The  Second  Corps  had  taken  an  active  part  in  this  ad- 
vance between  Cambrai  and  St.  Quentin,  causing  the 
liberation  of  these  two  towns  a  few  days  later. 

General  Rawlinson  hastened  to  congratulate  General 
Read  on  the  prowess  of  his  divisions,  and  when  the  plan 
of  the  operations  had  entirely  been  realized  the  American 
general  was  able  to  communicate  the  following  flattering 
appreciation  of  their  services  to  his  men.  The  first  was 
a  telegram  from  their  own  chief,  the  second  from  the 
British  high  command. 

"  The  commander-in-chief  desires  you  to  convey  to  the  officers 
and  soldiers  of  your  corps  his  appreciation  of  the  magnificent  quali- 
ties which  have  enabled  them,  against  powerful  resistance,  to  ad- 
vance more  than  ten  miles  and  to  take  more  than  6,000  prisoners 
since  September  27th." 

Field  Marshal  Sir  Douglass  Haig  expressed  himself 
in  the  following  terms : 

October  20th. 

I  wish  to  express  to  you  personally  and  to  all  of  the  officers  and 
men  serving  under  you,  my  warm  appreciation  of  the  very  val- 
uable and  gallant  services  rendered  by  you  throughout  the  recent 
operations  with  the  Fourth  British  Army.  Called  upon  to  attack 
positions  of  great  strength  held  by  a  determined  enemy,  all  ranks  of 
the  Twenty-seventh  and  Thirtieth  American  Divisions  under  your 
command  displayed  an  energy,  courage,  and  determination  in  attack 


Italian  and  Russian  Fronts  329 

which  proved  irresistible.  It  does  not  need  me  to  tell  you  that  in 
the  heavy  fighting  of  the  past  three  weeks  you  have  earned  the 
lasting  esteem  and  admiration  of  your  British  comrades  in  arms 
whose  successes  you  have  so  nobly  shared. 

The  Thirtieth  Division  was  withdrawn  from  the  sector 
the  night  of  October  i9-2oth;  the  Twenty-seventh  was  re- 
lieved the  following  night. 

The  Second  American  Army  Corps  was  in  turn  with- 
drawn from  the  front,  leaving  the  ground  to  be  guarded 
by  the  Ninth  and  Thirteenth  Army  Corps. 

Entrained  at  Roisel,  these  two  divisions  went,  the 
Twenty-seventh  to  Corbye,  the  Thirtieth  to  Querrieu, 
where  they  were  to  be  reenforced  and  to  continue  their 
military  training. 

But  before  the  conclusion  of  this  period  of  instruction 
and  of  rest,  the  armistice  was  signed. 

On  November  19th  the  Second  Corps  with  its  con- 
stituent divisions,  was  transferred  to  Le  Mans,  there  to 
await  embarkation  orders  for  America. 

In  compliance  with  a  request  from  the  Italian  Gov- 
ernment, the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Expeditionary 
Forces  detached  from  the  Eighty-fourth  Division,  the 
33 2d  Infantry  Regiment,  which  was  placed  at  the  disposi- 
tion of  General  Diaz. 

The  regiment  arrived  on  October  29th  at  Treviso;  on 
the  thirty-first,  when  the  enemy  was  in  retreat  It  reached 
the  left  bank  of  the  Piave.  On  the  third  of  November, 
arriving  at  the  Tagllamento,  the  regiment  took  contact^ 
through  Its  patrols  with  the  enemy's  rear-guard  and  or- 
ganized along  a  four-mile  front  the  bridgehead  of  Ponte 
della  Delizla.    November  4th  capturing  Codroipo  on  the 


330     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Udine  road,  it  seized  upon  important  stores  and  supplies 
which  the  enemy  had  been  obliged  to  abandon.  After  as- 
sisting at  the  disarmament  of  the  Austrian  forces,  the 
332nd  by  a  rapid  march  reached  Ipplis  on  the  seventh  and 
there  was  dislocated.  One  battalion  was  directed  to  Cat- 
tare  by  way  of  V&nice,  the  two  others  were  sent  to  Cor- 
mons  (Austria).  On  November  17th  one  of  the  two 
battalions  garrisoned  at  Cormons  was  detached  and  sent 
to  Fiume. 

The  Expeditionary  Forces  detached  for  operations  in 
Russia  with  the  allied  contingents  the  339th  Infantry 
Regiment,  a  battalion  of  engineers,  a  field  hospital,  and  a 
field  ambulance.  These  troops,  which  numbered  in  all 
about  4,800  men,  embarked  on  August  26th  at  Newcastle, 
and  operated  with  the  force  of  29,000  French  and  British 
in  the  region  of  Arkangel. 

Together  with  the  Allies  they  mounted  the  river  Dvina, 
attaining  Shenkursk,  which  they  occupied  for  a  time  but 
where  they  were  unable  to  maintain  themselves. 

The  twenty-fifth  of  January,  19 19,  our  combined  forces, 
attacked  by  Red  troops  much  superior  in  number,  were 
obliged  to  withdraw  as  far  as  the  junction  of  the  Vaga 
and  Dvina  rivers.  There  they  seem  to  bq  solidly  es- 
tablished protecting  the  base  port  of  Arkangel  as  well 
as  that  of  Murmansk  with  which  they  remained  linked 
by  rail  and  from  which  they  drew  their  supplies. 


CHAPTER  XI 

DEVELOPMENT    OF    THE    LINES    OF    COMMUNICATION 

ORGANIZATION     IN     AMERICA SEA     TRANSPORT  A- 

TIO.N GROWTH    OF    THE    SERVICES    OF    THE    REAR 

IN  FRANCE DIRECTOR  GENERAL  OF  TRANSPORTA- 
TION   MOTOR      TRANSPORT      SERVICE MILITARY 

BOARD   OF   ALLIED    SUPPLY 

''  All  the  Fighting  is  not  done  at  the  Front  "  was 
an  inscription  which  might  be  frequently  seen  on  placards 
hung  upon  the  walls  of  the  various  offices  of  the  services 
of  supply. 

In  fact  from  April,  19 17,  to  November,  19 18,  Ameri- 
can services  of  the  rear  had  been  waging  incessant  war 
against  the  tremendous  difficulties  of  every  kind  entailed 
by  the  huge  distances  to  be  covered,  the  initial  unpre- 
paredness,  and  the  element  of  danger  supplied  by  the 
German  submarines  during  the  crossing  of  the  Atlantic. 

In  a  preceding  chapter  we  have  endeavored  to  convey 
to  our  readers  some  idea  of  the  complex  and  difficult 
problems  with  which  the  authorities  of  the  United  States 
were  confronted.  We  have  seen  that  the  five  main  serv- 
ices which  had  administered  Americans  army  in  peace 
time  had  set  themselves  to  work  without  delay.  Power- 
ful help  had  been  given  by  the  voluntary  cooperation  of 
a  great  number  of  prominent  men  of  business,  manufac- 
turers, bankers,  engineers,  scientists,  who  put  their 
technical  knowledge  and  their  experience  of  great  com- 
mercial enterprises  at  the  disposal  of  their  government. 

331 


332     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

In  the  space  of  a  few  weeks  the  War  Department  had 
placed  upward  of  60,000  contracts,  requiring  thousands 
of  tons  of  raw  material  and  employing  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands of  workmen.  New  manufacturing  plants  were 
erected;  at  the  same  time  immense  services  intended  for 
the  reception,  distribution,  and  transportation  of  supplies 
and  material  were  being  organized. 

The  setting  on  foot  of  a  great  system  of  war  manu- 
factures had  been  most  difficult ;  factories  became  quickly 
congested  with  orders  from  divers  ministerial  depart- 
ments that  came  in  pell-mell  in  competition  not  only  with 
one  another  but  also  with  those  of  the  allied  govern- 
ments. Shortage  of  raw  material  was  acutely  felt  almost 
everywhere,  and  the  establishment  of  some  order  of  pri- 
ority soon  became  necessary.  The  Council  of  National 
Defense  was  utilized  as  a  clearing  house  for  dealing  with 
these  problems,  and  later  the  War  Industries  Board  was 
formed.  There,  representatives  of  the  Army,  Navy,  and 
other  departments  met  with  delegates  of  the  manufac- 
turers and  settled  particularly  knotty  points  as  they  arose. 
As  problems  of  this  type  became  more  complex,  and  as  the 
War  Department  bureaus  began  to  get  their  work  more 
in  hand,  centralization  of  the  purchasing  mechanism  of 
the  army  became  both  desirable  and  possible.  This  was 
done  in  February,  191 8,  through  the  creation,  as  part 
of  the  General  Staff,  of  two  important  sections.  One, 
that  of  *'  Purchase  and  Supply,"  was  charged  with  the 
purchase  of  all  material,  equipment,  and  supplies  re- 
quired for  the  needs  of  the  army. 

The  other,  called  '*  Division  of  Storage  and  Traffic," 
controlled  the  storage  of  all  supplies  and  furthermore 
was  in  charge  of  military  sea  or  land  transportation.  On 
April  1 6th  these  two  sections  were  united  and  placed  un- 


Organization  in  America  333 

der  Quartermaster  General  Goethals,  the  builder  of  the 
Panama  Canal,  under  the  title  of  Director  of  Purchase, 
Storage,  and  Traffic.  He  had  absolute  control  of  all 
American  Services  of  the  Rear,  from  the  production  cen- 
ters in  the  United  States  to  the  European  ports  of  de- 
barkation on  the  Atlantic. 

During  a  period  of  particularly  intense  activity,  for  a 
few  months  beginning  May,  19 18,  Mr.  Edward  R.  Stet- 
tinius,  of  J.  P.  Morgan  &  Co.,  well  known  to  the  allied 
governments  for  the  services  he  had  rendered  in  organiz- 
ing their  system  of  purchases  in  the  United  States,  served 
as  Second  Assistant  Secretary  of  War  with  general  super- 
vision over  the  purchasing  functions  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment. 

Under  such  management,  the  organizations  established 
in  the  United  States  were  not  long  in  reaching  a  high 
degree  of  efficiency,  and  in  the  first  months  of  19 18  con- 
stantly growing  streams  of  men  and  material  flowed  into 
the  ports  of  embarkation. 

Thanks  to  energetic  action  on  the  part  of  the  Shipping 
Board  and  of  its  section  for  the  control  of  tonnage,  the 
number  of  ships  available  for  the  crossing  of  the  Atlantic 
considerably  increased.  As  has  already  been  said  the 
German  ships  that  had  been  seized  in  the  American  ports 
had  been  put  Into  service  in  the  fall  of  19 17.  In  Feb- 
ruary, 191 8,  the  Shipping  Board  had  purchased  seven 
British  transports.  By  the  end  of  March,  the  German 
drive  which  placed  the  Allies  in  such  a  perilous  position, 
convinced  them  that  the  moment  had  come  for  drastic 
measures.  The  British  Government  lent  all  the  trans- 
ports It  could  dispose  of.  The  American  War  Trade 
Board  absolutely  prohibited  all  non-essential  importa- 
tions.    Eighty-seven    Dutch    boats    heretofore    Idle    In 


334     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

United  States  ports,  with  a  total  deadweight  of  533,000 
tons,  were  requisitioned;  in  the  course  of  the  summer 
important  quantities  of  Japanese  and  Scandinavian  ship- 
ping was  chartered. 

To  conclude,  the  output  of  the  new  American  ship- 
building yards  began  slowly  to  make  itself  felt.  At  the 
time  of  the  armistice  there  existed  three  hundred  and 
forty-one  of  these  yards  with  a  total  of  1,284  launching 
ways;  more  than  double  the  number  existing  in  the  rest 
of  the  world.  Oh  November  i,  19 18,  the  army  had  in 
service  a  fleet  of  its  own  consisting  of  39  troop  ships,  38 
animal  transports,  18  refrigerator  ships,  228  cargo  ships, 
and  4  tankers.  In  addition.  General  Pershing  had  gath- 
ered in  Europe  a  cross-Channel  fleet  which  numbered  104 
vessels  averaging  3,000  tons.  By  adding  to  these  figures 
those  of  the  vessels  lent  by  the  Allies,  we  will  find  that, 
at  the  time  of  the  armistice,  the  American  Army  had 
shipping  either  in  operation  or  under  definite  allocation 
totalling  3,800,000  tons  deadweight,  a  fleet  twice  as  large 
as  the  entire  American  merchant  marine  engaged  in 
foreign  trade  when  the  war  began. 

While  the  number  of  boats  was  thus  augmenting  the 
time  employed  for  the  round  trips  decreased  as  a  direct 
consequence  of  the  improvements  in  the  operation  of  the 
ports.  From  February  i,  191 8,  to  the  armistice  the 
troop  ships,  including  the  slower  vessels,  averaged  under 
forty  days  for  a  complete  circular  trip.  The  faster  ships 
averaged  under  thirty  days;  during  the  summer  the 
Leviathan,  former  Vaterland,  and  the  Mount  Vernon, 
former  Kronprinzessin  Cecilie,  averaged  under  twenty- 
seven;  The  Great  Northern  and  Northern  Pacific  aver- 
aged respectively  twenty-five  and  twenty-six  days,  and 
have  each  made  the  round  trip  in  nineteen  days.     During 


Sea  Transportation  335 

the  whole  summer  the  Leviathan  landed  American  troops 
in  France  at  the  rate  of  over  four  hundred  men  a  day. 

The  round  trip  voyages  of  the  cargo  transports  which 
are  much  slower  and  carry  large  amounts  of  freight  which 
is  difficult  to  handle,  were  naturally  effected  less  rapidly. 
These  ships,  nevertheless,  during  the  spring  and  summer 
of  19 1 8  maintained  an  average  of  seventy  days.  When 
it  is  remembered  that  these  results  were  achieved  by  ves- 
sels which  were  compelled  to  navigate  in  convoys  and  to 
wait  for  escorts,  it  will  be  readily  seen  that  there  was  no 
slackness  in  the  ports  on  either  side  of  the  Atlantic  during 
the  decisive  months. 

To  mention  the  American  ports  only:  New  York, 
during  the  fall,  shipped  to  the  Expeditionary  Forces 
a  monthly  average  of  400,000  tons  of  freight,  and  did 
so  with  a  normal  detention  in  port  for  the  large  army 
cargo  transports  of  only  fifteen  days.  Newport  News 
had  been  developed  to  such  a  point  that  at  the  time  of  the 
armistice,  cargo  to  the  extent  of  150,000  tons  a  month 
and  animals  to  the  number  of  20,000  a  month  were 
shipped  from  this  port. 

Baltimore  and  Philadelphia  shipped,  respectively, 
80,000  tons  a  month. 

The  first  convoy  of  troops  left  America  for  France 
in  June,  1917.  In  July  and  August  few  men  were  em- 
barked, but  from  September  on,  in  consequence  of  the 
entry  into  service  of  German  shipping,  the  rate  of  troop 
transportation  seriously  increased  and  reached  50,000 
men  in  December.  By  February,  191 8,  a  total  of 
195,000  had  been  attained.  In  March,  shipment  for 
this  month  alone  was  84,000.  But  at  that  time,  the 
German  armies,  having  assumed  the  offensive,  there 
was  a  great  demand  for  American  infantry;  the  British 


33^     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Government  furnished  many  ships  for  this  purpose. 
Transports  were  loaded  fifty  per  cent,  in  excess  of  their 
normal  capacity.  From  this  time  on  the  monthly  rate  of 
embarkation  increased  by  gigantic  leaps —  118,500  men 
in  April,  246,000  in  May,  278,800  in  June.  Before  the 
first  of  July  1,000,000  men  had  been  transported.  The 
July  record  exceeded  all  expectations,  the  number  of 
troops  embarked  being  306,185,  and  before  the  end  of 
October  the  second  million  had  sailed  from  American 
shores.  During  the  four  months  of  May,  June,  July,  and 
August  121,703  men  were  embarked.  When  the  armi- 
stice was  signed  the  total  embarkations  amounted  to 
2,076,000. 

Out  of  this  number,  49.9  per  cent,  was  transported  by 
British  shipping;  43.7  per  cent,  by  American,  6.4  per 
cent,  by  French  Russian,  and  Italian  shipping.  In  the 
words  of  Secretary  Baker,  '*  Never  had  such  a  troop 
movement  been  contemplated."  This  achievement 
wrought  a  decisive  effect  upon  the  world's  history,  at  one 
of  its  most  crucial  moments. 

If  we  turn  to  the  question  of  cargo  movement,  taking 
into  account  only  the  shipments  made  from  the  United 
States,  we  find  that  the  figures  were  low  at  the  beginning; 
16,000  tons  in  June,  19 17,  12,000  in  July,  19,000  in 
August.  From  that  time  on,  under  the  influence  of  meas- 
ures taken  to  increase  the  number  of  vessels,  a  sharp  as- 
cending movement  began,  which  continued  regularly  so 
that,  in  October,  19 18,  the  monthly  rate  of  transatlantic 
transportation  was  636,000  tons.  The  total  monthly 
transatlantic  and  cross-Channel  tonnage  discharged  dur- 
ing the  two  highest  months  was  911,000  and  913,000 
tons. 

Almost  all  of  the  5,150,000  tons  of  freight  transported 


Sea  Transportation  337 

from  America  to  Europe  before  the  armistice  was  carried 
in  American  bottoms,  and  less  than  5  per  cent,  was  lifted 
by  allied  ships.  It  may  be  interesting  to  quote  here,  from 
the  report  of  Secretary  Baker,  some  information  con- 
cerning the  material  in  question.  It  included  among 
other  items  1,145  consolidation  locomotives  of  the  100- 
ton  type,  of  which  350  were  shipped  already  set  up  on 
their  own  wheels,  so  that  they  could  run  under  their  own 
steam  a  few  hours  after  having  been  unloaded  onto  the 
tracks  by  the  powerful  hoisting  machines  of  Brest  and  St. 
Nazaire.  This  is  the  first  time  that  the  annals  of  mari- 
time transportation  have  recorded  the  voyage  of  locomo- 
tives of  such  size  entirely  mounted.  Special  vessels  with 
extra  large  hatches  were  withdrawn  from  the  Cuban  ore 
trade  for  this  purpose.  In  the  meantime,  the  hatches  of 
other  ships  were  specially  lengthened  so  that  on  the  day 
of  the  armistice  the  military  authorities  were  prepared  to 
ship  these  engines  at  the  rate  of  200  a  month.  By  that 
time,  the  number  of  standard-gauge  freight  cars  imported 
from  America  to  France  for  the  A.  E.  F.  amounted  to 
17,000  of  the  33-ton  type;  that  is  to  say,  with  a  carrying 
capacity  of  51,000  cars  of  the  French  lo-ton  type. 

Although  this  enumeration  may  appear  somewhat 
lengthy  it  is  indispensable  to  give  an  idea  of  what  was 
accomplished  in  transportation.  Indispensable,  but  in- 
adequate —  for  with  results  obtained  we  must  also  take 
into  account  those  which  were  in  process  of  formation  and 
on  the  point  of  becoming  effective  when  hostilities  were 
suddenly  brought  to  a  close.  In  November,  19 18,  the 
sea  tonnage  at  the  disposal  of  the  A.  E.  F.  was  increasing 
at  the  rate  of  half  a  million  tons  a  month.  The  output 
of  the  shipbuilding  yards  had  become  so  enormous  that, 
by  the  spring  of  19 19,  it  was  hoped  that  all  boats  bor- 


338     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

rowed  from  the  British  merchant  service  might  be  re- 
stored: and  before  the  end  of  the  summer,  the  United 
States  expected  to  be  themselves  in  a  position  to  lend  to 
England  a  like  amount  of  shipping. 

At  the  close  of  the  war  the  diagram  of  monthly  trans- 
portation of  freight  from  America  to  France  was  still  on 
the  ascending  curve ;  the  increase  in  the  number  of  availa- 
ble ships  combined  with  the  decrease  of  submarine  danger 
fully  justified  the  assertion  that  the  program  of  an  Ex- 
peditionary Force  of  eighty  divisions  would  certainly  have 
been  entirely  carried  out  in  a  short  time. 

Every  one  had  his  share  of  glory  in  obtaining  these 
magnificent  results. 

The  American  departments  which  organized  a  formid- 
able system  of  war  manufacture,  of  transportation  and 
supply,  which  succeeded  in  finding  ships  when  it  seemed 
quite  impossible  to  discover  any,  and  which,  in  ever-in- 
creasing numbers,  embarked  upon  these  vessels  men  and 
material  in  enormous  masses ;  the  navy  which,  at  the  cost 
of  immense  efforts,  was  able  to  cut  down  to  an  almost 
insignificant  figure  the  losses  inflicted  by  German  sub- 
marines upon  the  American  Expeditionary  Forces;  the 
British,  who  transported  on  their  ships  almost  half  of 
these  effectives;  the  French  finally,  who  came  in  for  a 
large  share  of  praise  by  the  manner  in  which  their  ports 
and  railroads  responded  to  the  demands  which  many  ex- 
perts supposed  to  be  impossible  after  forty  months  of 
war;  this  brings  us  to  the  question  of  organization  in 
France. 

When  General  Pershing  at  the  beginning  of  the  war 
decided  that  the  direction  of  his  services  of  the  rear  would 
be  for  some  time  located  at  the  Chaumont  headquarters, 


Services  of  Rear  in  France  339 

he  counted,  as  has  been  previously  mentioned,  upon  leav- 
ing them  there  for  as  short  a  time  as  possible. 

With  the  constant  increase  in  the  numbers  of  the  Ex- 
peditionary Forces,  and  the  development  of  their  organ- 
izations, questions  of  supply  became  more  and  more  com- 
plicated and  called  for  an  ever-growing  personnel.  The 
network  of  American  activities  by  degrees  covered  the  en- 
tire territory  of  France,  and  it  became  urgent  to  take 
advantage  of  local  resources  of  all  kinds. 

On  December  14th  a  new  base  section  had  been  es- 
tablished in  Great  Britain.  On  account  of  great  distances 
involved  it  now  became  imperative  to  locate  the  central 
direction  of  this  network  not  at  the  extremity  of  the  line, 
but  in  its  very  center.  On  January  15th  it  was  trans- 
ported to  Tours.  From  here  its  activities  extended  over 
the  whole  of  France  and  of  Great  Britain.  Its  propor- 
tions were  those  of  a  ministry  such  as  might  have  been 
formed  had  we  combined  our  French  departments  of 
War,  of  Public  Works,  and  of  Transportation.  The  of- 
fices entirely  filled  three  large  barracks  which  the  French 
Government  had  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Americans. 
From  one  of  these  offices  the  general  commanding  the 
service  of  supplies  controlled  the  enormous  organization 
charged  with  meeting  the  requirements  of  the  Expedition- 
ary Forces.^  Under  his  immediate  orders  he  had  a  staflf 
and  several  departments.  The  staff  consisted  of  three 
sections : 

The  First  Section  exercised  delegated  authority  over 
all  matters  of  organization  administration,  and  the  pro- 
curing of  personnel  and  material  from  both  the  United 

^  General  Kernan  controlled  the  service  of  supplies  up  to  the  end  of 
July,  1918,  at  which  date  he  was  replaced  by  General  James  G.  Harboard, 
who  commanded  the  S.  O.  S.  up  to  the  end  of  the  war. 


340     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

States  and  Europe.  It  disposed  of  two  powerful 
agencies;  the  sea  tonnage  and  the  General  Purchasing 
Board.  Notified  every  month  by  the  Shipping  Board  at 
Washington  of  the  quantity  of  shipping  available  for  the 
succeeding  month,  it  distributed  it  among  the  divers  serv- 
ices in  proportion  to  their  wants  and  in  the  measure  in 
which  they  had  been  unable  to  meet  those  needs  by  pur- 
chase on  the  European  markets. 

The  Second  Section,  far  less  important,  controlled  all 
questions  of  intelligence  and  information  counter-espion- 
age, and  postal  censorship. 

The  Fourth  Section,  for  there  was  no  third  section, 
had  a  general  surveillance  over  all  questions  of  construc- 
tion, transportation,  and  supply,  took  charge  of  men, 
animals,  and  material  at  the  time  of  their  debarkation 
or,  in  what  concerns  the  two  latter,  at  the  time  when  they 
were  acquired  by  the  American  Army  through  purchase 
in  Europe.  From  that  time  on,  this  service  was  responsi- 
ble for  their  housing  and  storage  in  the  camps,  barracks, 
depots  of  all  kinds  whose  establishment  it  also  supervised, 
as  well  as  of  their  transportation  by  rail,  roads,  or  canals 
to  their  ultimate  destination.  It  was  responsible  for  the 
reception  and  billeting  of  troops  upon  their  arrival  In 
Europe.  On  French  territory  It  directed  all  labor  units, 
finally  It  controlled  the  salvage  and  remount  service. 

These  three  sections,  of  course,  kept  In  constant  touch 
with  the  corresponding  sections  of  headquarters  at  Chau- 
mont. 

Such  was  the  organization  which  assumed  the  heavy 
task  of  coordinating  and  facilitating  the  work  of  the  great 
services  whose  activities  have  been  already  dealt  with  in 
a  preceding  chapter. 

How  was  this  central  direction  to  make  Its  action  felt 


nmn  lines  of  communication 

(/TIL  ll£0  BY  TM[  fiMlRICfiH  mflY 


SECTlOht>BOUND*'li'E''  OF  THE 
SFRViasOF  iHtREAR 


Organization  of  the  Services  of  the  war 


Services  of  Rear  in  France  341 

wherever  it  was  necessary?  That  is  to  say,  at  every  spot 
where  American  troops,  American  installations,  American 
leave  areas  were  stationed  or  established? 

It  must  be  remembered  that  after  the  spring  of  19 18 
there  were  actually  more  or  less  important  American  de- 
tachments stationed  in  the  whole  of  France  and  In  the 
southeastern  part  of  England. 

The  key  to  the  difficulty  had  been  sought  and  found 
in  a  territorial  organization  similar  to  that  existing  in 
the  United  States  In  peace  time.  The  S.  O.  S.  head- 
quarters at  Tours  corresponded  to  the  War  Department 
in  Washington.  The  territory  had  been  divided  Into  sec- 
tions corresponding  to  the  military  departments  In  the 
United  States. 

At  the  head  of  each  section  was  placed  an  officer  —  a 
brigadier-general  In  most  cases  —  who  had  a  double  role. 
On  the  one  hand,  he  controlled  all  questions  of  discipline, 
police,  sanitation,  of  all  American  troops  stationed  in  his 
section.  On  the  other  hand  he  was  responsible  for  the 
technical  running  of  all  activities  that  were  established  on 
his  territory  by  services  of  the  A.  E.  F. 

The  final  organization  consisted  of: 
7  Base  Sections, 
I   Intermediate  Section, 
I   Advance  Section. 

The  limits  of  these  are  Indicated  on  the  annexed  dia- 
gram.^ 

The  departments  of  the  Seine  and  of  Seine-et-Oise  on 
one  hand,  the  region  of  Tours,  on  the  other  hand,  formed 
two  independent  districts  placed  under  the  immediate  con- 

2  After  the  armistice  were  organized : 

Base  Section  No.  8  (Italy), 

Base  Section  No.  9   (Antwerp  and  Rotterdam). 


342     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

trol  of  the  general  commanding  the  district  of  Paris  and 
the  Tours  headquarters  commandant.  All  the  different 
base  sections  were,  of  course,  far  from  possessing  the 
same  degree  of  importance. 

Chief  of  these,  according  both  to  date  of  creation  and 
extent  of  output,  was  Base  No.  i  developed  in  the  region 
of  the  lower  Loire. 

When  the  armistice  was  signed,  twenty-six  American 
ships  could  simultaneously  unload  in  its  ports ;  fourteen  at 
St.  Nazaire,  one  at  Montoir,  eight  at  Nantes,  three  at 
Sables  d'Olonne.  Over  thirty-seven  per  cent,  of  all  ma- 
terials and  supplies  imported  for  the  Expeditionary 
Forces  had  passed  through  there :  1,600,000  had  been  un- 
loaded at  St.  Nazaire,  639,000  at  Nantes. 

The  changes  that  had  occurred  at  Montoir,  the  gen- 
eral storage  depot  for  the  port  of  St.  Nazaire,  were  in- 
deed astounding.  In  19 17,  before  the  work  of  filling  and 
draining  was  started,  the  site  of  these  future  installations 
was  nothing  but  a  vast  area  of  flat,  marshy  ground. 
Work  was  actually  started  in  January,  19 18;  in  March, 
at  the  time  of  Secretary  Baker's  visit,  a  forest  of  piles 
made  of  reenforced  concrete  appeared  above  the  surface, 
ready  to  support  the  heavy  iron  trestles  which  were  to 
serve  for  the  construction  of  the  warehouses.  On  the 
day  of  the  armistice,  138  of  these  warehouses  were  en- 
tirely completed,  and  125  miles  of  standard-gauge  rail- 
way tracks,  out  of  250  which  were  contemplated  in  the 
finished  project,  had  already  been  laid  down. 

As  to  the  eight  berths  whose  construction  had  been 
decided  on  the  Loire,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Brivet,  only 
one  was  completed  at  that  time. 

It  is  not  in  the  region  of  the  lower  Loire  that  a  com- 
plete type  of  a  maritime  base  entirely  constructed  by  the 


Services  of  Rear  in  France  343 

Americans  is  to  be  found,  but  rather  in  the  region  of  the 
Gironde,  the  center  of  Base  Section  No.  2.  There,  at 
the  close  of  hostilities,  the  port  of  Bassens  and  the  gen- 
eral storage  depot  of  St.  Sulpice  were  being  operated  to 
their  full  capacity.  At  Bassens  twenty  ships  could  unload 
at  the  same  time ;  ten  at  the  French  docks  and  ten  at  the 
American,  all  of  which  were  now  entirely  completed. 
Twenty-five  per  cent,  of  all  the  supplies  imported  for  the 
A.  E.  F.  had  been  unloaded  at  Bassens.  The  American 
piers  built  on  wooden  piles  supported  two  lines  of  ware- 
houses parallel  to  the  shore.  The  floor  of  these  ware- 
houses had  a  weight-carrying  capacity  of  300  pounds 
per  square  foot.  One  of  them  attained  the  immense 
dimensions  of  1,340  feet  in  length  and  100  feet  in 
breadth. 

Hardly  had  a  ship  docked,  than  it  was  taken  hold  of 
by  companies  of  stevedores.  These  companies  were 
organized  in  as  many  sections  as  there  were  holds  in  each 
ship,  an  arrangement  which  made  it  possible  to  supervise 
and  direct  the  work.  Instantly,  all  available  hoisting  ma- 
chines on  board  the  ship  or  on  the  pier  came  into  play, 
emptying  the  contents  of  the  holds  into  the  freight  cars 
which  were  constantly  being  lined  up  alongside.  No 
sooner  were  these  loaded  than  they  were  forwarded  to 
St.  Sulpice  over  the  American  tracks  which  had  been  laid 
beside  the  Bordeaux-Paris  main  line.  If  we  follow  this 
track  we  reach  not  far  from  St.  Sulpice  a  refrigerating 
plant  with  a  capacity  of  4,000  tons,  where  American  beef 
scarcely  lifted  from  the  vessel's  holds  underwent  a  new 
process  of  chilling  before  being  continued  on  its  way  to 
Gievres. 

The  visit  to  such  an  establishment  as  this  may  be  recom- 
mended to  the  numerous  French  consumers  who  have  a 


344     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

prejudice  against  frozen  meat  as  unreasoning  as  it  is 
detrimental  to  their  pockets. 

The  American  soldier  Is  the  heaviest  meat  consumer 
in  the  world.  His  ration  normally  of  200  ounces  Is  in- 
creased to  240  ounces  In  winter  during  field  service.  Ac- 
cording to  statistics  published  in  February,  19 19,  by  the 
French  Government,  the  number  of  existing  cattle  in 
France  was  reduced  by  the  war  to  13,314,000  heads. 
What  would  have  happened  had  the  American  Army,  in- 
stead of  being  fed  upon  frozen  meat  Imported  from 
America,  been  compelled  to  draw  upon  the  meat  resources 
in  France  at  the  rate  of  over  half  a  kilo  per  man  and  per 
day? 

Continuing  to  follow  the  American  tracks,  we  arrive 
at  St.  Sulpice-Izon,  fifteen  miles  from  Bordeaux,  at  the 
general  storage  depot  established  to  absorb  the  output 
of  the  port  of  Bassens.  It  is  interesting  to  make  a  short 
stop  at  this  place.  From  the  statistical  point  of  view, 
the  installations  of  St.  Sulplce  are  the  most  remarkable 
example  of  work  of  such  importance  completed  In  such  a 
short  time;  from  the  practical  point  of  view,  they  seem 
to  be  destined  to  play  a  great  part  In  the  economical  de- 
velopment of  the  Bordeaux  region. 

The  St.  Sulplce  general  storage  depot  was  established 
for  the  supply  of  1,000,000  men  during  thirty  days.  The 
entire  project,  which  was  almost  finished  at  the  end  of 
hostilities,  comprised  108  warehouses,  with  a  total  sur- 
face of  2,500,000  square  feet,  distributed  among  the  fol- 
lowing services :  air  service,  chemical  warfare,  engineers, 
medical  corps,  motor  transport,  ordnance,  quartermaster, 
signal  corps. 

Besides,  6,000,000  square  feet  of  open  storage  were 
provided   for   and   ninety-two   miles   of   standard-gauge 


Services  of  Rear  in  France  345 

tracks  were  laid  for  the  service  of  this  immense  depot, 
where  at  the  close  of  the  war  some  eight  hundred  cars 
were  loaded  and  unloaded  each  day.  The  daily  ship- 
ment toward  the  zone  of  the  advance  and  the  intermediate 
section  amounted  to  55,000  tons. 

The  speed  record  in  warehouse  construction  during  the 
course  of  the  war  was  probably  attained  at  St.  Sulpice : 
In  fourteen  days  six  hundred  German  prisoners,  working 
under  the  supervision  of  American  engineers,  built  eight- 
een warehouses,  the  majority  of  which  were  fifty  by  five 
hundred  feet. 

Troops  permanently  stationed  at  St.  Sulpice  numbered 
255  officers  and  11,000  men.  In  the  neighborhood,  at 
St.  Loubes  on  the  Dordogne  River,  the  ordnance  had 
established  an  immense  ammunition  depot. 

Such  were  the  main  installations  constructed  by  the 
Americans  in  the  Gironde  region. 

We  have  dwelt  at  length  on  the  description  of  the  base 
sections  of  St.  Nazaire  and  Bordeaux,  because  it  is  there 
that  the  most  important  and  varied  work  was  carried  out 
by  the  Americans.  As  to  all  the  others  we  may  confine 
ourselves  to  the  mention  of  their  main  characteristics. 

Base  Section  No.  3  which  included  Great  Britain,  was 
especially  important  on  account  of  the  large  transit  of 
American  troops  going  to  France  and  also  on  account  of 
the  enormous  quantities  of  material  and  supplies  —  a 
total  of  2,485,019  short  tons,  that  crossed  the  Channel 
for  the  use  of  the  Expeditionary  Forces  up  to  May  i, 
1919. 

Coal  figures  at  the  rate  of  seventy-five  per  cent,  in  this 
total. 

In  this  connection  It  may  be  of  interest  to  mention  the 
arrangements  made  between  the  French  Government  and 


34^     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

the  A.  E.  F.  with  a  view  to  economizing  railroad  trans- 
portation. According  to  this  agreement,  part  of  the  coal 
imported  from  Great  Britain  for  the  supply  of  American 
troops  was  turned  over  to  the  French  on  its  unloading  at 
the  Channel  ports. 

The  French  Government  refunded  the  same  amount  of 
tonnage  extracted  from  the  coal  fields  of  central  France, 
located  in  close  proximity  to  the  American  lines  of  com- 
munication. 

Supplies  imported  from  Great  Britain  were  unloaded 
in  France  at  the  docks  operated  by  the  French  and  British 
in  the  ports  of  Base  Section  No.  4  (Le  Havre)  ;  however, 
at  the  time  of  the  armistice  four  berths  were  permanently 
assigned  to  the  American  Expeditionary  Forces  in  this 
port. 

Brest,  headquarters  of  Base  Section  No.  5,  thanks  to 
the  depth  and  excellence  of  its  harbor  became  the  landing 
place  of  huge  masses  of  troops  transported  during  the 
summer  of  19 18.  There  it  was  that  the  Leviathan 
which  draws  forty-two  feet,  disembarked  every  month 
effectives  which  equalled  in  number  those  of  a  German 
infantry  division. 

Base  Section  No.  6,  Marseilles,  was  organized  only  in 
June,  19 1 8.  On  the  one  hand  it  had  become  essential  at 
that  time  to  take  advantage  of  all  existing  port  facilities 
on  account  of  the  ever-growing  importance  of  debarka- 
tion of  American  supplies.  On  the  other  hand  the  Allies 
had  the  submarine  menace  pretty  well  under  control. 
When  the  armistice  was  signed  the  Expeditionary  Forces 
were  able  to  unload  simultaneously  nine  ships  in  the  port 
of  Marseilles.  The  great  general  storage  depot  at 
Miramas,  created  for  the  supply  of  the  Salonica  Army, 


Services  of  Rear  in  France  347 

was  partially  turned  over  to  the  American  services  of  the 
rear. 

It  occupied  the  same  comparative  position  toward  Mar- 
seilles, as  Montoir  toward  St.  Nazaire,  or  St.  Sulpice  to- 
ward Bassens. 

Finally,  Base  Section  No.  7  was  established  between 
Base  Sections  Nos.  i  and  2  with  its  center  at  La  Palice 
and  La  Rochelle.  It  was  intended  to  be  equipped  at  an 
early  date  with  a  port  of  the  same  size  as  that  established 
at  Bassens,  and  the  site  of  which  was  to  be  Talmont  on 
the  Gironde.  Its  construction  was  made  unnecessary  by 
the  signing  of  the  armistice. 

While  the  principal  base  sections  were  being  developed 
after  the  manner  above  described,  the  installations  in  the 
intermediate  zone  were  proceeding  with  equal  rapidity. 
Extensive  work  was  being  carried  on  at  the  great  general 
storage  depot  at  Gievres  which  was  destined  to  receive 
the  material  for  quartermaster,  engineers,  ordnance, 
medical  department,  and  chemical  warfare  services.  Al- 
though far  from  completion  when  the  armistice  was 
signed  it  had  already  attained  dimensions  and  handled 
an  output  of  which  the  following  figures  may  convey  some 
slight  idea.  Of  standard-gauge  track  120  miles  out  of 
the  240  projected,  were  in  active  operation.  During  Oc- 
tober a  daily  average  of  1,600  cars  were  discharged  and 
loaded.  The  capacity  of  the  oil  and  gasoline  tanks  al- 
ready in  service  was  2,000,000  gallons  with  a  plan  for 
double  the  quantity.  The  refrigerator  plant  could  con- 
tain 6,500  tons  of  meat;  that  is  to  say,  a  quantity  suffi- 
cient for  them  to  have  distributed  one  pound  of  meat 
daily  to  each  inhabitant  of  Paris,  London,  New  York,  and 
Chicago,  united. 


34^     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Every  twenty-four  hours  sixty  carloads  of  meat  arriv- 
ing from  the  United  States  were  placed  in  refrigeration, 
and  an  equal  number  forwarded  to  the  front.  The  plant 
was  ready  for  work  six  months  after  construction  began. 
Refrigeration  was  obtained  by  means  of  circulatory  am- 
monia pipes  which,  if  put  down  in  line  would  have  reached 
from  New  York  to  Philadelphia.^ 

A  number  of  other  American  establishments  were 
ranged  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Tours  —  Bourges  —  Nevers 
—  Dijon  railway  line.  None,  however,  were  so  inter- 
esting as  that  belonging  to  the  salvage  service  which  was 
situated  in  the  intermediate  section  at  St.  Pierre  des 
Corps,  near  Tours. 

A  visit  to  this  workshop  is  one  of  the  most  instructive 
which  can  be  made.  Every  possible  implement  and  sys- 
tem serving  for  the  repair  and  recuperation  of  articles  of 
clothing  and  equipment,  was  here  to  be  found.  And 
m^ny  things  which  an  outsider  would  lightly  pronounce 
fit  for  nothing  but  the  scrap  heap  were  made  over  "  as 
good  as  new."  Upon  their  arrival  at  St.  Pierre  des 
Corps  all  effects  were  carefully  sorted,  and  subsequently 
subjected  to  a  series  of  steaming  and  sterilizing  pro- 
cesses, from  which  they  emerge  perfectly  cleansed.  Dry- 
ing was  effected  by  the  combined  action  of  compressed 
air  and  centrifugal  force,  and  each  article  then  repaired 
according  to  its  category  when  first  sorted  out,  either 
mechanically  or  by  hand.  A  special  machine  in  the  space 
of  a  few  seconds  could  fit  a  new  heel  and  sole  on  a  worn- 
out   shoe.     Waterproofs   were   mended  by   hand   from 

^  The  machines  were  capable  of  producing  five  hundred  tons  of  ice  in 
twenty-four  hours,  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact  they  were  not  utilized  for  this 
purpose,  experience  having  shown  that  in  the  moderate  climate  of  France 
it  was  not  necessary  to  ice  the  refrigerator  cars  used  for  meat  transpor- 
tation. 


Services  of  Rear  in  France  349 

patches  cut  from  others  judged  completely  unfit  for  serv- 
ice. We  have  already  mentioned  in  Chapter  VI  the  im- 
mense pecuniary  saving  which  the  salvage  service  *  as- 
sured to  the  American  Government,  and  in  this  case  we 
may  consider  that  the  money-saving  was  unimportant  in 
comparison  with  the  economy  thus  realized  on  the  mari- 
time tonnage. 

Naturally  the  details  of  organization  of  the  services 
of  the  rear  are  —  when  they  run  through  the  advance  sec- 
tion —  largely  dependent  upon  the  conduct  of  hostilities. 
Beside  the  permanent  installations  of  which  we  have  been 
speaking,  we  must  also  mention  others  of  a  more  tem- 
porary kind.  Regulating  stations,  advanced  depots, 
evacuation  hospitals,  etc.,  which  the  German  offensive 
near  Chateau-Thierry  obliged  the  Americans  to  install 
behind  that  portion  of  the  battle  area  in  which  the  Ameri- 
can divisions  were  called  upon  to  intervene.  And  we 
may  say  here  that  if  all  the  difficulties  were  at  length 
happily  surmounted,  it  is  principally  to  the  perfect  co- 
operation between  the  Franco-American  services  that 
credit  should  be  given.  This  complete  accord  was  as- 
sured during  the  active  operations  by  General  Moseley, 
chief  of  the  Fourth  Section  at  American  headquarters  on 
the  one  side,  and  by  General  Payot,  director  of  the 
French  services  of  the  rear  on  the  other. 

The  permanent  installations  in  the  advance  section  had 
progressed  along  the  same  lines  as  those  of  the  other 
intermediate  and  base  sections,  and  were  either  completed 

*In  October,  1918,  the  factory  at  St.  Pierre  des  Corps  employed  the  fol- 
lowing personnel:  26  officers,  745  enlisted  men,  730  male  civilians,  5,300 
women  workers,  the  total  being  6,8oi. 

The  minimum  women's  salary  was  seven  francs  a  day,  while  a  num- 
ber of  those  who  worked  by  the  piece  gained  from  fifteen  to  twenty  francs 
daily. 


350     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

or  in  process  of  completion  well  within  the  specified  time 
limit. 

In  particular,  the  advanced  depot  of  Is-sur-Tille,  which 
was  to  play  in  the  zone  of  advance  the  same  important 
role  as  the  general  storage  depot  of  Gievres  for  the  in- 
termediate zone  section,  was  about  finished.  The  total- 
ity of  the  projected  track  system,  no  miles,  was  in 
process  of  exploitation.  The  bakeries  furnished  300  tons 
of  bread  daily.  Further,  toward  the  front,  the  regulat- 
ing station  of  Liffol-le-Grand  was  capable  of  supplying 
400,000  men;  together  with  St.  Dizier,  this  station 
played  an  important  part  at  the  moment  of  the  German 
retreat.  All  the  establishments  of  the  divers  services: 
Ordnance  depots,  hospitals,  remount  stations,  and  forestry 
centers  were  in  normal  process  of  development,  so  that 
during  the  formidable  offensive  in  the  St.  Mihiel  salient, 
and  the  final  operations  between  the  Meuse  and  the  Ar- 
gonne,  the  services  of  supply  and  of  evacuation  were 
running  smoothly  enough  for  it  to  be  said  that  these 
services  of  transportation  so  modestly  begun  had  at  length 
attained  the  proportions  of  a  colossal  organization. 

General  Atterbury  had  under  his  orders  at  the  date  of 
the  armistice  2,000  officers  and  53,000  men.  We  have 
already  seen  how,  upon  his  arrival  in  France,  he  had  set 
about  organizing  the  railroad  service  of  the  Expedition- 
ary Forces  along  the  same  general  lines  as  those  used  by 
one  of  the  great  companies  in  peace  time.  His  program 
had  been  perfectly  carried  out. 

It  is  interesting  to  mention  here  that  the  Amer- 
ican railway  service  possessed  a  special  organization 
thanks  to  which  they  were  enabled  to  trace  each  car  and 


Director  of  Transportation  351 

follow  its  every  movement.  The  system  employed  may 
be  briefly  described  as  follows : 

Each  American  car  bore  an  individual  number,  and  at 
the  moment  of  loading  in  port  or  warehouse,  this  number 
was  telegraphed  to  the  central  direction  together  with  the 
numbers  of  all  the  cars  which  formed  the  same  train. 

From  this  moment  it  was  never  lost  sight  of.  In  each 
station  utilized  by  the  American  services  were  stationed 
*'  car  checkers  "  whose  duty  was  to  note  the  numbers  of 
all  cars  loading,  unloading,  and  sidetracked  in  the  station. 

Thus  in  comparing  the  lists  established  on  this  double 
information  the  central  direction  was  always  able  to  as- 
certain the  whereabouts  of  each  particular  car,  in  what 
station  it  was  to  be  found,  over  what  lines  it  had  passed, 
and  the  length  of  time  that  it  had  been  on  the  road.  Any 
car  which  was  not  listed  within  twenty-four  hours  was 
placed  upon  a  tracer  bulletin.  This  method  of  organiza- 
tion made  it  possible  even  during  the  most  difficult  periods 
to  make  the  best  of  all  rolling  stock  resources.  In  order 
to  work  satisfactorily  the  system  requires  a  telegraph  and 
telephone  organization  of  the  best  quality  as  well  as  a 
numerous  checking  personnel.  But  the  resulting  cost  is 
amply  compensated  by  the  economies  made  in  material 
and  the  time  saved  in  transportation. 

As  we  have  already  seen  the  Americans  did  not  con- 
struct any  important  railway  line  in  France;  however,  as 
part  of  the  different  installations  of  their  rear  services, 
large  quantities  of  rails  were  laid  down  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  ports  and  warehouses  which,  if  spread  out  in  length, 
would  have  attained  1,000  miles  of  standard-gauge  track. 

Besides  the  1,145  locomotives  imported  with  17,000 
cars  from  the  United  States  before  the  armistice,  the  rail- 
way repair  personnel  overhauled  no  less  than  1,423  loco- 


\ 


352     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

motives  and  48,000  cars  belonging  to  the  French  and  set 
in  motion  upon  our  canals  and  waterways  more  than  100 
barges  navigating  in  the  American  service. 

An  Order  dated  December  8,  19 17,  had  organized  the 
automobile  service  of  the  Expeditionary  Forces.  Two 
subsequent  orders  dated  respectively  February  16,  and 
May  II,  19 1 8,  rendered  this  service  completely  inde- 
pendent of  the  quartermaster's  corps,  and  at  the  same 
time  defined  the  precise  duties  of  the  service,  which  was 
entrusted  with  the  furnishing  and  upkeep  of  all  auto- 
mobile vehicles  with  the  exception  of  those  whose  type 
rendered  them  exclusively  appropriate  to  a  definite  serv- 
ice, such  as,  for  instance,  the  artillery  tractors  which  re- 
mained under  the  control  of  the  ordnance,  the  rolling 
kitchens,  furnished  by  the  quartermaster  corps  and  the 
motor  ambulances  belonging  to  the  medical  department. 
The  quartermaster,  as  we  have  seen  in  a  previous  chapter, 
was  also  responsible  for  the  furnishing  of  gasoline,  oil, 
and  grease. 

On  the  eleventh  of  July  the  "  automobile  service  " 
changed  its  name  and  became  the  "  Motor  Transport 
Corps,"  General  M.  L.  Walker  being  placed  at  its  head. 

During  the  entire  war  and  for  the  same  reasons  which 
have  already  been  indicated  as  limiting  the  other  services, 
the  American  Army  in  France  was  constantly  confronted 
by  the  lack  of  two-thirds  of  the  necessary  personnel,  and 
one-half  of  the  vehicles  necessary  for  the  Motor  Trans- 
port. It  was  not  until  August,  19 18,  that  the  tables  of 
organization  were  definitely  drawn  up  for  the  Motor 
Transport  Corps. 

At  this  time  about  1,300,000  men  had  already  arrived 
in  France  and  the  personnel  required  by  this  corps  for 


Motor  Transport  Service  353 

each  army  was  estimated  at  45,000  men.  The  total 
effectives  in  personnel  then  present  in  Europe  amounted 
to  20,000  men  only.  At  the  moment  when  the  troops  of 
the  Second  iVrmy  began  to  arrive  it  was  found  necessary 
to  borrow  drivers  and  mechanics  from  all  the  services 
capable  of  lending  them.  As  a  large  part  of  the  Amer- 
ican personnel  were  comparatively  without  instruction,  a 
school  for  motor  service  was  established  at  Decize  in 
July,  19 1 8.  At  the  end  of  hostilities  700  officers  or 
candidates  and  3,000  men  had  received  or  were  receiving 
instruction. 

The  difficulties  in  regard  to  material  were  equally 
great.  It  had  been  decided  that  for  every  vehicle  sent  to 
France  a  six  months'  supply  of  spare  parts  should  be 
shipped,  after  which  the  system  of  automatic  supply 
would  be  practiced.  The  magnitude  of  the  demands 
from  the  allied  armies  prevented  the  carrying  out  of  this 
project,  as  the  troops  came  too  fast  for  the  motor  ma- 
terial to  keep  abreast  of  their  needs. 

On  April  i,  191 8,  the  total  number  of  vehicles  on  hand 
was  37,959,  whereas  after  calculations  made  the  effectives 
of  the  Expeditionary  Forces  would  have  required  at  least 
108,000.  All  that  could  be  found  were  purchased  in 
Europe  with  the  result  that  the  motor  material  in  use 
throughout  the  American  Army  included  78  different 
types  of  passenger  cars,  78  kinds  of  trucks,  and  9  kinds  of 
motor-cycles,  a  fact  which  was  scarcely  calculated  to 
simplify  repair  or  the  renewal  of  parts. 

The  shops  of  Verneuil  ^  and  Romorantin,  which  pos- 

^  Construction  of  this  shop  was  begun  May,  1918,  and  carried  out  en- 
tirely by  the  personnel  of  the  Motor  Transport  Corps  and  German  pris- 
oners. This  establishment  was  not  only  capable  of  making  all  repairs  but 
also  of  manufacturing  the  spare  parts  required  by  every  type  of  car. 
By  March  ist,  1919,  505,000  pieces  had  been  turned  out. 


354     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

sessed  a  highly  perfected  equipment,  were  charged  with 
the  repairs  —  the  first  of  American  machines,  the  second 
with  that  of  European-made  vehicles. 

In  the  zone  of  the  interior^  the  motor  material  was  not 
permanently  assigned  to  any  particular  service,  but  re- 
mained under  the  control  of  the  central  direction  which 
decided  where  and  how  it  could  be  utilized  to  the  greatest 
advantage,  and  distributed  It  where  most  needed.  This 
organization  gave  excellent  practical  results,  making  the 
very  most  of  the  rather  slender  material  on  hand. 

With  troops  in  the  field,  the  motor  transport  corps 
limited  its  activities  to  the  technical  supervision  and  main- 
tenance of  all  automobile  material.  This  service  had 
representatives  both  In  divisions  and  armies. 

At  the  conclusion  of  hostilities  the  Expeditionary 
Forces  disposed  of:  7,604  passenger  cars  and  of  24,055 
trucks,  6,363  had  a  carrying  capacity  less  than  a  ton  and 
a  half,  3,912  a  capacity  between  a  ton  and  a  half  and  two 
tons,  11,503  of  three  tons,  2,277  o^  ^^e  tons.  Con- 
sequently by  that  time  the  deficit  in  material  was  being 
rapidly  made  up. 

In  order  to  complete  this  account  of  the  American 
services  we  must  now  say  a  word  In  regard  to  that  one 
which  was  perhaps  the  most  important  of  all  and  without 
which  the  scope  of  the  other  services  would  have  been 
necessarily  considerably  curtailed.  We  mean  the  Gen- 
eral Purchasing  Board  enlarged  into  the  Military  Board 
of  Allied  Supply. 

Had  the  American  Army  been  obliged  to  Import  from 
the  United  States  all  the  necessary  material  for  its 
organization,  maintenance,  and  fighting  power,  the  war 


Military  Board. of  Allied  Supply  355 

would  probably  not  be  over  at  the  present  time  of  writing. 

A  few  figures  will  serve  to  indicate  the  truth  of  this 
assertion.  Between  June,  19 18,  and  the  armistice,  as  we 
have  seen,  some  5,000,000  tons  of  supplies  had  been  im- 
ported from  the  United  States  into  France.  During  this 
same  period,  the  Expeditionary  Forces  procured  through 
the  Purchasing  Board  10,000,000  tons  on  the  European 
markets. 

General  Pershing,  from  the  moment  of  his  arrival  in 
France,  had  no  illusions  as  to  the  questions  of  tonnage  and 
the  inevitable  delays  which  must  elapse  before  a  sufficient 
number  of  vessels  could  become  available  to  meet  his  re- 
quirements. According  to  all  estimates  and  for  a  long 
period,  the  Expeditionary  Forces  would  be  compelled  to 
draw  on  the  resources  of  Europe  for  a  large  portion  of 
their  supplies. 

In  the  existing  organizations,  Quartermaster,  Engi- 
neers, Medical  Department,  etc.,  the  main  services  alone 
disposed  of  credits  and  had  authority  to  make  purchases. 
In  securing  large  categories  of  material  destined  for  gen- 
eral consumption  the  services  would  have  found  them- 
selves competing  with  one  another  for  their  purchase  as 
well  as  with  the  other  Allies. 

It  was  on  this  account,  and  contrary  to  the  advice  of  a 
consulting  board  that  General  Pershing  on  August  20th, 
1917,  decided  upon  the  creation  of  a  central  board  formed 
by  representatives  from  every  service,  and  presided  over 
by  a  general  purchasing  agent,  who,  without  personally 
disposing  of  budgetary  appropriations,  had  control  and 
veto  power  over  contracts  and  bargains  made  by  the 
other  services  which  only  became  valid  after  his  approba- 
tion. 


35 6     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

The  general  purchasing  agent  was  obliged  to  remain  in 
constant  touch  with  the  allied  governments,  to  keep  in- 
formed as  to  purchasing  facihties  in  neutral  countries, 
and  was  also  charged  with  recruiting  the  labor  units  em- 
ployed by  the  Expeditionary  Forces.  Colonel  Charles 
G.  Dawes  (since  promoted  general)  and  one  of  the  best 
known  bankers  in  the  United  States,  was,  from  the  first, 
placed  at  the  head  of  the  General  Purchasing  Board. 

The  program  of  Colonel  Dawes  from  the  very  start 
was  clear  and  definite,  and  may  be  thus  summarized: 
On  the  one  hand  to  procure  for  the  divers  American  serv- 
ices, according  to  the  best  interests  of  all,  what  was  neces- 
sary for  each,  suppressing  the  hard  and  fast  lines  hereto- 
fore drawn  between  these  various  services.  On  the  other 
hand  to  centralize  and  coordinate  the  purchases  among 
the  Allies,  so  that  they  would  act  as  associates  and  no 
longer  as  rivals.  They  could  thus  procure  essentials  at 
a  uniform  price  and  distribute  them  according  to  the  pro 
rata  of  individual  needs. 

On  the  nineteenth  of  October,  19 17,  General  Pershing 
proposed  to  create  in  Paris  an  Inter-Allied  Board  for 
Purchasing,  composed  of  representatives  from  the  United 
States,  Great  Britain,  and  France.  He  suggested  that 
the  three  contracting  countries  should  no  longer  buy  in 
competition  with  one  another  but  by  commissions  acting  in 
their  name. 

The  Allies  fully  entered  into  the  views  of  the  Ameri- 
can commander-in-chief  and  the  organization  proposed  by 
him  was  adopted. 

On  June  20,  191 8,  Colonel  Dawes  was  designated  to 
represent  the  American  Army  in  the  Interallied  Commit- 
tee of  Supplies. 

To-day,  now  that  every  one  is  grateful  to  the  Ameri- 


Military  Board  of  Allied  Supply  2S1 

cans  for  having  contributed  in  no  small  measure  toward 
bringing  about  the  unity  of  command  at  the  front,  it 
should  not  be  forgotten  that  General  Pershing  and  Gen- 
eral Dawes  rendered  us  an  almost  equal  service  in  giving 
to  the  Allies,  after  the  manner  that  we  have  just  de- 
scribed, what  was  essential  to  the  common  welfare :  unity 
of  purchase. 

He  suggested  that,  in  the  future,  all  purchase  of  sup- 
plies for  the  three  allied  armies  be  made  no  longer  In 
competition,  but  in  common,  by  means  of  a  Central-Inter- 
allied Purchasing  Board.  This,  however,  was  only  a  be- 
ginning. 

In  April,  191 8,  the  experience  gained  by  Colonel 
Dawes  as  general  purchasing  agent  of  the  American  Ex- 
peditionary Forces  had  led  him  to  the  conclusion  that,  in 
the  words  of  a  report  he  addressed  to  General  Pershing: 

*'  Just  as  there  is  now  a  unified  military  command  of  the  Allies 
at  the  front  .  .  .  there  must  be  a  corresponding  merging  of  all 
separate  individual  authority  of  the  Allies  in  reference  to  the 
service  of  supply  into  one  military  authority  responsible  to  the 
corresponding  military  authority  at  the  front.  One  is  just  as 
necessary  as  the  other." 

This  principle  of  a  military  dictator  of  the  rear  of  the 
allied  armies  —  a  rear  covering  France,  England,  and  the 
United  States  —  in  absolute  control  of  all  their  resources 
in  the  supplies,  transportation  by  land  and  by  sea,  and 
facilities  of  all  kinds,  involved  an  economy  of  labor, 
money,  time  —  and  consequently,  of  human  life  the  great- 
ness of  which  can  hardly  be  realized. 

It  was  immediately  and  completely  endorsed  by  Gen- 
eral Pershing. 

From  that  time  on,  in  the  course  of  complicated  and 
strenuous   negotiations   with   the   allied   authorities,   the 


358      The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

American  High  Command  constantly  tried  to  enforce  that 
great  principle  of  unity. 

A  detailed  account  of  these  negotiations  would,  of 
course,  go  far  beyond  the  scope  of  this  book.  We  must, 
of  necessity,  limit  ourselves  to  a  brief  summary  of  the 
main  results  that  had  been  achieved  at  the  time  of  the 
armistice. 

By  the  end  of  May,  19 18,  the  American,  British,  and 
French  Governments  agreed  to  the  principle  of  unification 
of  military  supplies  and  utilities  for  their  armies.  With 
this  object  in  view,  a  board  —  the  Military  Board  of 
Allied  Supply  —  was  constituted.  It  consisted  of  three 
members  ^  whose  decisions  regarding  the  allotment  of 
material  and  supplies,  when  unanimously  taken  had  the 
immediate  force  of  law.  The  new  institution,  although 
it  did  not  possess  the  character  of  unity  called  for  by  the 
American  suggestion,  nevertheless  marked  a  tremendous 
progress  over  the  situation  that  had  existed  so  far. 

Thanks  to  the  activity,  energy,  and  spirit  of  coopera- 
tion of  its  members,  it  constantly  gained  more  and  more 
authority  and  the  scope  of  its  activities  kept  steadily  in- 
creasing up  to  the  end  of  the  war. 

Among  the  achievements  which,  in  the  future,  will 
earn  for  the  Military  Board  of  Allied  Supply  the  ever- 
lasting gratitude  of  the  Allies,  let  us  here  mention  the 
pooling  of  ammunition  between  the  Americans  and  the 
French,  the  creation  of  a  mobile  automobile  reserve  be- 
hind the  allied  armies,  the  establishment  of  a  system  regu- 

®  General  Payot  (president),  for  the  French  Army;  General  Dawes,  for 
the  American  Army;  General  Ford,  for  the  British  Army  (afterwards 
General  Travers  Clarke). 

Later  on,  the  Belgian  and  Italian  Governments  also  sent  representatives 
to  the  Military  Board  of  Allied  Supply.  They  were  Major  Cumont  and 
General  Merrone  respectively. 


Services  of  the  Rear.     Conclusion  359 

lating  automobile  transports,  the  solution  of  the  very 
difficult  problems  concerning  the  wood  and  tie  situation, 
and  of  those  concerning  the  supplies  of  forage. 

The  war  was  brought  to  its  close  before  the  Military 
Board  of  Allied  Supply  had  had  time  to  give  full  measure 
of  the  enormous  possibilities  that  were  in  It.  The  work 
It  accomplished  In  the  course  of  Its  short  existence  will, 
nevertheless,  In  the  future  be  a  cause  of  surprise  to  the 
students  of  the  war  who  will  trace  to  that  great,  although 
incomplete,  realization  of  the  plans  of  General  Pershing 
and  General  Dawes  the  first  successful  attempt  to  carry 
out.  In  a  practical  way,  the  Idea  of  a  Society  of  Nations. 

We  have  thus  rapidly  passed  in  review  the  organiza- 
tions of  the  different  American  services  of  the  rear  in 
France,  and  certainly  the  work  as  it  was  carried  out  was  a 
very  great  one.  But  we  cannot  lay  too  great  a  stress  upon 
the  fact,  that  In  order  to  comprehend  the  real  magnitude 
of  the  effort  furnished  by  the  United  States,  we  should 
not  content  ourselves  with  an  examination  of  what  was 
actually  accomplished,  but  take  also  Into  consideration  the 
gigantic  work  which  was  being -set  on  foot. 

As  has  already  been  seen  in  connection  with  the  ship- 
building question,  when  the  armistice  was  signed  the 
services  of  the  rear  were  only  just  beginning  to  give  the 
full  measure  of  their  capacity,  and  had  war  continued  we 
should  have  seen  four  million  of  men  on  our  shores  in  the 
autumn  of  19 19,  together  with  everything  which  the  ar- 
rival of  such  numbers  would  necessarily  entail. 

November,  19 18,  saw,  on  the  contrary  all  construction 
work  stopped  and  all  contracts  annulled,  but  It  still  re- 
mains Interesting  to  glance  for  a  moment  over  some  of  the 
enterprises  In  course  of  realization  at  this  time. 


360     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

In  the  ports,  on  a  plan  of  159  berths,  77  were  aban- 
doned. Out  of  98,000  cars  and  4,000  locomotives  about 
to  be  delivered,  the  orders  for  68,000  and  2,400  respec- 
tively were  cancelled.  Out  of  358,961  beds  ordered  for 
the  base  hospitals,  all  but  182,196  were  stopped  in  the 
course  of  installation. 

During  the  last  thirty  days  of  the  war,  there  had  been 
sent  from  the  United  States  twice  as  much  material  as  had 
arrived  during  seven  whole  months  of  19 17 — between 
June  and  December. 

From  the  first  of  June,  19 18,  to  the  armistice  —  that 
is  to  say,  fiwt  months  and  eleven  days  —  the  Expedi- 
tionary Forces  had  received  from  America  2,880,000  tons 
of  supplies  against  1,530,000  during  the  previous  year. 

But  it  is  useless  to  add  more  figures  which  only  prove  a 
foregone  conclusion. 

What  we  have  already  set  down  is  certainly  sufficient 
to  demonstrate  that  in  capitulating  on  November  11, 
19 1 8,  Germany  did  the  only  possible  thing  which  had 
been  left  her  to  do. 


CHAPTER  XII 

GREAT  BENEVOLENT  ASSOCIATIONS  UNDER  THE  MILITARY 

AUTHORITY    AMERICAN    RED    CROSS    YOUNG 

men's      CHRISTIAN      ASSOCIATION  KNIGHTS      OF 

COLUMBUS SALVATION    ARMY AMERICAN     LIB- 
RARY   ASSOCIATION JEWISH     WELFARE YOUNG 

women's  CHRISTIAN  ASSOCIATION,  ETC.,  ETC. 

America  is  indubitably  the  country  where  the  greatest 
use  is  made  of  the  free  right  of  association. 

When  a  person  whose  intention  it  is  to  found  a  school, 
college,  hospital,  or  library,  to  fight  for  an  idea,  or  create 
a  fashion,  finds  that  his  individual  means  are  inadequate 
to  a  large  enterprise,  an  association  is  formed.  And 
these  societies  founded  in  a  common  interest  are  powerful 
in  direct  proportion  to  the  personal  importance  and  num- 
ber of  their  members. 

Such  societies  are  often  political,  others  seek  success  of 
a  material  nature,  many  others  are  benevolent,  moral,  or 
religious  in  character,  for,  in  this  tolerant  democracy, 
charity  is  as  general  and  frequent  as  religion  is  powerful. 

The  statistics  collected  at  the  time  of  the  American 
Civil  War  gave  an  indication  of  what  might  be  expected 
from  the  collective  philanthropy  of  the  United  States. 
In  1864,  individual  subscriptions  and  the  sums  voted 
by  the  municipal  or  legislative  bodies  attained  the 
immense  figure  of  $228,000,000.  The  "  Sanitary  Com- 
mission," toward  the  end  of  hostilities,  disposed  of  an 
annual  sum  exceeding  $8,000,000,  and  was  formed  of 

.361 


362     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

more  than  thirty  thousand  committees  charged  with  the 
care  and  comfort  of  the  soldier  at  the  front. 

The  "  Western  Sanitary  Commission,"  founded  by 
General  Fremont  at  the  beginning  of  the  Rebellion,  was 
particularly  interested  in  the  welfare  of  the  armies  who 
were  drawn  from  the  western  sections  of  the  country. 

The  "  Christian  Commission  "  looked  after  the  dis- 
tribution of  tracts  and  pamphlets  in  the  divers  camps  and 
the  "  Commission  of  War  Claims,"  presided  over  by 
General  Scott,  took  charge  of  claims,  even  those  against 
the  government,  by  private  soldiers. 

Such  a  patriotic  and  charitable  movement  at  a  time 
when  money  was  scarce  gave  some  idea  of  what  modern 
America  might  be  expected  to  accomplish  in  aid  of  the 
combatants  of  the  European  war.  But  the  actual  effort 
surpassed  all  expectations.  Those  societies,  already 
powerful  from  their  numbers,  their  wealth,  and  the  posi- 
tion of  the  directors,  at  once  came  to  the  aid  not  only  of 
the  American  combatant,  but  also  of  the  allied  armies. 

Unfortunately  we  shall  be  able  here  to  give  but  a  short 
resume  of  the  extraordinary  work  accomplished  by  some 
of  them. 

General  Pershing  at  once  sought  a  method  by  which  he 
might  reconcile  military  prerogatives  and  centralized  au- 
thority with  the  autonomy  and  spirit  of  initiative  of  each 
individual  society.  We  may  consider  that  his  actions 
were  well  inspired  since,  under  his  authority,  the  chari- 
table organizations  placed  under  military  control  grew, 
developed,  and  extended  the  sphere  of  their  utility  al- 
ways for  the  greater  good  and  comfort  of  the  combatant 
and  without  the  slightest  encroachment  upon  army  discip- 
line.    This  centralization  of  authority  usefully  coordi- 


Great  Benevolent  Associations  363 

nated  these  separate  activities  and  prevented  the  waste 
which  would  have  resulted  if  several  different  societies 
had  worked  on  precisely  the  same  lines. 

Many  of  the  associations  recognized  by  the  Federal 
Government  already  existed  before  the  beginning  of  hos- 
tilities. Upon  the  declaration  of  war,  they  were  mili- 
tarized and  placed  under  the  direct  authority  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  and  afterward  under  that  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief. General  Pershing,  in  his  turn,  had  to 
decide  as  to  the  particular  range  of  each  society  in  France 
and  placed  these  philanthropic  organizations  under  the 
immediate  control  of  the  first  section  of  the  General  Staff. 

Thus  we  read  in  General  Order  No.  26  that  the  Ameri- 
can Red  Cross  Society  would  be  particularly  entrusted 
with  the  care  of  sick  and  wounded,  while  the  Y.  M.  C.  A. 
would  work  more  especially  for  the  moralization,  recrea- 
tion, instruction,  and  amusement  of  the  contingents. 

The  supervision  exercised  over  all  the  philanthropic 
societies  by  the  high  command  was  constant;  every  month 
an  officer  from  headquarters  assembled  the  delegates  of 
each  association  in  Paris,  studied  their  reports,  listened  to 
their  suggestions  or  to  their  complaints. 

In  each  army,  likewise,  and  sometimes  in  each  corps,  a 
staff  officer  was  particularly  accredited  to  the  surveillance 
of  the  organization  operating  with  his  unit. 

Certain  societies  such  as  the  Red  Cross,  Y.  M.  C.  A., 
Knights  of  Columbus,  Salvation  Army  kept  their  own 
complete  autonomy,  and  were  under  the  direct  control  of 
the  high  command.  Others  less  powerful,  or  whose  work 
was  less  specialized,  like  the  Library  Association,  the 
Jewish  Welfare,  or  Young  Women's  Christian  Associa- 
tion were  affiliated  with  the  Y.  M.  C.  A. 


364     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 
Let  us  rapidly  examine  the  work  of  each. 

On  the  twelfth  of  July,  19 17,  twelve  delegates  of  the 
American  Red  Cross  arrived  in  France  at  the  same  date 
with  General  Pershing.  The  day  the  armistice  was 
signed,  more  than  six  thousand  employees  of  the  society 
assigned  only  to  the  French  service  were  devoting  them- 
selves to  the  care  of  the  wounded  in  hospitals  or  to  that 
of  children  and  refugees. 

The  first  duty  of  the  Red  Cross  was  to  aid  and  to 
ameliorate  the  condition  not  only  of  the  soldier  but  like- 
wise of  his  family  and  other  war  victims. 

The  American  Army  was  not  yet  disembarked,  when 
in  order  to  respond  to  the  desire  manifested  by 
20,000,000  Americans  and  subscribers  who  by  their  gen- 
erosity had  raised  $100,000,000,  the  delegates  of  the 
Red  Cross  came  to  Europe  to  get  in  close  touch  with  the 
Allies. 

They  began  by  augmenting  the  number  of  French  can- 
teens. Many  women  offered  their  services,  so  that  in  the 
lapse  of  a  few  months  these  establishments  were  able  to 
distribute  food  and  hot  drinks  to  250,000  soldiers  a  week. 

The  sum  of  $3,000,000  was  distributed  in  aid  of  the 
families  of  French  soldiers  who  were  in  need  and  who 
were  recommended  by  our  high  command. 

Thirty  dispensaries  or  children's  hospitals  were  opened. 
At  Evian  the  French  civilians  repatriated  through  Ger- 
many found  American  counters  hospitably  and  liberally 
provisioned. 

Five  thousand  homeless  persons  were  lodged  in  Paris 
thanks  to  the  work  of  the  Red  Cross  and  other  French 
societies  who  terminated  the  construction  of  unfinished 
buildings. 


American  Red  Cross  365 

From  March  to  June,  19 17,  620,000  persons  were 
cared  for  by  this  organization.^ 

When  the  Expeditionary  Forces  reached  France,  its 
services  attained  a  far  greater  extension;  but  this  growth 
was  accomplished  without  detriment  to  anything  already 
being  done  for  our  own  soldiers  or  civil  population. 

It  became,  however,  necessary  to  multiply  the  number 
of  canteens,  and  thirty  more  were  constructed  capable  of 
furnishing  nourishment  for  from  six  to  eight  thousand 
men  per  day. 

More  delegates  were  appointed  In  each  Important  unit 
whose  mission  was  to  oversee  and  arrange  for  the  arrival 
of  all  sorts  of  material  in  the  hospitals  and  ambulances 
at  the  front.  Each  division  had  an  officer  called 
"  searcher  "  whose  object  was  to  get  in  touch  with  such 
soldiers  as  were  seeking  means  of  communicating  with 
their  family,  to  look  after  his  private  interests  at 
home,  or  who  was  simply  In  need  of  moral  "  cheering 
up." 

The  Red  Cross  succeeded  also  In  establishing  movable 
canteens  at  the  front  In  order  to  provide  the  men  who 
could  not  be  reached  by  regular  food  supplies  with  hot 
drinks. 

But  the  most  useful.  If  not  the  most  brilliant,  aim  of 
this  organization  was  to  install  hospitals  and  to  furnish 
medical  necessities  to  the  sanitary  formations  of  the 
army. 

Improvised  hospitals  were  opened  at  Beauvals,  Jouy, 
and  Juilly  which  rendered  great  services  during  the  battles 
of  the  spring  and  summer  of  191 8.  i\t  the  same  time, 
the  sanitary  formations  of  the  Red  Cross  of  the  Paris 

1  Marshall  Petain  officially  expressed  his  appreciation  of  the  immense 
service  of  the  American  Red  Cross. 


366     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

region  were  increased.  Toward  the  end  of  September, 
the  number  of  beds  available  in  the  capital  and  its  sur- 
roundings was  over  7,000. 

During  the  month  which  preceded  the  armistice,  the 
Red  Cross  provided  beds,  medical  care,  and  food  to  an 
average  of  300,000  men  a  day. 

All  the  bandages  of  the  army  and  a  portion  of  the 
splints  came  from  the  Red  Cross  stores.  This  organiza- 
tion supplied  at  the  same  time  4,000  French  hospitals  with 
medical  necessities  and  surgical  appliances. 

The  bandages  were  issued  by  the  workrooms  at  the 
rate  of  200,000  a  week.  This  number  was  doubled  by 
the  shipments  coming  from  the  United  States. 

Special  diet  kitchens  for  the  sick  were  installed  and 
directed  by  the  same  organization  in  French  and  American 
hospitals. 

There  were  about  20,000  trained  nurses;  those  speak- 
ing French  were  detached  for  service  in  our  hospitals. 

A  special  department  was  organized  for  the  care  of 
the  mutilated.  This  section  combined  to  supply  our  Sani- 
tary Commission  with  one  hundred  and  fifty  artificial 
limbs  a  month. 

Four  hundred  men  and  women  were  employed  in  hos- 
pitals and  dressing  stations,  to  write  advising  the  families 
in  America  as  to  the  circumstances  in  which  their  soldier 
relatives  had  been  killed  or  wounded,  supplying  any  avail- 
able information  on  those  who  were  missing.  In  the  lat- 
ter half  of  the  year  19 18,  the  special  information  (home 
communication  and  searchers)  department  wrote  or  re- 
ceived on  an  average  of  13,500  letters  a  month.  The 
same  department  organized  more  than  eighty  barracks  in 
the  neighborhood  of  the  hospitals  in  order  to  take  care  of 
convalescents. 


American  Red  Cross  367 

The  Welfare  and  Recreation  bureaus  distributed 
pamphlets,^  books,  magazines,  and  newspapers  by  the 
hundred  thousand,  as  well  as  games  of  all  sorts.  In  many 
of  the  hospitals  and  camps,  It  founded  officers'  or  nurses' 
clubs. 

The  Scientific  Section  of  the  Red  Cross  organized  a 
service  of  medical  and  surgical  Information  and  published 
a  monthly  review  which  was  widely  distributed.  It  or- 
ganized a  department  for  research  as  to  the  best  means 
of  fighting  vermin,  curing  trench  fever,  wounds  to  the 
lungs,  and  poison  gas.  To  this  list,  already  so  extensive, 
of  practical  work  efficiently  accomplished,  we  must  add 
the  liberal  distribution  of  clothing,  of  knitted  garments, 
sweaters,  shoes,  trench  boots  and  socks,  sent  to  the  French 
as  well  as  to  American  soldiers. 

This  great  organization  rendered  services  to  which  it 
is  difficult  here  to  do  justice,  as  they  go  beyond  the  limits 
of  our  present  sketch.  The  following  sums  may  give 
some  Idea  of  the  work  accomplished  by  the  American 
Red  Cross.  At  the  time  of  the  armistice,  the  amount  of 
money  subscribed  and  which  the  organization  held  at  its 
disposal  was  $300,000,000.  To  this  sum  should  be 
added  the  bandages,  and  surgical  dressings,  clothes,  and 
materials  of  all  sorts  of  which  the  value  to-day  is 
$80,000,000. 

The  success  which  the  American  Red  Cross  achieved 
on  the  field  of  charity  was  not  alone  due  to  the  extent 
of  Its  wealth,  but  also  to  the  enlightenment  with  which  its 
chiefs  administered  and  distributed  that  wealth.  By  the 
use  of  direct  method  and  the  suppression  of  red  tape,  the 
directors  succeeded  in  reaching  without  delay  their  allies 
as    well    as    their    own    compatriots.     They    Invariably 

2  See  later  on  the  American  Library  Association. 


368     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

showed  in  difficult  and  unforeseen  circumstances  prompt 
decision  and  instantaneous  grasp  of  the  situation. 

Among  those  to  whom  France  and  the  United  States 
owe  so  much,  four  stand  out  whose  names  will  always  be 
remembered  in  connection  with  the  work  of  this  benefi- 
cent organization.  In  the  United  States,  Ex-President 
Taft,  head  of  the  Red  Cross,  who  by  his  eloquent  ap- 
peals elicited  such  a  generous  response  from  individuals 
as  well  as  from  the  certain  collectivities.  This  gigan- 
tic accumulation  made  it  possible  to  achieve  the  great 
things  which  were  accomplished.  In  France,  Mr.  P. 
Davison,  president  of  the  war  committee  for  Europe, 
Colonel  Gibson,  commissioner  for  France,  and  Mr. 
James  H.  Perkins  directed  the  work  in  all  its  ramifica- 
tions. 

The  Young  Men^s  Christian  Association,  known  to  all 
Americans  and  now  to  most  of  the  French,  existed  long 
before  the  war,  which  had  scarcely  been  declared  before 
the  Y.  M.  C.  A.,  on  the  twentieth  of  April,  offered  its 
services  to  the  President. 

This  organization  set  to  work  without  losing  any  time. 
While  it  was  establishing  its  canteens  and  its  recreation 
halls  in  the  first  American  camps  where  recruits  were 
gathered,  it  sent  Messrs.  Carter  and  Davis  to  Paris, 
where  the  European  seat  of  the  association  began  its  la- 
bors. In  Order  No.  26,  General  Pershing  indicated  to 
the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  that  its  object  should  be  the  social,  phys- 
ical, and  religious  perfecting  of  the  soldier.  By  Order 
No.  33  of  the  sixth  of  September,  19 17,  the  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  Expeditionary  Forces  advised  his  officers 
and  men  to  make  use  of  the  advantages  offered  by  the 
association.     He  added: 


y.  M.  C.  A,  369 

**  The  canteens  of  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  will  be  organized  like  mili- 
tary canteens,  of  which  they  are  to  take  the  place.  In  that  way, 
officers  and  soldiers  will  not  be  distracted  from  their  military 
service. 

"  Consequently  in  future,  officers  will  forbid  the  opening  of 
military  canteens  in  the  places  where  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  has  already 
established  a  canteen. 

**  The  canteens  will  not  only  be  operated  in  the  areas  which  are 
removed  from  active  operations;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  desirable  to 
have  them  as  near  the  front  as  the  military  situation  will  permit  so 
that  the  soldiers  can  have  the  comfort  which  these  establishments 
offer  at  a  time  when  they  are  likely  to  be  most  in  need  of  them." 

The  Y.  M.  C.  A.  took  pains  to  carry  out  the  wishes  of 
the  commander-in-chief.  Wherever  there  was  an  agglo- 
meration of  American  soldiers,  a  canteen  was  installed. 
As  a  result,  the  organization  operated  as  many  as  1,252 
canteens  or  recreation  halls. 

In  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  huts,  the  men  could  purchase  cer- 
tain kinds  of  food  —  chocolate,  toilet  articles,  etc. —  and 
procure,  free  of  charge,  writing  paper,  newspapers,  and 
books.  These  installations  rendered  good  service,  and 
General  Pershing  was  able  to  write  to  Mr.  Carter  at  the 
end  of  the  war  that : 

"  The  society  had  given  valuable  assistance  to  the  Expeditionary 
Forces  by  the  working  of  their  canteens.  Handicapped  by  the 
shortage  of  transport  by  sea  and  land,  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  had  accom- 
plished more  than  could  have  been  expected,  and  you  may  be  sure 
that  the  association  has  had  a  large  part  in  the  great  work  accom- 
plished by  the  American  Army." 

The  Association  endeavored  to  keep  always  In  view 
the  moral  and  religious  work  which  It  proposed  to  achieve. 
It  got  In  touch  with  the  chaplains  of  all  the  different  de- 
nominations and  placed  halls  at  their  disposal  for  the 
exercise  of  religious  services. 


370     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

In  their  reading  rooms  were  to  be  found  besides  books 
furnished  by  the  Library  Association  and  the  millions  of 
newspapers  distributed  by  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.,  pamphlets  and 
booklets  edited  by  the  Association  itself;  the  section  for 
the  distribution  of  the  writings  of  a  moral  nature  alone 
sent  out  600,000  publications  a  week.  Another  section 
specialized  the  study  of  the  Bible  which  it  undertook  to 
spread  and  interpret. 

The  Association  was  bent  on  entertaining  the  soldiers 
and  keeping  them  from  being  homesick.  It  secured  the 
assistance  of  427  professional  actors  and  actresses  and 
gave,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Its  centers,  3,000  perform- 
ances. It  provided  825  costumes  a  month  to  enable  the 
officers  and  men  to  organize  theatricals  at  the  front.  In 
the  month  of  January,  19 18,  It  distributed  1,118  instru- 
ments and  20,000  pieces  of  music. 

The  moving  picture  section  gave,  on  an  average,  2,400 
representations  a  week  in  France  and  later  on  In  the 
enemy  zone  occupied  by  the  Americans.  They  often  or- 
ganized free  performances  for  the  children  In  our  villages. 

The  department  for  athletic  sports  was  very  active. 
It  encouraged  more  particularly  baseball,  basketball, 
tennis,  boxing,  football,  and  races  of  all  sorts.  The 
competition  games  organized  by  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  during 
the  last  six  months  of  19 18  brought  together  4,770,000 
players  and  9,000,000  spectators.  In  Paris,  the  Associa- 
tion gave  exhibitions  of  boxing  or  other  athletic  games  at 
the  Palais  de  Glace  and  in  the  Circus  to  which  men  in  uni- 
form were  admitted  free. 

Several  of  the  teachers  of  the  sports  department  be- 
came monitors  in  the  regular  army  and  prepared  the  men 
for  the  June  international  games  where  the  competitors 
belonged  to  twenty-one  allied  and  associated  countries. 


7.  M.  C.  A.  371 

The  Educational  Section  opened  courses  for  the 
illiterate,  courses  In  French,  and  courses  for  higher  educa- 
tion, even  for  studies  of  law  and  architecture. 

More  recently,  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  has  largely  contributed 
toward  the  founding  of  the  university  of  the  American 
Army  at  Beaune,  destined  to  accommodate  20,000 
scholars. 

The  Association  also  opened  In  France  seventy-five 
hotels,  restaurants,  or  cafes.  It  organized  recreation 
halls  In  the  leave  areas  for  American  officers  and  men: 
AIx-les-Balns,  Chambery,  Challes-les-aux,  Chamonix,  St. 
Gervais,  in  Haute-Savole;  Nimes  In  the  department  of 
Gard,  Grenoble,  UrIage-les-Balns,  i\llevard-les-BaIns  In 
the  Dauphlne,  Nice,  Cannes,  Menton,  Monte  Carlo  on 
the  Riviera,  Valse-les-Balns  In  the  Ardeche;  Lamalou-les- 
Balns  In  the  Herault,  La  Bourboule,  le  Mont-Dore  In 
Auvergne;  Cauterets,  Eaux-Bonnes,  Bagneres-de-Luchon 
In  the  Pyrenees,  St.  Malo,  DInard,  and  Parame  In 
Brittany. 

The  organization  also  undertook  to  facilitate  communi- 
cations between  the  soldier  and  his  family,  following 
which  purpose  It  distributed  180,000,000  sheets  of  writ- 
ing paper  and  sent  to  the  United  States  more  than 
$16,000,000  transmitted  by  the  officers  and  men  to  their 
relations  In  America. 

As  a  matter  of  principle,  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  made  It  a 
habit  to  sell  articles  In  Its  canteens  at  a  moderate  price, 
without,  however,  looking  for  profit;  It  has  also  shown 
that  It  knows  how  to  give.  We  find  In  Its  budget,  under 
the  head  of  "  Donations,''  sums  aggregating  more  than 
$1,000,000.  The  Christmas  presents  alone  amounted  to 
more  than  $500,000.^ 

3  $2oo,cxx5,ooo  were  sent  to  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  from  America. 


372     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

The  organization  on  January  loth,  19 19,  had  586 
active  members,  sixty-eight  of  whom  have  been  decorated 
and  cited  for  their  courage  by  the  commanders-in-chief  of 
the  aUied  armies.  The  ^Association  operated  1,414  estab- 
lishments besides  canteens,  depots,  garages,  theaters,  and 
gymnasiums. 

The  Y.  M.  C.  A.  collaborated  in  the  work  of  the 
"  Foyer  du  Soldat,"  and  the  two  societies  combined 
founded  1,452  foyers. 

It  also  centralized  the  work  of  the  American  Library 
Association,  the  Jewish  Welfare,  and  the  Young  Women's 
Christian  Association,  acting  as  their  intermediary  with 
the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Expeditionary  Forces. 

The  scope  of  this  work  was  extensive  and  grew  in  pro- 
portion as  the  army  developed.  It  was  impossible  to 
v'isit  a  cantonment,  a  camp,  or  a  village,  however  near  to 
the  front  they  might  be,  without  finding  on  a  house,  often 
in  ruins,  on  a  tent  or  a  barrack,  the  symbolical  triangle  of 
the  Association.* 

The  association  of  the  Knights  of  Columbus  was 
founded  in  the  United  States  about  twenty  years  ago. 
It  started  with  65,000  members;  now  it  has  more  than 
500,000. 

In  the  beginning,  this  organization,  composed  entirely 
of  Catholics,  assisted  American  soldiers  during  the  war 
against  Mexico.  At  that  time,  no  private  contribution 
with  a  view  to  increasing  its  resources  had  been  raised, 
and,  without  any  special  appeal  to  the  generosity  of  its 
members,  the  society  of  the  Knights  of  Columbus  had 
succeeded  in  making  large  distribution  of  food,  of  equip- 

*The  triangle  represents,  by  its  three  points,  the  body,  the  mind,  and 
the  spirit. 


K.  of  C.  373 

ment,  and  of  games  to  the  combatants.  When  America 
entered  into  the  European  conflict,  the  Knights  offered 
their  services  to  the  President  of  the  United  States;  they 
were  accepted.  The  capital  at  their  disposal  not  being 
sufficient  to  carry  out  in  America  and  in  France  the  liberal 
program  which  the  society  had  in  view,  the  Knights  of 
Columbus  raised  generous  subscriptions  amounting  during 
the  war  to  more  than  $15,000,000. 

The  society  opened  in  the  United  States  150  recreation 
halls  and  canteens  where  the  soldier  could  find  games, 
writing  paper,  newspapers,  books,  musical  instruments, 
and  also  facilities  for  the  practice  of  the  Catholic  religion. 
In  Europe,  the  Knights  of  Columbus  were  represented  by 
765  delegates.  They  shipped  several  thousand  tons  of 
merchandise.  One  hundred  and  twenty-five  barracks 
were  erected,  where  writing  paper,  pens  and  ink,  choco- 
late, candy,  tobacco,  soap,  towels,  paper,  and  hot  drinks 
were  given  out  free  of  charge.^ 

The  Knights  of  Columbus,  like  the  Red  Cross,  sent 
their  rolling  kitchens  —  of  which  fifteen  were  in  opera- 
tion at  the  end  of  hostilities  —  into  the  front-line  trenches 
in  order  to  distribute  hot  soup  to  the  soldiers. 

This  society  made  a  great  effort  to  develop  a  taste  for 
athletic  games.  Its  budget  shows  a  large  provision  for 
the  acquirement  of  the  accessories  necessary  to  the  sports 
most  favored  by  the  American  soldiers.  Great  success 
was  achieved  in  the  organization  of  all  sorts  of  shows, 
and  in  theatricals  a  band  of  minstrels  gave  frequent  and 
extremely  popular  performances. 

5  General  headquarters  were  in  favor  of  gratuitous  distribution  in  the 
trenches  or  when  the  soldiers  could  not  procure  regular  rations.  On  the 
other  hand  it  was  considered  that  the  troops  ought  to  pay  for  the  above 
articles  when  they  were  withdrawn  from  the  front  or  scattered  in  the 
rest  areas.     The  American  soldier's  pay  was  more  than  one  dollar  a  day. 


374     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Under  the  vigorous  Impulsion  of  Supreme  Knight  Ed- 
ward L.  Hearn,  the  Knights  of  Columbus  contributed 
largely  to  the  well-being  of  the  American  trooper  and  suc- 
ceeded In  gaining  his  confidence  and  esteem  entirely  re- 
gardless of  religious  opinions. 

The  Salvation  Army,  which  began  work  In  July,  19 17, 
differed  mainly  from  the  other  benevolent  organizations 
In  having  specialized  its  work  near  and  at  the  front. 
No  canteens  were  estabhshed  by  this  society  in  the  large 
towns  or  at  the  rear,  but  canteens  were  opened  for  the 
fighting  units  at  the  earliest  possible  moment;  thus,  before 
the  First  Division  had  completed  Its  Installation  In  the 
neighborhood  of  Gondrecourt,  the  Salvation  Army  had 
already  opened  its  recreation  halls  and  reading  rooms  for 
the  men.  When  the  troops  moved  Into  line  the  workers 
who  had  been  with  them  during  periods  of  rest  or  instruc- 
tion followed  them  to  points  close  to  the  firing  line  where 
canteens  were  set  up  and  hot  coffee  and  chocolate  dis- 
tributed freely  to  those  who  were  leaving  the  trenches  or 
going  under  fire,  hot  doughnuts  were  also  cooked  and  sent 
Into  the  trenches. 

When  an  offensive  was  In  progress  the  Salvation  Army 
women  assisted  in  the  advance  dressing  stations,  and 
when  the  American  front  was  extended  to  the  Montdidler 
and  Soissons  sector,  canteens  were  operated  In  dugouts 
which  were  alone  available. 

This  society  was  directed  by  Colonel  Baker  and  com- 
prised about  two  hundred  men  and  women  and  about  three 
hundred  French  or  American  workers,  most  of  whom 
were  frequently  under  shell-fire,  and  as  may  readily  be 
imagined  the  delegates  of  the  Salvation  Army  were  ex- 
tremely popular  with  the  fighting  troops. 


A.  L.  A.  375 

The  American  Library  Association  began  its  regular 
work  in  January,  191 8. 

At  this  time  a  dispatch  office  was  established  at  Hobo- 
ken  for  the  purpose  of  assembling  books  and  placing 
them  on  the  transports.  The  books  sent  in  this  way 
were  unloaded  in  France  and  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the 
men  either  in  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  huts  or  directly  with  the 
men  themselves. 

At  the  same  time,  the  American  Library  Association 
dispatched  a  representative  to  France  to  lay  the  founda- 
tion of  a  broader  service. 

The  delegate  easily  convinced  the  commander-in-chief 
of  the  utility  of  his  mission,  and  General  Pershing  took 
pains  to  request  the  Secretary  of  War  that  fifty  tons  a 
month  might  be  reserved  on  the  military  transports  for 
the  carriage  of  the  books  and  pamphlets  for  the  American 
Army. 

By  common  agreement,  it  was  decided  that  the  Library 
Association  should  furnish  books  to  the  American  Red 
Cross,  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.,  and  the  Knights  of  Columbus. 
These  societies  on  their  part  agreed  to  see  that  the  sol- 
diers received  the  books  entrusted  to  their  care. 

In  the  month  of  April,  the  Association  inaugurated  its 
present  headquarters  at  Paris  and  its  central  library  at 
10  Rue  de  I'Elysee. 

In  September,  the  Postmaster  General  in  Washington 
agreed  to  forward  free  all  publications  sent  to  Europe  by 
this  society,  and  general  headquarters  authorized  its  rep- 
resentatives to  communicate  directly  with  the  military 
authorities  of  the  Expeditionary  Forces. 

From  that  time  on,  the  Library  Association  developed 
rapidly  and  extensively. 

Shipping  bureaus  were   installed  at  Newport  News, 


37^     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

Boston,  Philadelphia,  and  New  York.  They  succeeded 
in  shipping  upward  of  100,000  volumes  a  month. 

By  February  i,  19 19,  1,800,000  books  had  been  sent 
to  France.  A  lot  of  libraries  were  opened  in  Y.  M.  C.  A., 
Knights  of  Columbus,  Salvation  Army,  Y.  W.  C.  A.,  and 
Jewish  Welfare  organizations  and  264  in  detached  camps 
belonging  to  the  Expeditionary  Forces. 

Each  American  ambulance  was  endowed  with  a  collec- 
tion of  books. 

A  similar  service  was  organized  in  England  and  in 
Russia  for.the  benefit  of  the  troops  stationed  and  fighting 
in  these  countries. 

The  Paris  shipping  office  sent  out  4,347  specified 
volumes  to  certain  soldiers  who  had  requested  them. 

The  library  in  Paris  was  much  frequented  by  officers 
and  men  stationed  there,  or  passing  through  the  capital. 
It  was  utilized  by  30,000  members  of  the  Expeditionary 
Forces. 

After  the  armistice  was  signed,  the  number  of  books 
asked  for  by  all  the  branch  offices  was  greatly  Increased. 
The  soldiers  wished  particularly  to  have  Instructive  books, 
text-books,  works  of  elementary  education  used  In  primary 
and  in  high  schools.  More  than  half  a  million  books  of 
this  sort  were  recently  issued;  most  of  these  volumes  were 
taken  by  officer-instructors  in  the  military  schools. 

A  delegate  of  the  Library  Association,  to  be  found  In 
every  army,  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  central  com- 
mittee any  criticism  which  he  might  think  necessary,  on 
the  operation  of  the  work  In  the  unit  to  which  he  was 
attached. 

Libraries  were  also  opened  at  Chatillon,  Chaumont, 
Dijon,  Gondrecourt,  Neufchateau,  Nevers,  Tours,  and  in 
the  hospital  centers  of  AHerey,  Le  Mans,  Mesves,  Save- 


Jewish  Welfare  Board  377 

nay.  A  reading  room  was  later  installed  at  Coblenz, 
another  opened  at  Treves.  Sixty-two  army  transports 
were  supplied  with  a  library. 

The  society  largely  contributed  to  the  supply  of  works 
on  technical  and  specialized  subjects,  which  could  be  con- 
sulted either  at  the  second  section  of  general  headquarters 
at  Chaumont  or  at  the  staff  school  at  Langres. 

Representing  the  Congressional  Library  at  Washing- 
ton, it  also  furnished  the  necessary  documents  for  the 
labor  of  the  Peace  Conference. 

Latterly,  it  has  collaborated  with  the  "  Association  des 
Bibliothecaires  Frangais  "  and  the  sub-committee  of  the 
"  Renaissance  des  Cites  "  with  the  idea  of  making  Ameri- 
can Library  methods  better  known  in  France,  also  to 
facilitate  the  future  establishment  of  libraries  in  the  de- 
vastated regions. 

The  Jewish  Welfare  Board  did  not  begin  work  in 
France  until  the  last  months  of  the  war. 

The  Association  desired  to  ensure  the  exercise  of  the 
Jewish  rites  in  the  American  Army,  to  distribute  certain 
kinds  of  literature,  and  to  render  personal  service  to  the 
Jewish  soldier,  more  especially  to  locate  his  relatives  in 
Russia  or  Poland. 

Fourteen  central  offices  were  Installed  at  Bordeaux, 
Brest,  Coblenz,  Dijon,  Gievres,  Le  Mans,  Nantes,  Paris, 
St.  Aignan,  St.  Nazaire,  Tours,  Pontanezen,  Kerhuon, 
and  in  the  principal  camps  where  the  soldiers  gathered 
before  their  embarkation  for  the  United  States.  In  these 
centers,  the  rabbis  exercised  the  rites  of  the  Jewish 
church,  preferably  on  Friday  night.  11,000  abbreviated 
Jewish  prayers,  7,000  books  on  Jewish  thought,  and  5,000 
extracts  from  the  Scriptures  were  distributed. 


37^     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

The  soldiers  were  also  supplied  in  the  canteens  with 
tea,  chocolate,  bread,  preserves,  cakes,  cigarettes,  and 
writing  paper. 

At  the  request  of  certain  French  and  English  organiza- 
tions and  also  in  answer  to  the  call  of  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.,  the 
Young  Women's  Christian  Association  decided  to  carry 
on  in  Europe  the  charitable  work  which  had  been  largely 
organized  among  the  munition  workers  in  the  United 
States. 

The  object  of  its  members  was  to  give  help  to  the 
women  of  all  nationalities  working  for  the  armies.  Thus, 
wherever  women  were  employed,  especially  in  the  ser- 
vices of  the  chief  signal  officer,  the  Association  estab- 
lished lodgings  or  "  Hostess  Houses."  It  was  thus  rep- 
resented at  Brest,  St.  Nazaire,  Bordeaux,  Le  Havre, 
Tours,  Paris,  Nevers,  Langres,  Chaumont,  Neufchateau, 
Toul  where  telephone  centrals  had  been  installed,  and 
even  at  Souilly  during  the  battle  between  the  Meuse  and 
the  Argonne  when  the  First  Army  general  headquarters 
was  operating  in  this  locality. 

The  Y.  W.  C.  A.  opened  clubs  for  women  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  base  hospitals  in  order  to  provide  rest  and 
recreation  halls  for  the  nurses.  Clubs  were  organized  in 
Paris,  Savenay,  Brest,  St.  Nazaire,  Coetquidan,  Nantes, 
Angers,  Tours,  Joinville,  Chatel-Guyon,  Vichy,  Mars, 
Allerey,  Dijon,  Chaumont  Contrexeville,  Vittel,  and 
Bazoilles. 

The  association  installed  and  operated  three  hotels  in 
Paris  where  women  employed  in  war  work  found  board 
and  lodging  at  low  rates.  Other  hotels  of  the  same 
order  were  opened  at  Brest,  Bordeaux,  Le  Havre,  Le 
Mans,  Tours,  Toul,  Chaumont,  and  Coblenz. 


Other  Benevolent  Associations  379 

Canteens,  where  French  women  working  either  for  the 
American  services  or  in  our  own  factories  were  admitted, 
were  organized:  Five  in  Paris;  three  in  Lyons;  three  at 
Bourges;  two  at  Roanne;  one  at  Tours,  St.  Etienne,  Ro- 
morantin,  Montluqon,  and  Is-sur-Tille. 

At  Lyons,  to  mention  the  work  done  by  this  association 
in  only  one  of  these  cities,  6,000  women  made  use  of  the 
canteens  of  this  organization,  which  in  this  one  center 
succeeded  in  serving  1,200  meals  a  day. 

M.  Loucheur,  in  recognition  of  the  devoted  work  of 
this  society,  asked  the  Y.  W.  C.  A.  not  to  close  its  can- 
teens at  the  end  of  the  war.  This  organization  continued 
accordingly  after  the  armistice  under  Franco-American 
direction. 

While  some  American  organizations,  such  as  the  Red 
Cross,  did  not  hesitate  before  the  landing  of  the  Amerian 
troops  and  even  after  their  arrival  to  offer  their  services 
and  to  assist  our  combatants,  there  was  another  category 
which  did  not  wait  until  the  United  States  declared  war 
to  manifest  their  interest  in  our  cause  with  equal  devotion 
and  enlightenment. 

A  few  weeks  after  the  opening  of  hostilities,  the  Ameri- 
can colony  in  Paris  organized  the  ambulance  of  Neuilly.^ 
This  hospital  center  soon  disposed  of  about  a  thousand 
beds.  The  sick  and  wounded  were  cared  for  at  Neuilly 
by  a  personnel  of  nurses  and  doctors  as  devoted  as  they 
were  capable,  and  the  admirable  service  given  there  was 
soon  effectively  supplemented  by  the  generous  gift  of  a 

^  When  the  commander-in-chief  decided  to  militarize  the  various  or- 
ganizations which  were  placed  at  the  service  of  the  army,  general  orders, 
dated  July  20th,  converted  the  Neuilly  Ambulance  into  Base  Hospital 
No.  I. 


380     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

sanitary  train  for  the  direct  evacuation  of  the  wounded. 
Colonel  Robert  Bacon,  former  ambassador  to  Paris, 
whose  zeal  in  our  cause  was  as  much  appreciated  in  his 
lifetime  as  his  death  is  now  regretted,  placed  this  train 
at  the  disposal  of  the  French  command.  It  remained 
throughout  the  war  the  best  equipped  and  the  most  com- 
fortable of  its  kind  in  service. 

Nor  were  the  large  funds  of  which  the  Neuilly  am- 
bulance disposed  utilized  only  for  the  running  of  the  hos- 
pital or  of  the  train.  A  distributing  committee,  pre- 
sided over  by  Mrs.  Robert  Woods  Bliss,  was  formed  with 
the  object  of  collecting  American  gifts  and  subscriptions 
for  the  soldier  at  the  front. 

A  service  of  field  ambulances  was  also  subscribed  for  by 
funds  largely  sent  from  the  United  States.  It  consisted 
of  twenty-five  sections  of  motor  ambulances  for  the 
transportation  of  wounded  and  operated  by  volunteers 
enrolled  under  the  direction  of  Mr.  Piatt  H.  Andrew, 
whose  zeal  and  devotion  were  appreciated  in  all  the 
French  divisions. 

The  Norton-Harjes  ambulance  service,  due  also  to 
American  generosity  and  which  comprised  fifteen  sections, 
was  also  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  French  command. 

Many  American  women,  responding  to  the  call  of  the 
'^  American  Fund  for  French  Wounded/*  ^  grouped 
themselves  together  to  help  our  combatants. 

"^  The  first  appeal  for  the  French  wounded  was  made  in  England  by 
Mrs.  Floyd.     Later  the  society  assumed   a  purely  American   character. 

At  the  head  of  this  formation  was  Mrs.  Lathrop,  who  worked  in- 
defatigably  up  to  the  end  of  the  war.  Six  hundred  committees  were 
formed  in  the  United  States  and  gifts  to  the  value  of  $5,000,000  were 
sent  to  France,  permitting  the  establishment  of  depots  and  dispensaries 
in  thirty  French  towns. 

Among  the  women  who  directed  the  efforts  in  the  aid  of  the  French 
wounded  we  ought  to  mention  Mrs.  Francis  Shaw,  Mrs.  William  Gwin, 


Other  Benevolent  Associations  381 

The  American  Surgical  Dressings  Association^  founded 
in  Paris  by  Mrs.  Austin,  had  also  many  working  com- 
mittees in  America.  Thanks  to  this  work  our  hospitals 
rarely  lacked  dressings  or  bandages  for  the  wounded. 

The  Fatherless  Children  of  France,  working  in  close 
touch  with  the  French  Government,  through  the  care  and 
adoption  of  war  orphans  has  accomplished  a  work  too 
well  known  in  America  and  too  extensive  to  be  here  fully 
described. 

The  same  may  be  said  of  the  work  of  Miss  Anne  Mor- 
gan, particularly  in  the  devastated  regions,  which  has  been 
constant  and  devoted  from  the  first. 

Probably  the  American  woman  whose  work  covered 
the  broadest  field  was  Mrs.  Wharton.  Her  ouvroir  or 
workroom  gave  employment  to  quantities  of  girls  thrown 
out  of  work  by  the  war. 

The  American  Hostels  for  Refugees,  into  which  was 
merged  the  "  Foyer  Franco-Beige,"  was  created  under 
the  presidency  of  Mrs.  Wharton  during  the  early  days 
of  October,  19 14.  Six  separate  committees  worked  to 
aid  the  refugees  of  the  invaded  districts;  an  infirmary  was 
established,  a  depot  for  the  gratuitous  distribution  of  sup- 
plies opened,  an  employment  bureau  established,  a  res- 
taurant, dispensary,  and  a  workroom,  still  running  in 
19 19,  were  installed  down  town,  as  well  as  a  center  for 
the  free  distribution  of  clothing. 

Later  under  the  increasing  stress  of  the  German  offen- 

and  Miss  Anna  M.  Vail,  all  working  in  Paris;  Mrs.  Charles  Chapin 
and  Mrs.  Ethelbert  Nevin  in  New  York;  Miss  Edith  Bangs  in  Boston 
and  Mrs.  Russell  Tyson  in  Chicago.  Thanks  to  the  enterprise  and  de- 
votion of  these  ladies  and  their  collaborators,  41,812  cases  were  re- 
ceived from  America,  and  44,794  were  distributed  to  hospitals  and 
among  the  needy  families  of  soldiers.  The  committee  unwilling  to  cease 
their  good  works  with  the  cessation  of  hostilities  plan  to  endow  a  perma- 
nent children's  hospital  of  one  hundred  beds  in  Rheims. 


382     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

sive  of  191 8,  several  apartment  houses  were  opened  and 
free  lodging  given  to  refugees. 

For  one  year,  the  society  worked  in  collaboration  with 
the  Red  Cross,  but  once  more  obtained  full  autonomy  in 
August,  19 1 8. 

The  work  of  the  Children  of  Flanders ^  with  a  large 
colony  of  refugee  children,  was  established  in  five  different 
centers  in  France,  and  a  group  of  workrooms  for  the 
supply  of  garments  and  knitted  goods. 

The  American  Convalescent  Homes  established  three 
principal  homes  in  France  for  the  families  and  children 
of  refugees  either  suffering  from  or  threatened  by  tuber- 
culosis. 

French  Tuberculosis  War  Victims  was  founded  in  19 16 
with  a  view  to  the  care  and  cure  of  light  cases  of  tuber- 
culosis through  obtaining  the  best  conditions  of  fresh  air 
and  hygiene  for  the  patients.  Over  $700,000  were 
raised  in  America  for  this  enterprise,  which  was  subse- 
quently taken  over  by  the  Red  Cross. 

During  the  summer  of  19 14,  Mr.  Herrick,  American 
ambassador  in  Paris,  seeing  the  number  of  charitable  or- 
ganizations that  were  being  formed  in  France  and  with 
a  view  of  coordinating  the  individual  efforts  which  were 
being  made  by  an  arrangement  with  the  French  Govern- 
ment and  high  command,  established  the: 

American  Relief  Clearing  House  with  Mr.  Harjes  as 
president  and  Mr.  H.  O.  Beatty  as  director.  This  or- 
ganization remained  in  touch  with  our  front  and  rear 
services,  obtained  free  transportation  on  the  principal 
lines  of  navigation  and  railways,  thus  distributing  gratis 
the  quantities  of  gifts  of  all  sorts  which  were  due  to 
American  generosity. 


Other  Benevolent  Associations  383 

From  November,  19 14,  to  June,  19 17,  the  clearing 
house  handled  150,000  cases  of  clothing  and  supplies,  dis- 
tributed over  $2,000,000  in  cash,  and  $1,000,000  worth 
of  supplies. 

When  America  entered  the  war,  the  Relief  Clearing 
House  passed  over  its  work  to  the  American  Red  Cross. 

Naturally  the  great  benevolent  organizations  deserve  a 
more  complete  study  than  our  Insufficient  experience  of 
their  varied  activities  has  permitted  us  to  record  here.  It 
Is  to  be  hoped  not  only  that  they  may  one  day  be  more 
worthily  described,  but  also  that  we  may  Investigate  In 
France  the  causes  which  have  brought  about  such  colos- 
sal results  as  have  been  achieved  by  the  American  method 
of  association. 

Almost  all  these  societies  have,  in  a  great  measure, 
ameliorated  the  material  welfare  of  our  combatants,  but 
this  perhaps  Is  one  of  the  least  Important  parts  of  the 
work  accomplished.  In  attenuating  the  sufferings  of 
the  victims  of  war,  they  have  succeeded  in  maintaining 
a  high  morale  near  the  front,  and  have  accomplished  the 
great  result  of  shortening  the  distance  which  separates 
the  soldier  from  his  home. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  describe  adequately  the  mani- 
fold activities  undertaken  by  the  American  residents  and 
even  of  the  transient  visitors  In  Paris  when  the  war 
broke  out  and  which  were  developed  by  private  or  col- 
lective initiative  as  it  continued.  To  do  so  would  require 
a  volume  and  not  merely  a  chapter.  We  must  therefore 
beg  our  readers  to  consider  that  none  have  been  volun- 
tarily omitted  In  this  brief  sketch,  but  that  those  of  which 
we  speak  from  certain  personal  knowledge  may  be  taken 
as  a  type  of  the  many  others,  equally  meritorious,  which 


384     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

the  authors  of  this  book  have  not  had  the  chance  of  know- 
ing individually. 

Thanks  to  all  of  them,  and  thanks  to  the  great  variety 
and  scope  of  their  benevolent  activities,  the  man  no  longer 
of  fighting  age  who  was  obliged  to  remain  in  the  United 
States,  and  the  woman  whom  family  duties  kept  at  home, 
were  both  able  to  take  a  useful  share  in  the  European 
war  according  to  their  means  but  more  especially  in  direct 
proportion  to  their  personal  influence  and  energy. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

FRANCO-AMERICAN  COOPERATION CONCLUSION 

During  the  two  years  that  the  American  forces  were 
establishing  their  services  and  fighting  upon  French  soil, 
they  were  necessarily  brought  into  close  and  constant  re- 
lations with  our  military  administration  and  with  the  civil 
population  of  our  country. 

In  order  to  procure  supplies  and  material  of  all  sorts 
—  lodgings,  transport,  and  so  forth  —  they  were  obliged 
to  apply  to  the  competent  French  authorities,  and,  when 
actively  engaged,  they  were  in  permanent  touch  with  the 
French  military  command. 

A  complete  association  of  the  French  and  American 
services,  both  in  the  Interior  and  in  the  army  zones,  be- 
came an  essential  element  of  future  success. 

During  their  first  interview  upon  these  subjects.  Gen- 
eral Pershing  and  the  Minister  of  War,  M.  Painleve, 
found  themselves  in  complete  agreement  as  to  the  neces- 
sity of  hastening  the  entry  into  line  of  the  American  con- 
tingents; and,  in  order  to  facilitate  this  in  every  way,  they 
at  once  decided  to  organize  a  permanent  liaison  system. 

The  Americans  proceeded  to  appoint  a  certain  number 
of  missions  or  individual  officers  to  act  as  liaison  agents 
with  the  particular  allied  staffs  called  upon  to  work  In 
conjunction  with  their  own.  According  to  the  importance 
of  the  questions  Involved,  these  American  representatives 
were  empowered  either  to  reach  a  direct  settlement  or  re- 
port the  affair  to  their  superiors. 

Officers  representing  the  high  command  of  the  Ex- 

385 


386     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

peditlonary  Forces  were  to  be  found  in  all  the  offices  of 
our  French  general  headquarters,  of  our  War  Ministry, 
of  our  regional  staffs  and  railway  regulating  stations 
where  American  interests  were  involved,  as  well  as  at  the 
headquarters  of  the  interallied  commander-in-chief.^ 

In  order  to  facilitate  the  work  of  the  Americans,  we  on 
our  side  increased  our  liaison  services  and  even  when  it 
seemed  advisable,  modified  the  interior  organization  of 
some  of  our  departments,  so  that  our  new  ally  would  find 
his  task  simplified. 

As  soon  as  the  American  headquarters  were  perma- 
nently constituted  at  Chaumont,  the  French  commander- 
in-chief  appointed  a  military  mission,  composed  of  analog- 
ous corresponding  services,  which  was  particularly  en- 
trusted with  the  duty  of  furnishing  interpreters  and  liaison 
agents  ^  to  the  recently  arrived  American  units. 

In  the  interior,  wherever  important  American  ser- 
vices were  to  be  found,  as  in  the  base  ports  and  regional 
staffs,  the  Minister  of  War  created  missions  which  were 
to  serve  as  intermediaries  between  our  allies  and  the  civil 
and  military  administration.  In  the  principal  staffs  and 
important  services  of  our  ministry,  bureaus  were  installed 
to  supervise  and  coordinate  all  questions  involving 
American  cooperation. 

^The  heads  of  these  American  military  missions  were: 

At  the  headquarters  of  the  Allied  Armies:  Colonel  T.  Bentley  Mott, 
at  present  military  attache  in  Paris. 

At  the  headquarters  of  the  French  Armies:  Colonel  Frank  Parker,  suc- 
ceeded by  Colonel  C.  de  W^itt  Wilcox,  subsequently  by  Colonel  Paul  H. 
Clark. 

At  the  headquarters  of  the  British  Armies:     Colonel  Robert  Bacon. 

Colonel  Herman  Harjes  was  entrusted  with  the  organization  and  in- 
spection of  the  personnel  of  all  the  liaison  missions  attached  to  the  various 
staffs  and  services. 

2  This  French  mission  was  at  first  under  the  orders  of  General  Raguen- 
eau,  subsequently  under  those  of  Colonel  Linard. 


Franco-American  Cooperation  387 

On  December  19,  19 17,  the  Prime  Minister  appointed 
a  special  Councillor  on  Franco-American  Affairs  to  the 
under  Secretary  of  War  ^  and  also  created  a  central  office 
of  Franco-American  Relations. 

On  June  19th,  19 18,  the  General  Commission  for 
Franco-American  War  Affairs  *  was  organized.  Its  chief, 
to  whom  was  entrusted  the  duty  of  coordinating  the  work 
of  the  Franco-American  bureaus  in  the  ministries,  was 
also  to  follow  up  the  execution  of  the  different  measures 
which  had  been  judged  necessary.  At  the  same  time  the 
High  Commissioner  directed  the  work  which  was  under- 
taken in  America  through  a  delegate  who  was  to  take 
charge  of  the  services  already  created  in  the  United  States 
by  the  French  Republic. 

In  general  such  were  the  measures  taken  in  France  to 
facilitate  the  entry  into  line  of  the  American  contingents. 

It  is  not  for  us  to  estimate  the  value  of  this  assistance. 
We  may,  with  greater  relevance,  reproduce  here  one  of 
the  passages  from  General  Pershing's  telegraphic  report 
to  the  War  Department  in  Washington  summing  up,  after 
the  armistice,  the  operations  in  which  his  armies  had 
taken  part: 

"  The  French  Government  and  Army  have  always  stood  ready 
to  furnish  us  with  supplies,  equipment,  and  transportation  and  to 
aid  us  in  every  way.  In  the  towns  and  hamlets  wherever  our 
troops  have  been  stationed  or  billeted,  the  French  people  have 
everywhere  received  them  more  as  relatives  and  intimate  friends 
than  as  soldiers  of  a  foreign  army. 

"  For  these  things  words  are  quite  inadequate  to  express  our 
gratitude." 

3  M.  Jules  Cambon,  formerly  French  Ambassador  to  Washington  and 
to  Berlin. 

*  Under  the  direction  of  M.  Andre  Tardieu. 


3^8     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

The  armistice  found  General  Pershing  at  the  head  of 
an  army  more  than  two  million  strong.  In  the  course 
of  19 19  this  force  would  have  been  doubled.  Both  in 
France  and  America  every  provision  was  made  to  attain 
this  result;  the  powerful  mechanism  which  had  been  set  on 
foot  in  view  of  mobilization  was  running  without  a  hitch. 
Transports  and  reception  camps  in  Europe  were  kept  up 
to  their  full  capacity.  Nothing,  not  even  the  German 
submarine,  was  now  able  to  seriously  impede  the  regular 
movement  of  reenforcement. 

Undoubtedly  the  knowledge  of  this  situation  had  its 
influence  on  the  enemies'  decision  to  abandon  the  struggle, 
so  that  America  would  not  pursue  her  effort  to  a  finish 
even  more  disastrous  to  Germany. 

The  two  million  soldiers  already  in  Europe  sufficed  to 
determine  our  victory.  Thanks  to  American  aid,  the 
enemy  had  been  forced:  first  to  stabilize,  then  to  defen- 
sive warfare  followed  by  a  more  and  more  precipitate 
retreat  and,  finally,  on  the  eleventh  of  November,  to  a 
capitulation. 

No  sooner  had  the  armistice  been  signed  than  the  com- 
mander-in-chief, while  watching  the  advance  of  his  troops 
toward  the  Rhine,  had  his  mind  preoccupied  by  another 
thought,  that  of  lightening  war-worn  France  of  an  occu- 
pation which  had  now  become  unnecessary.  From  that 
moment,  the  Americans  turned  homeward  with  the  same 
order  and  the  same  rapidity  which  had  characterized  their 
arrival  on  our  shores. 

Of  their  passage  among  us,  of  their  exploits  on  our 
battlefields,  are  they  to  leave  no  more  than  a  memory? 
We  hope  otherwise. 

The  contact  of  our  populations  with  these  Americans, 
energetic  in  action,  of  open  minds  and  rapid  initiative. 


Conclusion  389 

has  surely  enlarged  their  horizon.  Our  industrial,  com- 
mercial and  agricultural  methods,  possibly  our  social  and 
political  conceptions,  may  be  modified  by  interchange  of 
thought  with  men  constantly  seeking  movement  and 
progress.  We  may  perhaps  find  that  the  natural  tendency 
toward  routine  and  bureaucracy  with  which  we  are  often 
reproached  will  be  gradually  modified  by  the  penetration 
of  new  ideas. 

The  love  of  open  air  and  outdoor  sports  so  character- 
istic of  American  youth  cannot  but  have  been  an  excellent 
example. 

Our  technicists,  brought  in  touch  with  the  American 
method  of  work,  will  surely  have  made  many  useful  ob- 
servations concerning,  for  instance,  the  scientific  and  at 
the  same  time  simple  working  of  railroads,  telephones, 
and  telegraphs. 

Let  us  recall  that,  upon  leaving  France,  the  American 
services  have  turned  over  to  us  various  workins^  facilities 
—  ports,  docks,  warehouses,  shops,  rolling  stock,  and  even 
a  trained  and  organized  civilian  labor,  all  of  which  should 
make  our  future  economic  struggles  easier. 

French  officers  and  soldiers  who  have  throuprhout  the 
last  two  years  been  in  contact  with  the  American  forces, 
working  beside  them  will,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  have  watched 
with  interest  and  profit  the  fashion  in  which  these  have 
accomplished  their  tasks. 

The  eminently  aggressive  spirit  which  the  American 
soldier  brings  with  him  to  the  firing  line  will  not  have 
failed  to  impress  our  French  observers,  nor  will  the  effort 
made  by  each  commander  to  develop  the  physical  and 
moral  qualities  of  his  men  have  passed  unnoticed. 

In  this  connection,  one  question  may  be  asked: 

"  Why  was  the  American  officer  unready  to  profit  by 


390     The  American  Army  in  the  European  Conflict 

the  veterans'  experience,  unless  he  found  that  it  accorded 
with  his  own?  " 

To  this  we  may  reply  that,  with  the  mentality  of  this 
new  army,  each  individual  chief,  to  gain  and  maintain 
ascendancy  over  his  men,  was  oblij^^ed  to  show  an  unflinch- 
ing confidence  in  his  own  personal  ability. 

The  men  also  were  eager  to  show  their  commander 
what  they  could  do  unaided.  Both  had  the  desire,  per- 
haps unacknowledged,  of  owing  to  themselves  above  all 
that  consciousness  which  the  good  soldier  must  ever  pos- 
sess —  his  superiority  over  the  foe.  Fine  and  martial 
spirit  of  a  people  that  has  never  known  defeat ! 

It  is  to  be  hoped  that  our  army  staff  may  remain  in 
touch  with  American  headquarters  and  continue  to  study 
the  working  methods  of  their  associates  of  yesterday, 
their  frien.ds  of  the  present  and  future.  Our  American 
comrades  are  certain  to  codify  In  their  new  Field  Service 
Regulations  a  portion  of  that  experience  gained  on  the 
battle-fields  of  the  great  war. 

The  names  of  the  officers  upon  whom  this  work  will 
devolve  are  already  known  to  us.  We  cannot  for  a  mo- 
ment doubt  as  to  what  their  conclusions  will  be. 

All  have  been  trained  in  that  school  to  which  General 
Pershing  belongs.  The  spirit  of  offensive  warfare  has 
permeated  their  tactical  conceptions  and  will  surely  in- 
spire their  future  writings. 

As  for  ourselves,  who  have  witnessed  all  that  has  been 
set  down  in  these  pages,  we  have  endeavored  to  relate 
with  perfect  impartiality  the  events  which  are  herein 
chronicled,  convinced  that  the  simple  and  unvarnished 
truth  is  the  best  homage  we  can  ever  render  to  the  admir- 
able effort  of  our  brothers  in  arms. 

Paris,  July  4th. 


APPENDIX  I 

Following  is  the  order  of  battle  of  the  American  Expeditionary- 
Forces  on  December  i,  1918: 

This  date  has  been  selected  preferably  to  any  other  as  being  that 
of  the  most  complete  development  and  greatest  numerical  strength 
of  the  command. 

In  consulting  this  document,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that,  as 
a  consequence  of  numerous  promotions  and  new  assignments,  on 
the  one  hand  many  American  officers  had  had  for  a  very  short  time 
the  ranks  and  employments  with  which  their  names  are  herein 
associated ;  on  the  other  hand,  many  others  had,  at  that  time,  been 
but  recently  transferred  from  positions  which  they  held  for  a  long 
period  in  the  course  of  the  war. 

Finally,  the  lack  of  available  space  has  compelled  the  writers, 
much  to  their  regret,  to  limit  themselves  to  the  troops  in  the  field 
and  omit  those  permanently  assigned  to  the  Services  of  Supply. 

ORDER  OF  BATTLE  OF  THE  AMERICAN  EXPEDI- 
TIONARY FORCES  AT  THE   DATE  OF 
DECEMBER  i,  1918 

General  Headquarters 

American  Expeditionary  Forces 

General  John  J.  Pershing Commanding 

Major-General  James  W.  McAndrew Chief  of  Staff 

Brigadier-General  LeRoy  Eltinge Deputy  Chief  of  Staff 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Albert  S.  Kuegle Secretary-General  Staff 

Brigadier-General  Avery  D.  Andrews Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-i 

Brigadier-General  Dennis  E.  Nolan Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-2 

Brigadier-General  Fox  Connor Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-3 

Brigadier-General  George  V.  H.  Moseley.  Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-4 

Brigadier-General  H.  B.  Fiske Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-5 

391 


392  Appendix  I 

Major-General  Ernest  Hinds Chief  of  Artillery 

Major-General  Mason  M.  Patrick Chief  of  Air  Service 

Brigadier-General  S.  D.  Rockenbach Chief  of  Tank  Corps 

FIRST  ARMY 

Lieutenant-General  Hunter  Liggett Commanding 

Brigadier-General  Hugh  A.  Drumm.  . .  Chief  of  Staff 

Colonel  Leon  B.  Kromer Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-l 

Colonel  Willey  Howell Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-2 

Colonel  Lawrence  Halstead Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-3 

Colonel  John  L.  DeWitt Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-4 

Colonel  Lewis  H.  Watkins Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-5 

Major-General  William  S.  McNair Chief  of  Artillery 


FIRST  ARMY  CORPS: 

Major-General  William  M.  Wright 

Colonel  Walter  S.  Grant 

Major  Lemuel  L.  Bolles 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Noble  B.  Juah .  . 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Royden  E.  Beebe 
Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  A.  Selleck . . . 


Commanding 
Chief  of  Staff 
Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-i 
Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-2 
Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-3 
Atg.  Chief  of  Artillery 


Thirty-sixth  Division: 

Major-General  William  R.  Smith Commanding 

Colonel  Ezekiel  J.  Williams Chief  of  Staff 

yist  Infantry  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  Pegram  Whitworth. .  .Comdg. 

Colonel  Luther  H.  James Comdg.,  141st  Regt.  Inf. 

Colonel  Alfred  W.  Bloor Comdg.,  I42d  Regt.  Inf. 

7 2d  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  John  A.  Hulen Comdg. 

Colonel  Irving  J.  Phillipson Comdg.,  143d  Regt. 

Colonel  Oscar  E.  Roberts Comdg.,  144th  Regt. 

6 1  St  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  John  E.  Stephens Comdg. 

Colonel  Claud  V.  Birkhead Comdg.,  131st  Rgt.  F.A. 


Appendix  I  393 

Colonel  Arthur  R.  Sholars Comdg.,  I32d  Rgt.  F.A. 

Colonel  Fred  A.  Logan Comdg.,  133d  Rgt.  F.A. 

Seventy-eighth  Division  : 

Major-General  James  H.  McRae Commanding 

Colonel  Charles  D.  Herron C.  of  S. 

155th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brig.-General  Sanford  D.  Stanberry ...  Comdg. 

Colonel  John  M.  Morgan Comdg.,  309th  Regt.  Inf. 

Colonel  Walter  C.  Babcock Comdg.,  310th  Regt.  Inf. 

156th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  James  T.  Dean Comdg. 

Colonel  Marcus  B.  Stokes Comdg.,  311th  Regt. 

Colonel  Alvord  V.  P.  Anderson Comdg.,  312th  Regt. 

J 53d  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Clint  C.  Hearn Comdg. 

Colonel  A.  G.  Fisher Comdg.,  307th  Rgt.  F.  A. 

Colonel  Chas.  M.  Bunker Comdg.,  308th  Rgt.  F.  A. 

Colonel  Edwin  O.  Sarratt Comdg.,  309th  Rgt.  F.  A. 

Eightieth  Division: 

Major-General  Samuel  D.  Sturgis Commanding 

Colonel  William  H.  Waldron C.  of  S. 

I5gth  Infantry  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  Geo.  H.  Jamerson .  .  Comdg. 

Colonel  Chas.  Keller Comdg.  317th  Regt.  Inf. 

Colonel  Harry  C.  Jones Comdg.  318th  Regt.  Inf. 

•  1 60th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Lloyd  M.  Brett Comdg. 

Colonel  James  M.  Love Comdg.  319th  Regt.  Inf. 

Colonel  Ephraim  C.  Peyton Comdg.  320th  Regt.  Inf. 

155th  Field  Artillery  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  James  H.  Bryson. .  .Comdg. 
Colonel  O.  L.  Brunzell Comdg.  313th  Regt.  F.  A. 


394  Appendix  I 

Colonel  Jas.  F.  Walker Comdg.  314th  Regt.  F.  A. 

Colonel  Wm.  Tidball Comdg.  315th  Regt.  F.  A. 

FIFTH  ARMY  CORPS: 

Major-General  Charles  P.  Summerall.  .  .Commanding 

Brigadier-General  Wilson  B.  Burtt Chief  of  StafiE 

Lt.-Colonel  Albert  W.  Foreman Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-i 

Lt.-Colonel  George  M.  Russell Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-2 

Colonel  T.  H.  Emerson Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-3 

Brigadier-General  Dwight  E.  Aultman.  .Comdg.  Corps  Artillery 

TwENTy-sixTH  Division: 

Major-General  Harry  C.  Hale Commanding 

Colonel  Duncan  K.  Major Chief  of  Staff 

Sist  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  L.  L.  Durfee Comdg. 

Colonel  Horace  P.  Hobbs Comdg.  loist  Regt.  Inf. 

Colonel  Hiram  I.  Bearss Comdg.  I02d  Regt.  Inf. 

52d  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Geo.  H.  Shelton Comdg. 

Lieut.-Colonel  Cassius  M.  Dowell '.Comdg.  103d  Regt. 

Colonel  B.  Frank  Cheatham Comdg.  104th  Regt. 

51st  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  P.  D.  Glassford Comdg. 

Colonel  Robert  E.  Goodwin Comdg.  loist  Regt.  F.  A. 

Colonel  J.  A.  Mack Comdg.  io2d  Regt.  F.  A. 

Colonel  J.  Alden  Twachtman Comdg.  103d  Regt.  F.  A. 

Twenty-ninth  Division: 

Major-General  Charles  G.  Morton Commanding 

Colonel  S.  A.  Cloman Chief  of  Staff 

57th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Leroy  S.  Upton Comdg. 

Colonel  Wm.  R.  Polk Comdg.  1 13th  Regt.  Inf. 

Colonel  Geo.  Williams Comdg.  1 14th  Regt.  Inf. 


Appendix  I  395 

^8th  Infantry  Brigade 

Colonel  John  McKay  Palmer Comdg.  Temp. 

Colonel  Milton  A.  Reckord Comdg.  115th  Regt.  Inf. 

Colonel  Reginald  H.  Kelley Comdg.  11 6th  Regt.  Inf. 

54th  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Lucius  R.  Holbrook ...  Comdg. 

Colonel  Washington  Bowie Comdg.  iioth  F.  A. 

Colonel  Wm.  F.  Jones Comdg.  1 1 ith  F.  A. 

Colonel  Quincy  A.  Gillmore Comdg.  1 12th  F.  A. 

Eighty-second  Division  : 

Major-General  George  B.  Duncan Commanding 

Colonel  Gordon  Johnson C.  of  S. 

163d  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Marcus  D.  Cronin ...  Comdg. 

Colonel  Walter  M.  Whitman Comdg.  325th  Regt.  Inf. 

Colonel  Pierce  A.  Murphy Comdg.  326th  Regt.  Inf. 

164th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Julian  R.  Lindsey Comdg. 

Lieut.-Colonel  Frank  W.  Blalock Comdg.  327th  Regt. 

Colonel  Richard  Wetherill Comdg.  328th  Regt. 

157th  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Daniel  F.  Craig Comdg. 

Colonel  Earl  D.   Pierce Comdg.  319th  Regt.  F.  A. 

Colonel  Harry  C.  Williams Comdg.  320th  Regt.  F.  A. 

Lieut.-Colonel  Churchill  B.  Meahard.  .Comdg.  321st  Regt.  F.  A. 

EIGHTH  ARMY  CORPS : 

Major-General  Henry  T.  Allen Comdg. 

Colonel  George  C.  Marshall C.  of  S. 

Lieut.-Col.  William  B.  Graham Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-i 

Major  Thom  C.  Catron Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-2 

Colonel  Hjalmer  Erickson Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-3 


396  Appendix  I 

Sixth  Division: 

Major-General  Walter  H.  Gordon Commanding 

Colonel  Joseph  W.  Beacham Chief  of  Staff 

nth  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Wm.  R.  Dashiell Comdg. 

Colonel  Thos.  H.  Slavens Comdg.  51st  Regt. 

Colonel  Ernest  V.  Smith Comdg.  $26.  Regt. 

J2th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  James  B.  Erwin Comdg. 

Colonel  Frederick  G.  Stritzinger Comdg.  53d  Regt. 

Colonel  Matthias  Crowley Comdg.  54th  Regt. 

6th  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Edward  A.  Miller Comdg. 

Colonel  Willard  D.  Newbill Comdg.  3d  Regt. 

Colonel  W.  G.  Peace Comdg.  11  th  Regt. 

Colonel  Samuel  Frankenberger Comdg.  78th  Regt. 

Seventy-seventh  Division: 

Major-General  Robert  Alexander Commanding 

Colonel  Clarence  C.  Scherrill C.  of  S. 

153d  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Michael  J.  Lenihan Comdg. 

Colonel  Raymond  Sheldon Comdg.  305th  Regt. 

Colonel  George  Vidmer Comdg.  306th  Regt. 

154th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Harrison  J.  Price Comdg. 

Colonel  Eugene  Houghton Comdg.  307th  Regt. 

Colonel  John  R.  R.  Hannay Comdg.  308th  Regt. 

1 5 2d  Field  Artillery  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  Manus  McCloskey ....  Comdg. 

Lieut.-Colonel  Wm.   McCleave Comdg.  304th  Regt. 

Colonel  Fred  C.  Boyle Comdg.  305th  Regt. 

Colonel  C.  D.  Winn Comdg.  306th  Regt. 


Appendix  I  397 

Seventy-ninth  Division  : 

Major-General  Joseph  E.  Kuhn Commanding 

Colonel  Tenney  Ross Chief  of  Staff 

iSJth  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  John  S.  Winn Comdg. 

Colonel  C.  B.  Sweezey Comdg.  313th  Regt. 

Colonel  Wm.  H.  Oury Comdg.  314th  Regt. 

158th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Evan  M.  Johnson Comdg. 

Colonel  Alden  C.  Knowles Comdg.  315th  Regt. 

Colonel  Garrison  McCaskey Comdg.  316th  Regt. 

154th  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Andrew  H^ro Comdg. 

Colonel  Howard  Landers Comdg.  310th  Regt. 

Colonel  Chas.  Mortimer Comdg.  3 nth  Regt. 

Colonel  Harry  P.  Wilbur Comdg.  312th  Regt. 

Eighty-first  Division: 

Major-General  Charles  J.  Bailey Commanding 

Colonel  Charles  D.  Roberts Chief  of  Staff 

i6ist  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Geo.  W.  Mclver Comdg. 

Colonel  Frank  Halstead Comdg.  321st  Regt. 

Colonel  Lorain  T.  Richardson Comdg.  322d  Regt. 

i62d  Infantry  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  Monroe  McFarland.  .  .Comdg. 

Colonel  Thos.  A.  Pierce Comdg.  323d  Regt. 

Colonel  Geo.  W.  Moses Comdg.  324th  Regt. 

156th  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Andrew  Moses Comdg. 

Colonel  R.  P.  Reeder .Comdg.  316th  F.  A.  Regt. 

Colonel  N.  E.  Margetts Comdg.  317th  Regt. 

Colonel  J.  P.  Robinson Comdg.  3 1 8th  Regt. 


398  Appendix  I 


'  SECOND  ARMY 

Lieutenant-General  Robert  L.  Bullard . .  Commanding 
Brigadier-General  Stuart  Heintzelman.  .Chief  of  Staff 

Colonel  G.  K.  Wilson Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-i 

Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  F.  Thompson Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-2 

Colonel  W.  N.  Haskell Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-3 

Colonel  George  P.  Tyner Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-4 

Colonel  J.  E.  Bell Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-5 

Brigadier-General  Dwight  E.  Aultman . .  Chief  of  Army  Artillery 

SIXTH  CORPS: 

Major-General  Charles  T.  Mencher ....  Commanding 

Colonel  Edgar  T.  Collins Chief  of  Staff 

Colonel  Charles  H.  Bridges Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-i 

Lieut.-Colonel  Samuel  T.  Mackall Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-2 

Colonel  George  F.  Baltzell Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-3 

Brigadier-General  Albert  J.  Bowley. . .  .Chf.  of  Cps.  Artillery 

Seventh  Division: 

Major-General  Edmund  Wittenmyer Commanding 

Lieutenant-Colonel  H.  A.  Parker Chief  of  Staff 

13th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  A.  W.  Bjornstad Comdg. 

Colonel  Jas.  V.  Heidt Comdg.  55th  Regt.  Inf. 

Colonel  Arthur  L.  Bump Comdg.  56th  Regt. 

14th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Lutz  Wahl Comdg. 

Colonel  Fred  L.  Munson Comdg.  34th  Regt. 

Colonel  Edson  A.  Lewis Comdg.  64th  Regt. 

7th  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Pienann  N.  Hbrn Comdg. 

Colonel  Harrison   Hall Comdg.  8th  Regt. 

Colonel  Edgar  A.  Sirmyer Comdg.  79th  Regt. 

Colonel  F.  W.  Stopf ord Comdg.  80th  Regt. 


Appendix  I  399 

Twenty-eighth  Division  : 

Major-General  William  H.  Hay Commanding 

Colonel  Walter  C.  Sweeney Chief  of  Staff 

SSth  Infantry  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  Wilds  P.  Richardson ..  Comdg. 

Colonel  A.  F.  Prescott Comdg.  109th  Regt. 

Colonel  Samuel  V.   Ham Comdg.  i  loth  Regt. 

S6th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  H.  A.  Allen Comdg. 

Colonel  C.  F.  Armistead Comdg.  iiith  Regt. 

Colonel  Geo.  C.  Richards Comdg.  11 2th  Regt. 

S3d  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  William  G.  Price Comdg. 

Colonel  Richard  C.  Burleson Comdg.  107th  Regt. 

Colonel  Franc  Lacocq Comdg.  io8th  Regt. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  H.  H.  Fuller Comdg.  109th  Regt. 

Ninety-second  Division: 

Major-General  Charles  H.  Martin Commanding 

Colonel  Allen  J.  Greer Chief  of  Staff 

iSsd  Infantry  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  Malvern  H.  Barnum.  .Comdg. 

Colonel  Hunter  B.  Nelson Comdg.  365th  Regt. 

Colonel  Ralph  B.  Parrott Comdg.  366th  Regt. 

jS4th  Infantry  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  Albert  H.  Blanding ...  Comdg. 

Colonel  Wm.  G.  Doane Comdg.  367th  Regt. 

Colonel  Fred  R.  Brown Comdg.  368th  Regt. 

167th  Field  Artillery  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  John  H.  Sherburne.  .Comdg. 

Colonel  John  O'Neil Comdg.  349th  Regt.  F.A. 

Colonel  Walter  E.  Prosser Comdg.  350th  Regt. 

Colonel  W.  H.  Carpenter Comdg.  351st  Regt. 


400  Appendix  I 

NINTH  ARMY  CORPS: 

Major-General  Adelbert  Cronkhlte Comdg. 

Brigadier-General  W.  K.  Naylor Chief  of  Staff 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Dabney  Ward Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-I 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Miles  Sherman Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-2 

Lieutenant-Colonel  H.  R.  Richmond Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-3 

Brigadier-General  R.  P.  Davis Comdg.  Corps  Artillery 

Thirty-third  Division  : 

Major-General  George  Bell Comdg. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  William  H.  Simpson.  .Chief  of  Staff 

6sth  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Edward  L.  King Comdg. 

Colonel  Edgar  A.  Myer Comdg.  129th  Rgt.  Inf. 

Colonel  John  B.  Clinnin Comdg.  130th  Regt. 

66th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-Greneral  Paul  E.  Wolfe Comdg. 

Colonel  Joseph  B.  Sanborn Comdg.  131st  Regt. 

Colonel  Abel  Davis Comdg.  I32d  Regt. 

58th  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Henry  Todd,  Jr Comdg. 

Colonel  Milton  J.  Forman Comdg.  I22d  Regt. 

Colonel  Chas.  B.  Davis Comdg.  123d  Regt. 

Colonel  Horatio  B.  Hackett Comdg.  124th  Regt. 

Thirty-fifth  Division  : 

Major-General  Peter  E.  Traub Commanding 

Colonel  Hamilton  S.  Hawkins Chief  of  Staff 

6gth  Infantry  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  Thomas  W.  Darrah .  .  .  Comdg. 

Colonel  Ira  L.  Reeves Comdg.  137th  Regt. 

Col.  Americus  Mitchell Comdg.  138th  Regt. 

yoth  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Thos.  B.  Dugan Comdg. 

Colonel  Carl  L.  Ristine Comdg.  139th  Regt. 

Colonel  Alonzo  Gray Comdg.  140th  Regt. 


Appendix  I  401 

60th  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Lucien  G.  Berry. .  Comdg. 

Colonel  Geo.  A.  Taylor Comdg.  128th  F.  A.  Regt. 

Colonel  Karl  D.  Klemm Comdg.   129th  Regt. 

Colonel  Hugh  S.  Brown Comdg.    130th    Regt. 


THIRD  ARMY 

Major-General  Joseph  T.  Dickman Commanding 

Brigadier-General  Malin  Craig Chief  of  Staff 

Colonel  James  A.  Logan Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-i 

Colonel  R.  H.  Williams Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-2 

Colonel  John  C.  Montgomery Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-3 

Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  H.  Perkins Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-4 

Colonel  Walter  C.  Short Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-5 

THIRD  CORPS: 

Major-General  John  L.  Hines Commanding 

Brigadier-General  Campbell  King Chief  of  Staff 

Lieutenant-Colonel  M.  C.  Shallenburger .  .Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-i 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Horace  C.  Stebbins. .  .Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-2 
Colonel  Adna  H.  Chaffee Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-3 

Second  Division: 

Brigadier-General  John  A.  Lejeune Commanding 

Colonel  H.  B.  Myers Chief  of  Staff 

3d  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Charles  E.  Kilbourne . .  Comdg. 

Colonel  Robert  O.  VanHorn Comdg.  9th  Regt. 

Colonel  Edward  R.  Stone.  , Comdg.  23d  Regt. 

4th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brig.-Gcneral  Wendell  C.  Neville Comdg. 

Colonel  Logan  H.  Feland Comdg.  5th  Regt.  Marines 

Colonel  Harry  Lee Comdg.  6th  Regt.  Marines 


402  Appendix  I 

2nd  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Colonel  Dan  T.  Moore Comdg. 

Colonel  David  McC.  McKell Comdg.  12th  Regt. 

Colonel  J.  P.  Davis Comdg.  15th  Regt. 

Colonel  Robert  H.  Dunlap Comdg.  17th  Regt. 

Thirty-second  Division  : 

Major-General  William  Lassiter Commanding 

Colonel  Robert  McC.  Beck Chief  of  Staf! 

63d  Infantry  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  Wm.  R.  Smedburg.  . .  .Comdg. 

Colonel  Edgar  G.  Heckel Comdg.  125th  Regt. 

Major  Guy  M.  Wilson Comdg.  126th  Regt. 

64th  Infantry  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  Edmund  B.  Winans ...  Comdg. 

Colonel  Russell  C.  Langden Comdg.  127th  Regt. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Henry  A.  Meyer Comdg.  128th  Regt. 

66th  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Johnson  Hagood (Ord.  to  command) 

Colonel  Conrad  H.  Lanza Comdg. 

Colonel  Phillip  H.  Worcester Comdg.  146th  Regt. 

Colonel  Boyd  Wales Comdg.  147th  Regt. 

Colonel  Marion  S.  Battle Comdg.  148th  Regt. 

Forty-second  Division  : 

Major-General  C.  A.  F.  Flagler Commanding 

Colonel  William  N.  Hughes Chief  of  Staf? 

Sjd  Infantry  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  Frank  M.  Caldwell.  .  .Comdg. 

Colonel  C.  R.  Howland Comdg.  165th  Regt. 

Colonel  Benson  W.  Hough Comdg.  i66th  Regt. 

84th  Infantry  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  Douglas  McArthur. .  .Comdg. 

Colonel  Wm.  P.  Screws Comdg.  167th  Regt. 

Colonel  Matthew  A.  Tinley Comdg.  i68th  Regt. 


Appendix  I  403 

67th  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  George  G.  Gatley Comdg. 

Colonel  Henry  J.  Rielly Comdg.  149th  Regt. 

Colonel  Robert  H:  Tyndall Comdg.  150th  Regt. 

Colonel  Geo.  E.  Leach Comdg.  151st  Regt. 

FOURTH  CORPS: 

Major-General  Charles  H.  Muir Commanding 

Brigadier-General  Briant  H.  Wells Chief  of  Staff 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Mack  Garr Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-i 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Joseph   Stilwell Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-2 

Colonel  Berkeley  Enochs Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-3 

Brigadier-General  Wm.  M.  Cruikshank.  .Chief  of  Corps  Art. 

First  Division: 

Major-General  E.  F.  McGlachlan Commanding 

Colonel  Stephen  O.  Fuqua Chief  of  Staff 

1st  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Frank  Parker Comdg. 

Colonel  W.  F.  Harrell .Comdg.  i6th  Rgt.  Inf. 

Col.  C.  A.  Hunt Comdg.  i8th  Regt.  . 

2d  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigade-General  F.  C.  Marshall. Comdg. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Theodore  Roosevelt.  .Comdg.  26th  Regt. 
Lieutenant-Colonel  T.  W.  Hammond ....  Comdg.  28th  Regt. 

1st  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Henry  W.  Butner Comdg. 

Colonel  C.  L.  Corbin Comdg.  5th  F.  A.  Rgt. 

Colonel  Wm.  H.  Dodds Comdg.  6th  F.  A.  Rgt. 

Colonel  Francis  Ruggles Comdg.  7th  Rgt. 

Third  Division  : 

Major  General  Robert  L.  Howze Commanding 

Colonel   Robert   McCleave Chief  of  Staff 


404  Appendix  I 

Sth  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Fred  W.  Sladen Comdg. 

Colonel  Geo.  R.  Herbst Comdg.  4th  Inf.  Regt. 

Colonel  Wm.  M.  Morrow Comdg.  7th  Inf.  Regt. 

6th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Ora  E.  Hunt Comdg. 

Colonel  Howard  R.  Perry Comdg.  30th  Regt. 

Colonel  Frank  H.  Adams Comdg.  38th  Regt. 

3rd  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Harry  G.  Bishop Comdg. 

Colonel  Chas.  Reese  Lloyd Comdg.  loth  Regt. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Ronald  B.  Johnson ...  Comdg.  i8th  Regt. 
Colonel  E.  St.  J.  Greble Comdg.  76th  Regt. 

Fourth  Division: 

Major  General  Mark  L.  Hersey Commanding 

Colonel  Christian  A.  Bach Chief  of  Staff 

Jth  Infantry  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  Benjamin  A.  Poore. . .  .Comdg. 

Colonel  Frank  C.  Bolles Comdg.  39th  Regt. 

Colonel  Troy  H.  Middleton Comdg.  47th  Regt. 

8th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Ewing  E.  Booth Comdg. 

Colonel  O.  P.  M.  Hazzard Comdg.  58th  Regt. 

Colonel  F.  M.  Wise Comdg.  59th  Regt. 

4th  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Edwin  B.  Babbitt Comdg. 

Colonel  Wright  Smith Comdg.  13th  Regt. 

Colonel  Henning  F.  Colly Comdg.  i6th  Regt. 

Colonel  Archibald  F.  Comiskey Comdg.  77th  Regt. 

SEVENTH  CORPS: 

Major-General  Wm.  G.  Haan Commanding 

Colonel  H.  J.  Brees Chief  of  Staff 

Colonel  Clifford  Game Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-I 


Appendix  I  405 

Major  Elmer  F.  Rice Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-2 

Colonel  Roger  S.  Fitch Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-3 

Major  F.  J.  Dunnigan Corps  Artillery  Cdr. 

Fifth  Division: 

Major  General  Hanson  E.  Ely Commanding 

Colonel  Clement  A.  Trott Chief  of  StaflE 

gth  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Jos.  G.  Castner Comdg. 

Colonel  Frank  B.  Hawkins Comdg.  60th  Regt. 

Colonel  Phillip  B.  Peyton Comdg.  6ist  Regt. 

lOth  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Paul  B.  Malone Comdg. 

Colonel  Henry  J.  Hunt Comdg.  6th  Regt. 

Colonel  Robert  H.  Peck Comdg.  i  ith  Regt. 

5th  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Wm.  C.  Rivers Comdg. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Wm.  E.  Dunn Comdg.  19th  Regt. 

Colonel  Brooke  Payne Comdg.  20th  Regt. 

Colonel  Richard  H.  McMaster Comdg.  21st  Regt. 

Eighty-ninth  Division: 

Major-General  Frank  L.  Winn Commanding 

Colonel  John  C.  H.  Lee Chief  of  Staff 

lyyth  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Herman   Hall Comdg. 

Colonel  James  H.  Reeves Comdg.  353d  Regt. 

Colonel  Conrad  S.  Babcock Comdg.  354th  Regt. 

ijSth  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Geo.  C.  Barnhardt Comdg. 

Colonel  Wm.  A.  Cavanaugh Comdg.  355th  Regt. 

Colonel  Robert  H.  Allen Comdg.  356th  Regt. 


4o6  Appendix  I 

164th  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Edgar  T.  Donnelly Comdg. 

Colonel  Ernest  Wheeler Comdg.  340th  Regt. 

Colonel  Robert  Davis Comdg.  341st  Regt. 

Colonel  Earle  Biscoe Comdg.  342d  Regt. 

Ninetieth  Division: 

Major-General  Leroy  S.  Lyon Commanding 

Colonel  John  J.  Kingman Chief  of  Staff 

i^gth  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Jos.  T.  O'Neil Comdg. 

Colonel  Edgar  T.  Hartman Comdg.  357th  Regt. 

Colonel  Woodson  Hocker Comdg.  358th  Regt. 

jSoth  Infantry  Brigade 

Brig.-Gen.  Ulysses  G.  McAlexander Comdg. 

Colonel  E.  Kearsley  Sterling Comdg.  359th  Regt. 

Colonel  Howard  C.  Price. Comdg.  360th  Regt. 

165th  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Colonel  R.  S.  Abernathy Comdg.  Temp. 

Colonel  Henry  B.  Farrar Comdg.  343d  Regt. 

Colonel  A.  U.  Falkner Comdg.  344th  Regt. 

Colonel  G.  L.  Wertenbaker Comdg.  345  th  Regt. 

UNASSIGNED 

SECOND  ARMY  CORPS: 

Major-General  George  W.  Read Commanding 

Brigadier-General  George  S.  Simonds. . .  .Chief  of  Staff 

Colonel  Richard  K.  Hale Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-i 

Colonel  Kerr  T.  Riggs Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-2 

Colonel  Fred  E.  Buchanan Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-3 

Colonel  John  P.  Terrell .Asst.  C.  of  S.,  G-4 

Twenty-seventh  Division: 

Major-General  John  F.  O'Ryan Commanding 

Colonel  Stanley  H.  Ford Chief  of  Staff 


Appendix  I  407 

53d  Infantry  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  Charles  I.  DeBevoise .  .  Comdg. 

Colonel  James  M.  Andrews Comdg.  105th  Regt. 

Colonel  Franklin  W.  Ward Comdg.  io6th  Regt. 

S4th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Palmer  E.  Pierce Comdg. 

Colonel  Mortimer  D.  Bryant Comdg.  107th  Regt. 

Colonel  Edgar  S.  Jennings Comdg.  io8th  Regt. 

52 d  Field  Artillery  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  George  A.  Wingate. .  .  .Comdg. 

Colonel  Charles  C.  Pulis Comdg.  104th  Regt. 

Colonel  DeWitt  C.  Weld Comdg.  105th  Regt. 

Colonel  E.  P.  Smith Comdg.  io6th  Regt. 

Thirtieth  Division: 

Major-General  Edward  M.  Lewis Commanding 

Colonel  John  K.  Herr Chief  of  Staff 

59th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  L.  D.  Tyson Comdg. 

Colonel  Carey  F.  Spence Comdg.  1 1 7th  Regt. 

Colonel  Orren  R.  Wolfe Comdg.  i  i8th  Regt. 

60th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  S.  L.  Faison Comdg. 

Colonel  J.  Van  B.  Metts Comdg.  1 19th  Regt. 

Colonel  Sidney  B.  Minor Comdg.  120th  Regt. 

55th  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  John  W.  Kilbreth Comdg. 

Colonel  Albert  L.  Cox Comdg.  1 13th  Regt. 

Colonel  Luke  Lee Comdg.  1 14th  Regt. 

Colonel  Harry  S.  Berry Comdg.  11 5th  Regt. 

Thirty-seventh  Division: 

Major-General  Charles  S.  Farnsworth ....  Commanding 
Colonel  Dana  T.  Merrill Chief  of  Staff 


408  Appendix  I 

ysd  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Wm.  M.  Fassett Comdg. 

Colonel  Frank  C.  Gerlach Comdg.  145  th  Regt. 

Colonel  James  M.  Pickering Comdg.  146th  Regt. 

14th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  W.  P.  Jackson Comdg. 

Colonel  Frederick  W.  Galbraith Comdg.  147th  Regt. 

Colonel  Geo.  W.  Stewart Comdg.  148th  Regt. 

62 d  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Edward  Burr Comdg. 

Colonel  Harold  M.  Bush Cdg.  134th  F.  A.  Rgt. 

Colonel  Dudley  J.  Hurd Cdg.  135th  F.  A.  Rgt. 

Colonel  Paul  L.  Mitchell Comdg.  136th  Regt. 

Eighty-seventh  Division  : 

Brigadier-General  Wm.  F.  Martin Commanding 

Colonel  Henry  R.  Richmond Chief  of  Staff 

173d  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Marcus  D.  Cronin Comdg. 

Colonel  John  O'Shea Comdg.  345th  Regt. 

Major  George  R.  Byrd Comdg.  346th  Regt. 

174th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Wm.  F.  Martin Comdg.  Div.  Temp. 

Colonel  Pearl  M.  Shaffer Comdg.  347th  Regt. 

Colonel  Dwight  W.  Ryther Comdg.  348th  Regt. 

i62d  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  John  L.  Hayden Comdg. 

Colonel  F.  Wharton-Griffith Cdg.  334th  F.  A.  Rgt. 

Colonel  Lewis  S.  Ryan Comdg.  335th  Regt. 

Major  Milton  B.  Taulbee Comdg.  336th  Regt. 

Eighty-eighth  Division: 

Major-General  William  Weigel Commanding 

Colonel  Fay  W.  Brabson Chief  of  Staff 


Appendix  I  409 

175th  Infantry  Brig/ide 

Brigadier-General  M.  B.  Stewart Comdg. 

Colonel  Girard  Sturtevant Comdg.  349th  Regt. 

Colonel  Chas.  B.  Stone Comdg.  350th  Regt. 

1 7 6th  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Wm.  B.  Beach Comdg. 

Colonel  Herbert  B.  Crosby Comdg.  351st  Regt. 

Colonel  Clyde  E.  Hawkins Comdg.  352d  Regt. 

163d  Field  Artillery  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Stephen  M.  Foote Comdg. 

Colonel  Geo.  R.  Greene Comdg.  337th  Regt. 

Colonel  Ned  B.  Rehkopf Comdg.  338th  Regt. 

Colonel  Samuel  C.  Vestal Comdg.  339th  Regt. 

Ninety-first  Division: 

Major-General  Wm.  H.  Johnston Commanding 

Colonel  Henry  C.  Jewett Chief  of  Staff 

iSist  Infantry  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  John  B.  McDonald. .  .  .Comdg. 

Colonel  Avery  D.  Cummings Comdg.  361st  Regt. 

Colonel  Jas.  B.  Woolnough Comdg.  362d  Regt. 

lS2d  Infantry  Brigade 

Brigadier-General  Vernon  A.  Caldwell. .  .Comdg. 

Colonel  Harry  LaT.  Cavanaugh Comdg.  363d  Regt. 

Colonel  Lucius  C.  Bennett Comdg.  364th  Inf. 

i66th  Field  Artillery  Brigade 
Brigadier-General  Beverly  F.  Browne.  .  .  .Comdg. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  G.  S.  Gay Cdg.  346th  F.  A.  Rgt. 

Colonel  Louis  E.  Bennett Cdg.  347th  F.  A.  Rgt. 

Colonel  S.  F.  Bottom Cdg.  348th  F.  A.  Rgt. 


APPENDIX  II 

ORGANIZATIONS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  EXPEDI- 
TIONARY FORCES  CITED  IN  GENERAL  ORDERS 
BY  THE  FRENCH  HIGH  COMMAND  ^ 

Third  Infantry  Brigade.  In  the  course  of  operations  north  of 
the  Marne,  from  June  i,  to  July  2,  191 8,  under  the  energetic 
and  gallant  leadership  of  its  commander,  General  Lewis,  and  of 
its  officers,  without  taking  heed  of  heavy  casualties  valiantly  sup- 
ported, stormed  the  village  of  Vaux  and  La  Roche  Wood.  It 
thus  gave  a  splendid  example  of  aggressive  value  and  self-sacrifice, 
and  took  an  important  share  in  the  victorious  offensive,  the  result 
of  which  was  to  compel  the  enemy  to  evacuate  the  soil  of  France 
and  to  sue  for  an  armistice. 

Fourth  Infantry  Brigade  (Marines).  In  the  course  of  heavy 
fighting  was  rushed  to  a  part  of  the  front  that  was  being  violently 
attacked  by  the  enemy  and  immediately  proved  itself  a  first-class 
fighting  unit.  No  sooner  entered  into  line  than  the  brigade,  in 
conjunction  with  French  troops  checked  a  violent  attack  launched 
on  an  important  sector  of  our  positions ;  and  afterward,  on  its  own 
account,  undertook  a  succession  of  offensive  operations  in  the  course 
of  which,  thanks  to  the  courage,  energy,  aggressiveness,  and 
tenacity  of  its  men  who  allowed  themselves  to  be  checked  neither 
by  hardships  nor  by  losses,  thanks  to  the  activity  and  energy  of  its 
officers,  and  thanks  especially  to  the  personal  action  of  its  com- 
mander. General  James  G.  Harbord,  the  efforts  of  the  Fourth 
Brigade  were  crowned  with  success. 

Operating  in  closest  liaison,  its  two  regiments  and  its  machine- 
gun  battalion,  after  twelve  days  of  incessant  fighting  (from  June 
2d  to  June  13th)  succeeded  in  making  an  advance  of  a  mile  to  a 
mile  and  a  half  on  a  two  mile  and  a  quarter  front  over  very  diffi- 

^  The  citations  printed  herewith  have  been  notified  to  the  General  Head- 
quarters of  the  American  Expeditionary  Forces  prior  to  April  15,  1919. 

410 


Appendix  II  411 

cult  ground,  capturing  during  their  advance  important  quantities 
of  material  and  making  over  five  hundred  prisoners ;  they  inflicted 
very  severe  losses  on  the  enemy,  took  two  strongholds  of  paramount 
importance:  the  village  of  Bouresches  and  the  strongly  fortified 
Belleau  Wood. 

Sixty-third  Infantry  Brigade.  Composed  of  the  125th  and 
126th  Regiments  covered  itself  with  glory  in  the  fighting  around 
Juvigny  on  August  28,  19 18.  Immediately  upon  arriving  on  the 
battle-field  it  assumed  the  offensive,  surprised  the  enemy,  whom  it 
demoralized  by  the  speed  and  vigor  of  its  attack.  The  Sixty-third 
Brigade  proved  its  superiority  in  terrible  hand-to-hand  fighting, 
from  which  it  emerged  victorious  in  spite  of  repeated  enemy 
counter-attacks.  It  pushed  back  the  foe  to  the  vicinity  of  Terny- 
Sorny  and  vanquished  him,  thus  affording  powerful  aid  to  the 
French  troops  who  were  in  close  proximity  during  the  attacks 
which  took  place  from  August  30th  to  September  ist. 

Sixty-fourth  Infantry  Brigade.  A  splendid  brigade  to  which 
the  French  soldiers  fighting  in  its  neighborhood  paid  the  sincere 
tribute  of  calling  it  "  The  Terrible  Brigade."  Composed  of  the 
127th  and  128th  Infantry  Regiments,  stormed  the  village  of 
Juvigny  on  August  30th  with  irresistible  dash  and  on  August  31st 
and  September  ist  continued  its  advance,  constantly  maintaining 
its  superiority  over  the  enemy  notwithstanding  severe  losses,  check- 
ing most  violent  counter-attacks,  and,  fighting  for  three  days  with- 
out rest  or  pause,  and  almost  without  food. 

Sth  Regiment  of  Infantry  (Marines).  Engaged  unexpectedly 
in  the  offensive  of  July  18,  191 8,  during  a  very  dark  night  on 
unknown  and  difficult  ground,  for  two  days  it  displayed  remarkable 
vigor  and  tenacity  without  allowing  itself  to  be  discouraged  either 
by  hardships  or  difficulty  of  supply.  It  pushed  back  the  enemy  to  a 
depth  of  seven  miles,  capturing  2,700  prisoners,  twelve  cannon,  and 
several  hundred  machine  guns.  This  regiment  was  commanded 
by  Colonel  Logan  H.  Feland. 

Sth  Regiment  of  Infantry  (Marines).  Took  a  glorious  part  in 
the  operations  engaged  in  Champagne  during  October,  19 18,  by 
the  Fourth  Army.  Participated  on  October  3d  in  the  attack  on 
the  strong  enemy  positions  between  the  White  Hills  and  Medeah 
Farm;  pushed  forward  to  St.  Etienne  a  Arnes,  thus  making  an 
advance  of  three  miles  and  a  half.     It  captured  several  thousands 


412  Appendix  II 

of  prisoners,  cannon,  machine  guns,  and  important  quantities  of 
war  material. 

This  attack,  together  with  that  of  the  French  divisions,  com- 
pelled the  enemy  to  evacuate  both  banks  of  the  Suippe  and  the 
high  ground  around  Notre  Dame-des-Champs. 

6th  Regiment  of  Infantry  (Marines).  Engaged  unexpectedly 
in  the  offensive  of  July  i8,  191 8,  during  a  very  dark  night  on 
unknown  and  difficult  ground,  for  two  days  it  displayed  remarkable 
vigor  and  tenacity  without  allowing  itself  to  be  discouraged  either 
by  hardships  or  difficulty  of  supply.  It  pushed  back  the  enemy  to  a 
depth  of  seven  miles,  capturing  2,700  prisoners,  twelve  cannon,  and 
several  hundred  machine  guns.  This  regiment  was  commanded  by 
Colonel  Logan  H.  Feland.  Took  a  glorious  part  in  the  operations 
engaged  in  Champagne  during  October,  19 18,  by  the  Fourth  Army. 
Participated  on  October  3d  in  the  attack  on  the  strong  enemy  po- 
sitions between  the  White  Hills  and  Medeah  Farm;  pushed  for- 
ward to  St.  Etienne  a  Arnes,  thus  making  an  advance  of  three 
miles  and  a  half.  It  captured  several  thousands  of  prisoners, 
cannon,  machine  guns,  and  important  quantities  of  war  material. 
This  attack,  together  with  that  of  the  French  divisions,  com- 
pelled the  enemy  to  evacuate  both  banks  of  the  Suippe  and  the 
high  ground  around  Notre  Dame-des-Champs. 

gth  Regiment  of  Infantry.  Under  command  of  Colonel  Up- 
ton. Engaged  unexpectedly  in  the  offensive  of  July  18,  19 18, 
during  a  very  dark  night  on  unknown  and  difficult  ground,  for 
iwo  days  it  displayed  remarkable  vigor  and  tenacity  without  al- 
lowing itself  to  be  discouraged  either  by  hardships  or  difficulty  of 
supply.  It  pushed  back  the  enemy  to  a  depth  of  seven  miles,  cap- 
turing 2,700  prisoners,  twelve  cannon,  and  several  hundred  ma- 
chine guns. 

Qth  Regiment  of  Infantry.  Took  a  glorious  part  in  the  opera- 
tions engaged  in  Champagne  during  October,  191 8,  by  the  Fourth 
Army.  Participated  on  October  3d  in  the  attack  on  the  strong 
enemy  positions  between  the  White  Hills  and  Medeah  Farm; 
pushed  forward  to  St.  Etienne  a  Arnes,  thus  making  an  advance 
of  three  miles  and  a  half.  It  captured  several  thousands  of  pris- 
oners, cannon,  machine  guns,  and  important  quantities  of  war  ma- 
terial.    This  attack,  together  with  that  of  the  French  divisions, 


Appendix  II  413 

compelled  the  enemy  to  evacuate  both  banks  of  the  Suippe  and  the 
high  ground  around  Notre  Dame-des-Champs. 

i8th  Regiment  of  Infantry.  A  splendid  regiment  of  attack  per- 
meated with  the  spirit  of  offensive.  On  July  18,  19 18,  under  the 
energetic  leadership  of  its  commander,  Colonel  Frank  Parker,  it 
elicited  the  admiration  of  all  the  neighboring  units  in  taking  by 
storm  all  the  objectives  assigned  to  it  absolutely  without  check  and 
in  spite  of  severe  casualties.  During  the  days  following  it  con- 
tinued to  display  the  same  aggressive  spirit  and  determination.  In 
October,  191 8,  under  the  excellent  leadership  of  Colonel  Charles 
A.  Hunt,  assisted  by  a  body  of  officers  of  the  first  order,  the  i8th 
Regiment  displayed  the  same  qualities  of  abnegation,  launching 
desperate  attacks  on  powerful  positions  and,  thanks  to  its  in- 
domitable will  to  conquer,  succeeded  at  last  in  throwing  back  the 
enemy. 

23d  Regiment  of  Infantry.  Engaged  unexpectedly  in  the  of- 
fensive of  July  18,  191 8,  during  a  very  dark  night  on  unknown 
and  difficult  grounds,  for  two  days  it  displayed  remarkable  vigor 
and  tenacity  without  allowing  itself  to  be  discouraged  either  by 
hardships  or  difficulty  of  supply.  It  pushed  back  the  enemy  to  a 
depth  of  seven  miles,  capturing  2,700  prisoners,  twelve  cannon,  and 
several  hundred  machine  guns.  This  regiment  was  commanded  by 
Colonel  Paul  B.  M  alone. 

2;^d  Regiment  of  Infantry.  Took  a  glorious  part  in  the  opera- 
tions engaged  in  Champagne  during  October,  19 18,  by  the  Fourth 
Army.  Participated  on  October  3d  in  the  attack  on  the  strong 
enemy  positions  between  the  White  Hills  and  Medeah  Farm; 
pushed  forward  to  St.  Etienne  a  Arnes,  thus  making  an  advance 
of  three  miles  and  a  half.  It  captured  several  thousands  of  pris- 
oners, cannon,  machine  guns,  and  important  quantities  of  war 
material. 

28th  Regiment  of  Infantry.  Imbued  with  superb  offensive 
spirit,  on  May  28,  19 18,  with  Colonel  H.  E.  Ely  in  command, 
attacked  a  strongly  fortified  village  and  with  irresistible  dash 
reached  all  objectives  and  retained  the  ground  conquered  in  spite 
of  repeated  counter-attacks. 

30th  Regiment  of  Infantry.  One  of  the  old  original  regiments 
of  the  American  Army  which,  under  the  fine  and  energetic  lead 


414  Appendix  II 

of  its  chief,  Colonel  E.  L.  Buth,  proved  true  to  its  traditions,  with- 
standing the  main  onslaught  of  the  German  attack  of  July  15, 
19 1 8,  on  the  front  of  the  army  corps  to  which  it  had  been  assigned. 
Under  heavy  artillery  fire  which  entailed  severe  losses  the  30th 
Regiment  checked  the  enemy's  drive  and  reestablished  its  initial 
positions  after  capturing  more  than  two  hundred  prisoners. 

38th  Regiment  of  Infantry.  A  crack  regiment,  under  the  clever 
and  energetic  leadership  of  its  commander.  Colonel  McAlexander, 
displayed  unshakable  firmness  in  resisting  the  German  assault  of 
July  15,  191 8.  Attacked  on  its  front  and  outflanked  on  both 
wings,  it  maintained  its  position  on  the  banks  of  the  Marne  accord- 
ing to  orders  received  to  that  effect  and,  in  spite  of  everything, 
hurled  back  an  enemy  superior  in  numbers  and  captured  two  hun- 
dred prisoners. 

3gth  Regiment  of  Infantry.  Attached  to  a  division  entrusted 
with  the  defense  of  the  sector,  was  called  upon  to  take  part  in  a 
battle  on  the  day  following  its  arrival  in  the  line.  Under  the 
command  of  Colonel  Frank  C.  Bolles  displayed  remarkable  bravery 
in  the  course  of  its  baptism  of  fire.  It  captured  the  Cresnes 
Thickets,  the  town  of  Norroy,  an  enemy  battery,  important  quanti- 
ties of  trench  equipment,  and  machine  guns  together  with  over  a 
hundred  prisoners. 

104th  Regiment  of  Infantry.  In  the  course  of  the  fighting  on 
April  lOth,  1 2th,  and  13th,  displayed  great  courage  and  spirit  of 
self-sacrifice.  Subjected  to  heavy  bombardment  and  attacked  by 
powerful  German  forces,  it  succeeded  in  checking  a  dangerous 
enemy  advance,  energetically  counter-attacking  with  the  bayonet 
and  taking  prisoners,  recaptured  the  trenches  which  it  had  been 
forced  to  abandon  in  the  course  of  the  enemy's  initial  assault. 

I2^th  and  126th  Regiments  of  Infantry.  Are  mentioned  in 
general  orders  concerning  the  Sixty-third  Brigade. 

127th  and  128th  Regiments  of  Infantry.  Are  mentioned  in 
orders  concerning  the  Sixty-fourth  Brigade. 

369th  Regiment  of  Infantry.  Led  by  Colonel  Hayward,  who, 
though  wounded,  insisted  on  retaining  command  of  his  regiment 
during  action,  led  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Pickering,  an  officer  of 
remarkable  coolness  and  courage,  by  Major  Cobb  (killed),  by 
Major  Spencer  (severely  wounded),  by  Major  Little,  an  excel- 


Appendix  II  415 

lent  leader,  the  369th  Regiment  of  American  infantry,  which,  in 
the  September  attacks  of  19 18  was,  for  the  first  time,  under  fire, 
captured  strong  and  vigorously  defended  enemy  entrenchments, 
stormed  the  village  of  Sechault,  and  took  prisoners,  six  cannon, 
and  large  numbers  of  machine  guns. 

371st  Regiment  of  Infantry.  Displayed,  in  the  course  of  the 
first  fighting  in  which  it  participated,  all  the  qualities  of  daring 
and  bravery  characteristic  of  first-rate  storm  troops.  Under  com- 
mand of  Colonel  Miles  it  launched,  with  fine  dash  and  utter 
contempt  of  danger,  an  attack  on  an  obstinately  defended  position, 
captured  it  after  desperate  fighting  and  under  exceptionally  heavy 
machine-gun  fire.  Continuing  its  advance,  in  spite  of  enemy 
artillery  fire  which  entailed  severe  losses,  captured  many  prisoners 
besides  cannon,  machine  guns,  and  important  quantities  of  material. 

372d  Regiment  of  Infantry.  Displayed,  in  the  course  of  the 
first  fighting  in  which  it  participated,  all  the  qualities  of  daring 
and  bravery  characteristic  of  first-rate  storm  troops.  Under  com- 
mand of  Colonel  Tupes  it  launched,  with  fine  dash  and  utter 
contempt  of  danger,  an  attack  on  an  obstinately  defended  position, 
captured  it  after  desperate  fighting  and  under  exceptional  heavy 
machine-gun  fire.  Continuing  its  advance,  in  spite  of  enemy 
artillery  fire  which  entailed  severe  losses,  captured  many  prisoners 
besides  cannon,  machine  guns,  and  important  quantities  of  material. 

I2th  Regiment  of  Artillery.  This  regiment  with  remarkable 
audacity  and  skill  assisted  the  Second  Division's  attack  on  July 
1 8th  southwest  of  Solssons,  firing  at  close  range.  The  guns  were 
boldly  pushed  forward,  following  the  advancing  Infantry  and 
inflicted  severe  losses  on  the  enemy. 

After  the  relief  of  the  infantry  of  the  Second  Division  on  July 
20th,  the  1 2th  Regiment  valiantly  fought  side  by  side  with  the 
Fifty-eighth  and  Twelfth  French  Divisions,  helping  the  Infantry 
in  the  course  of  their  unceasing  attacks  and  more  especially  on 
July  2 1  St  during  the  assault  on  Hartennes.  Officers  and  enlisted 
men  of  the  regiment  showed  themselves  worthy,  by  their  courage 
and  devotion  to  duty,  of  the  best  traditions  of  their  army. 

15th  Regiment  of  Artillery.  This  regiment  displayed  great 
daring  and  remarkable  skill  In  backing  the  Infantry  of  the  Second 
Division.     On  July  18,  19 18,  at  the  southwest  of  Soissons,  pluckily 


41 6  Appendix  II 

pushing  its  guns  ahead  upon  the  heels  of  the  advancing  infantry,  it 
inflicted  extremely  heavy  losses  on  the  enemy.  The  Second  Divi- 
sion having  been  relieved  on  July  20th,  the  15th  Regiment  was 
successively  ordered  to  sustain  the  Fifty-eighth  and  Twelfth 
French  Divisions  with  which  it  valiantly  fought,  and  in  the 
course  of  the  frequent  counter-attacks  launched  by  these  two  divi- 
sions and,  more  especially  during  the  assault  on  Hartennes  (July 
2ist),  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  regiment  showed  themselves 
worthy  of  the  best  traditions  of  their  army  through  their  gallantry 
and  devotion. 

17th  Regiment  of  Artillery.  With  untiring  zeal  and  unflagging 
energy  this  regiment  valiantly  aided  the  attack  of  the  Second 
Division  on  July  i8th  southwest  of  Soissons.  Always  impatient 
to  push  forward  the  guns  and  in  spite  of  heavy  enemy  bombard- 
ment, it  constantly  inundated  the  foe  under  a  terrific  destruction 
fire  from  its  155's.  After  the  Second  Division  had  been  relieved 
on  July  20th,  it  remained  in  line  sustaining  the  Fifty-eighth  and 
Twelfth  French  Divisions. 

Officers  and  enlisted  men  displayed  remarkable  energy  in  the 
courageous  accomplishment  of  all  the  missions  entrusted  to  them; 
during  the  continuous  attacks  launched  by  the  French  divisions 
they  inflicted  severe  losses  on  the  enemy,  and  displayed,  amid 
dangers  and  hardships  of  all  kinds,  high  valor  and  extraordinary 
tenacity. 

2d  Regiment  of  Engineers.  With  Colonel  Mitchell  in  com- 
mand. Engaged  unexpectedly  in  the  offensive  of  July  18,  19 18, 
during  a  very  dark  night  on  unknown  and  difficult  ground,  for  two 
days  it  displayed  remarkable  vigor  and  tenacity  without  allowing 
itself  to  be  discouraged  either  by  hardships  or  difficulty  of  supply. 
It  pushed  back  the  enemy  to  a  depth  of  seven  miles,  capturing  2,7CX) 
prisoners,  twelve  cannon,  and  several  hundred  machine  guns. 

2d  Regiment  of  Engineers.  Played  a  glorious  part  in  the  opera- 
tions undertaken  in  Champagne  in  October,  191 8.  On  October 
3d,  during  the  attack  on  the  White  Hills  and  Medeah  Farm, 
through  its  bravery  and  endurance  under  fire  it  powerfully  aided 
in  the  advance  of  the  infantry  as  far  as  St.  Etienne  a  Arnes. 
Thanks  to  the  great  assistance  which  it  afforded  to  the  infantry 
operation  it  became  possible  to  eject  the  enemy  from  the  banks  of 


Appendix  II  417 

the  Suippe  and  from  the  high  ground  around  Notre  Dame-des- 
Champs. 

302d  Regiment  of  Engineers.  This  regiment  with  Colonel 
Sherill  in  command  on  September  6,  19 18,  constructed  a  bridge 
over  the  Vesle  in  three  hours,  the  work  being  carried  out  under 
constant  artillery  fire.  The  success  of  this  feat  rendered  it  pos- 
sible for  the  French  artillery  to  cross  the  river  at  the  very  start  of 
operations  and  contributed  to  the  success  of  the  offensive  then 
under  way. 

1st  Battalion  of  the  I02d  Regiment  of  Infantry.  A  crack  unit 
with  Colonel  Hiram  J.  Bears  conducting  the  attack  in  first  line, 
it  carried  out  an  extremely  difficult  operation  in  brilliant  style  and 
at  the  cost  of  splendid  effort.  It  rushed  aggressively  into  the 
battle  and  after  desperate  fighting  triumphed  over  the  enemy  who 
was  greatly  superior  in  number  and  extremely  tenacious,  and  who 
was,  besides,  entrenched  in  concrete  shelters  backed  by  great  masses 
of  machine  guns  and  a  powerful  artillery,  and  who,  in  the  course 
of  action,  made  use  of  infamous  methods  of  warfare.  It  heroically 
effected  its  mission,  storming  a  village  and  maintaining  its  positions 
throughout  the  day  notwithstanding  four  enemy  counter-attacks, 
thus  setting  the  finest  example  of  self-sacrifice. 

4th  Machine-gun  Battalion.  On  the  evening  of  July  18,  1918, 
near  Vierzy,  this  battalion  displayed  exceptional  bravery  and  dash 
in  assisting  in  the  attack  delivered  by  the  Third  Brigade.  In  the 
course  of  an  advance  with  an  attacking  infantry  and  thanks  to  its 
skillful  employment  of  fire,  it  overcame  the  resistance  of  the 
enemy.  By  the  destruction  of  strongly  enforced  machine-gun 
nests  it  gave  valuable  help  to  the  infantry  in  the  course  of  the 
latter 's  brilliant  attack  and  by  occupying  the  objectives  gained  and 
holding  them  against  powerful  counter-attacks  the  Fourth 
Machine-gun  Battalion  made  itself  recognized  as  an  important 
factor  in  the  success  of  the  day. 

Sth  Machine-gun  Battalion.  On  the  evening  of  July  18,  19 18, 
near  Vierzy,  this  battalion  displayed  exceptional  bravery  and  dash 
in  assisting  in  the  attack  delivered  by  the  Third  Brigade.  In  the 
course  of  an  advance  with  an  attacking  infantry  and  thanks  to  its 
skillful  employment  of  fire,  it  overcame  the  resistance  of  the  en- 
emy.    By  the  destruction  of  strongly  enforced  machine  gun  nests 


41 8  ^Appendix  II 

it  gave  valuable  help  to  the  infantry  in  the  course  of  the  latter's 
brilliant  attack  and  by  occupying  the  objective  gained  and  holding 
them  against  powerful  counter-attacks  the  Fourth  Machine-gun 
Battalion  made  itself  recognized  as  an  important  factor  in  the 
success  of  the  day. 

6th  Machine-gun  Battalion  (Fourth  Brigade,  Second  Division), 
was  mentioned  in  general  orders  concerning  the  Fourth  Brigade 
(Marines). 

6th  Machine-gun  Battalion.  Although  exhausted  by  a  long 
journey  in  trucks  and  a  lengthy  night  march  over  difficult  roads, 
this  battalion,  on  July  i8,  191 8,  rushed  into  battle  in  the  vicinity 
of  Vierzy  and  aided  in  consolidating  the  position  captured  that 
day.  On  the  morning  of  the  nineteenth  it  gallantly  pushed  for- 
ward in  the  open,  under  a  rain  of  artillery  and  machine-gun  fire, 
and  helped  resolutely  in  the  assault  which  was  being  launched 
against  the  enemy's  reenforced  positions.  Confronted  with  ob- 
stinate resistance  and  subjected  to  continuous  counter-attacks  it  dis- 
played the  finest  courage  in  rapidly  organizing  and  resolutely 
holding  the  important  positions  which  the  infantry  had  just 
conquered. 

yth  Machine-gun  Battalion  (Third  Division).  Prevented  the 
enemy  from  crossing  the  Marne,  and  in  the  course  of  fierce  fight- 
ing, especially  on  May  31st  and  June  ist,  contested  the  northern 
suburbs  of  Chateau-Thierry  foot  by  foot,  covering  itself  with  glory 
as  much  by  its  valor  as  by  its  skill,  and  inflicted  tremendous  losses 
upon  the  enemy. 

ijgth  Machine-gun  Battalion.  Fought  for  four  days  in  the 
vicinity  of  Juvigny  with  energy,  endurance,  and  skill.  Although 
hard  hit  by  the  enemy  bombardment  it  unceasingly  pushed  forward, 
keeping  the  foe  under  direct  and  accurate  fire,  checking  his  counter- 
attacks, and  inflicting  upon  him  serious  losses.  It  gave  powerful 
assistance  in  the  capture  of  Juvigny  and  also  in  retaining  the 
conquered  positions. 

1st  Anti-aircraft  Battalion.  Under  the  able  and  efficient  leader- 
ship of  its  commander.  Major  Gushing,  made  itself  conspicuous 
through  the  excellent  results  achieved  on  the  Marne  and  the 
Moselle  by  its  bravery  and  fine  spirit. 

2d  Field  Signal  Battalion  (First  Division).     Having  received 


Appendix  II  419 

orders  to  repair  the  telephone  lines  in  a  dangerous  zone,  carried 
out  its  mission  with  utmost  bravery,  working  all  night  under  a 
heavy  bombardment  of  gas  shells,  which  entailed  severe  losses. 

The  following  organizations  also  obtained  mention  in  the  gen- 
eral orders  of  the  French  High  Command: 

1st  Battery,  ist  Anti-aircraft  Battalion. 

Company  F,  9th  Regiment  of  Infantry. 

Company  G,  9th  Regiment  of  Infantry. 

Company  I,  9th  Regiment  of  Infantry. 

Company  L,  9th  Regiment  of  Infantry. 

Company  C,  370th  Regiment  of  Infantry. 

Company  B,  30th  Regiment  of  Engineers. 

Company  C,  56th  Regiment  of  Engineers  (Searchlights). 

Battery  D,  17th  Regiment  of  Artillery. 

Battery  B,  53d  Regiment  of  Artillery. 

Battery  H,  53d  Regiment  of  Artillery. 

308th  Battery,  Trench  Artillery. 

2d  Platoon,  Stokes  Trench  Mortars,  I02d  Infantry. 

2d  Platoon,  Company  B,  i68th  Infantry. 

Shenkel  Platoon,  Company  B,  iiith  Infantry. 

Benz  Platoon,  Company  A,  iiith  Infantry. 

Pioneer  Platoon,  Trench  Mortar  Battery,  i68th  Infantry. 

1st  Platoon,  Company  B,  i68th  Infantry. 

1st  Platoon,  Company  C,  308th  Infantry. 

2d  Platoon,  Company  C,  308th  Infantry. 

Air  Squadron  91. 

Air  Squadron  94. 

Air  Squadron  103  (Lafayette)  three  citations. 


Sanitary  Sections. 

Sanitary  Sections. 

No.       I,  two  citations. 

No.  585. 

No.       2. 

No.  586. 

No.       7. 

No.  591,  two  citations. 

No.       8,  two  citations. 

No.  593. 

No.       9. 

No.  594. 

No.     14. 

No.  621,  two  citations. 

420 


Appendix  II 


No.     17. 
No.     26. 
No.     65. 
No.  503. 
No.  504. 
No.  510. 
No.  516,  two 
No.  523,  two 
No.  525. 
No.  533. 
No.  534,  two 
No.  535. 
No.  539,  two 
No.  544. 
No.  546. 
No.  553,  two 
No.  558. 
No.  567,  two 
No.  568. 
No.  583. 


citations, 
citations. 


citations, 
citations. 

citations, 
citations. 


No.  622. 
No.  623, 
No.  625, 
No.  626, 
No.  627. 
No.  628, 
No.  629, 
No.  633, 
No.  634. 
No.  635. 
No.  636, 
No.  637. 
No.  639. 
No.  641. 
No.  642. 
No.  643. 
No.  644. 
No.  645. 
No.  646, 
No.  648. 


two  citations, 
two  citations, 
three  citations. 

two  citations, 
three  citations, 
three  citations. 


two  citations. 


four  citations. 


INDEX 


Accounting  division  of  quartermas- 
ter corps,   228. 

Adjutant-general,  function  of,  in 
American   forces   in    France,  46- 

Administrative  section,  of  quarter- 
master corps,  228 ;  of  ordnance 
department,  233. 

Aerial  squadrons,  formation  of, 
207;  the  Lafayette  squadron, 
207-208 ;  mention  of,  in  general 
orders  of  French  high  command, 
419.     See  Aviation   service. 

Aeronautical  school  of  American 
army  in  France,  71. 

Aerostation,  development  of,  by  A. 
E.   F.,  212-213. 

Affiliated   Divisions,    321. 

Aircraft  Production  Board,  creation 
of,  84. 

Airplanes,  types  of,  203-204;  num- 
ber of,  received  by  A.  E.  F.,  205. 

Air  service,  organization  of,  in 
American  army  in  France,  202- 
208 ;  system  adopted  for  supplies 
and  repairs,  208-210.  See  Avi- 
ation. 

Alexandre,  General,  in  charge  of 
Fifth  American  Corps  artillery 
before  St.  Mihiel,  270. 

Alien  enemies  in  United  States,  de- 
tention   of,    II. 

Allen,  General  Henry  T.,  in  com- 
mand of  Ninetieth  Division, 
252  n. 

Allied  Supply,  Military  Board  of, 
245;  account  of  work  of,  354- 
358;  summary  of  results  secured 
by,  358-359. 

Alvord,  Benjamin,  first  adjutant- 
general  of  American  forces  in 
France,  46  n. 

Ambulance  companies,  221,  222. 

Ambulance  of  Neuilly,  379. 

Ambulances  donated  by  Americans, 
380. 

America,  slowness  of,  in  going  to 
war,  1-2;  Germany's  inability  to 


understand,  3 ;  judged  to  desire 
"peace  at  any  price,"  4;  review 
of  causes  leading  to  rupture  with 
Germany,  5-10;  declaration  of 
war  between  Germany  and,  11; 
unreadiness  of,  for  war,  12 ;  visit 
of  French  and  English  war  mis- 
sions to,  12-13;  new  energy  given 
to  conscription  movement  in,  by 
visit  of  war  missions,  13;  prep- 
aration of  armed  forces  for  war, 
13-32. 

American  Convalescent  Homes,  the, 
382. 

American  Fund  for  French  Wound- 
ed, 380. 

American  Hostels  for  Refugees, 
creation  of,  381. 

American  Library  Association,  363, 
370;  work  of,  centralized  by  Y. 
M.  C.  A.,  372;  account  of  work 
of,  .375-377- 

American  Surgical  Dressings  As- 
sociation, 381. 

American  Zone,  section  of  French 
country  called,  59-60. 

Ammunition,  used  by  A.  E.  F.,  236- 
238 ;  pooling  of,  between  Ameri- 
cans and  French,  358. 

Anamite  soldiers  as  drivers  for 
Americans,  174. 

Ancona,  Italian  ship  sunk  in  Med- 
iterranean,  8. 

Anderson,  Colonel  Alvord,  V.  P., 
255  n. 

Anderson,  Colonel  T.  M.,   156  n. 

Andrew,  Piatt  H.,  service  of  field 
ambulances   directed   by,   380. 

Andrews,  General  Alvery  D., 
45  n. 

Andrews,   Colonel   G.   M.,   324  n. 

Angers,  training  center  for  heavy 
artillery  at,  63 ;  railway  trans- 
portation school  at,  76. 

Anti-aircraft  battalion,  cited  in  gen- 
eral orders  by  French  high  com- 
mand, 418. 

Anti-aircraft  school,  in  France,  69. 


421 


422 


Index 


Arabic,  sinking  of,  8. 

Argonne  Forest,  operations  between 
river  Meuse  and,  in  autumn  of 
1918,  277-306;  occurrence  of  most 
dramatic  episodes  of  the  war  in, 

Arms  equipment  of  American 
forces  in  France,  53-55- 

Army,  United  States:  condition  of, 
upon  declaration  of  war  with 
Germany,  13-14;  system  of 
grouping  of  fighting  units,  29- 
32;  Pershing's  plans  for  organi- 
zation of,  in  France,  36-37;  "par- 
tial qualities  and  military  defects 
of  Americans,  37-38;  constitution 
of  General  StaflF,  45-46 ;  constitu- 
tion of  fighting  units,  47-52 ;  plan 
for  field  army  services,  52-53 ; 
arms  and  ordnance  equipment  of, 
53-55;  principles  governing  in- 
struction of,  55-59;  first  appear- 
ance of  American  contingents  in 
France,  116-128;  operations  of, 
in  spring  defensive  (1918),  133- 
167;  in  summer  counter-offensive, 
168-184;  account  of  organization 
of  main  services  of  Expeditionary 
Forces,  186  ff. ;  situation  of,  at  be- 
ginning of  September,  1918,  247- 
261 ;  activities  during  general 
oflFensive  September-November, 
1918,  262-306;  losses  in  Meuse- 
Argonne  fighting,  303 ;  the  march 
to  the  Rhine,  307-319;  part  taken 
by  American  units  in  operations 
on  British  front,  320-329;  forces 
detached  for  operations  in  Italy 
and  in  Russia,  329-330;  review 
of  organization  and  activities  of 
services  of  the  rear,  331-360;  or- 
der of  battle  of,  op  December  i, 
1918,  391-409;  organizations  of, 
cited  in  general  orders  by  the 
French   high   command,   410-420. 

Army  corps,  formation  of,  48-49; 
command  of,   52. 

Army  schools  in  France,  63-70. 

Artillery,  camps  for  training  offi- 
cers for,  24;  increase  in  number 
of  regiments  of,  and  shortage  of 
equipment,  31-32;  composition  of 
divisional,  in  American  army  in 
France,  50-51;  camps  selected  in 


France  for  training  in,  60-63 ; 
rate  of  arrival  of,  in  France, 
61  n;  army  schools  for  training 
in,  in  France,  69-70;  first  use  of 
American,  on  firing  line  in 
France,  119-120;  functions  of 
chief  of,  189;  account  of  organi- 
zation, equipment,  and  composi- 
tion of,  189-192;  French  admira- 
tion for  American,  192;  supply  of 
material  for,  236-237;  situation 
of  American,  at  beginning  of 
September,  1918,  259-260;  situa- 
tion of,  before  St.  Mihiel,  271; 
in  Meuse-Argonne  operations, 
282-284;  regiments  of,  men- 
tioned in  general  orders  of 
French  high  command,  419. 

Association,  use  made  of  free  right 
of,  in  America,  361 ;  colossal  re- 
sults achieved  by  American 
method   of,   383. 

Athletic  games,  effort  of  Knights  of 
Columbus  to  develop  taste  for, 
373. 

Atterbury,  General,  113,  350;  ap- 
pointed director-general  of  trans- 
portation  in  France,   105. 

Aultman,  General  D.  E.,  138  n.,  154 
n. 

Austin,  Mrs.,  founder  of  American 
Surgical  Dressings  Association, 
381. 

Automobile  service,  352;  achieve- 
ments in  regard  to,  of  Military 
Board  of  Allied  Supply,  358-359. 

Auto-surgical  ambulances,  French, 
222  n. 

Autun,  military  police  corps  train- 
ing detachment  at,  75. 

Averill,   Colonel   N.  K.,   171  n. 

Aviation,  schools  for  training  in, 
72-74. 

Aviation  service,  work  of,  to  meet 
demands  of  war  time,  84-85 ;  at 
time  of  Meuse-Argonne  opera- 
tions, 290  n.  See  also  Air  serv- 
ice. 

Avord,  aviation  instruction  center 
at,  72. 

Aztec,  sinking  of  the,  ion. 

Babcock,  Colonel  Conrad  S.,  252  n. 
Babcock,  Colonel  Walter  C,  255  n. 


Index 


423 


Bacon,  Robert,  sanitary  train  do- 
nated by,  379-380. 

Bailey,  General  Charles  J.,  in  com- 
mand of  Eighty-first  Division, 
258  n. 

Baker,  Newton  D.,  Secretary  of 
War,  on  the  firing  line,  130-131; 
with  General  Pershing  during 
operations  against  St.  Mihiel, 
272;  enters  St.  Mihiel,  276-277; 
quoted  on  shipment  of  troops 
from  America,  336;  cargo  move- 
ment, 337. 

Baker,  Colonel,  Salvation  Army, 
374.. 

Bakeries,  daily  output  of  American, 
230;   bread   supplied  by,   350. 

Balloon  service  of  A.  E.  F.,  212- 
213. 

Ballou,  General  Charles  C,  in  com- 
mand of  Ninety-Second  Division, 
254  n. 

Baltzell,  Colonel   George  F.,  250  n. 

Bandholtz,  General  H.  H.,  255  n. 

Bangs,   Miss  Edith,   380  n. 

Barber,  Colonel  A.  E.,  155  n.,  249. 

Barney,  Lieutenant  James  W., 
251  n. 

Barnum,  General  M.  H.,  254  n. 

Barracks,  erection  of,  by  engineer 
corps,   198. 

Barth,  General  C.  H.,  in  command 
of  Seventh   Division,  257  n. 

Base  sections  of  service  of  supplies, 
341-349. 

Bassens,  as  a  base  port  for  Ameri- 
can use,  96 ;  work  on  improve- 
ment of,  100-102;  operated  by 
Americans,  343. 

Bathelemont,  tomb  near,  of  first 
American  killed  in  action,  120 

Battalion,  composition  of  a,  50. 

Beach,   General   W.  O.,  258  n. 

Bears,  Colonel   Hiram  J.,  417. 

Beatty,  H.  O.,  director  of  American 
Relief  Clearing  House,   382. 

Bell,  General  George,  in  command 
of  Thirty-third   Division,  255  n. 

Belleau  Wood,  taking  of,  by  Sec- 
ond   Division,    151-153. 

Benevolent  associations  under  mili- 
tary authority,  318,  361-384. 

Bennet,  Colonel  E.  R.,  160  n. 

Bennet,  Colonel  John  B.,  253  n. 


Berry,   Major  C.  W.,  324. 

Berry,  General  L.   G.,  253  n 

Bethel,  General,  head  of  judge-ad- 
vocate's department,  244. 

Bevoise,  Colonel  C.  T.  de,  324  n. 

Bjoranstad,   General  A.  W.,   173  n. 

Blatchford,  General  R.  M.,  in  com- 
mand of  lines  of  communication, 
104. 

Bliss,  Mrs.  Robert  Woods,  president 
of  distributing  conmiittee,  380. 

Bliss,  General  Tasker  H.,  repre- 
sents America  at  Supreme  War 
Council,    134  n. 

Bloor,  Colonel  A.  W.,  257  n. 

Bolles,    Colonel    Frank   C,   414. 

Boiling,  Colonel,  202  n. 

Books  sent  to  American  army  in 
France,  375-377- 

Bordeaux,  harbor  for  debarkation 
of  American  troops,  39 ;  descrip- 
tion of  American  base  section  of, 
342-345. 

Bowley,  Colonel  A.  J.,  147  n. 

Boyd,  Captain,  United  States  mili- 
tary attache  in  France,  92-94. 

Bradley,  General  Alfred  E.,  chief 
surgeon  A.  E.  F.,  219-220. 

Brest,  American  base  section  at, 
346. 

Brett,  General  Lloyd  M.,  256  n. 

Bridges,  Colonel  Charles  H.,  250  n. 

Brigade,  composition  of  a,  50;  com- 
mand of,   51. 

Briggs,    Colonel   R.   N.,    171  n. 

British  front,  American  units  on 
the,  320-329. 

Brown,  Colonel  Fred  R.,  254  n. 

Brown,  Colonel  M.  D.,  162  n. 

Brown,    General   R.  A.,    160  n. 

Browning  guns  used  by  American 
army  in   France,   54. 

Buchan,  Colonel  F.  E.,  324  n. 

Buck,  General  B.  B.,  138  n. 

Bullard,  General  R.  L.,  117;  takes 
command  of  First  Division,  121 ; 
high  morale  of  First  Division  as 
commanded  by,  138;  in  command 
of  Third  Corps,  173,  249 ;  in  com- 
mand on  the  Vesle,  1 81-182; 
placed  in  command  of  Second 
Army,  296. 

Bundy,  General  Omar,  117,  146  n. ; 
in  command  of  Second  Division, 


424 


Index 


122;  in  command  of  Sixth  Corps, 
250. 

Burnhara,  General  W.  P.,  in  com- 
mand of  Eighty-second  Division, 
252  n. 

Burtt,  General  W.  B.,  250  n. 

Buth,  Colonel  E.  L.,  in  command  of 
30th   Regiment  of   Infantry,  414. 

Buttle,  Lt.-Col.  G.  M.,  255. 

Butts,  Colonel  Edmund  L.,  156  n. 


Cadre    Divisions    in   British    army, 

321. 
Caldwell,  Colonel  V.  A.,  254  n. 
Cambon,      Jules,      Councillor      on 

Franco-American  Affairs,  387. 
Cameron,    General    George    H.,    in 

command  of  Sixth  Corps,  250;  in 

command  of  Fifth  Corps,  270. 
Camouflage     section     of     engineer 

service,   200. 
Camps,    establishment    of    training, 

29;  system  of  drilling  in,  30;  for 

training    of   American    forces    in 

France,    59-60;    of    embarkation, 

86.^ 
Candidates,  school  for,  in  France, 

68. 
Cargo    movement    from    America, 

336-338- 

Castelli,  Chief  Surgeon  (French 
Army),   220. 

Castner,  General  J.  C,  253  n. 

Catlin,  Colonel   A.,   146  n. 

Cavanaugh,  Colonel  H.  La  T., 
257  n. 

Cavanaugh,  Colonel  W.  A.,  252  n. 

Cement  supply  for  engineer  serv- 
ice, 201. 

Cemeteries,  American  military,  in 
Europe,  231-232. 

Chamberlaine,  General  W.,  1470.; 
in  command  of  American  rail- 
road  artillery,   191. 

Chapin,  Mrs.  Charles,  380  n. 

Chaplains,  school  at  Le  Mans  for 
instruction  of,  76. 

Charles,  Colonel  Oscar  J.,  257  n. 

Chateau-Thierry,  work  of  Third 
Division  at,  157-158. 

Chaumont,  American  headquarters 
established  at,  77;  all  heads  of 
main      services      of      American 


forces  stationed  for  a  time  at, 
186. 

Chemical  warfare,  schools  for,  75. 

Chemical  warfare  service  of  Amer- 
ican army,  239;  organization  of, 
240-242. 

Chief  of  artillery,  functions  of,  189. 

Children  of  Flanders,  work  of  the. 

Citations  of  organizations  of  Amer- 
ican army  by  French  high  com- 
mand, 410-420. 

City  of  Memphis,  sinking  of,  ion. 

Civil  War,  benevolent  associations 
at  time  of,  361-362. 

Clark,  Lt.-Col.  Francis  W.,  173  n. 

Clark,  Colonel  Paul  H.,  386  n. 

Clarke,  General  Travers,  member 
of  Military  Board  of  Allied  Sup- 
ply, 358  n. 

Clemenceau,  Premier,  congratulates 
American  soldiers  after  storm- 
ing of  Cantigny,  145. 

Clermont,  training  center  for 
heavy  artillery  at,  63. 

Clinnin,  Colonel  J.  V.,  255  n. 

Cobb,  Major,  killed  in  action,  414. 

Coblenz,  occupation  of,  by  Third 
Army,  314-315- 

Cochon,  Colonel  Frank  S.,  256  n. 

Coe,  General,  in  command  of 
American  railroad  artillery,  191. 

Coetquidan,  American  artillery 
training  camp  at,  61,  62;  artil- 
lery aerial  observation  school  at, 
73- 

Cold-storage      plants,      American, 

343-344.  347-348- 

Cole,  General  Charles  H.,  i54n. 

Colored  officers,  camps  for  instruc- 
tion of,  28. 

Colored  troops,  divisions  composed 
of,  29  n. 

Companies,  composition  of,  50  n. 

Compulsory  military  service,  pas- 
sage of  act  creating,  15;  applica- 
tion of  law,  16-22. 

Connor,  General  W.  D.,  46  n., 
170  n.;  chief  of  coordination  sec- 
tion, 112. 

Construction  and  maintenance  di- 
vision   of    ordnance    department, 

234- 
Corps.     See  Army  corps. 


Index 


425 


Corps  schools  in  France,  70-72. 
Corvisart,  General,  127. 
Council   of   National   Defense,   332. 
Courneau,  American  artillery  train- 
ing camp  at,  62. 
Courts-martial,     administration     of 

military  justice  by  American,  245. 
Craig,  Colonel  Malin,  155  n. 
Crawford,  General  C,  156  n. 
Cronin,  General  M.  D.,  252  n. 
Cronkhite,     General     Adelbert,     in 

command   of   Eightieth   Division, 

256  n. 
Crookston,  Lt.-Col.  A.  V.,  162  n. 
Crosby,  Colonel  H.  B.,  258  n. 
Crowder,     made     Provost-Marshal 

General,  17. 
Crowley,  Colonel  M.,  254  n. 
Cruikshank,      Colonel     Wm.      M., 

1560. 
Cumont,  Major,  Belgian  member  of 

Military  Board  of  Allied  Supply, 

358  n. 
Cushing,  Major,  in  command  of  ist 

Battalion,  418. 


Dabney,  Lt.-Col.  Ward  S.,  251  n. 

Darrah,  General  T.  W.,  162  n. 

Dashiell,  General  Wm.  R.,  254  n. 

Davis,  Colonel  Abel,  255  n. 

Davis,  Colonel  J.  R.,  147  n. 

Davis,  General  Robert  C,  adju- 
tant-general of  American  forces 
in  France,  46  n. 

Davis,  Colonel  Wm.  D.,  257  n. 

Davison,  H.  P.,  president  of  Red 
Cross  war  committee  for  Europe, 
368. 

Dawes,  General  Charles  G.,  head 
of  General  Purchasing  Board, 
356;  service  rendered  by,  357; 
work  of,  on  Military  Board  of 
Allied  Supply,  358. 

Dean,  General  James  T.,  255  n. 

Deems,  Colonel  Clarence,  Jr.,  252  n. 

Depot  divisions,  48-49. 

De  Witt,  Colonel  J.  L.,  249  n. 

Dickman,  General  Joseph  T.,  in 
command  of  Third  Division,  156; 
activities  of,  in  spring  defensive, 
158,  161;  in  command  of  Fourth 
Corps,  249,  269;  in  command  of 
First  Corps,  297. 


Dillon,  Colonel  T.  H.,  in  command 
of  37th  Engineers,  200. 

Divisions  of  United  States  Army, 
organization  and  composition  of, 
29-30;  of  army  corps,  48-50; 
command  of,  51 ;  composition  of 
the  staflF,   51-52. 

Dorey,  Colonel  Halstead,  156  n. 

Doyle,  Colonel  Fred  C,  171  n. 

Drumm,  General  Hugh  A.,  249  n. ; 
chief  of  staff,  266,  267. 

Duncan,  General  George  B.,  121, 
138  n.;  in  command  of  Seventy- 
seventh  Division,  171. 

Dutch  ships,  requisitioning  of,  333- 
334- 

Educational  section  of  Y.  M.  C.  A., 

371. 

Edwards,  General  Clarence,  in 
command  of  Twenty-sixth  Divi- 
sion,  124-125,   154  n. 

Eightieth  Division,  in  September, 
1918,  256;  operations  of,  on  Brit- 
ish front,  320  ff. 

Eighty-first  Division,  in  September, 
1918,  258. 

Eighty-second  Division,  order  of 
battle  in  September,  1918,  2520.; 
operations  of,  on  British  front, 
320  ff. 

Eighty-eighth  Division,  in  Septem- 
ber, 1918,  251  n. 

Eighty-ninth  Division,  order  of  bat- 
tle in  September,  1918,  252  n. 

Eltinge,  General  Le  Roy,  deputy 
chief  of  staff  of  American  army, 
45  n. 

Ely,  Colonel  Frank  D.,  252  n. 

Ely,  Colonel  Hanson  E.,  138  n., 
145  n. ;  in  command  of  28th  Regi- 
ment of  Infantry,  413. 

Emerson,  Lt.-Col.  T.  H.,  250  n. 

Engineering  division  of  ordnance 
department,  234. 

Engineers,  camps  for  training  oflB- 
cers  for,  24;  school  for,  in 
France,  66\  increase  in  number 
of  effectives,  85  n. ;  regiments  of, 
assigned  to  transportation  de- 
partment in  France,  114;  duties 
of,  197-200;  subdivisions  of,  200- 
201;  quantities  of  material  re- 
quired   by,    201 ;    regiments    of, 


426 


Index 


mentioned  in  general  orders  of 
French  high  command,  419. 

England,  war  mission  from,  to 
United  States,  12-13. 

Erwin,  General  James  B.,  2540. 

Esperey,  General  Franchet  d',  127. 

Faison,  General  S.  L.,  324  n. 

Farnsworth,  General  C.  S.,  in  com- 
mand of  Thirty-seventh  Division, 
254  n. 

Farr,  Colonel  Otho  W.  B.,  156  n. 

Fatherless  Children  of  France, 
work  of  the,  381. 

Feland,  Colonel  Logan  H.,  411,  412. 

Field  hospitals,  221,  222. 

Field  officers,  course  for,  69. 

Field  signal  battalions,  216. 

Fifth  Corps,  in  September,  19 18, 
250;  in  operations  against  St. 
Mihiel,  270. 

Fifth  Division,  in  September,  1918, 
253 ;  the  first  to  cross  river 
Meuse,  301  n. 

Fighting  units,  organization  of,  47- 
52. 

Finance  division  of  quartermaster 
corps,  228. 

First  American  Army  Corps,  crea- 
tion of,  155-156;  Order  of  Battle 
July  4,  1918,  155  n. ;  in  Septem- 
ber, 1918,  249;  in  operations 
against  St.  Mihiel,  269;  order  of 
battle  December  i,  1918,  392-397. 

First  Division,  arrival  and  estab- 
lishment of,  in  France,  116-122; 
inspected  by  Secretary  of  War 
Baker,  130;  confided  to  Fifth 
French  Army,  137;  splendid  qual- 
ities of,  137-138;  Order  of  Battle 
of.  May  I,  1918,  138  n.;  opera- 
tions of,  in  spring  defensive  of 
1918,  139  fi^.;  successful  storming 
of  Cantigny  by,  143-44;  losses  of, 
145 ;  situation  of,  on  eve  of  sum- 
mer counter-offensive,  i68;  oper- 
ations of,  175-177;  in  September, 
1918,  253. 

Fiske,  Harold  B.,  46  n. 

Flagler,  General  C.  A.  F.,  253  n. 

Floyd,  Mrs.,  380  n. 

Foch,  General,  made  supreme  com- 
mander of  Allied  forces  on 
Western    front,    134;    congratu- 


lates American  soldiers  after 
storming  of   Cantigny,    145. 

Foltz,  General  F.  S.,  256  n. 

Ford,   Colonel   Stanley  H.,  324  n. 

Ford,  General,  member  of  Military 
Board  of  Allied  Supply,  358  n. 

Forman,  Lt.-Col.  Albert  W.,  250  n. 

Forty-second  Division,  entrance  of, 
into  active  service,  128-129;  i"" 
spected  by  Secretary  of  War 
Baker,  130;  Order  of  Battle  on 
July  10,  1918,  160  n.;  losses  of,  in 
defending  the  Marne,  167;  sit- 
uation of,  on  eve  of  summer 
counter-offensive,  171;  in  Sep- 
tember, 1918,  253. 

Foulois,  General,  202. 

Fourth  Corps,  in  September,  1918, 
249-250;  in  operations  against 
St.  Mihiel,  269. 

Fourth  Division,  situation  of,  on 
eve  of  summer  counter-offensive, 
169;  consolidated  with  First 
American  Corps,  178;  in  Sep- 
tember, 19 18,  253;  operations  of, 
on  British  front,  320  ff. 

Fox-Connor,  General,  46  n. 

Foyer  du  Soldat,  collaboration  of 
Y.  M.  C.  A.  in  work  of,  372. 

France,  war  mission  from,  to 
United  States,  12-13;  arrival  of 
General  Pershing  in,  36;  arrival 
of  first  American  contingents  in, 
116-128. 

Franco-American  cooperation,  385- 
390. 

Fraternization,  unsuccessful  Ger- 
man attempts  at,  316-318. 

French  Tuberculosis  War  Victims, 
founding  of,  382. 

Fries,  General,  chief  of  gas  service, 
239. 


Galbraith,  Colonel  F.  W.,  254  n. 
Garrett,  W.  A.,  American  railway 

expert  in  France,  112. 
Gas   defense   school   at    Chaumont, 

75. 

Gas  mask,  efficiency  of  the,  de- 
signed by  medical  corps,  86. 

Gas  masks,  deliveries  of,  241. 

Gas  Regiment,  organization  of, 
239-240. 


Index 


427 


Gas  school,  army,  in  France,  67. 

Gas  service  of  American  army,  239. 

Gasser,  Lt.-Col.  Lorenzo  D.,   173  n. 

General  Purchasing  Board,  account 
of  the,  354-359- 

General  Staff,  formation  of,  by 
General  Pershing,  45 ;  five  sec- 
tions into  which  divided,  45-46 ; 
function  of  adjutant-general,  46- 

Geological  section  of  engineer  serv- 
ice, 200-201. 

Germans,  bulletin  of,  quoted  on 
American  soldiers,  153;  superior- 
ity of  American  artillery  over 
that  of,  192;  position  of  forces 
of,  opposed  to  Americans  at  St. 
Mihiel,  271 ;  account  issued  from 
headquarters,  concerning  Ameri- 
can-French assault  on  St.  Mihiel, 
275-276 ;  order  of  battle  in 
Meuse-Argonne  operations,  286- 
287;  occupation  of  territory  of, 
after  the  armistice,  by  Allied 
forces,  312-319;  wisdom  of,  in 
capitulating,  360. 

Germany,  diplomatic  error  of,  in 
regard  to  United  States,  3 ;  pro- 
claims that  United  States  will 
have  peace  at  any  price,  4;  con- 
tinued acts  of  provocation  by,  5- 
10;  breaking  off  of  diplomatic 
relations  with,  10;  United  States 
declares  war  upon,  11. 

Gettysburg  and  St.  Mihiel  contrast- 
ed, 277. 

Gibson,  Colonel,  Red  Cross  com- 
missioner for  France,  368. 

Gievres,  main  American  storage  de- 
pot at,  109,   347. 

Gironde  region,  installations  by 
Americans  in,   342-345. 

Glassford,  Colonel  P.  D.,  153  n. 

Goethals,      Quartermaster-General, 

333- 

Gondrecourt,  camp  at,  for  training 
of  First  Division,  44,  59 ;  installa- 
tion of  First  Division  at,  118. 

Gordon,  General  Walter  H.,  in 
command  of  Sixth  Division, 
254  n. 

Graves  registration  service  of 
American  army,  229;  work  done 
by,  231-232. 


Greble,    Lt.-Col.    E.    St.    John,    Jr., 

162  n. 
Grunert,  Major  George,  155  n. 
Guns,  supply  of,  for  A.  E.  F.,  236- 

237- 
Gwin,  Mrs.  William,  380  n. 

Hacker,  Colonel  T.  B.,  chief  of 
salvage  service,  231. 

Haig,  Field  Marshal  Sir  Douglas, 
congratulations  of,  expressed  to 
Second  American  Army  Corps, 
328-329. 

Hale,  Colonel  R.  K.,  324. 

Halen,  General  John  A.,  257  n. 

Hall,  Colonel  Charles  L.,  249  n. 

Halstead,  Colonel   Frank,  258  n. 

Hamilton,  Colonel  Clad.,  253  n. 

Han,  General  William  G.,  in  com- 
mand of  Thirty-second  Division, 
170. 

Hanson,  General  T.  G.,  252  n. 

Harbord,  General  James  G.,  first 
chief  of  staff  of  American  army, 
45  n. ;  in  command  of  Fourth  In- 
fantry Brigade  (Marines),  146 
n.;  high  qualities  of,  147;  suc- 
ceeds to  £pmmand  of  Second 
Division,  168;  in  charge  of  serv- 
ice of  supplies,  339  n.;  cited  in 
general  orders  by  French  high 
command,  410. 

Harjes,  Mr.,  president  of  American 
Relief  Clearing  House,  382. 

Harjes,  Colonel  Herman,  38611. 

Harris,  Colonel  A.  J.,  255  n. 

Harsey,  General  Mark  L.,  255  n. 

Hartman,  Colonel  Ed.  T.,  252  n. 

Haskell,   Lt.-Col.    W.    H.,   250  n. 

Haubery,  Colonel  Sanford  B., 
254  n. 

Hawkins,  Colonel  Clyde  E.,  258  n. 

Hawkins,  Colonel  F.  B.,  253  n. 

Hay,  General  William  H.,  254  n. 

Hayward,  Colonel,  distinguished 
services  of,  414. 

Headquarters  and  supply  section 
of  field   signal  battalions,  216. 

Healdton,  sinking  of,  lo  n. 

Hearn,  Edward  L.,  Supreme 
Knight,    Knights    of    Columbus, 

374- 
Heidt,  Colonel  J.  M.,  257  n. 
Heintzelman,  Colonel  Stuart,  250  n. 


428 


Index 


Hcrr,  Lt-Col.  J.  K.,  3*411. 
Herrick,   American    ambassador   in 

Paris,  382. 
Herrick,  Colonel  H.  S.,  324  n. 
Hill  204,  attack  on,  shared  by  30th 

Regiment,  158. 
Hines,     General    John    L.,    138  n.; 

in    command    of    Third    Corps, 

297. 
Holbrook,  Colonel  I.  R.,  138  n. 
Hollingsworth,      Lt.-Col.      C.      P., 

253  n. 
Hoover,  Colonel  John  S.,  257  n. 
Hospital    system,    organization    of, 

22CH-223 ;    in    the    interior,    225- 

226. 
Hospital  trains,  225,  379-380. 
Hostess      houses      established      in 

France  by  Y.  W.  C.  A.,  378. 
Hough,  Colonel  Benson  W.,  160  n. 
Housatonic,  sinking  of,  10.  ^ 
House,    Colonel,    seconds    idea    of 

unified  high  command  among  Al- 
lies, 133. 
Hume,  Colonel  Frank  M.,  154  n. 
Hunt,  Colonel  Charles  A.,  413. 
Hunt,  Colonel  Henry  J.,  253  n. 

Illinois,  sinking  of,   10  n. 
Infantry  schools  in  France,  66. 
Information,    section    of,    American 

army,  191. 
Inspection  service  of  quartermaster 

corps,  228. 
Inspector-general's    department    of 

American  army,  242-244. 
Instruction   of   American  forces   in 

France,  principles  governing,  55- 

59- 

Intelligence  school,  army,  m 
France,  69. 

Inter-Allied  Tank   Committee,   196. 

Irwin,  Colonel  Isaac,  171  n. 

Irwin,  General  Le  Roy  G.,  170  n. 

Is-sur-Tille,  American  regulating 
station  at,  in. 

Italy,  Expeditionary  Forces  de- 
tached for  operations  in,  329- 
330. 

Jackson,  Colonel  W.  E.,  257  n. 
Jackson,  General  W.  P.,  254  n. 
Jadwin,  General  E.,  engineer  corps 
under  direction  of,  198. 


Jamerson,     General     George     H., 

256  n. 

Jennings,  Colonel  E.  S.,  324  n. 

Jewish  Welfare  Board,  affiliated 
with  Y.  M.  C.  A.,  363,  372;  ac- 
count of  work  of,  377-378. 

Joffre,  member  of  French  war 
mission  to  United  States,  12; 
Pershing  met  by,  in  Paris,  36; 
advises  early  appearance  of 
American  contingent  on  French 
soil,  n6;  visit  paid  by,  to  first 
American  troops,  119. 

Johnson,  General  E.  M.,  171  n. 

Johnson,   Lt.-Col.   Gordon,  251  n. 

Johnson,  Colonel  W.  O..  257  n. 

Johnston,  General  William  H.,  in 
command  of  Ninety-first  Divi- 
sion, 256  n. 

Jones,  Colonel  Harry  C,  255. 

Judge-advocate  of  American  army, 
244-245. 

Juvigny,  capture  of,  183-184. 

Kemp,  Colonel  George  M.,  162  n. 

Kenly,  General,  202. 

Kernan,  General,  in  charge  of 
service  of  supplies,  339  n. 

King,  General  Edw.  L.,  255  n. 

Klemm,  Colonel  Karl  D.,  253  n. 

Knights  of  Columbus,  318;  under 
direct  control  of  high  military 
command,  363 ;  founding  of,  and 
early  work,  372 ;  work  done  by, 
in  European  conflict,  373-374. 

Knowles,  Colonel  Alden  C,  257  n. 

Kuhn,  General  Joseph  E.,  in  com- 
mand of  Seventy-Ninth  Division, 

257  n. 

Laconia,  sinking  of,  10  n. 

La     Courtine,     American     artillery 

training  camp  at,  62. 
Lafayette,     American     soldiers     at 

tomb  of,  118. 
Lafayette  squadron,  the,  207-208. 
Langdon,  Colonel  C.  R.,  170  n. 
Langres,  army  general  staflP  college 

at,  65-66. 
La    Pallice,    as    a    base    port    for 

American  use,  95. 
Lassiter,    General,   in   command   of 

Fourth  Corps  artillery,  269. 
Lathrop,  Mrs.,  380  n. 


Index 


429 


Leach,  Colonel  George  E.,  160  n. 

Le   Mans,  chaplains'  school   at,  76. 

Lenihan,  General  M.  J.,  160  n. 

Lewis,  Colonel  E.  A.,  257  n. 

Lewis,  General  E.  M.,  146  n., 
324  n.;  forces  of,  take  Vaux  Vil- 
lage,  1^3-154- 

Liberty  engine,  adoption  of,  by  avi- 
ation service,  84. 

Liberty  No.  8  tank,  194-195. 

Libourne,  training  center  for  heavy 
artillery  at,  63. 

Libraries     established     in     France, 

375-377- 

Library  Association.  See  Ameri- 
can Library  Association. 

LiffoI-le-Grand,  American  regulat- 
ing station  at,  ni-112. 

Liggett,  General  Hunter,  in  com- 
mand of  First  Army  Corps,  155- 
156,  249,  269;  placed  in  com- 
mand of  First  Army,  296. 

Limoges,  training  center  for  heavy 
artillery  at,  63. 

Lincoln,  President,  position  of, 
prior  to  Civil  War,  2,  3. 

Lindsey,  General  J.  R.,  252  n. 

Lines  of  communication,  activities 
in  connection  with  establishment 
of,  78-115;  work  of  signal  corps 
to  establish,  214. 

Little,  Major,  414. 

Lloyd,  Colonel  Charles  Rees, 
156  n. 

Locke,  Colonel  Morris  E.,  155  n. 

Locomotives,  shipment  of,  to 
France,  337;  overhauling  of 
French,  by  Americans,  352. 

Logan,  Colonel  E.  L.,  154  n. 

Logan,  General  James  A.,  45  n. 

Logan,  Major,  head  of  American 
military  mission  in  France,  92- 
94. 

Loire,  changes  wrought  in  region 
of  the  lower,  by  American  S.  O. 
S.,  342. 

Lost  Battalion,  Major  Whittlesey 
and  the,  295. 

Lusitania,  sinking  of,  6. 

Lyman  M.  Laiv,  sinking  of,  10. 

Lynch,  Colonel  J.  A.,  2540. 


McAlexander,   Colonel    Ulysses  G., 


156  n.,     414;     praise     of,     by     a 
French  officer,  166. 

McAlexander,   General  V.   S.,  252. 

McAndrew,  General  James  W.,  ap- 
pointed chief  of  staflf  of  Ameri- 
can army,  45  n. ;  head  of  army 
general  staff  college  at  Langres, 
65-66. 

McArthur,  Colonel  John  C,  252  n. 

McCleave,  Colonel  R.,  249  n. 

McCloskey,  Colonel  Manus,  1470.. 
171  n. 

McClure,  General  N.  F.,  253  n. 

McCormick,  Colonel  C.  B.,  170  n. 

McCoy,  Colonel  Frank,  160  n. 

McCoy,  Colonel  Robert,   170  n. 

McCrae,  General  James  H.,  in 
command  of  Seventy-eighth  Di- 
vision, 255  n. 

McDonald,  General  J.  B.,  256  n. 

McFarland,   General   M.,  258  n. 

McGlachlin,  General,  in  command 
of  artillery  of  First  Army,  191. 

Machine-gun  battalions,  citation  of, 
in  general  orders  of  French  high 
command,  417-418. 

Machine-gun  company,  composition 
of  a,  50. 

Machine-gun  school  in  France,  66. 

Mclver,  General  G.  W.,  258  n. 

Mackall,  Lt.-Col.   S.  T.,  250  n. 

McKinley,  President,  position  of,  at 
time  of  war  with  Spain,  2  n. 

McKinstry,  General  C,  160  n.; 
light  railway  service  directed  by, 
199. 

McMahon,  General  John,  in  com- 
mand of  Fifth  Division,  253  n. 

MacMaster,  Colonel  H.,  253  n. 

Maine,  blowing  up  of  the,  2  n. 

Malone,  Colonel  Paul  B.,  46  n., 
147  n.,  253,  413- 

Marines,  the,  147;  distinguished 
behavior  of,  at  Belleau  Wood, 
152-153;  cited  in  general  orders 
by  the  French  high  command, 
410-411. 

Maritime  bases  constructed  by 
Americans  in   France,  342-343. 

Marne,  part  taken  in  defense  of, 
by  American  troops  (1918),  159- 
167. 

Marseilles,  American  base  section 
at,  346. 


430 


Index 


Martin,  General  Charles  I.,  253  n. 

Meat,  American,  for  army  in 
France,  343-344,  347-348- 

Medical  corps,  activities  of  the, 
85-86,  187;  hospitals  established 
by,   108. 

Medical  service,  organization  and 
achievements  of  American,  in 
France,  219-225;  in  the  interior, 
225-226. 

Medical  supplies,  statistics  of,  226. 

Menoher,  General  Charles  T.,  in 
command  of  Forty-second  Divi- 
sion, 128,  160,  164. 

Merritt,  Camp,  86. 

Merrone,  General,  Italian  member 
of  Military  Board  of  Allied 
Supply,  358  n. 

Metts,  Colonel  J.  Van  B.,  324  n. 

Meucon,  American  artillery  train- 
ing camp  at,  61,  62;  American 
balloon  school  at,  72;  artillery 
aerial  observation  school  at,  73. 

Meuse,  operations  between  Ar- 
gonne  Forest  and,  277-306. 

Mezey,  fight  between  Second  Divi- 
sion and  Germans  near,  122-124. 

Miles,  Colonel,  415. 

Military  Board  of  Allied  Supply, 
245;  account  of,  354-358;  re- 
sults    secured     by,     summarized, 

358-359. 

Military  schools  m  France,  plan 
for  organization  of,  63-77. 

Mills,  Camp,  86. 

Miner,  Colonel  Asher,  162  n. 

Minor,  Colonel  S.  W.,  324  n. 

Mitchell,  Colonel  Americus,  202, 
252  n.,  416. 

Mobile  hospitals,  221,  222. 

Mobilization  of  American  forces 
for  war,  13-32. 

Montoir,  storage  depot  at,  99;  im- 
provements at,  342. 

Morgan,  Miss  Anne,  381. 

Morgan,  Colonel  John  M.,  255  n. 

Morrow,  Colonel  Wm.  V.,  170  n. 

Morton,  General  Charles  G.,  in 
command  of  Twenty-ninth  Divi- 
sion, 255  n. 

Moseley,  General  George  Van  H., 
46  n. 

Moses,  Colonel  G.  W^.,  258  n. 

Moss,  Colonel  James  A.,  2540. 


Motor  transport  corps,  114-115, 
245-246,  352-354- 

Motor  transport  school,  75. 

Mott,  Colonel  T.  Bentley,  3860. 

Muir,  General  Charles  H.,  in  com- 
mand of  Twenty-eighth  Division, 
162;  known  by  his  men  as 
"  Uncle  Charlie,"  170. 

Munson,  Colonel  Fred  L.,  257  n. 

Music,  school  for  instruction  in 
military,  75. 

Murphy,  Colonel  Pierce  A.,  253  n. 

Myer,  Colonel  E.  A.,  255  n. 

National  Guard,  condition  of,  at 
outbreak  of  war  with  Germany, 
13-14. 

Navy,  work  of,  in  protectmg  troops 
en  route  to  France,  91-92. 

Nelson,  Colonel  H.  B.,  252  n. 

Neuilly  ambulance,  the,  379. 

Neville,  Colonel  W.  C,  147  n. 

Nevin,  Mrs.  Ethelbert,  380  n. 

Newell,  Colonel  Isaac,  254  n. 

Nicholson,   General  Wm.  J.,  257  n. 

Ninetieth  Division,  order  of  battle 
in  September,  1918,  252  n. 

Ninety-first  Division,  in  September, 
1918,  256. 

Ninety-second  Division,  in  Septem- 
ber,  1918,  254. 

Nivelle,  General,  133. 

Noble,  General  K.  H.,  257  n. 

Nolan,  General  Dennis  E.,  46  n. 

Norton-Harjes  ambulance  service, 
380. 

Nuttman,  Colonel  L.  M.,  252  n. 


Officers'  training  camps,  organiza- 
tion of,  23 ;  course  of  instruction 
at,  24;  work  of,  as  summarized 
by  Secretary  of  War,  25-26; 
opened  in  training  areas  of  divi- 
sions of  National  Guard  or  Na- 
tional Army,  27-28 ;  for  colored 
officers,  28. 

Oil,  statistics  of,  supplied  to  Amer- 
ican army,  230. 

O'Neil,  General  J.  P.,  252  n. 

Ordnance  department  of  American 
army,  232-238 ;  function  of,  in 
peace  time,  80;  difficulties  en- 
countered   by,    in    meeting    war- 


Index 


431 


time  demands,  82-84;    recruiting 

of  personnel,  238-239. 
Ordnance    equipment    of   American 

army  in  France,  53-55. 
Ordnance  schools,  74-75. 
Organization    of    main    services    of 

American    Expeditionary    Forces, 

186  ff. 
Ornans,    American    artillery   train- 
ing camp  in  zone  of,  62. 
O'Ryan,  General  J.  F.,  324  n. 
Oury,  Colonel  Wm.  H.,  257  n. 
Outpost   company    of   signal   corps, 

217. 

Painleve,  French  Minister  of  War, 

36,  39.  ii9»  385- 

Palmer,  Colonel  John  McA.,  46  n. 

Paris,  first  American  battalion  to 
parade  in,  117-118. 

Parker,  Colonel  Cortland,  138  n. 

Parker,  Colonel  Frank,  138  n., 
386  n.,  413. 

Parker,  Colonel  J.  H.,  i54n. 

Parrott,  Colonel  Ralph  B.,  254  n. 

Parsons,  William  Barclay,  railway 
expert  in  France,  112. 

Patrick,  General,  chief  of  air  serv- 
ice, 203. 

Payne,  Colonel  Brooke,  253  n. 

Payot,  General,  director  of  French 
service  of  the  rear,  112;  presi- 
dent of  Military  Board  of  Allied 
Supply,  358  n. 

Pearce,  Colonel  E.  d'A.,  252  n. 

Pearce,  Colonel  Thomas  A.,  258  n. 

Penhouet,  shipbuilding  yards  at,  99. 

Penner,  Colonel  Carl,   171  n. 

Perkins,  James  H.,  work  of,  in 
connection  with  Red  Cross,  368. 

Perry,  Colonel  Howard  R.,  256  n. 

Pershing,  General  John  J.,  depar- 
ture of,  for  France,  33;  career 
of,  prior  to  appointment  as  com- 
mander of  American  Expedition- 
ary Forces,  33-36;  officers  who 
accompanied,  36 ;  visit  of,  to 
London  and  arrival  in  Paris,  36; 
plans  of,  for  organization  of  his 
army,  36-37;  two  dominant  ideas 
of,  37;  close  acquaintance  of, 
with  characteristics  of  his  men, 
37-38 ;  choice  of  debarkation 
ports    and    of    railroads    by,    38- 


39;  interviews  between  General 
Petain  and,  39-44;  decisions  ar- 
rived at,  with  Petain,  43-44;  or- 
ganization of  General  Staff  by, 
45-46 ;  constitution  of  fighting 
units  by,  47-52 ;  establishes  head- 
quarters at  Chaumont,  77 ;  or- 
ganization of  services  of  the  rear, 
92-116;  at  tomb  of  Lafayette, 
118;  advice  of,  on  practical 
methods  of  fighting,  119;  work 
of  American  soldiers  closely  fol- 
lowed by,  125-126 ;  eagerness  of, 
to  learn  from  French  experience, 
127;  in  favor  of  a  unified  high 
command  among  Allies,  133; 
places  American  forces  at  dis- 
posal of  General  Foch,  134;  pre- 
vious safeguarding  by,  of  auton- 
omy of  Expeditionary  Forces, 
134-135;  recommends  employ- 
ment of  American  troops  in  large 
units,  135;  attitude  of,  toward 
summer  counter-offensive  of 
1918,  167-168;  desire  of,  that 
American  divisions  be  main- 
tained side  by  side  in  summer 
counter-offensive,  173 ;  firm  pol- 
icy of,  in  handling  his  forces, 
184-185;  correct  military  intui- 
tion of,  185;  plan  of,  in  having 
all  heads  of  main  services  sta- 
tioned for  a  time  at  Chaumont 
headquarters,  186;  importance  of 
air  service  recognized  by,  202; 
position  of  forces  of,  at  begin- 
ning of  September,  1918,  247- 
261 ;  account  of  operations  of, 
against  St.  Mihiel,  262-276 ;  en- 
trance of,  into  St.  Mihiel,  276- 
277;  street  in  St.  Mihiel  named 
for,  277  n. ;  activities  of,  in  oper- 
ations between  river  Meuse  and 
Argonne  Forest,  278-306;  Gen- 
eral Order  issued  by,  upon  sign- 
ing of  armistice,  307-308 ;  crea- 
tion of  General  Purchasing 
Board  by,  355-356;  creates  Inter- 
Allied  Board  for  Purchasing, 
356;  service  rendered  by,  in  se- 
curing unity  of  purchase,  357; 
treatment  of  the  great  benevolent 
associations  by,  362-363 ;  report 
by,  on  value  to  American  army 


432 


Index 


of  French  cooperation  and  assist- 
ance, 3877388. 

Persia,  sinking  of,  8. 

Personal  division  of  quarternaaster 
corps,  22S. 

Petain,  General,  39,  131,  136. 
137  n.;  position  of,  in  a  military 
way,  39-41 ;  General  Pershings' 
first  visit  to,  41 ;  collaboration  of 
Pershing  and,  42-45;  inspects 
front  line  of  battle  on  the  Marne 
(1918),  162;  advice  by,  on  "No 
maneuvring  under  fire,"  163;  co- 
operation between  Pershing  and, 
in  autumn  offensive  of  191 8,  264; 
entrance  of,  with  General  Persh- 
ing, into  St.  Mihiel,  276-277. 

Peyton,  Lt.-Col.  Ephraim  G.,  256  n. 

Photographic  division  of  signal 
corps,  219. 

Pickering,  Lt.-Col.  254  n.;  distin- 
guished services  of,  414. 

Pierce,  General  P.  E.,  3240. 

Pigeon  school  at  Saizerais,  75. 

Plattsburg,  officers'  training  camp 
at,  23. 

Plunkett,  Rear-Admiral,  in  com- 
mand of  naval  gunners,  192. 

Poincare,  President,  review  of  first 
American  troops  by,  119. 

Police  duties,  schools  for,  75. 

Pope,  Lt.-Col.  William  R.,  255  n.^ 

Ports,  choice  of,  for  use  of  Ameri- 
cans in  France,  94-96. 

Prentice,  Captain  John  H.,  251  n. 

Price,  Colonel  H.  C,  252  n. 

Price,  Colonel  H.  J.,  258  n. 

Price,  General  William  G.,  162  n. 

Priority  schedule,  the,  91. 

Purchasing  board  and  agent,  estab- 
lishment of,  in  Paris,  105. 

Quartermaster  corps,  functions  of, 
in  peace  time,  80;  reorganization 
of,  to  meet  war-time  emergen- 
cies, 81-82;  duties  devolving  on, 
227-229 ;  results  accomplished  by, 
230-232;   personnel  of,  232. 

Radio  companyof  signal  corps,  217. 

Railway  lines,  choice  of,  for  link- 
ing American  base  ports  with 
combat  zone,  97,  104. 

Railway    service,    organization    of 


American,    in    France,    112,    199, 

350-351. 

Railway  transportation  school,  76. 

Read,  General  G.  W.,  in  command 
of  Second  Army  Corps,  249,  322, 
324  n. 

Reckord,  Colonel  Milton  A.,  255  n. 

Recruiting  system,  mechanism  of, 
for  carrying  out  universal  mili- 
tary service  measure,   17-20. 

Red  Cross,  American,  318;  en- 
trusted with  care  of  sick  and 
wounded,  363 ;  under  direct  mili- 
tary control,  363 ;  account  of 
work  of,  364-368. 

Reeves,  Colonel  James  H.,  2520. 

Regiment,  composition  of  a,  50; 
command  of  a,  51. 

Regulating  stations,  system  of,  iio- 
112. 

Reilly,  Colonel  Henry  J.,   160  n. 

Relief   Clearing   House,   American, 

Remount  division  of  quartermaster 
corps,  229;  achievements  of, 
230-231. 

Renault  type  of  tank,  194,  195. 

Repair  shop  organization,   235-236. 

Replacement  divisions,  48. 

Requirements  division  of  ordnance 
department,  233. 

Rhine,  march  of  Franco-American 
army  to  the,  307-319. 

Rhodes,  General  C.  D.,  252  n. 

Ribot,    French   Prime   Minister,    12. 

Richards,  Colonel  George  C,  162  n. 

Richardson,  Colonel  L.  T.,  258  n. 

Rifle  shortage  at  beginning  of  war, 
31- 

Riggs,  Lt.-Col.  K.  T.,  324  n. 

Rivers,  Colonel  W.  C.,  156  n. 

Road-service  section  of  engineer 
service,  199. 

Rockenbach,  General,  chief  of  tank 
corps,  194. 

Rogers,  Quartermaster  -  General 
Harry  L.,  227. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  correspond- 
ence between  Secretary  of  War 
and,  6;  military  preparedness  ad- 
vocated by,  14  n. 

Rumbold,  Colonel  F.  M.,  253  n. 

Russell,  General,  chief  signal  of- 
ficer, 218. 


Index 


433 


Russell,  Lt.-Col.  George  M.,  250  n. 
Russia,    Expeditionary    Forces    de- 
tached for  operations  in,  330. 


Saint-Mihiel,  discussion  of  opera- 
tions for  taking,  by  Pershing  and 
Petain,  43 ;  early  plans  bearing 
upon,  262-264;  maturing  of  plans 
for  operations  against,  in  Sep- 
tember offensive,  264-271 ;  the 
American  assault  on,  272-276; 
entrance  of  Pershing  and  Petain 
into,  276-277. 

St.  Nazaire,  as  a  base  port  for 
American  use,  39,  94-95 ;  work 
of  improving  conditions  at,  99- 
100;  description  of,  342. 

St.  Pierre  des  Corps,  American 
salvage  service  headquarters  at, 
348-349. 

St.  Sulpice-Izon,  American  storage 
depot  at,  102,  344-345. 

Salvage  service  of  American  army 
in  France,  228-229;  results  of 
work  of,  231 ;  description  of 
work,  348-349- 

Salvation  Army,  318;  under  direct 
control  of  high  military  com- 
mand, 363;   account  of  work  of, 

374- 

Sanborn,  Colonel  Joseph  B.,  255  n. 

Sanitary  school,  army,  in  France, 
67. 

Sanitary  sections,  mentioned  in 
general  orders  of  French  high 
command,  419-420. 

Saumur,  army  school  at,  68 ;  artil- 
lery school  at,  70. 

Schools  in  France:  army,  65-70; 
corps,  70-72;  for  aviation,  72- 
74;  for  ordnance,  74-75;  for 
miscellaneous  branches  of  serv- 
ice, 75-76;  the  inter-allied,  76. 

Scientific  section  of  American  Red 
Cross,  367. 

Screws,  Colonel  Wm.  P.,  160  n. 

Searchlight  section  of  engineer 
service,  200;  mentioned  in  gen- 
eral orders  of  French  high  com- 
mand, 419. 

Second  Army  Corps,  249 ;  Order  of 
Battle  of,  324  n.;  distinguished 
services    of,    326-327 ;    order    of 


battle,  December  i,  1918,  398- 
401. 
Second  Division,  training  of,  re- 
ceived in  France,  122;  gives 
good  account  of  itself,  122-124; 
inspected  by  Secretary  of  War 
Baker,  130;  passes  into  ranks  of 
French  Fifth  Army,  146;  Order 
of  Battle  of,  June  i,  1918,  146  n.; 
operations  of,  in  spring  defen- 
sive of  1918,  147  ff.;  attack  and 
capture  of  Belleau  Wood  by, 
151-153;  a  German  army  bulle- 
tin quoted  concerning,  153;  cap- 
ture of  Vaux  Village  by  Third 
Brigade,  153-154;  losses  of,  155; 
situation  of,  on  eve  of  summer 
counter-offensive,  168;  operations 
of,   175-177;   in  September,   1918, 

253- 

Seicheprey,  gallant  conduct  of 
Twenty-sixth  Division  at,  131- 
132. 

Sergy,  fighting  about  village  of, 
179-180. 

Services  of  Supply  (S.  O.  S.),  com- 
position of,  187;  organization  of, 
339;  functions  of  three  sections 
of,  339-340;  base,  intermediate, 
and  advance  section  of,  341-349. 

Services  of  the  rear,  organization 
and  work  of,  78-82,  88-89,  92- 
115;  General  Order  which  cre- 
ated, 103-104;  reorganization  of, 
in  spring  of  1918,  187-188;  ac- 
count of  activities  of,  331-359; 
projects  under  way,  when  armis- 
tice was  signed,   359-360. 

Seventh  Corps,  in  September,  1918, 
250. 

Seventh  Division,  257. 

Seventy-eighth  Division,  in  Sep- 
tember, 1918,  255;  operations  of, 
on  British  front,  320  ff. 

Seventy-ninth  Division,  in  Septem- 
ber, 1918,  257. 

Seventy-seventh  Division,  situation 
of,  on  eve  of  summer  counter- 
offensive,  171 ;  Order  of  Battle 
on  August  19,  1918,  171  n.;  oper- 
ations of,  on  British  front,  320  ff. 

Shannon,  Colonel  Ed.  C,  162  n. 

Shaw,  Mrs.  Francis,  380  n. 

Shelton,  Colonel  George  H.,  154  n. 


434 


Index 


Sherburne,   Colonel  J.  H.,   155  n. 

Sherill,  Colonel,  417. 

Shipment  of  troops  to  France, 
problems  and  achievements  con- 
nected with,   87-88,  334-336. 

Shortage  of  military  equipment  at 
opening  of  war,  31. 

Sibert,  General,  in  command  of 
First  Division,  117-122. 

Signal  corps,  functions  of,  in  peace 
time,  80;  work  of,  in  France, 
108,  213-216;  personnel  of,  218. 

Signal  school,  army,  in  France,  Sj. 

Simonds,  Colonel  G.,  324  n. 

Sims,  Admiral,  in  London  to  ^  or- 
ganize protection  of  American 
ships,  91. 

Sixth  Corps,  in  September,  1918, 
250. 

Sixth  Division,  254. 

Sixty-fourth  Infantry  Brigade 
("The  Terrible  Brigade"),  4"- 

Sladen,  General  Fred  W.,  156  n. 

Smedberg,  Colonel  W.  R.,  Jr., 
171  n. 

Smith,  Colonel  Ernest  V.,  25411. 

Fmith,  Lt.-Col.  F.  H.,  171  n. 

Smith,  Colonel  Hamilton,   138  n. 

Smith,  General  William  R.,  in 
command  of  Thirty-sixth  Divi- 
sion, 257  n. 

Souge,  American  artillery  training 
camp  at,  61,  62;  artillery  aerial 
observation  school  at,  73. 

Spanish-American  War,  slowness 
of  United  States  in  beginning,  2. 

Spence,  Colonel  C.  F.,  324  n. 

Spencer,  Major,  414. 

Spring  defensive  of   1918,   133-167. 

Staff  of  a  division,  composition  of, 
51-52. 

Stark,  Colonel,  army  surgeon  of 
First  Army,  223. 

Stettinius,  Edward  R.,  Second  As- 
sistant Secretary  of  War,  333. 

Stewart,  General  M.  B.,  258  n. 

Stillwell,  Major  Joseph,  250  n. 

Stokes,   Colonel   Marcus  B.,  255  n. 

Storage  depots  established  by 
Americans  in  France,  343-345. 

Stretzinger,  Colonel  F.  G.,  2540. 

Students'  Army  Training  Corps, 
22  n. 

Sturdevant,  Colonel  G.,  258  n. 


Submarines,  German,  outrages  by, 
6-8. 

Summerall,  General  C.  P.,  138  n., 
139,  140;  succeeds  General  Bul- 
lard  in  command  of  First  Divi- 
sion, 168;  in  command  of  Fifth 
Corps,  297. 

Summer  counter-offensive  of  1918, 
167-184. 

Supplies  division,  of  quartermaster 
corps,  228 ;  of  ordnance  depart- 
ment, 234. 

Sussex,  sinking  of,  8. 

Sweezy,  Colonel  Claude  B,  25711. 

Taft,  former  President,  work  of,  in 
connection  with  Red  Cross,  368. 

Tank  school  of  American  army  in 
France,  70. 

Tanks,  different  types  of,  193-195; 
good  use  made  of,  by  American 
troops,  197;  used  by  American 
army  in  Argonne  Forest,  289. 

Tardieu,  Andre,  director  of  Gen- 
eral Commission  for  Franco- 
American   War   Affairs,   387  n. 

Taylor,  Colonel  James  D.,  252  n. 

Taylor,  Colonel  W.  A.,  324  n. 

Taylor,  General,  at  head  of  en- 
gineer service,   197  n, 

T'elegraph  and  telephone  equip- 
ment, 218. 

Telegraph  battalions,  216. 

Telephone  system,  excellence  of 
American,  in  France,  219. 

Third  American  Corps,  staff  of,  on 
July  i6,  1918,  173  n.;  operations 
of,  on  Vesle  River,  181-183;  in 
September,  1918,  249;  occupa- 
tion of  Coblenz  bridgehead  by, 
315;  Order  of  Battle  December 
I,  1918,  401-406. 

Third    Division,    operations    of,    in 

•  spring  defensive  of  1918,  156- 
158;  Order  of  Battle  of.  May 
31,  1918,  156  n.;  situation  of,  on 
eve  of  summer  counter-offensive, 
168-169;  in  September,  1918,  253. 

Third  Infantry  Brigade,  cited  in 
general  orders  by  French  high 
command,  410. 

Thirtieth  Division,  operations  of, 
on  British  front,  320  ff. 

Thirtieth     Regiment     of     Infantry, 


Ind 


ex 


435 


cited  In  general  orders  by  French 
high  command,  413-414. 

Thirty-fifth  Division,  in  September, 
1918,  253;  operations  of,  on  Brit- 
ish front,  320  ff. 

Thirty-second  Division,  composi- 
tion of,  170;  operations  of,  183. 

Thirty-seventh  Division,  in  Sep- 
tember,  1918,  254. 

Thirty-sixth  Division,  in  Septem- 
ber, 1918,  257. 

Thirty-third  Division,  in  Septem- 
ber, 1918,  255;  operations  of,  on 
British  front,  320  if. ;  distin- 
guished services  of,  323. 

Tours,  headquarters  of  Services  of 
Supply  at,  187;  air  training  sec- 
tions at,  202,  203 ;  aviators  grad- 
uated from  school  at,  207 ;  ac- 
tivities of  American  medical 
corps  at,  220  ff. ;  headquarters  of 
American  forces  at,  339. 

Tractor  artillery  school  in  France, 
70- 

Training  camps,  for  officers,  23 ; 
for  troops,  29-30;  for  American 
forces  in  France,  46;  principles 
governing  instruction  in  France, 
55-59- 

Transportation,  department  of, 
245-246. 

Transportation  of  American  sol- 
diers to  France,  78-79,  87-88, 
333-338. 

Transportation  lines,  work  of  ex- 
perts on,  112-114. 

Traub,  General  Peter  E.,  154  n.; 
in  command  of  Thirty-fifth  Divi- 
sion, 253  n. 

Tupes,  Colonel,  415. 

Twenty-eighth  Division,  Order  of 
Battle  on  August  i,  1918,  162  n.; 
situation  of,  on  eve  of  summer 
counter-oflFensive,  169-170;  oper- 
tions  of,  on  British  front,  320  ff. 

Twenty-ninth  Division,  in  Septem- 
ber, 1918,  254,  255. 

Twenty-sixth  Division,  arrival  and 
early  activities  of,  in  France, 
124-125 ;  fight  of,  at  Seicheprey, 
131-132;  Order  of  Battle  of,  July 
lo,  1918,  154  n.;  situation  of,  on 
eve  of  summer  counter-oflFensive, 
169;  in  September,  1918,  253. 


Twenty-seventh     Division,     opera- 
tions of,  on  British  front,  320  flf. 
Tyndall,  Colonel  R.  H.,  160  n. 
Tyson,  General  L.  D.,  324  n. 
Tyson,  Mrs.  Russell,   38011. 

U  21,  German  submarine,  6. 
Ulio,  Major  James,  250  n. 
United    States.     See   America. 
Unity  of  purchase,  the  securing  of, 

355-357. 
Universal  military  service  measure, 

passage  of,  12-13. 
Upton,    Colonel    Leroy,    146  n. ;    of 

9th  Regiment  of  Infantry,  412. 

Vail,  Miss  Anna  M.,  380  n. 

Valbonne,  American  army  school 
at,  68. 

Valdahon,  American  artillery 
training  camp  at,  60. 

Vandenburg,   General,   141  n. 

Vaux  Village,  capture  of,  by  Third 
Brigade  of  Second  Division, 
153-154. 

Vesle,  crossing  of  the,  180. 

Vidner,  Colonel  G.,  171  n. 

Vigilancia,  sinking  of  the,   10  n. 

Villers-Bretonneux,  raid  near,  323. 

Vincent,  General,  in  command  of 
First  Corps  artillery,  269. 

Viviani,  head  of  French  war  mis- 
sion to  United  States,  12  n. 

Wadhams,  Colonel,  220;  coordina- 
tion of  medical  activities  at  the 
front  by,  221-223. 

Wahl,   General   Lutz,   257  n. 

Walch,  General,  in  charge  of  artil- 
lery of  First  Corps,  282  n. 

Wales,  Colonel  Boyd,  171  n. 

Walker,   Colonel   Kirby,  253  n. 

Walker,  General  M.  L.,  head  of 
Motor  Transport  Corps,  352. 

War    Council    at    Versailles,    133- 

134. 
War    Industries    Board,    formation 

of,  332. 
Water  supply  service,  functions  of, 

200. 
Watkins,  Colonel  Lewis  H.,  249  n. 
Weeks,     Colonel     George     MacD., 

257  n. 
Weigel,    General    William,    162  n.; 


43^ 


Index 


in  command  of  Eighty-eighth 
Division,  258  n. 

Welfare  and  recreation  bureaus  of 
American  Red  Cross,  367. 

Wells,  General  Briant  H.,  250  n. 

Westnedge,  Colonel  Jos.  B.,   170  n. 

Wharton,  Mrs.  Edith,  work  of, 
381. 

White,  Colonel  George  P.,  253  n. 

Whitman,  Colonel  Walter  M., 
252  n. 

Whittlesey,  Major,  commander  of 
famous   "  Lost  Battalion,"   295. 

Wilcox,  Colonel  C.  de  Witt,  386  n. 

Wilgus,  W.  F.,  member  of  com- 
mission of  specialists  in  France, 
99;  plans  designed  by,  for  rail- 
road system  at  Bassens,  loi ;  ap- 
pointed deputy  director-general 
of  transportation  in  France,  105 ; 
member  of  commission  of  railway 
experts,  112. 

Williams,  Colonel  H.  C,  252  n. 

Williams,  Lt.-Col.  R.  H.,  155  n. 

Williams,  General,  chief  of  ord- 
nance department,  233. 

Wilson,  Lt.-Col.  James  E.,  253  n. 

Wilson,  President,  breaks  off  diplo- 
matic relations  with  Germany, 
10;  declares  state  of  war  be- 
tween Germany  and  United 
States,  11;  satisfaction  of,  over 
unification  of  Allied  command, 
134  n. 

Winans,  General  Ed.  B.,  17011. 


Winn,  General  Frank  L.,  in  com- 
mand of  Eighty-ninth  Division, 
252  n. 

Wire  company  of  signal  corps,  217. 

Wise,  Colonel  Hugh  D.,  253  n. 

Wittenmyer,  General  E.,  171  n. 

Witworth,  General  Pegram,  257  n. 

Woevre,  repulse  of  German  force 
at,  131. 

Wolf,  General  Paul  A.,  255  n. 

Wolfe,  Colonel  O.  R.,  324  n. 

Wood,  General  Leonard,  crusade 
of,  for  military  preparedness, 
7  n. ;  influential  in  organizing  of- 
ficers' training  camps,  23. 

Woolnough,  Lt.-Col.  J.  B.,  257  n. 

Worillow,  Colonel  Ulysses  G., 
256  n. 

Wright,  Colonel  William  K.,  257  n. 

Wright,  General  W.  W.,  in  com- 
mand of  Seventh  Corps,  250, 
251  n. 


Young  Men's  Christian  Associa- 
tion, 318;  duties  assigned  to,  by 
General  Pershing,  363 ;  under 
direct  military  control,  363 ;  ac- 
count of  work  of,  368-372. 

Young  Women's  Christian  Associa- 
tion, 363;  affiliated  with  Y.  M. 
C.  A.,  372;  work  done  by,  378- 
379- 

Zimmerman,  General  C.  X.,  254  n. 


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